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Abstract 
This thesis is primarily a philosophical exploration of emotions. From a feminist, liberal 
perspective, I focus on the cultivation of morally appropriate emotions, particularly 
compassion, in education. My central claim is that emotions are essential elements of 
human intelligence and wellbeing. They are complex responses to events of significance to 
us and, because emotions play a central role in our lives, they help to define who we are 
and why we are as we are; they are expressions of our values and what we value. Emotions 
can motivate us to action, and so we need, if we want just institutions, to ensure that those 
actions are ethical and proportionate. On the view that emotions can be rational, and that 
they result from eudaimonistic judgements, if we want a society of healthy human beings 
who have concern for others, who know how to treat others fairly and sensitively, how to 
take action when things go wrong, then we need to attend, I argue here, to emotional health 
in education. We should aim to habituate the emotional capacities of all individuals as an 
enduring resource of good character. At issue, is how to educate young people to have 
healthy emotions that are ethical, proportionate, discerning and deliberative, that have 
ethical action as their goals, and which do not negatively discriminate on the basis of 
gender.   
In the development of emotional wellbeing and moral character, compassion is an emotion 
that merits particular attention. Such is the potential ethical power of this emotion, that I 
propose compassion to be the arch-guardian of the moral domain and, accordingly, a 
prerequisite for the cultivation of moral sentiment and respect for human dignity. A 
consideration of emotions will raise questions about who should feel, how we should feel, 
when, and to what extent, emotions such as compassion, sympathy or anger in acceptable 
and appropriate ways. I argue, too, that we should attend to the how and why of 
interpreting these emotions. Whilst a number of analyses reveal how powerful emotional 
interpretations are in stigmatising, labeling or stereotyping men and women, rarely, if ever, 
are questions raised in education about the assumptions on which gendered emotions rest. I 
respond here by proposing that if education is to serve a role in the cultivation of morally 
appropriate emotions, then we must question, and should no longer accept, gendered 
emotions, that is emotions that belong to, or are more ‘natural’ for one sex than another. 
Acknowledging the importance of care for wellbeing, I question the claims of some care 
ethicists who would have us believe that care does not require moral theory and that it is 
not an issue of justice. I assert, to the contrary, that unless an ethics of care rests on sound 
moral and conceptual constructs, it will perpetuate a bifurcation of emotion and reason 
whilst sustaining stereotypically gendered emotions. In order to illuminate my argument 
for the cultivation of de-gendered, just emotions, I draw upon empirical research on the 
effects of deformed emotional attitudes towards women and children which seriously 
impede their wellbeing and functioning. I draw, too, on novels, both for the 
exemplification of my arguments and as a vehicle which, creatively and sensitively used, 
can help us to shape our imaginative and empathic capacities to take into the folds of our 
consciousness people who are both similar to and remote and different from us.  
I am accompanied throughout the thesis by a fictional pupil ‘Nancy’ with and through 
whom I exculpate complex theoretical and philosophical issues. The thesis re-affirms the 
importance of cultivating morally appropriate de-gendered emotions, particularly 
compassion, and concludes with the proposal that we should incorporate and embed an 
understanding of the emotions in the education curricula, for both pupils and those who 
teach them. I propose, too, that emotions might be regarded as an architectonic capability 
anchoring and influencing all other human capabilities. 
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Chapter One: Emotions and Education. 
 
1.1 Introduction. 
In this thesis I construct a predominantly philosophical account of emotions, and of 
compassion in particular, premised on the view that emotions are often rational1 and 
cognitive, and that they result from eudaimonistic2 judgements. Applying the study to 
education generally, and to schools in particular, I shall argue that educational research has 
not yet paid much attention to the construct of emotions, or to how an understanding of 
emotions can help us to produce what, in Scotland, we now refer to as ‘successful learners, 
responsible citizens, confident individuals and effective contributors’: the four capacities 
of a Curriculum for Excellence (SEED, 2004). The aim of my research is to consider how 
education can cultivate the emotions in ways that enable individuals to fulfill these four 
capacities, developing healthy emotional landscapes in which all young people can ‘use’3 
their emotions with discernment and sensitivity.  
 
I shall attend, in particular, to the gendered emergence, expression and interpretation of 
emotions, contending that a division of emotions along gender lines that are culturally and 
socially constructed is damaging to, and limiting of, the potential of both sexes to flourish. 
I shall do so against a background of theory and research that seems scant with respect to 
how we might cultivate emotionally healthy individuals. It is not that emotional 
intelligence is not recognised, it is. There is an extensive literature on it, especially as 
popularised by Daniel Goleman (1996) and Howard Gardner (1983) and this is well-
known in Scottish schools4. However, the aim of such writers is to show us how to use (or 
manage) emotions for intelligent interaction and behaviour modification rather than how to 
cultivate emotionally healthy individuals or to provide a philosophical analysis of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1I will shortly explain why I assert that emotions are often rational.  
2I use eudaimonistic here following Nussbaum so taking it to refer to a person’s flourishing, wellbeing and 
the ‘good’, with a meaning ‘compatible with as many distinct conceptions of what that good is as one cares 
to propose’ (2001:31).  
3I claim that we can ‘use’ emotions strategically to achieve our ends. We can ‘use’ anger to good effect if we 
want our partner to take our grievance seriously, for example, or we can feign fear to convey danger to a 
child. To ‘use’ here means focusing on the relevant thoughts to strategically arouse emotion or to evaluate 
situations appropriately. See Greenspan (2000:475) who argues that ‘[a]ttention to emotions can induce the 
reasons for an emotion can induce it – not with certainty but with enough regularity to provide the reasons 
for a strategy. …So emotions do have an instrumental role to play in day-to-day practical rationality’. See 
also Aristotle’s account of inducing emotional states in The Rhetoric. Aristotle’s discussion of emotion is 
clearly appreciative of the rationality of emotion. We might also say we ‘manage’ emotions.  
4Senior teachers or Deputes who wish to become Headteachers are expected to take the Scottish Qualification 
for Headteachership (SQH) or the Fast Route to Head Teachership (FRH). Emotional Intelligence forms part 
of these courses, and Goleman and Gardner are popular. 
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emotions5. Bar-On et al. (2007) argue that emotionally intelligent people understand 
themselves and others, are emotionally expressive, and can establish, develop and maintain 
constructive relationships. Emotionally intelligent people are, further, successful: they can 
bring about change in their social and working environments because they can manage 
their emotions effectively. What is missing in such analyses is, at best, attention to how 
one might become emotionally adept in order to be emotionally intelligent if, indeed, 
emotional intelligence is a concept that has any significant value6. On the line I shall 
develop, emotions are essential elements of human intelligence and wellbeing. 
Accordingly, they deserve and demand more scrutiny and theoretical attention than 
populist accounts provide if we are to educate young people who can enjoy emotional 
wellbeing. This is the central issue the thesis seeks to address. However, before embarking 
on a more detailed outline of the thesis, I shall pause, briefly, to locate the thesis in my life, 
to explain how it came about, and to do so with an unashamedly personal, emotional 
account of its emergence.  
 
 
1.2 Locating this Thesis. 
I am a girl from the Isle of Lewis, a remote island off the North West coast of Scotland, 
where the Gaelic culture still survives and the Presbyterian Church holds sway. I had a 
traditional, strict up-bringing in which belief in scripture and church attendance was the 
norm. Until I was in my early teens, I never questioned either the church or faith in God 
and, certainly, I did not question how women were supposed to behave. Women were 
quietly spoken, very respectful and silent in church or when men were present in the house 
during the Communions. While I often wore trousers, in church or when church guests 
were visiting us, or we them, skirts and hats were obligatory, excess jewellery or make-up 
was disapproved of and long hair was desirable. Men, I was brought up to believe, headed 
households. Women’s work was in the home, and women, because of Eve’s seduction by 
the serpent, had brought sin to the world, which justified our inferior status. However, for 
me, Eve represented reason, a woman who asked ‘what if?’. Adam simply followed her, 
without thought. Both had rested in a state of bliss and enchantment, feeling no fear, shame 
or jealousy; no compassion, pity or sympathy. As a teenager grappling with the idea of a 
beautiful Garden inhabited by only two people living a life of no moment until a snake slid 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5However, Goleman does draw on Aristotelian philosophy. 
6For a discussion of such concerns, see, for example, Carr (2000, 2002); Kristjansson (2001); Roberts et al. 
(2001); Griffiths (2003); Rietti (2009). 
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along to hiss his seductions to Eve, Eden seemed inexpressibly dull: an Edenic stupor. 
‘What’s the point of having a mind?’, I asked. ‘Why put the tree there and say don’t eat 
those apples?’, ‘Does God not understand the psychology of the creatures he created?’. 
The answers that came back made no sense. In any case, it was Eve who was punished and 
relegated to second class status, while Adam, who obeyed, ascended to the aristocracy. 
Someone had to start it? But how unfair! And how convenient! 
I have no brothers. I am confident, however, that were my parents to have had a son (and I 
am very glad they did not), he would have been under the bonnet of the car and his sisters 
would have been inside doing the housework. As it was, we were inside helping our 
mother, something I became increasingly less willing to do, as I grew older, preferring 
books to the kitchen sink. I am also confident that a brother would have been encouraged 
to be a boy: boisterous, active, loud, into rock music and football. We girls were 
encouraged to feel bad about being ‘angry’ and for not being ‘caring’ enough; in both 
cases I failed to conform to what was expected. The division of emotional and intellectual 
labour was also visible in school. The girls did ‘Home Economics’, as it was then called, 
and the boys did Woodwork. It was no surprise when boys did well in Maths and Physics, 
but surprising indeed if one of them was good at Languages or Literature. A girl was really 
bright if she did well in Maths and a Science, and even more bright if she was good in all 
Science and Mathematics subjects. I was ‘rubbish’7 at Maths, Chemistry and Physics, I 
hated Home Economics, but I got along well with Biology and in most other subjects I 
conformed to the gendered stereotype. 
 
No-one, anywhere, challenged the view that women were different from men.  I asked my 
Dad why he did not stay at home and look after us while Mum went out to work and he 
replied with the only reason he could: ‘That’s women’s work’. My mum thought my 
question stupid, retorting: ‘I thought you were supposed to be intelligent?’. That was a 
frequent response when I exasperated my parents with ‘all those blinking questions!’. My 
concern grew about difference as it became apparent that double standards operated when 
it came to what men and women could do in the realm of sexual expression. Why could the 
boys get what they wanted, while the girls were labelled ‘sluts’ if they did? Because ‘boys 
can’, is all I received in reply.  
 
‘But why?’  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7‘Rubbish’ is an informal and widely used expression that indicates how badly one fares in a subject or the 
poor state of a skill. Pupils will very often say they are ‘rubbish at’ Maths, or Art or French.  
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‘Because they can.’  
‘But why?’  
‘Because they need to know what to do.’  
‘And don’t women?’  
‘Not until they’re married.’  
 
As I matured, I saw that these bewildering responses revealed an inequality that somehow 
transmuted to mean that women were to blame for their sexual assaults: a decent chaste 
woman would not have been assaulted. I became indignant, especially as I started to 
experience unwanted sexual attention myself, and to know women who had been harassed 
but felt too ashamed to do anything about it. There were other attitudes that disturbed me: 
men who would answer my partner when I had asked the question; men and women who 
thought angry women were ‘mad’; women and men who thought that women who did not 
want children were not ‘real’ women or perhaps were just ‘kidding themselves’; watching 
bright women who had worked hard for their careers relinquishing them as a matter of 
course to have children. Importantly, I wanted to know why men felt they had the right to 
women’s bodies, in the flesh or in the media, and why men felt they were being men when 
they beat up their partners.  
 
It was against this background that my interest in feminism and gender grew and was 
nourished. My interest in emotions emerged when I studied Frontiers of Justice in 2008, a 
book which, simultaneously, sparked my interest in philosophy. From Frontiers, I moved 
to Upheavals of Thought, a work that crystallized my fascination with the emotions. Here 
was a way to explore my interests: gender, feminism, equality, justice and fairness 
considered through emotions, a quintessential human capacity, at least as far as the 
complex (because developed in relation to others) emotions of compassion, envy or 
jealousy are concerned. Emotions are often talked about, but not always understood, and 
only rarely does everyday talk of the emotions acknowledge that they can reveal who and 
what we are, and from where we have come, psychologically and experientially. What do 
we know about emotions? How are we to understand them? Many people can express their 
feelings and perhaps articulate what has made them angry or jealous. ‘I was boiling with 
him because he kicked the dog’. Straightforward cause and effect. But why be angry about 
a dog? And, here, the person may tell you: ‘I love dogs’. The dog has value to the person 
who got angry. In cases that are more complex, finding a simple cause might be more 
difficult and more painful.  
 
‘Why is M angry with her?’  
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‘She was asked by T to do X and she was busy.’ 
‘But why get so angry as to stop talking, to avoid contact, not to return messages?’  
 
Here the cause is more obscure, folded deep in angry M’s psyche. To dig out that cause 
might be uncomfortable if M has to admit that she feels inferior to T, that she had felt on 
an equal footing with her clever friends, valued her own intelligence, and now she is 
confronted by someone who makes her feel stupid. M cannot be honest with herself or 
with T with the result that their relationship becomes impaired through M’s unexamined 
anger and resentment. M’s perception of T’s request, M’s ethical evaluation of T and the 
motive behind asking her to do X, and her subsequent conduct towards T, all reveal a set of 
values, formed by experience, based on self-evaluation in comparison to another or others, 
which motivates action and orientates a set of social relationships. This was fascinating 
stuff. Emotions would be the focus of my thesis.  
 
Novels entered my thesis because I love reading. Reading has sustained me since 
childhood, giving me an exit from the real world and entry into another safer and, often, far 
more exciting world. With a novel in hand, I can go to a world of magic, to be ensorcelled 
with the characters as they come under the spell of a wicked witch8 or a devil’s 
messenger9. I can choose to enter the world of magical realism where midnight’s children10 
are gifted with very special powers but only if hope lives on to keep those powers alive. Or 
I can disappear down the fabric of a hole in Oxford and find myself in an alternative world 
with a knife that can create portals to other worlds11. Tired of magic, I can pick up another 
book and follow the pilgrim as he stops to watch a pair of legs waving from a baptismal 
font and feel some mirth and satisfaction at the sight of a greedy and dishonest pope 
getting his just rewards by being dumped upside down in the font12. A cheeky and 
subversive, but all too just, punishment; it made me think of the waving wriggling legs of a 
wood louse trapped on its back. Or I can muse with the author on shallow people who 
‘refine the nicer quibbles of non-existence, give vacancy its shape, being in the strictest 
sense those Arts of Naught practised by hostesses’13. And Proust’s hostesses, ‘bring people 
together’, ‘bring people out’, ‘match guests with one another’, are ‘present but invisible’, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8C.S. Lewis’s The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe. 
9Mikhail Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita.  
10Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children. 
11Philip Pullman’s The Subtle Knife, (His Dark Matter Trilogy).   
12Dante’s Inferno, Canto XIX. 
13Proust (2003/2:177). 
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and are ‘a good go between’. Proust is perceptive: women are very good at those social 
skills. They are ‘naturals’, be they hostesses, church attendees or just simply lassies14.  
I am now a secondary school teacher qualified to teach Geography and Modern Studies15 
to pupils ranging from 11 to 18 years’ old. I love teaching. It can be great fun as well as 
frustrating. I rarely conform to the rules to punish: they do not work and are often punitive 
rather than recuperative or transformative. I rely, to a great extent, on my ability to judge 
the particulars and their relationship to the general (to sound slightly philosophical for the 
moment), and on finding out what motivates pupils to act as they do. If a pupil arrives in 
school angry or upset, or is late and aggressive, I want to know why. To insist on 
punishing children because rather trivial rules have been broken or because they do not 
know how to eat communion bread is, to me, obtuse. Here we have the universal 
application of rules without sensitivity to context or particulars, without, that is, an 
appropriate emotional regard for the child. This has always worried me. 
 
Many teachers are caring and very interested in those they teach. Some are not. Some may 
be good teachers, teaching their subjects competently, but not necessarily in a caring way, 
if we take that to mean being sympathetic towards and liking their pupils. I have seen 
many a pupil sent outside the classroom, being spoken to harshly, their objections being 
dismissed, their circumstances ignored or treated ineptly. How is it possible to help pupils 
come to terms with what may have happened to them if those who could help them do not 
seek to understand the nature of emotions? But what lies in an emotion? How do emotions 
motivate us to action? What does it mean if emotions are evaluations of self, others and 
self to others and, further, that emotions express our values, experiences and self-worth? 
How can we help a pupil, undeservedly feeling shame, to understand, and accept with 
insight and perceptiveness, her situation if those around her cannot, or will not, or struggle 
to ‘see’ why she lacks confidence, hides her face, tries not to be seen, continually 
downplays her abilities, refuses to speak out in class, or is so consumed by shame and 
loathing she cannot do her work well? What if another pupil, who is neglected at home 
because her parents are drug addicts, is angry? She shouts, yells, swears, refuses to 
comply, bangs doors shut, tears up her jotter, tells her classmates to ‘f**k off’, is perfectly 
willing to tell teachers the same, and picks fights with other pupils in the playground. She 
is particularly unappealing, I suggest, because she is a girl who is angry and very coarse. 
She is rather ‘masculine’ in her aggression. If she were a boy, we might be prepared for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14Scottish idiom for girl. 
15A Scottish subject, a blend of Sociology, Politics and International Relations. 
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anger and outbursts because boys are ‘naturally’ more angry and aggressive than are girls, 
and they need to get it out of their system or teachers will have no end of trouble. Boys, 
you see, have more testosterone than do girls.  
 
How do we react to a girl who is sullen, uncommunicative and unpopular? Why is her 
demeanour so unpleasant to us? Why is sullenness her dominant state of comportment? 
Why immediately punish such pupils for ‘bad behaviour’? Why can we not treat them with 
a little more compassion? I believe we should be more compassionate but take the view 
that we are unlikely to be so, or to remain so consistently and over time, if we do not 
understand what compassion is, or what incites shame or anger, or any other emotion. I 
work towards the view, in this thesis, that teachers ought to receive an education that 
attends to the emotions if they are to be duly discerning, discriminating and sensitive to 
pupils’ emotional states. They might, then, be more likely to take thoughtful action to help 
their pupils feel respected and valued, kept safe from harm and daily, commonplace 
indignities. Pupils, in their turn, might feel that they are not just in school to be acted upon, 
to be taught so that teachers and schools can proclaim good results, but that they are 
respected and valued in their own right, as young but maturing individuals. A common 
complaint that pupils make is that they are treated like babies, treated with disrespect. 
Their opinions and concerns do not count, they are shouted at in public, punished in public, 
sent into the corridor where they can be seen. When teachers make mistakes, they do not 
get punished. ‘Why’, pupils often ask, ‘is this fair?’. Whilst some pupil behaviours will, of 
course, deserve punishment or censure, there will also be occasions when pupils might 
justifiably feel that what is meted out to them is unfair or disproportionate16. 
 
 
1.3 Why Study Emotions? 
How can a study of the emotions help pupils who ask questions about fair treatment? How 
can a study of the emotions help the teacher of pupils who ask questions about fair 
treatment? And how can a study of emotions help teachers act compassionately towards 
the vociferously angry and neglected pupil or her shy, passive and downtrodden peer? 
Emotions, I came to understand, are powerful. They provide us with an orientation, an 
attitude to the world, colouring that world in tints, shades or bold colours, enlivening it or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16See, for example, Hilton’s (2006:205) work with young people excluded from school in which she notes 
their frustration and anger that ‘disciplinary structures had failed to successfully investigate the root causes of 
problematic behaviour’. 
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darkening, depending on what the case may be (Wollheim, 1999). Our emotions have a 
history, which form in our very youngest infancy. But our emotions, like history, do not 
move in a single current, but ‘in laminar flows, like different sheets of time moving at 
different rates, one above the other like the currents in the sea’17. Unlike the currents at the 
lowest level of the sea, which are cold and still, the oldest of our emotions flow in, through 
and out of our present, like the Aurora Borealis or the Sirocco winds, bringing in their 
wake heat or cold, depending, as Wollheim (1999) suggests, on what the case may be. Our 
emotions are not simply our lives’ palimpsests, over which our experiences have been 
written or erased, but reside deep within our personalities where many different times co-
exist, flowing at different speeds and intensities, enshrining our experiences, values, 
concerns and goals. 
 
How emotions are to be understood and categorized, however, is far from straightforward. 
While there is rarely agreement on how emotions might be distinguished one from another, 
or on the processes of emotion formation, let alone on where the boundaries between 
emotions and non-emotions lie, some emotions are more likely to be characterised as 
emotional states that prefigure the acute emotions such as anger, or include diverse 
emotions such as empathy (Lazarus, 1991a:821). Consequently, a robust theory of emotion 
will be necessary to guide an understanding of emotions’ constituent elements and 
processes if one is to avoid, as far as possible, the conceptual confusions briefly alluded to 
here. I aim to show, in this chapter and the next, that such a theory will contain both 
specific and general propositions that follow the analyses mainly of philosophers, but also 
of psychologists such as Ortony and Clore (1989) and Lazarus (1991a, b). My focus 
throughout the thesis, but especially in Chapter 2, will also be on compassion using 
Nussbaum's (2001) analysis and her argument that it is central to a good education and a 
prerequisite for the cultivation of moral sentiment and human dignity. I claim, too, that 
compassion is especially important to women’s justice and so I, concomitantly, argue for 
the importance of the emotions to women’s justice for reasons I will develop in the thesis 
and that I outline, briefly, below.  
 
Countering the view that emotions occur in contrast to rationality, Nussbaum (1999a, b) 
defends the study of emotions in moral philosophy, arguing that women have been 
denigrated for their ‘emotional natures’ or deemed to have certain innate emotional 
capacities. Women are frequently expected to care more, feel more, and be more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17I borrow the analogy from Adam Nicolson’s Sea Room (2002:67). 
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expressive of emotions than their more ‘rational’ male counterparts. Emotions, to adapt 
Fausto-Sterling's (2000:8) argument, are embodied in the 'capacities, gestures, movements, 
locations and behaviours' we are supposed to exhibit. Inevitably emotions are deeply 
intertwined with notions of gender, part of that extensive repertoire of political, social, 
moral, ideological, cultural, religious, scientific and racial discourses that have been used 
over time, place and culture to define who we are. Fausto-Sterling (1992, 2000) and 
Nussbaum (1999a:29) have argued, from their respective perspectives of biology and 
philosophy, that notions of what is ‘natural’ or ‘right’ follow us everywhere and 
dehumanise many people on the basis of sex, class, race and sexuality, an argument I 
support and develop throughout.  
 
Emotions have been used to dichotomise men and women as unequal complements 
(Campbell, 1994:47).  For example, a consideration of emotions raises questions around 
who and how we should express emotions reflecting 'care' and 'nurture'. Who should feel, 
how should we feel, when, and to what extent are emotions such as 'compassion', 'pity', 
'sorrow' or 'anger' acceptable and appropriate? And how should these emotions be 
expressed and interpreted? ‘Feminine’ emotions expressing vulnerability, pain or hurt can 
be characterised as negative traits to dismiss the seriousness of what is important to 
women. If expressed in the public sphere, such emotions can be judged as over-reactions 
or their subject as excessively ‘emotional.’ Whilst a number of analyses reveal how 
powerful emotional interpretations are in stigmatising, labelling or stereotyping men and 
women, rarely, if ever, are questions raised about the assumptions on which such gendered 
views rest. Neither do many analyses ask if we should continue to accept emotions as 
belonging in one sphere but not another, or to one sex but not another. However, Syed 
(2008) is aware of how emotions are socially regulated, prescribed and classified, and, 
further, how the suppression of emotional capacity can lead to discrimination and impair 
cognitive performance. He also accepts that emotions have cognitive content and his 
analysis resonates with the work of Nussbaum and what we understand about cognitive 
dissonance. For Syed, gendering emotions can have adverse effects on psychological 
wellbeing if the goals of the individual are suppressed, distorted or brought into conflict 
with the beliefs and goals of institutions or individuals. Following Syed (2008), I will 
argue in this thesis, that the suppression or over-cultivation of particular emotions, for 
gendered, social or cultural reasons, or the corruption of emotional functioning from the 
effects of abuse, are corrosive to wellbeing and functioning.  
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Many of our emotions, such as anger, hatred, shame or disgust, are learned from our 
society18. These emotions contain positive and negative evaluations directed towards 
individuals or groups, which are often absorbed from families, peers and wider society, 
and may reflect cultural artefacts rather than innate disposition to the emotion and its 
expression. How do we teach so that we judge and evaluate others in ways that respect 
individuality and difference, avoiding stigma and the corrosive emotions of shame and 
disgust? How do we educate in order that young people learn to imagine the plight of 
others, to focus on the intrinsic worth and goodness of others who deserve equal respect, so 
that one’s sex, gender, age, ethnicity or sexual orientation is of no moral consequence? 
Without attending to such questions in education, as I shall argue in the final chapter, the 
inequalities and asymmetries of power that women continue to experience, along with the 
violence that many women experience as a result of asymmetrical power structures, even 
in the most equality striving societies such Norway and Sweden19, will not be eradicated. 
 
How we react to emotions, which ones we exhibit and encourage, which ones we repress 
or discourage; in short, how we cultivate emotional responses in children is of ethical 
importance. As I noted above, our emotions are socialized to contain positive or negative 
evaluations, depending on the social situation, culture, or family values with which we are 
brought up. Children who express disgust at homosexuality, or express hatred for a football 
team, or who mock girls for being stupid and fit only for a certain destiny, have not 
absorbed these values unaided. Such values have been nursed in the home and by the peer 
group, and reinforced by the child’s cultural, religious and social settings and relevant 
media. If schools are the primary social institutions in which gendered emotions and 
assumptions about what humans can do and be are visible, then at issue, as I proposed 
above, is how schools educate young people, of both sexes, to have healthy emotions that 
are ethical, proportionate, discerning, deliberative and which have ethical action as their 
goals, so as to avoid practices that are harmful or denigrating. In Aristotelian (2004) terms, 
our aim should be to cultivate citizens who have developed, or are developing, reasoned 
self-cultivation, and this should be the goal of good education.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18See Nussbaum (1999a,b, 2001, 2004a). 
19Whilst official public opinion strongly condemns violence against women and strongly supports equality in 
Nordic countries, they are still plagued by male violence. Like women worldwide, Scandinavian women are 
too embarrassed and too ashamed to report the abuse, this time because abusive oppressive relationships are 
not supposed to be the outcome in an egalitarian society. See Enander (2009). 
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Why though, should we appeal to compassion in education20? Of all the emotions, 
compassion has been regarded as a sound basis on which to deliberate about the value of 
external goods and appropriate action in private and public life (Nussbaum, 2001:299). 
However, we often arrive at compassion by false psychological mechanisms resulting from 
being taught to have sympathy and empathy for the wrong things, or for only those who 
are closest to us. That is, people are more likely to have compassion in circumstances that 
divide and rank human beings creating ‘in- and out-groups’ (Nussbaum, 2001:386). 
Additionally, we are more likely to have compassion for people along clearly demarcated 
boundaries ranging from close family, friends and acquaintances to close professional 
associates, or similarly situated people. I shall follow Nussbaum’s view that the emotional 
factors that produce such divisions are too deep seated to be eradicated easily, and that 
emotions such as shame, disgust or hatred, sympathy and empathy create boundaries to 
compassion that reinforce hierarchies, and keep us partial in our concern for certain groups 
of people, possibly corroding their ability and capacity to function well. 
 
Compassion, Nussbaum argues (2001:387) requires an appropriate education in connection 
with a correct theory of concern. Accordingly, education in compassion needs to be 
designed so that we are aware that notions of humanity can be obstructed by negative 
emotions that include some people but exclude others, or divide us on the basis of non-
moral categories. As noted, the emotions of men and women are gendered, often with 
harmful results. The moral education of women in many cultures cultivates compassion to 
a greater extent than it does men in relations of love, friendship and care. The difference 
between men and women in their emotional expression is the underlying factor of their 
appraisal of what is of value to their wellbeing and that of others. Differences between the 
sexes on this basis could begin to be eliminated if the appraisals of what is important to a 
good life were taught equally to all, such as a life without violence, the non-
commodification of women’s bodies and services, and an appreciation of difference and 
similarity. Equal access to emotional resources, engendered through good developmental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20We should, arguably, appeal to the development of compassion in all of our institutions, not just schools, 
but particularly in those institutions in which we care for vulnerable people: prisons, children’s homes, 
residential homes and hospitals, for example. The urgent need for compassionate care is all too apparent 
given the fresh revelations of child abuse in places such as the Bryn Estan Children’s home in North Wales 
and Jimmy Savile’s abuse of up to 300 young people at the BBC, in hospitals and prisons. I would like to 
thank Gayle Letherby for raising this issue with me. Similarly, I would advocate work that sought to make 
the workplace more compassionate. Please note, too, that I do not want to suggest that all schools are ‘good’, 
rather that they are one of our ‘primary’, that is basic (in Rawlsian terms), social institutions along with 
health, the legal and judicial system, for example.  
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processes learned early in childhood and supported in schools, might begin to help us 
eradicate inequalities and their attendant injustices.  
 
However, compassion alone, Nussbaum says, is not enough and neither is it a ‘complete 
moral theory’ (2001:399). It provides, nonetheless, a ‘bridge’ from the self to others not 
closely associated to us, reducing the distinction between disparate groups of people, as 
well as differences between the sexes. Compassion can also provide a bridge between 
intimates. But do intimates not naturally feel compassion for each other? Unfortunately 
they may not. One reason why gender violence is so pervasive is that the men (and, but far 
less often, women) who commit violence fail to empathise with their partners, denying 
them subjectivity (their experiences and emotional capacities), autonomy (the right to think 
and act for themselves), and integrity (their body and emotions are violable). Violent men, 
or women, cannot, or will not, sympathise with, or feel compassion for their partners, and 
so can justify treating them with extreme violence (Borochowitz, 2008). I shall conclude 
that education curricula should address intimate partner violence, openly and honestly 
confronting the sources of that violence: women’s inferior status. While there have been 
great efforts to de-gender the curricula, assumptions about the innate capacities of the 
sexes still persist and I shall build towards the proposal that, starting from early years’ 
education, we should cultivate in our pupils the capacity to have, to express and to 
understand emotions that shape the landscape of mental and social lives, and that particular 
emotions, especially compassion, do not belong to a particular sex, but are expressive of 
what it means to be a dignified human being.  
 
I shall argue, relatedly, for a more nuanced, less gendered understanding and acceptance of 
emotions that transcends their current use. False beliefs about emotions, about gendered 
human capacity, may mean, for example, that where there are assumptions about what 
boys and girls can do, there will be correspondingly higher or lower expectations of what 
they can achieve. If the assumption is that girls are better at languages and the arts and 
boys at Mathematics and the ‘hard’ Sciences, our cognitively distorted beliefs of what the 
natural characteristics of the sexes are will mean that we will act in ways that confirm 
those beliefs: girls will be mathematically less competent, and boys will continue to 
eschew languages (Buchanan, 2004). There may be a link to be made between subject 
choice and emotions. For example, and tentatively at this stage, if boys are not educated 
for compassion to the same degree that girls are, boys may prefer subjects regarded as 
‘masculine’, such as Science because it may be perceived as neutral, objective and 
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emotionless. Languages, Home Economics and Modern Studies are favourites with girls 
because these subjects are about expression, expressiveness, and caring. We need more 
‘care’ in education, argues Nel Noddings (1983, 2002, 2005), but her arguments do not, I 
contend, adequately address the concerns I have outlined here. I shall take the view that 
cultivating care in education, on Noddings’ account, is inadequate since, if care is taken to 
mean sensitivity to others and their wellbeing, that may not be stable enough to extend 
justice to others, including those not intimately connected to us. 
 
 
1.4 Understanding Emotions - The Theoretical Approach.  
This section comprises five related parts in support of the cognitive-evaluative approach I 
take to the emotions. Initially, I outline the cognitive element; secondly, I discuss the 
feeling component of emotions and follow that by a third section on the intelligence of 
emotions. The fourth section focusses on rationality and that leads me to the final and fifth 
part here in which I consider emotions as evaluative judgements and as ineliminable 
references to the self. 
 
a) Cognitivism 
An understanding of emotion will vary depending on whether the account stems from a 
particular school of psychology, neurology or philosophy, or whether emotion is subsumed 
within the domain of affective science. Davidson et al. (2009), for example, regard 
affective science as a broad concept, distinguished by six major affective phenomena. 
These are: emotion, described as a brief episode of ‘coordinated brain, autonomic, and 
behavioural change’ that prepare the organism to respond to an external of some 
significance to the organism; feelings which are described as the ‘subjective representation 
of emotion’; moods which are typically diffuse and of low intensity; attitudes which 
‘colour beliefs, preferences and predispositions towards objects and persons’; affective 
style which ‘bias an individual toward perceiving and responding to people or objects with 
a particular emotional quality’, and temperament which may be determined by genetic 
factors (p.xiii). I follow a broader conception of emotion than that presented by Davidson 
et al., drawing predominantly on the cognitive-evaluative approach to emotions.  
Cognitive science is the study of how knowledge is acquired, represented and used 
(Oatley, 1992:3) and cognition, with respect to emotions, also suggests perceptual 
awareness and the significance of what is happening in our immediate environment (Ben-
Ze’ev, 2000:55) through appraisal processes (Clore and Ortony, 2000) which, in turn, give 
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meaning to our emotional responses through our situational and generalised beliefs 
(Lazarus, 1991b). Aristotle (2004:2.1) defined emotions as ‘those things by the alteration 
of which men differ with regard to those judgements which pain and pleasure accompany’, 
dividing emotions into a tripartite schema of psychological explanation (what ‘state men 
are in when they are angry’), the character of the object (with ‘what people they are 
accustomed to be angry’), and the eliciting event (the circumstances). Oatley (1992:19), 
drawing on an Aristotelian framework, defines emotions as ‘mental states’ which develop 
as a result of evaluations of what has happened in relation to a person’s goals and beliefs. 
On Oatley’s analysis, the core of an emotion is ‘action readiness’, based on an evaluation 
(which need not be conscious) of what needs to be done. Patricia Greenspan (2009:7) 
understands emotion as a ‘compound of affect and evaluation’ which involve ‘pleasant or 
unpleasant feelings about valued or disvalued’ features of the emotion’s object. For Pitcher 
(1965), a person having an emotion could be described in two ways: in an occurrent or a 
dispositional sense. Occurrent emotions are those which the person is experiencing now 
whereas dispositional emotions are those which linger in the background and which may 
not be felt intensely, if at all. According to Pitcher (1965), emotions have several 
constituent parts. Emotions usually have an object which may be agent-directed or non-
agent directed. They rest on some relevant belief or apprehension (reasons for the emotion) 
which entails ‘modes of behaviour or inclination’ if the emotion is occurrent, or ‘wants, 
desires, beliefs, and so on’ if it is dispositional (p.333). The characteristic features of 
occurrent and dispositional emotions can be grouped together under the general heading of 
‘evaluations’ (p.334), which, in turn, can be subdivided into positive and negative 
evaluations (p.334). The reason Pitcher so grouped such seemingly different features as 
modes of behaviours, desires, inclinations and judgements was because of their intimate 
connection to cause and effect stemming from evaluational judgements. The definition I 
use largely follows that of Pitcher, but includes further features which I take from 
Nussbaum’s (2001) account of emotions to whose account I return in Chapter 2. There is, 
of course, more to say with respect to an emotion’s constituency and I will return to this, 
too, in the next chapter. Here, I wish simply to outline an emotion, at a basic level, in order 
to explain why the cognitive-evaluative approach to emotions predominates in the fields of 
both psychology and philosophy. 
 
Cognitivism in emotions came to dominate the social sciences and philosophy of mind 
because of a dissatisfaction with behaviourism’s neglect of values, goals, plans and 
commitments in motivating the agent to act and the elimination of the subject’s 
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experiences from the research (Lazarus, 1991b:129-133). A behaviourist approach to 
emotions tended to focus on innate biological forces such as drives, instincts and needs, 
taking no heed of cognitive referents motivating the agent to act in some way (Lazarus, 
1991a:819). What was missing was any sense that the subject was anything other than an 
organism prey to her drives, needs and instincts, rather than an agent who reacts 
emotionally because she appraises an event of some significance that might diminish or 
enhance her wellbeing. The ‘hydraulic model’ (Solomon, 1993:78) of the emotions, which 
was an attempt to characterise the workings of the human mind in terms of Newtonian 
mechanical structures, as well as being a streamlined version of the behaviourism of 
theorists such as Skinner, came to characterise all the major theories and models of 
psychology in various positivistic costumes mid century (Solomon, 1993:84). Where 
emotions were the object of study, these were to be defined as ‘perceptions of bodily 
states’ (Oatley, 1992:17) and the ‘effects of neurological processes’ (Solomon, 1993:81). 
Prominent theorists of this position included William James, CG Lange, Freud and Konrad 
Lorenz21. Within the British Empiricist tradition, feeling-centered emotions derived 
philosophical support from Locke, following Descartes, and were subsequently taken up 
by Hume. Emotions in this tradition were understood as ‘ “internal sensations” of pleasure 
or pain’ (Deigh, 1994:825). The appeal of processes such as ‘stimulus-response’, concepts 
of ‘force’ and ‘energy’, was that they were observable, calculable, tangible, predictable 
and subject to experimentation. They were also mechanistic: they represented reality as it 
was perceived to be by the observer. The phenomenon of sensation was ‘wholly 
constructed’ (Wollheim, 1999: 3) out of subjectivity, the ‘feel’ of a mental state. That is, 
the entirety of a mental state could be captured in emotion words such ‘I feel frightened’ 
and such an utterance would suffice to convey all that needed to be said without a 
consideration of the evaluation which aroused the state of fear. As Wittgenstein (1958:103) 
observed: ‘We think of the utterance of an emotion as though it were some artificial device 
to let others know that we have it’22. Like Jastrow’s ambiguous duck-rabbit illusion, where 
one alternately sees a duck then a rabbit, intentionality and subjectivity frequently seem to 
be ‘fused’ (Wollheim, 1999:8). However, the problem with studying human or animal 
consciousness is that it is chaotic, disordered, and complex, pervaded with the agent’s own 
unique character and history. Unsurprisingly, such simplistic reducibility of the subject to 
mechanistic forces failed repeatedly to provide predictive or explanatory accounts of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21For a discussion of the reductionist view of emotions, see Lazarus (1991a:8-15); Solomon (1993,  
Chapter 3); Deigh (1994); Nussbaum (2001:93-100).  
22These points allude to an upcoming discussion of the role of feeling in emotional states. For further 
discussion of these points, see Pitcher (1965) and Wollheim (1999:2-8). 
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human behaviour and emotion. However, rather than abandon behaviourism or other 
reductionist models, their proponents sought to come up with yet more complicated models 
and additional mental variables to fit the complexities of the human mind (Lazarus, 
1991a:8-9).  
 
Philosophers23 had argued, and still do, that eliminating intentionality from emotions was 
nonsensical. They also claimed that to make sense of human behaviour and motivation, 
human perceptual, cognitive and interpretive capacity or individuals’ values, goals or plans 
could not be kept out of the research, and neither could their judgements about what was 
happening to them and why. And so, the cognitivist movement in psychology, supported 
by advances in neuro-science24, began to emerge, offering an understanding of emotions 
that did have theoretical and empirical explanatory force and predictability25. 
Behaviourism was discredited, having failed through its own explanatory inadequacies26. 
As a result, computational processes27 came to prevail in psychology while, in the 
philosophy of emotions, intentionality gained the ascendancy over feeling-centered 
explanations (Deigh, 1994). However, the latter have not left the philosophical field 
entirely28 although feeling-centered conceptions are unable to explain the intentionality 
(thought content) of emotions or account for emotions as the objects of rational assessment 
(Deigh, 1994:825). As I focus on emotions as intentional and rational in the thesis, I will 
not pursue these concepts in depth here. However, while feeling-centered concepts are not 
germane to my argument for what an emotion is, it is worth making some general points 
against including feeling-centered conceptions into an emotion’s definition. I do so 
because ‘feeling’ seems to be so much a part of the emotional experience that it seems odd 
not to include it. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23Kenny (1963) and Pitcher (1965) were early proponents of intentionality and cognitivism in emotions. 
Current philosophers include Solomon (1993, 2003); Deigh (1994); Sherman (1989,1997,1998); Ben-Ze’ev 
(2000) and Nussbaum (various). But, of course, emotions’ intentionality is not new and can be traced back to 
Aristotle and the neo-Stoics.  
24See Damasio (1994); LeDoux (1999). 
25See Seligman (1976); de-Sousa (1987); Smith and Lazarus (1990); Lazarus (1984, 1991a,b); Oakley 
(1992); Oatley (1992); Ortony et al. (1998); Elster (1999); Clore and Ortony (2000); Oatley et al. (2006).  
26For an account of what good theory should achieve see Lazarus (1991a). For the difference between binary 
and prototypical analyses in cognitive science see Ben-Ze’ev (2000:6-9) who, along with cognitive 
psychologists such as Smith and Lazarus (1990), favours prototypical categories that have no clear-cut 
boundaries or equal degrees of membership. Such an approach suits the conceptual and analytical 
complexities of emotions. 
27In accepting emotions as having cognitive content I do not mean to accept the view that emotions are 
computational in nature, where computations, inferences or interpretations are products of conceptual or 
reasoning processes. For arguments against the computational view in emotions, see Ben-Ze’ev (1990, 1993, 
2000). For the computational approach, see, for example, Ortony et al. (1998, 2000). 
28See Goldie (2002) and Pugmire (2005) who argue that feelings should constitute part of an emotion’s 
definition. 
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b) Feelings 
We frequently describe emotions as feelings: ‘I feel envious’, ‘I feel angry’, and so on. 
However, these are figurative uses of language rather than descriptions of literal emotional 
states. Feelings, as described in these instances, or describing physical states of pain or 
pleasure, express our own state of mind or bodily state, and do not, necessarily, contain 
meaningful cognitive content. On the other hand, where feelings are rich in figurative 
language that is expressive of a real emotional state, say of loss or love, feelings become 
but a ‘terminological variant’, as Nussbaum (2001:60) argues, of perception, judgement or 
belief because of their rich cognitive content. Feelings may accompany an emotion but 
they are not necessary for it, even if they are that emotion’s most frequent companions. 
‘I’m boiling with rage’, is a very common metaphorical expression and no doubt a very 
angry person may indeed feel physical sensations akin to ‘boiling’. But one is not literally 
‘boiling’ with rage or anger, any more than one can be, literally, ‘green’ with envy. Indeed, 
what are the characteristic feelings associated with envy? I can feel thirsty without feeling 
thirsty for anything in particular as thirst is a physical sensation and so objectless. It is 
doubtful whether I can grieve for no-one or nothing in particular since this is a mental state 
which does have an object. Neither will everyone feel the same sensation. In some, the 
particular feeling of ‘boiling’ may be absent, even while they feel great anger. Feelings, 
furthermore, are very strong in occurrent (currently experienced) emotions, which is why 
the feeling component is to the fore in these states. In background or dispositional 
emotional states, such as long term anger at an old slight, the feeling component will be 
muted, if present at all. As Pitcher (1965:338) notes, the ‘calm’ emotions, such as envy, 
sympathy or hope, do not normally come with any sensations at all: they might, but they 
need not. In extreme danger, a person may not be aware of any sensation at all, so focused 
is she on escaping from danger. Pitcher (1965:338) puts the case thus: 
A young man, P, is being interviewed for an important job, and he is extremely 
anxious to make a good impression. One of the interviewers, Q, makes an 
insulting remark to P, and thereafter an observer might detect an icy tone, 
creeping into P’s voice when he addresses Q, although there are no other signs of 
anger. The iciness is not intentional, however, and in fact P is so intent on 
following the conversation and on creating a good impression, that he is not even 
aware of it, and he is certainly too engrossed to experience any feelings of anger.  
 
P may be angry but he feels or shows no symptoms of that anger. Oatley (1992:20) agrees 
that there is a ‘phenomenological tone’ to an emotion which may be consciously felt in 
occurrent emotions. This ‘tone’ can help distinguish between emotions (happiness or 
sadness) but it is clear that the conscious feeling is not identical with the evaluation of 
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anger in the case of P. What is at the core of an emotion is a mental state which can 
prepare us for action. Oatley (1992) notes that, in Western culture, we commonly, and 
wrongly, identify the underlying mental state of an emotion with its conscious feeling ‘as if 
the conscious feeling were the whole emotion’ (p.20). That is, it does not need to be the 
case that there are characteristic sensations that are essential in all cases, and in all 
circumstances, of anger, jealousy or compassion. I might have an elevated heart rate in fear 
(getting ready to flee), but I may also have an elevated rate in anger (getting ready, or not, 
to act) and in love (at the sight of the person I love). It is not the case I am angry because 
my heart rate is elevated. Likewise, my face might flush in fear (in cases of anxiety) and it 
might flush in anger (indignation). It might also flush in shame, embarrassment or love. If I 
lack these sensations, can it be said that I am not frightened, not angry, ashamed or not in 
love29? I may experience none of these sensations in one or more of those emotional states 
if I have learned to control my emotional (evaluative) response, or have adapted to, or 
become accustomed to the eliciting circumstances. Just as we can use emotions for 
strategic purposes, so we can use emotion words to convey an attitude or state of mind. 
Wittgenstein, in the Philosophical Investigations (2009)30, seems to suggest, not only that 
we ‘use’ (see p.7) emotion words to convey the feeling of an emotion, but, also that 
emotions are very different states of being from mere feeling.  
 
3. "For a second he felt violent pain." - Why does it sound odd to say: "For a 
second he felt deep grief"? Only because it so seldom happens?31 
 
4. But don't you feel grief now? ("But aren't you playing chess now?") The answer 
may be affirmative, but this does not make the concept of grief any more like the 
concept of sensation. -The question was really, of course, a temporal and personal 
one, not the logical question we wanted to ask.  
5. "I must tell you: I'm frightened." 
"I must tell you: it horrifies me."- Well, one can say this in a smiling tone of voice 
too.  
And do you mean to tell me that he doesn't feel it? How else does he know it? - 
But even if it is a report, he does not learn it from his feelings. (Wittgenstein, 
2009:i) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29A woman might be judged unemotional if she does not cry at a sad film and so deemed lacking in 
compassion.  A man might be called ‘gay’ if he does cry. These kinds of judgements on our emotional 
displays, and why we make them, are important aspects of this thesis.  
30Please note that throughout I have used the date of the edition of the work I am using. For original dates, 
see end references.  
31Wittgenstein’s philosophical ‘remarks’, as he termed them are numbered 1-693, a series of ‘sketches’ on 
meaning, understanding, proposition and logic which criss-cross each other throughout the length of his 
investigations and so which he, claimed, defied ordered and orderly sequences. See the preface to the 
Investigations. 
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While acknowledging emotions as embodied, conscious experiences that can arouse a 
variety of physiological responses, we cannot confidently assert that these states are so 
‘constantly correlated’ with our experiences of emotion that we could put that ‘particular 
bodily state in to the definition of an emotion type’ (Nussbaum, 2000:58). As the work of, 
for example, Seligman (1975), LeDoux (1998) and Fausto-Sterling (2000)  demonstrates, 
we are ‘plastic’ creatures in the sense that our mental states need not be permanently fixed, 
but can change over time to respond or adapt to old and new experiences (and see chapter 
5 for further development of the plasticity of the brain). If it is felt that sensations should 
be part of what defines an emotion (but surely not what distinguishes one emotion from 
another), it might be safer to allow this only in highly typical, or standard cases, such as 
those emotions described as basic32, so-called because they, anger, fear or surprise for 
example, are the result of evolution. For the cognitive account of emotions that I follow, 
and for the reasons I have set out here, it is difficult to agree with Goldie (2000:12) that 
‘[f]eelings are, as we all know, at the heart of emotion’. On the account I use here, feeling 
no more defines an emotion than ‘an army of fleas constitutes a dog’ (Solomon, 1993:97). 
Feeling is only one aspect of the emotion experience that complements, but does not 
explain or cause, the intentional state. Feelings cannot distinguish between emotions 
because they lack the cognitive mechanisms to evaluate or appraise what is happening in 
the environment (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000:64-66). 
  
This brief explanation for excluding feelings from a definition of emotions, save in typical 
cases, now permits me to consider a further possible challenge to the cognitive-evaluative 
account of emotions, namely how cognitive accounts can deal with apparently non-
intentional states such as moods and affective states. The general argument against 
cognitive accounts is that sufferers of anxiety or depression, or those who describe 
themselves as being down, irritable or happy, cannot identify the object of these states 
(Goldie, 2002; Pugmire, 2005). One way to get round this problem is to exclude moods 
from the emotion category, as do Clore and Ortony (2000), but this is perhaps too 
dogmatic. Others, such as Solomon (1993:71), take the view that moods are generalised 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32There are six representative criteria for basic emotions, according to Ben Ze’ev (2000:104-6). Basic 
emotions are those which appeared early in human evolutional development and so are developmental. The 
developmental account of basic emotions is closely related to their functional purpose, in that they express 
tendencies to action in response to environmental stimuli. These emotions are present in all human and so are 
universal. They are prevalent because basic emotions occur frequently. They are unique in being hardwired 
and manifest distinct physiological and facial changes, and are subject to less flexibility than complex 
emotions. Finally, basic emotions may have more primitive forms of intentionality. 
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emotions that take in enlarged views of the world, in contrast to emotions which are 
localised and specific. Another approach is to view moods as emotions looking for an 
object (Gaus, 1990). One might take the view, following Ben-Ze’ev (2000:87) that moods 
and affective traits have some intentionality but lack the complexity of emotions, being 
more diffuse and difficult to specify. However, moods are similar to feelings in that they 
express the subject’s own state of mind. Moods, then, should not be reduced to either 
emotions or feelings.  
 
c) Intelligence 
An additional reason for being cautious about including feelings and moods in the 
definition of emotion is because, as Nussbaum (2001) argues, emotions are intelligent 
responses to perceptions of value directed towards those whom we love, goals to which we 
aspire or events recalled with, for example, joy or grief. Emotions are often imbued with 
discernment, containing judgements about the salience for our wellbeing of uncontrolled 
external objects. The evaluations may be wrong, for whatever reason, leading to bad action 
or negative consequences and I shall show how this can be so in subsequent chapters. 
Emotions also, as my opening paragraph to this chapter suggests, can have a complicated 
architecture that are part narrative in form, involving a history of our relations to things we 
cherish, fear or loathe. They may be deeply rooted in the layers of our mental soil, from 
whose imprints and impressions it is often impossible to escape. Moods and feelings 
cannot capture this complexity. Like the architecture of a building, our emotions’ 
supporting structures are not only, sometimes, visible to us above the surface, but are also 
buried deep within the terrain on which that edifice stands. Our relation to, and memory of, 
a deeply loved person now many years dead whose perfume can still assail our olfactory 
senses, and whose voice may be suddenly heard, simply on hearing her favourite song, or 
passing by her favourite flowers, is testament to our emotions’ narrative force and history. 
Similarly, I may suddenly be overcome with anxiety on seeing the house where misery and 
loneliness were once the norm, despite the fact that I have not lived there for thirty years or 
more.  
 
In mere moments, as Proust notes, we can be moved from one emotional state to another in 
rapid succession, hurling from states of joy to sadness to relief, as if traversing regions so 
distinct that their unique features might as well belong to countries remotely located from 
each other. We can often experience emotions contiguously but so exterior to one another 
that we can ‘no longer comprehend, no longer even picture to (ourselves) in one, what (we) 
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desired, or feared, or accomplished in the other’ (Proust, 2003/1:184). Emotions can not 
only take us over by their force, consuming our will in the process, but they can also be 
powerful propulsions to action. One need think only of the power of grief, rage, or 
infatuated love to understand the elemental force of emotions that, arguably because of that 
force, are often dismissed as irrational and unintelligent states, a point I shall return to 
later. We are powerfully moved because our emotions may contain ‘ineliminable 
reference’ (Nussbaum, 2001:52) to the self: this is my hurt, anger or joy, reminding us 
repeatedly of our vulnerability and neediness (Seligman, 1975; Nussbaum, 2001), if not, 
indeed, of our temporality in which our consciousness of death, or fear of illness, persists 
as a background emotion (Nussbaum, 2001).  
 
d) Rationality 
The claim that emotions are very often rational might strike a discordant note given that 
emotions have often been thought of as irrational33, as blind and unthinking forces that 
propel the agent almost against her will to act in ways that could not be judged rational. 
Extreme anger, murderous hate, insane jealousy might be thought of as paradigm examples 
which support this kind of view. Othello, believing that Desdemona is unfaithful, murders 
her on what must surely be judged as scanty evidence. Why does Othello seem so ready to 
be deceived by Iago, to be driven mad by rage and jealousy? The complex psychology 
involved in Othello’s evaluations of Desdemona’s fidelity and quality of character, and his 
consequent actions seem irrational, out of proportion to the actual case34. Scorned and 
shamed, and raving at the Gods for Jason’s betrayal of her for Glauce’s royal bed, Medea35 
wants justice having sacrificed so much to love Jason faithfully and obediently. Deranged 
by love, Medea kills her own children. On what grounds can her murderous rage be 
justified? On just these two accounts, emotions seem to be a threat, not an aid, to 
rationality. In cognitive science, rationality is defined in the strong sense as behaviour that 
conforms to an optimum. Irrationality, according to Stanovich (2011:5), comes in degrees 
and is continuous from ‘fully rational’ to ‘less than perfectly rational’. Medea and Othello 
are, at least on the first definition, irrational, since neither engage in behaviour that 
conforms to an optimum, and may be ‘less than perfectly rational’ at the far end of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33Plato was of the view that emotions can subvert rationality. Emotions, however, are not necessarily any 
more irrational than thinking. See Oately (1992) for a fully developed argument on this point. 
34For further discussions on Othello, see Cavell (2003), McGinn (2006), Zamir (2007) and Nussbaum (2012). 
35I am citing from Euripides’ version of the play. The Stoics, Seneca included, were greatly interested in 
Medea for her passionate nature and great spirit but she loses her virtues because of her strong attachment to 
external goods. Medea loves ferociously. See Nussbaum (1994b, chapter 12) for a compelling account of 
Seneca’s Medea. 
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continuum. But we need to know more, I think, about their emotion situations before we 
can fully assess Medea and Othello for rationality.  
 
On a simple definition, rationality might be understood as based on reason, reason itself 
being the faculty by which we reflect, deliberate, assess, evaluate, judge or calculate the 
‘best’ course of action. Following Ronald de-Sousa (1987:5), emotions can be linked 
directly, or indirectly, to rationality in three ways: in judgements of reasonableness, as 
excuses and justifications, and in the thought-dependency of most emotions. Similarly, 
Pitcher (1965)36 suggests that emotions can be judged as being ‘warranted or unwarranted, 
justified or unjustified, reasonable or unreasonable’ (p.339). A person can have reasons for 
her emotions and emotions are ‘very often, and perhaps always’ (p.326) directed at an 
object. The emotion-situation, or the emotion eliciting conditions, consists ‘in part of some 
apprehension and of an evaluation’ (p.339) which can give reasons to act. To judge 
whether an emotion is reasonable or unreasonable, warranted or unwarranted, might 
require that we keep the ‘entire emotion-situation in view’ (p.346), keeping in view the 
apprehensions and evaluations, along with their supporting reasons. This assumes, of 
course, that such evaluations and apprehensions are available to us and herein lies the 
complexity of emotions, but if we could keep those evaluations and apprehensions in view 
that might help us to determine the rationality, or otherwise, of the emotion.  
These considerations raise further ‘puzzles’ (de-Sousa, 1987:5), if not a host of 
philosophically vexed questions. What, for example, are we to understand as ‘reasonable’ 
or ‘justified’? While recognising the complexity of these issues, an initial working 
definition of ‘reasonable’ might include something being considered ‘appropriate’. 
Alternatively, we might invoke a form of reasonableness that follows conventional, if 
generally inarticulated, standards such as ‘it is understandable why she got angry in the 
circumstances’. ‘Reasonable’ might also include the possibility of being subject to 
‘argument and justification’, which, as de-Sousa argues, are ‘notions central to rationality’ 
(1987:5). But how are emotions to be understood as ‘justifiable’? Again, following de-
Sousa’s line of argument, when we say that George got angry because his neighbour 
kicked his dog, we have an explanation, an excuse or a justification for what motivated his 
emotion, his anger. Was George’s response rational? We could reasonably suppose it was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36Pitcher critiques the ‘Traditional View’ of emotions, particularly that of Hume. This view, Pitcher argues, 
strips emotions of everything but the sensations they immediately arouse, the ‘pains, tickles, and itches’ 
(p.326). I will have more to say about the role of ‘feelings’, or affect, in emotions later in this chapter. To 
anticipate, pains, tickles, and itches can not be judged reasonable or unreasonable, for they do not take an 
object, have value to us or give us reasons to act, except to scratch the itch or the tickle, and alleviate the pain 
or irritation.  
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rational. His dog had been kicked, and we could reasonably add that he had a normative 
reason to act since he cares about his dog. His caring for the dog gave him a motivating 
reason, a decisive, or a ‘most decisive reason’ (Parfit, 2007) to so act. Let us assume that 
his neighbour had no good reason to kick the animal in the first place since the dog was 
sleeping in the garden. Even if the neighbour detests dogs because he was once bitten by a 
dog, on this occasion his action is unwarranted and so unreasonable. Perhaps one might 
say he was less than rational. Had the dog threatened the neighbour (baring his teeth, 
adopting an attack posture), then, in one way, kicking the dog might have been the rational 
thing to do. However, in another way, it would not have been the rational thing to do since 
kicking the dog could have infuriated the animal further, resulting in an attack and a 
mauled leg. On this account, the thought-dependency of emotions, what I shall later refer 
to as their ‘object’ or ‘aboutness’, along with their evaluations, can often be assessed as 
rational.  
Being ‘rational’ might also be minimally understood as taking the required means to 
achieve a desired end, once a person has reasoned about what that end is and what should 
be done to achieve it. Here, again, I am to alluding to the role that reason plays in emotions 
and in rationality and I will develop this more fully noting, in Chapter 2, that just because 
we often know the right means to achieve a desired end this does not mean that we will 
take the rights means. Often we detour from, or skip, the necessary steps in order to 
achieve our ends, making us rationally inconsistent. Bootstrapping, that is deceiving 
ourselves as to our true motives, might also detract from the rationality of emotion, 
creating reasons that justify what we prefer to do. These questions on the nature of 
rationality are difficult, requiring lengthy consideration. The best I might do here is to 
propose that emotions have a complex relationship to rationality and to argue that emotions 
can be rational responses to salience ‘among what would otherwise be an unmanageable 
plethora of objects of attention, interpretations, and strategies of inference and conduct’ 
(de-Sousa, 1987:xv). Further, given, as I said earlier, that our emotions are complexes of 
our sense of self, personality, experiences, dispositions, beliefs and values, a conclusion 
that this or that emotion is ‘rational’ or ‘irrational’ may be superficial and less than 
insightful. On the face of it, Othello might be judged irrational. He is consumed by 
jealousy and rage, wilfully refusing to admit the possibility that Desdemona is not a 
‘whore’, but that she is faithful and deeply in love with him. While everyone else knows 
the accusation of adultery to be ‘insanely false’ (Cavell, 1987:125), Othello eagerly grasps 
Iago’s flimsy evidence to corroborate what he wants to find as true. Othello both knows, 
but does not [want to] know, that Desdemona is honest and just, but he’ll ‘have some 
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proof’ (III, iii, 389-92). Cavell is less interested in which emotion Othello suffers, ‘call it 
jealousy’ he suggests, than that Othello’s suffering is an ‘extraordinary representation’ of 
the ‘ “astonishment” in sceptical doubt’ (p.128). Othello wants to keep knowledge at bay. 
As Cavell has observed, this is a tale of ‘knowing the existence of another’ (p.125), of 
‘what it means to know another exists’ (p.138). Othello wants to believe, contrary to all 
evidence, that Desdemona is a ‘false’ other. He refuses to recognise who she really is, or 
his relation to her, and in so doing reveals his fear of ‘finitude’ (Cavell, 1987:127). Even as 
hero, Othello, too, is vulnerable.  He is a human self who is finite, dependent and 
incomplete. Desdemona’s fate is to love that realisation into existence. Othello cannot bear 
Desdemona’s loving gaze because it penetrates deeply into his psyche, perhaps to his own 
sense of his blackness, a less than ‘perfect soul’ (I, ii, 31). Is Othello rational? Is he rational 
to prefer to believe that Desdemona is unfaithful rather than unfaithful? In one sense, given 
who Othello is, and what he cannot face - his own imperfection - yes, he is rational. 
Perhaps he is ‘rationally irrational’, to follow Parfit (2011), but less than rational not to 
have moderated his beliefs, powers of imagination and imaginary powers (of his 
perfection). ‘It is advice to accept one’s humanity’ (Cavell, 1987:140). Desdemona is a 
creature of flesh and blood, of human passions. She is separate from him, exists 
independently of him and so is not of him. His relationship with her, and her arousal, 
contaminates his image of himself as finite and perfect. Cavell interprets Othello’s 
scepticism as ‘the attempt to convert the human condition … into an intellectual difficulty, 
a riddle’ (p.138), a ‘metaphysical finitude as an intellectual lack’ (Cavell, 1976:263). 
Medea grieves for all she has lost, and what she must now lose through powers not of her 
making. She has been made ‘other’, a foreign woman, in Creon, abandoned and threatened 
with exile. Medea is made wretched, no pity is shown or to her sons. Anger boils, love 
turns to hate, ‘Surely, of all creatures that have life and will, we women are the most 
wretched’ (214-248). The injustice of her situation, her powerlessness as a woman enrages 
her.  
You have this city, your father’s home,  
the enjoyment of your life, and your friends’ company.  
I am alone; I have no city; now my husband  
insults me. I was taken as plunder from a land 
At the earth’s edge. I have no mother, brother, nor any 
Of my own blood to turn to in this extremity (248-284). 
 
The Chorus agree that her anger, to this point, is ‘just’. But Medea’s rage intensifies. 
Medea dismisses Jason’s insistence that she should approve of his plan, securing her and 
their children’s future by this royal marriage were she to calm her anger, as ‘glib high 
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mindedness’. He is guilty of what she charges. Jason adds insult to deep injury, 
demonstrating an unscrupulous lack of feeling: 
Even you would approve 
If you could govern your sex-jealousy. But you women 
Have reached a state where, if all’s well with your sex-life, 
You’ve everything you wish for; but when that goes wrong, 
At once all that is best and noblest turns to gall 
… If women didn’t exist 
Human life would be rid of all its miseries! (562-593) 
‘Oh what an evil power love has in people’s lives!’ (322-354) says Medea. This is a 
tragedy of excess and monstrousness. Can love be so brutal? Perhaps it can if fate itself is 
unremittingly cruel. Of all the emotions, perhaps the evaluations of love are the most 
difficult to keep in proportion. The passionate life ‘is a life of continued gaping openness 
to violation, in which pieces of the self are groping out into the world…’ (Nussbaum, 
1994b:442) and may bring us to make commit than rational acts.  
 
Of course, when we describe an act as ‘rational’, we often mean it in an ordinary, non-
technical sense. That is, an act is ‘rational’ to the extent that we judge it wise, sensible, 
understandable, the obvious thing to do, intelligent, reasonable, and so on. If we describe 
an act as ‘irrational’, we may intend to suggest that the act was stupid, thoughtless, lacking 
in sense or unreasonable. I will often use ‘irrational’ in a weaker sense to mean ‘less than 
fully rational’, following Parfit (2011:33). Thus, when I describe an emotion as ‘rational’, 
with little or no further explanation, I use the term in the ordinary sense of being 
‘reasonable’; there are sufficient reasons or enough reasons to act in a certain way. 
Because I use ‘belief’ in connection with the rationality of emotions to argue that they are, 
at least, a necessary condition for emotion, if not also, in many cases, constitutive of 
emotion, it is necessary to set out what I mean by the rationality of our beliefs. In doing so, 
I am, again, following Parfit (2011:34) who suggests the following:  
What we ought rationally to do depends in part on our beliefs about the facts.  
If we have certain beliefs about the relevant facts, and what we believe would, if it 
were true, give us a reason to act in some way, I shall call these beliefs whose 
truth would give us this reason.  
Some possible acts, then, would be: 
rational if we have beliefs about the relevant facts whose truth would give us 
sufficient reasons to act in this way, 
what we ought rationally to do if these reasons would be decisive, 
less than fully rational if we have beliefs whose truth would give us clear and decisive 
reasons not to act in this way, 
and 
irrational if these reasons would be strongly decisive. (Parfit, 2011:34, italics in the 
original) 
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To go beyond the ordinary sense of being reasonable, and to assess whether an emotion is 
rational we would need, I suggest, to know the ‘entire emotion-situation’ and all of its 
attendant appraisals, evaluations beliefs and supporting reasons. In ordinary life, having 
access to all the epistemic facts and reasons is not, however, usually possible. My friend is 
angry she has not received promotion. This is understandable, and I can sympathise with 
her, but her anger persists long after she was told she was turned down for promotion. 
Why? It turns out that her junior colleague was promoted instead. It is often impossible to 
know the epistemic facts and supporting reasons for an emotion since we frequently hide 
from what we do and should know. My friend does not confront her anger because she 
does not want to admit that she is jealous of her colleague. 
 
e) Emotions as evaluative judgements and ineliminable references 
What we can know is, obviously, imperfect and finite. One reason why literature is so 
valuable in an examination of the emotions, and hence why I draw on it in this thesis, is 
that novels can offer a more sustained exploration and examination of the epistemic facts 
of an entire emotion-situation than is often available in ‘real’ life. Novels, at least certain 
kinds of novel, are ‘profoundly committed to the emotions’ (Nussbaum, 1990:4): the life of 
compassion, or of anger, or of pity; or of these in combination with other emotions. But 
even so, what ‘knowledge’, to borrow from Nussbaum (1990), do these emotions contain? 
Beneath the eruptions of passionate or painful emotions, or below the landscapes of our 
calmer states, lies the complex person: who, what and why she is and has become. 
Emotions, too, not only reveal our own values and concerns, but connect us to others, 
speaking as they do so of our need of others, of our sociability, as well as of our insecurity. 
As Rousseau so elegantly told us, because we are not immune to vulnerability and the 
vicissitudes of life, our very weakness makes us sociable. 
Our common sufferings draw our hearts to our fellow-creatures … Every affection 
is a sign of insufficiency; if each of us had no need of others, we should hardly 
think of associating with them. So, our frail happiness has its roots in our 
weakness … All men are born naked and poor; all are liable to the sorrows of life, 
its disappointments, ills, needs, its sufferings of every kind; and all at length are 
condemned to die. (1993:218-19) 
 
I follow Nussbaum’s view (2001:22) that emotions are forms of evaluative judgements that 
ascribe to certain objects and people things that are of importance for the person’s own 
flourishing, and that they are acknowledgements of our vulnerability and neediness. In 
addition to the reasons outlined above, it is because emotions play a central role in our 
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lives that they help to define who we are and why we are as we are. Because emotions can 
move us to action, we need, if we want a just society, to ensure that those actions are 
ethical and proportionate. If we want a society peopled with healthy human beings who 
have concern for others, who know how to treat others fairly and sensitively, to take 
appropriate action when things go wrong, we need to attend to our emotional health. Our 
emotions are about something. They are perceptions of value and they embody ways of 
seeing the world with the power to increase our attentional capacity towards the object of 
our emotion. Emotions may contain beliefs37, often complex beliefs, which point to our 
capacity for good or bad judgement. Emotions are our way of connecting to others, of 
‘hooking’38 on to their good or bad, and acting to ensure that they, and we, flourish. 
Emotions allow us to discern the particulars of a situation, and are a form of critical 
activity that ought to be cultivated to a high degree if issues of justice and morality are of 
concern to us. The discriminating power of emotions will ground our ethical responses to 
external events. Certain emotions, such as compassion, can be cultivated over time as a 
significant part of developing our moral character and are especially important in 
diminishing the power of emotions such as shame or disgust that seek to denigrate or 
exclude, thereby tainting our moral judgements. There is a very important role for 
education here. Compassion, of course, may result in regard for the foolish, the non-
serious, but we can train this emotion to make it sensitive to what is of value and to judge 
the ‘size’39 of the event. When the ‘size’ is misjudged, the consequences can be truly 
awful, as we saw earlier with Othello and Medea. 
  
 
1.5 Emotions, Moral Education and Gender 
Forms of moral education that cultivate emotions such as empathy and compassion are 
important.  The use of novels affords a means of cultivating the emotions in schools and I 
develop this theme in Chapter 7. If the novel is a tour of all human experience, presenting 
cases of human need, vulnerability and worthiness to cultivate empathic understanding and 
compassionate appreciation of the characters, bringing pupils to immerse themselves in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37For further development of beliefs as necessary and sufficient, and constitutive of emotions, see Nussbaum 
(2001), pp.33-36. Nussbaum holds that beliefs are both necessary and sufficient for an emotion. She notes 
that the precise relationship between emotions and belief has long been debated, but that most accounts 
accept that belief is necessary for the emotion to occur. See Williams (1973), Rorty (1980), Lutz (1988), de-
Sousa (1987), Nussbaum (2001).  
38I borrow this from Nussbaum (2001:19). 
39Nussbaum employs the idea of ‘size’ in compassionate regard, which she takes from Aristotle. Objects, 
which have ‘size’ include evil brought about by chance, death, disease and shortage of food, and evils from 
sources that were expected to bring good things. See Rh.1386a4-14. We do not pity, or should not pity, the 
loss of trivial things such as a ‘toothbrush or paper clip’ (Nussbaum, 2001:307). 
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worlds of others to simulate their experiences vividly and imaginatively, could be a crucial 
moral component of cultivating emotions in education. Essential to an education in 
compassion and empathy, is the selection of situations, characters and texts that are both 
close to and remote from our own cultural concerns and partialities. If we accept that 
empathy is protean, there is no reason to think that we cannot extend the boundaries of 
concern for others, and thereby inhibit exclusive self- and group-privileging. An empathy-
free world is not to be endured. The Nazis were very successful in blocking not only 
compassion for those they wanted to destroy, but empathy too. By describing the Jews as 
cockroaches, homosexuals as deviants, and the Roma as filth, a rail track was cut to the 
death camps of Europe. As Burleigh trenchantly puts it, the souls of the Germans were 
raped when: 
… sections of the German elites and masses or ordinary people chose to abdicate 
their individual critical faculties in favour of a politics based on faith, hope, hatred 
and sentimental self-regard for their own race and nation. (Burleigh, 2000:1) 
 
If we need a more contemporary, less extreme example, then educators who are confronted 
with pupils who are angry, abusive, uninterested, cruel, indifferent to other’s pain, and so 
on, will need compassion and empathy if they are to be able to continue teaching them in a 
non-prejudicial way. This is no easy task for teachers who are expected to deal sensitively 
and fairly with bad behaviour. If we understand that many difficult and challenging pupils 
come from abusive and neglectful backgrounds, where violence is the norm, it is not 
surprising that their own behaviour will be far from what is deemed desirable. These 
pupils’ emotions may well be stunted or maladaptive. That is, the judgements, appraisals 
or apprehensions may be absent, poorly construed or formed from error, with respect to the 
extent of danger, motivation or intentions of those who would harm them. The medical 
evidence supports this view. Victims of abuse tend not to reason well as I shall indicate in 
Chapters 6 and 7. The question for those of us interested in making the case for 
compassion (and for the teaching of emotions more generally) in schools, in education 
more broadly, and, indeed in all public institutions, is how to change the vision of the 
emotionally damaged person, that is, the person who is excessively angry, unemotional, or 
both, so that her responses are more appropriate to the circumstances in which she finds 
herself.  
 
Bowlby (1988) argued that violence in the family was a major contributory cause of many 
psychiatric syndromes, a fact that had been ignored by clinicians, not least because of the 
influence of Freudian analysis with its focus on the unconscious and the fantastical. 
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Ignoring the effects of real life acts and contexts on real life people has profoundly 
negative real life consequences, as our damaged young children, young offenders and 
prison populations can attest. According to Bowlby, Freud’s decision in 1897 to view 
childhood seductions as ‘aetiologically’ (1988: 87) unimportant to mental health, and to 
dismiss such seductions as the product of their imaginations, ensured that abuse and 
violence were perpetrated from one generation to the next. Subsequently, Freudian 
psychoanalysts, Bowlby asserted, did not think it important to consider how parental 
treatment affected the child. In any case, following Freud, these fantasies were probably 
the result of prejudice, scapegoating and bias on the part of the child towards her parent[s]. 
As Bowlby pointed out, and it seems so obvious to us now, ‘violence breeds violence, and 
violence in families tends to perpetuate itself from one generation to the next’ (1988:87). 
Breaking the cycle of abuse calls for significant resources including, I will argue 
throughout, imaginative resources and imaginative empathy from teachers. It also calls for 
the cultivation of imaginative empathy in and towards those we teach. 
 
Imagination is also involved in complex emotions because of what we imagine as 
alternatives for others and ourselves. When we pity, we often imagine that there is little we 
can do to alleviate suffering, and sometimes this will be the case (as in terminal illness). 
However, pity, when it is used inappropriately to evaluate another’s situation, may mask 
other feelings, including guilt. If, for example, I remain calm with a pupil who has behaved 
odiously to another, pitying him rather than being angered by him, this might result in 
action that is uncaring and disproportionate, sanctioning the poor behaviour rather than 
condemning it through morally appropriate anger. Similarly, if I pity another pupil, judging 
her to be inferior in comparison to her peers, and if I believe that it is the pupil’s own fault 
that she has few friends, that emotion may mask my contempt or disgust for this pupil. 
These are important moral judgements I am making, and the actions I do or do not take, on 
the basis of those judgements and their concomitant emotions, are crucial for the wellbeing 
of those I teach. 
 
Inevitably, as I have noted, emotions are deeply intertwined with notions of gender. My 
analysis of emotions here follows an account of moral philosophy because it is concerned 
with analyzing, defending and recommending concepts of right and wrong behaviour, with 
how things ought to be40. I will argue that emotions ought not to be gendered. Because 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40Kant, for example, proposes that the most basic aim of moral philosophy is to search and establish the 
supreme principle of morality (GW:4:392), the categorical imperative: ‘what ought I to do?’. The Humanity 
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emotions connect us to others, how well we relate to others so that we cause no harm, how 
we respect others as distinct and separate, endowing them with dignity, and thereby 
endowing them with dignity, is an important feature of moral philosophy. Emotions pose 
problems for morality but also aid it, as Nussbaum (2001) claims, and I shall argue that 
emotions must be part of our educative training. The difficult task for educators is how to 
help pupils choose and express the right emotion, in the right way and to the right extent. 
Such an education is about consciously shaping emotional capacities so that we refine 
them into more discerning mechanisms. To ‘choose an emotion is to choose to cultivate 
them’ (Sherman, 1997:79) and while we cannot always ordain a given emotion, the aim 
should be to develop a state of character that shapes emotional capacities as a lasting 
resource of good character. If we succeed in this endeavour, our emotions become not ‘raw 
impulses’ but socialised moral responses to events that are often beyond our control. Over 
time, our emotions can be refined and brought under our control to serve us in ways that 
express our dignity and that respect the moral worth of others. Gendered emotions may 
impact on our respect for others persons if we deem their emotional response to be over-
expressive or under-expressive of their sex; or inappropriately expressed in certain social 
situations. 
 
To see how well we can achieve this, I will draw on a fictional pupil, Nancy, who 
embodies so many of the unappealing traits which confront teachers every day41. I will 
explore some of the complex issues I raise in this thesis through Nancy, bringing to life 
arguments and discussions that might otherwise seem abstract and remote from daily life. 
Further, because of my interest in the novel, and my assertion that the novel can be used to 
cultivate moralised emotions, it is worth asking how the novel might help a pupil like 
Nancy examine her own emotional states, the states of fictional characters, her responses to 
those events, and what she can learn from these fictionalised events. That is, how will 
Nancy understand, evaluate, examine and infer from the narratives she is reading, and how 
will she compare these to her own life? Will Nancy, despite her own troubles, be able to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Formula (GW:4:431) of the categorical imperative states that we must always treat ourselves or other people 
not as a mere means, but as ends, respecting our humanity. This formulation, in demanding that we respect 
humanity, limits what we can do in pursuit of our ends because we must respect, and promote, the ends of 
others (GW:4:430). In the Nicomachean Ethics (hereafter NE.), justice is the ‘sovereign’ virtue (1129b28) 
because we are just in relation to somebody else. The ‘best person’ is one who exercises justice for the 
advantage of the other; the ‘worst person’ is one who ‘exercises his wickedness towards both himself and his 
friends’ (1130a5-10). 
41In my concluding chapter I note, with thanks to Gayle Letherby for pointing this out to me, that presenting 
the narrative of Nancy, without a parallel narrative of a boy, has its limitations. The constraints of word 
limits and my focus on girls and women in this thesis did not permit such an account but this may be 
remedied in future work.  
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read with imagination, sympathy, compassion, anger, horror, disgust or envy and, if she 
can, might that be beneficial to her own emotional wellbeing? I present brief narratives 
from Nancy which describe her home life and her experiences in school42. While the 
narratives are fictionalised, they are based on many accounts of abuse, of which I have had 
personal experience, have read43 or have had recounted by pupils.  
 
Nancy is 14 years old and very slight. While she is often angry, at other times she is 
unresponsive, seemingly oblivious to her surroundings. She veers from being interested 
and compliant, to being obstreperous and provocative. While Nancy is needy, she exults in 
being the object of some very negative attention that includes insults, jeering, dismissal by 
her peers, and vexed comments by her teachers. She is also the object of ridicule because 
of the way in which she defiantly stomps down the corridor, ready to lash out should the 
expected negative comment come her way. Nancy does not know what to do with 
kindness. At best, she will work quietly, at other times she will leave the classroom, 
without permission, to seek the one other girl who seems equally bent on staying in 
permanent trouble. Nancy rarely smiles and rarely displays happiness or contentment. In 
fact, these states seem entirely absent from Nancy’s character. I will follow her through 
this thesis, imagining what she might do and how she might react in a variety of situations, 
asking what we could do to help her develop positive characteristics that protect her from 
the taunts of her peers, and give her a feeling of security in school. Nancy also comes from 
a violent home, which might help explain her emotional outbursts, her difficulties in 
affiliating with her peers and teachers and concentrating on her work. The principle 
question is how we can help a girl like Nancy flourish so that she can enjoy self-esteem 
and respect that might, more easily, enable us to treat her with dignity so that she can learn 
to reciprocate? If Nancy is to enjoy a good life emotionally, to realise eudaimonia, and to 
avoid becoming a victim of later abuse44, she will need to be encouraged to use her own 
agency and effort. This will need time and continuous careful effort. Virtuous action 
requires internal effort (how can I reason well?) and successful external action (how can I 
act well?) and both require propitious conditions (a warm and positive environment, a 
good education), as well as external resources or goods (her teachers’ time and 
compassion). Whatever Nancy’s potential capacities, those are not likely to be realised if 
they are left raw and untutored. The same will be true of her emotions if they are left prey 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42The narrative is in the regional vernacular to give the account an authentic feel as few children I teach 
speak Standard English. 
43For example, Dobash and Dobash (2000). 
44As often happens with abused children. See for example, Mullender et al. (2002) and Chapter 7 here. 
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to the vagaries of her own poorly formed construals and judgements, beyond the reach of 
her own will and consent to emotional temperance. What I would like to happen to Nancy 
over time is that she develop the capacity to do more than simply repress or control her 
emotions, especially her anger. I want her to choose her emotions but choosing ‘involves 
an education of consciously shaping emotional capacities and refining them into more 
discerning sensitivities’ (Sherman, 1997:79). So, while Nancy, in common with all of us, 
cannot always will a given emotion, we can help her, as Sherman (1979:79) suggests to 
‘develop a state of character that shapes emotional capacities as an enduring resource of 
character’. 
 
In the company of Nancy then, and assisted by a number of literary characters, I will 
develop my analysis of what an emotion is. I like de Sousa’s (1987:1) articulation of 
emotions as a kind of ‘philosophical hub’ leading us to problems of epistemology, 
ontology, psychology, ethics, and logical form. From within this hub I will take into 
account a number of different perspectives on what actually constitutes an emotion, 
theoretically and philosophically, drawing from other disciplines as and when it is apposite 
and enriching to my account to do so, and when I need to illuminate the argument. Given 
emotion’s complexity and variety, to rely only on one discipline alone would be to fail to 
give the analysis the depth and breadth the study of emotion deserves45.  
 
1.6 Organisation of the Thesis. 
The thesis is structured around seven chapters, including this introductory chapter. Each 
chapter adds an additional layer by way of developing the argument of what has gone 
before. The chapters are threaded through with the narrative of Nancy and excerpts from 
novels. I selected the novels for this thesis for a variety of reasons. All are books that I 
loved reading, not least, and importantly for this thesis, because of their rich moral content. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45Other disciplines can give us insights, concepts and formulations that might enrich the philosophical 
account. For example, fMRI imaging has implicated regions of the brain affected in depression. Damage to 
this area is now understood to mediate emotional cognition and behaviour that may be dysfunctional in 
depression. So, rather than speculate about the possible causes of depression, or emotional dysfunction, one 
can point to significant evidence for the source of a debilitating condition and offer treatment. Similarly, 
Giese-Davis and Spiegel (2009) demonstrate the importance of understanding empirical evidence if we are to 
understand emotions and the progression of cancer. For example, they cite the popular misconception that 
cancer patients who yield to fear will contribute to the progression of the disease. Instead, research supports 
the association between emotional suppression and helplessness, and repression and cancer incidence. 
Developments in neuroscience can now provide detailed accounts of the brain science that underlie 
emotional memory and learning (LaBar and LeDoux, 2009) and Davidson et al. (2009) point to a wide range 
of scientific, cultural, anthropological and psychological studies which have increased our understanding of 
emotions.	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Proust writes beautifully on the emotions, especially on love, grief and jealousy. A Heart 
of Darkness by Joseph Conrad and The Road by Cormac McCarthy (Chapter 3) are both 
morally complex novels and they exemplify, for me, the consequences of inhumanity, 
human and environmental degradation, and how well, or not, we behave when the norms 
of a just society are absent. Unless by Carol Shields (Chapter 4) and Cat’s Eye by Margaret 
Atwood  (Chapter 5) exemplify concerns raised in this thesis with respect to gender 
stereotypes and their potential to restrict autonomy, agency and personhood. While these 
novels, and others I cite variously, exemplify the points I make in each chapter, many of 
them, including The Road, Heart of Darkness and Cat’s Eye, are either on reading lists in 
Scottish secondary schools or are recommended for advanced personal study. Some of the 
novels, such as The Road, might be considered too bleak and hence inappropriate for 
Nancy and others of her age. However, Heart of Darkness is also a bleak depiction human 
depravity and yet is part of the literary canon along with the war poems of the First World 
War. The Scottish curriculum also includes holocaust literature as well as teaching on the 
appalling losses and brutality of the two Great Wars. My view is that literature can play a 
philosophical and epistemic role in the cultivation of moral emotions and the habituation of 
character. Reading literature, in this sense, may be instrumental since it is aimed at desiring 
a good end, but reading remains, nevertheless, good for its own sake. 
In Chapter 2, I establish what an emotion is and consider how, and in what ways, emotions 
are intrinsic to wellbeing. I pursue the line here that emotions are complex, sometimes 
overt and at other times subtle, responses to events of significance to us: they are a sort of 
window onto the external world. Emotions, I will argue, as suggested above, are nearly 
always directed at ‘objects’. Kenny (1963:41), for example, stipulates that emotions are 
‘essentially’ directed at objects, that is, they are about something which is of some value to 
us, involving judgements, interpretations, appraisals or beliefs about the object, and they 
can motivate us to action. I gave the example earlier: ‘I am angry with X because he hit the 
dog. I love dogs, and believe, very strongly, that abusing powerless creatures is wrong.’ 
From this example, we can see that emotions have cognitive content as they involve 
thinking about, judging, evaluating or imagining the importance of a salient external object 
and what might be happening to the object. I will argue, too, that emotions can be rational 
because they evaluate objects. This is critical, not least because emotions, especially 
women’s emotions, are so often dismissed as irrational. On the account I present here, 
however, it will be evident that this cannot be so. Emotions take in information from the 
external world and we react, in some way, to that information. I shall claim that emotions 
are normative and potentially ethical responses to salient events. I will also claim, adding 
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to the rich complexity of emotions, that they are, usually, an acknowledgement of 
neediness and lack of control over external events. 
 
In Chapter 3, I focus specifically on the family of what are often known as ‘other-
regarding’ emotions, and compassion in particular. A central argument of the thesis is that 
compassion can guide ethical action because it usually entails intense regard for, and a 
desire to alleviate suffering from, the object of the emotion. Compassion has a different 
nature from other emotions such as anger or indeed sympathy, compassion’s close kin. It 
follows a different course of thought and takes a different object; namely, an object that is 
suffering harm that is undeserved to some degree. Compassion, appropriately cultivated to 
see the ‘size’ of the object, is the ‘guardian’ of the moral domain (Haidt, 2009), motivating 
us to act to alleviate suffering and to regard the object as a person of dignity worthy of our 
respect. I will suggest that we should aim to cultivate moralised compassion, by which I 
mean a compassionate regard for the object that is proportional, sensitive, discerning and 
motivated by appropriate action. I revisit moralised compassion throughout the thesis and 
will argue, in the conclusion, that education curricula should include a study of the 
emotions in order that teachers, for example, can be discerning and ethically evaluative.  
 
Moralised compassion, I will argue, is important in the creation of just institutions. My 
proposal for the cultivation of moralised compassion leads me to the next chapter in which 
I focus on the ethics of care and the need for that to be supported by moral theory. This 
chapter comprises a complex and detailed discussion intended as groundwork for the later 
arguments of this thesis. Essentially, I shall assert that to care in the right way, at the right 
time and for the right reason, requires an engagement with the rules of moral salience; 
namely, the capacity to deliberate with perception and insight on articulated features of the 
environment. Good care demands, I argue, careful, sensitive, self-regarding, as well as 
other-regarding, thought and action. Discriminating amongst acts of ethical relevance is a 
matter of sizing up situations in terms of past and current experience, as well as attending 
to some imaginative and affective feel for the situation at hand. Women, so often seen as 
‘natural’ carers because of their ‘innate’ compassionate natures, tend to do most of the 
caring work, often to their own detriment. Care, too, is often undervalued and rarely 
understood because it is seen as an activity that requires low-level skills and little by way 
of intellectual ability or moral capacity. I suggest the contrary. Good care, like all ethical 
acts, requires the capacity for moral and abstract reasoning. Contrary to deeply held and 
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stereotypical views, both sexes have the capacities for good care and my position is that 
care that disdains or ignores the role of justice, universal principles, the importance of 
conceptual thinking, personhood, and that misunderstands or misapplies emotion theory, 
including moralised compassion, may be harmful to the care-receiver as well as to the 
care-giver. Any neglected or over-protected child, indeed carers with few ends of their 
own, knows this well. Because of its defence of, and intense respect for, the individual, I 
call on the moral and theoretical principles of liberal theory to support my case here, 
drawing primarily on Kant and Rawls. I propose that, if we wish to have just institutions, 
including schools, we need to understand how the role and functions of men and women 
are gendered and, in turn, how emotions are gendered.  
 
Having established the need for care to be supported by moral theory, I move, in Chapter 
5, to demonstrate how women have been brought up to feel more and to care more based 
on beliefs that they have innate, biological capacities which prepare them for caring roles. 
Here I demonstrate ways in which ‘science’ is being used to ‘prove’ innate biological 
difference, suggesting these claims are precipitate and should be viewed with much greater 
caution. In sum, I argue that if scientists already believe in innate difference then they will 
be predisposed to find difference when they come to analyse and interpret their results. 
However, because science is respected and is seen as authoritative, largely inaccessible to 
non-scientists, the claims scientists make have considerable bearing on how we see men 
and women. Unless we are wise to the legitimacy, or otherwise, of so-called proven 
scientific claims, they will serve to further promote and perpetuate gendered stereotypes 
about emotional capacity and natural sex roles. I then consider studies from psychology 
which indicate the extent to which emotions are gendered, and the extent to which our 
emotional expressions and interpretations are influenced by beliefs about who should 
express which emotion, when, and to what degree. 
 
Chapter 6 comprises a number of themes as it endeavours to pull together the threads of 
the thesis. Initially, I focus on Nancy and a short narrative from her life, using this to then 
demonstrate that emotions are vital to good health, wellbeing and functioning. To support 
the force of this claim I consider a number of psychological and medical studies on the 
effects of abuse on the emotional states of abused women, as well as the emotional states 
of men who abuse. In order to cope with adverse conditions and the indignities of abuse, 
girls and women (as well as boys and men) adopt adaptive emotional strategies which, 
while rational in the circumstances, are inimical to their wellbeing in a number of 
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disturbing ways. Having discussed the justifications men make for abusing their intimate 
partners and their children, I turn to the Capabilities Approach developed by Martha 
Nussbaum, proposing that this ethical framework can act as a guide to good conduct in our 
schools so that those concerned for the welfare of children and young adults can evaluate 
their acts against the ten central capabilities. My specific focus, however, will be on 
Capability 5, the emotions. Because emotions occur as a result of an eliciting condition in 
which perception, evaluation, imagination, deliberation, and motivating impulses are all 
present, allowing us to function in the world, to do and to be in intelligent and 
discriminating ways, I will suggest that emotions are an architectonic capability that 
anchors all other capabilities.  
 
In the concluding chapter, I develop my recommendation that a study of emotions should, 
as a matter of ethical importance critical to wellbeing and functioning, be included in 
educational curricula. This, I shall suggest, would enable educators to respond to pupils 
with greater sympathy and compassion and, moreover, ensure they could play a significant 
role in de-gendering emotions, to the benefit of both men and women. I draw on the books 
I have used in the thesis to propose that novels can extend the imaginative world of the 
mind and provide a valuable means by which to examine and understand moral theory 
relevant to our emotions. In this concluding chapter I also summarise my central 
arguments, outline the limitations of this thesis, point forward to further enquiry I would 
like to undertake, and reflect on the personal impact of this thesis. 
 
There is one final, but important, point. The style I adopt in this thesis is not committed to 
a single disciplinary conception of discourse, and my task is not simply to adhere to the 
rather economic language of philosophical argument. As Nussbaum (1990:49) has argued, 
there is ‘no single rule’ as to which style should be adopted in works which use literature 
to understand life and enrich philosophical accounts. Commenting on the dominance of 
conventional philosophical prose and regardless of the topic under examination, Nussbaum 
(1990:19) observed that the style of writing adopted by the descendants of the great 
philosophers was not just dry, correct, and abstract, but seemed to be ‘a kind of all-purpose 
solvent in which philosophical issues of any kind could be efficiently disentangled and all 
conclusions neatly disengaged’. No other style of writing was asserted or denied. 
Nussbaum attributes this preference to a ‘long-standing fascination’ with the style of 
natural science. While there is, of course, nothing wrong with this conventional style in 
and of itself, it is not, in every context and study, the only option.  
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Content from beyond philosophy has helped shaped the form of my argument. So I am 
allusive and, sometimes, literary, not always following the conventional structure of 
traditional philosophical argument. In addition to drawing from other disciplines, literature 
is used in this thesis both to enrich philosophical points and as an heuristic for moral 
education, and as in literature, I follow the styles which best suit my purpose, while 
accepting that these will not please all. Finally, Nancy’s dialogue and key parts of her story 
are italicised, as are the extracts from novels that I use as chapter epigraphs.  
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Chapter Two: What is an Emotion? 
 
The region of sadness I had just entered was as distinct from the region into 
which I had hurled myself with such joy only a moment before, as in certain skies 
a band of pink is separated as though by a line from a band of green or a band of 
black. (Proust, 1913:183) 
 
2.1 Introduction. 
If we had no attachments, many emotions would not figure in our lives46. It would not 
matter if misery, ills or sorrow stalked the world, or why, because our insecurity and need 
of others would not be known to us47. But we are sociable and we are insecure, and so we 
do need others. The first argument I will make in this chapter is that emotions express our 
deep attachments to people and to our goals and plans. I will begin by providing a general 
structure of three emotions, jealousy, grief and shame, suggesting that emotions can be 
cognitive, evaluative and intentional, and that they can reveal our values and aspirations. I 
will suggest, further, that emotions can entail imaginative reconstruction of what is 
happening in the external world, and that this capacity requires intelligence and 
discernment, along with the capacity to deliberate, to reason, well. In arguing in this way, I 
will be claiming that emotions are not necessarily capricious or necessarily blind to reason. 
On the contrary, emotions can aid reasoning. Reasoning well with what we have appraised 
from the external world, indeed from our own internal world, is important to making good 
assessments of what is happening and what we ought to do in response. Emotions can, of 
course, lead to immoral conduct, as my arguments on the effects of abuse on women’s and 
girls’ wellbeing in later chapters demonstrates, and so I do not argue that emotions are 
automatically ‘self-certifying’ (Nussbaum, 1990:42) sources of ethical behaviour. Rather, 
and following Aristotle, I suggest that we should learn from concrete experience and that 
this will require the cultivation of perception and judgement, the ability to read the 
environment for salience, and to deliberate on appropriate responses. If the evaluations are 
appropriate or well informed, and this is not always easy to achieve, then moral conduct is 
more likely to follow. And so our emotional responses, if properly cultivated over time, 
can lead to wisely chosen, virtuous action that responds appropriately to the conditions of 
human life.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46See fn. 32, p.25. There is a class of emotions, such as fear, anger, disgust, sadness, surprise and happiness, 
that are ‘basic’ and universal, the product of evolution. This is a classification that goes as far back as 
Darwin. See, for example, Wilfred Janig in Davidson et al. (2009:176). Fear, along with other basic 
emotions, is not the result of associative learning, and cannot be completely changed or modified. Robinson 
Crusoe, though solitary for a time, could almost certainly experience fear, anger or sadness. 
47See Nussbaum (1986) on the role of fragility and vulnerability in moral life. 
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The philosophical bases for the case I will make here, and indeed throughout the thesis, 
derive from Aristotle’s virtue ethics and Kant’s moral philosophy48. I will then discuss 
emotions in more detail, examining their characteristics, components and structure. This 
examination will include the evaluation, motivation and feeling associated with emotions, 
along with the characteristics of emotions’ intensity, duration and social comparison 
element. For the social comparison part of the discussion, I shall refer to my fictional pupil 
Nancy. The purpose of deconstructing emotions in such detail is to demonstrate that 
emotions are compound and diverse, complex and subtle, and that they may consist of 
multiple entities. This section is followed by a discussion on the intentionality of emotions, 
intentionality being that which tells us what the emotion is ‘about’, the ‘object’ of the 
emotion, and what circumstances elicited the emotion. Briefly, intentionality, here, 
focusses on the following: Nancy is angry at X because X has done Y and Y is important 
to Nancy in some way49. From intentionality, I move to a consideration of beliefs, 
judgements and appraisals, portmanteau terms for the evaluative component of the 
emotion. This evaluative component is very closely linked to the intentionality of the 
emotion because in having an emotion I am responding to something I judge or believe to 
have occurred. To take the brief sentence once more: Nancy is angry at X (intentionality) 
because X, Nancy believes, has done Y and Y is important to her in some way. That 
emotions have evaluative components consisting of beliefs, judgements or appraisals can 
be seen if Nancy now receives new information about X. Nancy was angry at X because 
she believed he had done Y. However, she now learns that X did not, in fact, do Y. W, his 
friend, is culpable. Therefore, she is angry at W and remorseful for blaming X. In setting 
out the argument for beliefs in this way, I am asserting that emotions can be malleable: 
change the evaluation and you can change the emotion. Nancy moves from anger at X to 
remorse for accusing X of doing Y. The combination of intentionality and evaluations 
forms what is referred to as the propositional content of emotions.  
 
My next move is to argue that emotions can be rational and intelligent, and that they are 
essential to ethical conduct. I will support my argument by relating rationality to three real 
and one fictional example, and by following Hampton’s (2007) account of Mens Rea, 
looking at willful irrationality and culpable rationality. What I am interested in here is the 
role of choice in actions, and how choice is guided by reason. How we deliberate, the 
decisions we come to or judgements we make will depend, to a great extent, on the quality 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48I acknowledge, however, with thanks to David Carr for pointing this out, that Aristotle and Kant are not 
everywhere consistent, especially with regard to practical reason. 
49I call this, simply, the X-Y-Z scenario. 
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of those deliberations and the views or beliefs which inform the deliberations that motivate 
us to subsequent action. Our upbringing, education and the kind of society in which we 
live has a profoundly significant bearing on our deliberative capacities and on the beliefs 
we hold. Emotions, I shall argue, can act as our moral compass and serve as strong barriers 
to immoral conduct. They can connect us, as I suggested earlier, to virtuous conduct and I 
argue, here, that emotions are rational to the extent that the beliefs they contain are true 
and the values they express are good. Saving my examples for later treatment, I will resort, 
for brevity and simplicity, to the X-Y-Z scenario of the kind I used above.  
 
Nancy was angry at X because she believed he had done Y. Her anger was fair and rational 
on the basis of the evidence she had. It turns out, however, that it was W who committed 
the act but Nancy refuses to believe it was W and continues to accuse X, despite 
supporting evidence from witnesses. Is Nancy being rational in her anger at X? Perhaps 
not. Her belief is now false but she is refusing to accept the truth that it was W. This might 
be because she harbours resentment at X for other misdemeanours and cannot let go of this 
opportunity to be angry with him, even though on this occasion that seems neither rational 
nor fair. Here she wants to uphold and defend herself as a person of dignity and of value. 
Nancy is perhaps being willfully irrational and her unjustified anger is not virtuous. But it 
seems unfair to say that she is willfully irrational once we know that, lying deep within her 
emotional complex, there is a reason for her anger at X. X has teased and taunted her so 
often that she does not trust her peers who back the claims of the popular X. It may be that 
Nancy does not understand the real reason for her anger in this situation: confused, 
neglected or abused children often do not, or cannot, distinguish between their emotions or 
the causes of their emotional states. Emotions are complex, subtle, nuanced, painful, 
revelatory and masking. She is responding to, and trying to cope with, adversity, but in 
maladaptive ways. It seems, superficially, that Nancy is irrational; but given that what is at 
stake are her dignity, self-esteem, and experiences, I think Nancy is all too rational. Her 
behaviour is also understandable because intelligible (some aspects of rationality depend 
on the concept of intelligibility50) on the basis of what she reasons and why. Nancy’s 
experience has taught her to distrust her peers. She does not, so far, have clear and decisive 
reasons to believe that it was, in fact, W who committed the act. So, for good experiential 
reasons, perhaps even for good epistemic reasons (no-one has persuaded her, or provided 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50Goldie (2000:12) prefers the notion of ‘intelligibility’ as it is a ‘thinner’ notion than rationality, a claim for 
which, on his view, over-intellectualises emotions. 
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her with evidence that it was W not X), Nancy is holding fast to her current belief. She 
might, however, be judged as ‘irrational’ in the ordinary sense of ‘foolish’. 
In holding to the complexity, rationality and intelligence of emotions, I will argue for a 
moral theory that makes a claim for the intrinsic and equal worth of human beings. I shall 
do so for three reasons. First, respect for intrinsic and equal worth enables the person to be 
and to do in order to flourish in truly human ways: we have dignity by virtue of being 
human. Secondly, intrinsic and equal worth may enable us to have a sense of what a person 
needs, as a particular and distinct person, in order to flourish as that person. And thirdly, 
such a moral theory can help us recognize our own and other’s neediness and vulnerability, 
that we should not be ashamed of that neediness or be made vulnerable to exploitation 
because of it. I will develop these themes further in the next chapter. Emotions, as noted 
earlier, are our lives’ palimpsests on which our experiences have been written. Emotions, 
and the experiences which give birth to them and shape them, live deep within our 
personalities where many different times co-exist, flowing at different speeds and 
intensities, enshrining our values, concerns and goals. 
 
 
2.2  The General Structure of Emotions: Jealousy, Grief and Shame. 
Emotions, I have said, may be understood as cognitive, intelligent and rational responses to 
external stimuli. In stating that emotions contain cognitive content, I am referring, 
following Lazarus (1991a:820), to knowledge and appraisal of what is happening in the 
environment51. By intelligent, I mean that the evaluations and motivations constitute, to a 
considerable degree, an appropriate and intelligible response to the eliciting condition. 
That is, the evaluation and action make the emotion intelligible52. As Nussbaum (2001:16) 
observes:  
[w]hen we wake up, we have to figure out how to live in [the] world of objects. 
Without the intelligence of the emotions, we have little hope of controlling that 
problem well. 
By rational I mean responding to facts or events that give us decisive reasons to act and to 
take efficient measures to pursue our valued goals. Following Parfit (2011:113-115), what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51See Aristotle (2004); Scherer (2009) and Ellsworth and Scherer (2009). The concept of cognition also 
encompasses patterns of perceptions, processing of data and perceptions, computational processes, 
interpretation of events, and appraisals of salience. 
52See de-Sousa (1987, chapter 5). 
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makes our evaluations or beliefs rational, or not, is their content, not the consequent action 
arising from those evaluations and beliefs53.  
In summary, an emotion may be understood as consisting of the following parts: 
• Emotions often have objects which are of some value to us. This is the ‘thought 
content’ of a mental phenomena emotion (intentionality)54.  
• Emotions have cognitive content because they involve thinking about, judging the 
importance, value or non-importance of a salient external object.  
• Emotions often involve judgements, interpretations, appraisals or beliefs about the 
object of value.  
• Emotions may contain general (dogs are great companions) and concrete (my dog 
is a great companion) evaluations; and background (ongoing emotions, and 
dispositional) or situational judgements (happening now, or episodic).55  
• Emotions may be rational because they evaluate objects of value thereby judging 
the extent to which the external object is important to one's well being and 
flourishing. One reason why my PhD is very important to me as it that it may help 
me in my career (self-referential emotion). However, someone else may judge it 
unimportant because a PhD is of no value to that person's career or wellbeing, 
though she may judge, nevertheless, that it is important to me. Emotions may be 
‘constitutively’ rational (Greenspan, 2000:478), at least to the extent that they help 
realise a valued end. Emotional behaviour, of course, may not be rational. It may 
still, however, be ‘rationally irrational’ (Parfit, 1984:14) meaning that I may 
sometimes depart from reason in order to achieve some end.  
• Emotions may be classified as negative or positive. Negative emotions are those 
which contain negative appraisals. Anger and fear are the obvious emotions in this 
category and others include grief, shame, disgust, dread, unhappiness and 
resentment. Positive emotions usually contain positive appraisals. These might 
include pride, joy, jubilance, gloating (taking pleasure at another’s misfortune), 
hope, admiration, awe and esteem. 
• Emotions can be motivations to action. Peter is beating a dog, for no good reason 
that can be seen, and I may be moved to act in some way. I like dogs and feel pity 
for the dog’s situation. If I do not like dogs then I may be less likely to experience 
an emotion at the animal’s beating. Rather, I might ignore the dog’s treatment. 
(Here, we can see how emotions can contain moral content, judgements of what is 
right or wrong, what we ought or should do.)  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53I acknowledged in the introduction that there is contestation, complexity and ambiguity in what rationality 
entails, especially in discussions of emotions and emotionally inspired immoral behaviour (Othello), and 
irrational actions which emerge from false beliefs or erroneous evaluations. Othello’s beliefs were irrational, 
his action extreme. His actions, however, may be seen as rational according to what he believed, as well as 
by what his society judged as appropriate for their norms and customs. The acts were rationally derived from, 
and supported by, beliefs, themselves formed from experience and disposition. Nancy may have erred in her 
judgement, but experience had formed in her a belief never to trust her teasers.   
54Mental phenomena, Wollheim proposes, need not be ‘complete thought’ as grammarians would term it, or a 
‘proposition’ but, rather, may be limited to a ‘concept’ as in (to use his own example) ‘fear is a fear of frogs’ 
(1999:6). And see chapter 2.  
55Wollheim (1999:1-2) discusses this distinction in terms of mental states and mental dispositions. Mental 
states are the ‘transient events which make up the lived part of the life of the mind’. Mental dispositions are 
‘persisting modifications’ which underlie mental states. Mental dispositions are formed from our life 
histories and innate abilities. They contain beliefs, desires, memories, abilities, skills, and so on, and ‘wax 
and wane’ throughout the course of our life.  
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• Emotions can be an acknowledgement of neediness and lack of control over 
external events. I fear death or illness; I love my mother and need her for my well-
being (as I do my friends)  
• Emotions may require or depend upon an active imagining of the object. Even 
when there is no object present, as in objectless (irrational) fear, fear is nevertheless 
present. I fear I am going to fall of the side of the mountain even though I know the 
ridge is too wide for that too happen. Here I am imagining myself falling off the 
mountain. 
 
I noted in the introduction to this chapter that if we had no attachments we would have no 
need for emotions because our insecurity and need of others would not be known to us. But 
humans are sociable animals and we are insecure: we cannot control every aspect of our 
lives and life is often contingent on others and events in ways that are unpredictable and 
unexpected. Few, I imagine, live strictly deterministic lives in which everything is known 
and mapped out. If there are people who so do56, they may have few occasions to express 
their emotions as their lives are so uneventful. We can also posit that when significant 
events do come along, their responses will be more maladaptive than people with eventful 
lives rich in contingency and unpredictability because they will lack the emotional 
experience and resources to respond. We can examine the strengths of these claims by 
looking at just three examples: jealousy, grief and shame. Let us begin with jealousy. 
Jealousy is a powerful and often destructive emotion. It expresses our deep attachment to 
another and our fear of losing that person to a rival. In being jealous, the threat to our self-
esteem is painfully exposed to us because the object of our jealousy is a person who knows 
us intimately and is one, the one, we love deeply. To have our need of intimacy spurned, to 
feel insecure at the thought that sensitive and deeply personal details may be whispered to 
the rival, can generate such intense pain that we are propelled to action. The most extreme 
action is to eliminate the rival altogether, killing her new lover, then, possibly, his partner 
and her children before committing suicide, or slowly awakening to the horror of what has 
occurred – if the jealous killer can. The more common response is suspicion and acting on 
suspicion so as to restore our damaged self-esteem. If we had no attachments, we would 
experience no jealousy. I will now extend and deepen the argument with further examples. 
 
Another emotion that speaks of our deep connection to, and need of, others is grief. Grief, 
that complex gnawing presence that marks us irredeemably with the irrevocable loss of the 
person we have loved, can leave us insensate from pain. We do not grieve at just anyone’s 
death, though we might feel sympathy at the thought of the pain being suffered by those 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56In the mythic Garden of Eden, perhaps. 
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who were close to the person who has died. We grieve for someone who was invaluable to 
us, or for a creature we loved dearly, though the intensity of feeling for the latter may be 
significantly less than the intensity of feeling for the former. It would be strange indeed if 
we grieved intensely and for a long time over the death of a cat. In such a case, it might be 
reasonable to assume either that this a pathological form of grief, where grief is parading 
as depression or hiding a serious mental illness, or that the object of grief is masking the 
true object of sadness which might be the loss of the cat’s owner. In grief, we are 
concerned not only with our own misfortunes, but the misfortunes of others. I have grieved 
for a close family relation who became lost to Alzheimers, for friends who lost their 
dreams when their pregnancies ended in miscarriage, and for a colleague who lost his son 
in a car crash. If grief can show us our sociability and need of others, it can reinforce this 
when we are confronted with misfortune and ill-luck. In feeling grief for others too, we 
demonstrate our capacity for imaginative sympathy or compassion for their misfortune: the 
erosion of brain function, miscarriage and accidental death has not happened to me, it has 
happened to others, but I can construct their experiences in my mind so as to connect with 
them emotionally and extend my moral concern to them. My capacity for imaginative 
construction is also a demonstration of complex intentionality57; namely, what my 
imagination is recreating, constructing or altering, how such experiences relate to me and 
to my own vulnerability to misfortune, what it must feel like to face a future without a 
cherished person or realizing a cherished goal, and the emotions that these constructions 
arouse in me. Here we may begin to see why emotions can be asserted as intelligent 
responses to what we most value.  
 
The third example of an emotion that reveals our sociability and insecurity is shame. 
Shame can move us to hide away when we know we have committed a deed that will hurt 
or embarrass those we respect. We feel shame because the opinion of others is important to 
us. To feel shame is to feel that our character is bad in some way, that our morals and 
principles have gone awry, or that we have been exposed for what we really are. If we 
doubt shame’s power, we need think only of those who are prepared to commit suicide 
rather than confront shame head on: it is too painful. Shame can become pathological, 
infecting our behaviour, thought patterns, and responses to normal events. For women and 
men brought up to believe that sex is a religious sin, a dirty animal act that is shameful, 
having a normal sexual relationship can become very difficult if they believe that their god 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57See Ben-Ze’ev (2000) for the relationship between imagination, emotions, and the intentionality of both 
and their relation to morality. Nussbaum (1990, 1994a,b, 2001) has also discussed this relationship. 
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is watching their every shameful move. Shame, however, also has the cleansing power to 
help us eradicate the effects of our bad deeds through atonement, redeeming us in the eyes 
of society and ourselves: we can restore our self-respect and sense of dignity. Shame can 
also act as a powerful disincentive to act badly in the first place. But shame, though it can 
play a positive role in our moral and social life, can also be distorted by our norms and 
beliefs forcing ourselves and others to ‘hide from humanity’ (Nussbaum, 2004a). Women 
who have been victims of abuse and violence often speak of their shame and humiliation 
from the loss of control over their body and environment, from a sense of powerlessness, 
the crushing of their dignity and self-respect, and of being treated as objects of no value58 
who can be invaded physically and emotionally. The fear and anxiety that ensue from 
abuse, particularly repeated abuse, disables victims, leaving them emotionally obtuse in 
extreme cases, and less responsive to what is happening in their environment. If a 
persistent sense of shame goes accompanied by fear and anxiety, we may have a troubled 
person indeed. In the case of shame, the evaluation is negative, and the response adaptive: 
the person hides from others. Abuse and its effects on emotional functioning is the subject 
for Chapter 6 though, I will refer to this theme throughout the thesis.  
 
We know well that societies across time and cultures single out groups of people for 
special treatment, stigmatising them so that we feel not only shame, but disgust for what 
we believe them to be or do59. The dehumanising treatment of the Jews in Nazi occupied 
Europe is well known, as is the evaluation of homosexuals as abnormal and aberrant, and 
the continuing persecution of the Roma in the UK and Europe. But we also single out 
people who have mental and physical deformities, children from the ‘wrong’ families who 
get into trouble and are branded as ‘thugs’ or ‘neds’60, individuals ‘out of control’ and who 
need ‘punishing’. Career women who delay having children or put their children into 
nursery so that they can pursue their careers, are made to feel guilt, a powerful ally of 
shame. Such women may also be held responsible for our society’s current ills61. And we 
are still glued to the view that female victims of sexual assault and violence cause their 
own atrocities, largely, I would suggest (and will argue in Chapter 5), because we are not 
free from the stereotypes, or social and cultural practices which view women as an inferior 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58For ways in which helplessness and powerlessness can be brought about, and their effects on a person’s 
ability to function well, see Seligman (1975). 
59For an excellent account of the role of shame and disgust in our lives, see Nussbaum (2004a). 
60A ‘ned’ is a derogatory Scottish term used to describe working class youths who wear casual clothes such 
as tracksuits and baseball caps with the inference that they engage in casual violence and petty crime. An 
alternative term, more widely used in the UK, is ‘chav’. 
61See Almond (2006); Centre for Social Justice, Breakthrough Britain (2007). 
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sex62. Anger, disgust and masculine pride predate on women’s vulnerability; fear, shame 
and disgust devour their victims. In shame, then, it is not only one’s own personal beliefs, 
moral values and ethical actions that become exposed to view, but that of the society in 
which we live. 
 
In briefly outlining the general structure of the three examples of jealousy, grief and 
shame, I am suggesting that emotions can be cognitive63, that they are responses to what 
we value both for ourselves and for others, that they can be intelligent and discerning, and 
that they connect us to the world. Emotions, in short, are compound and diverse, complex 
and subtle, and they consist of multiple rather than single entities (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000). An 
emotion consists of several entities (Greenspan, 1989), arriving in clusters rather than 
singly. Jealousy’s close associates are, for example, fear, envy, pride and anger; the 
associates of grief are anger, sadness and (hopeless) love; and shame often arrives in the 
company of guilt, remorse, fear and disgust. This is not surprising given that an emotion’s 
eliciting condition may be sudden and volatile, or stable over time (as in grief), and the 
object of the emotion is of value to one’s wellbeing and sense of self. Each emotion will 
vary in intensity, depending on the context and the relationship between the person 
experiencing that emotion and the external object and, should this be in doubt, we would 
do well to remember that we have many kinds of love, anger, fear, and sadness. Like the 
movements in a Beethoven symphony64, the relationship between and within the emotions 
is dynamic: the intensity will vary, rise to sudden or slow prominence, endure or subside, 
depending on the context and personal evaluation of what is happening in the world. With 
that in mind, let us return to grief.  
 
Grief may come with shock, disbelief, anger, deep sorrow, remorse, guilt, feelings of 
irrevocable loss and pained love, along with relief if one has watched another’s suffering 
or abuse, playing out in symphonic complexity over the life of the emotion itself. Proust, 
who arguably captures the rich detail, texture and nuance of emotions better than most 
writers, expresses not only the ineliminability of an emotion to our personal concerns, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62For extensive analyses of women’s inequality and ill-treatment globally, see for example, Nussbaum and 
Glover (1995); Nussbaum (1999a,b, 2000a); Charlesworth and Chinkin (2000); Mackinnon (2005, 2006). I 
mean to suggest that in the context of assault these might be among the dominant emotions felt by perpetrator 
and victims. See Nussbaum (2004a) for the role of disgust and shame in law, public life and morality, in 
which she cites the case of lesbian murder occasioned because the murderer found the act ‘disgusting’. 
63I adhere very closely to Nussbaum’s analysis of the emotions in Upheavals of Thought (2001). I am also 
highly influenced by Ben-Ze’ev’s The Subtlety of Emotions (2000). 
64I could have chosen any composer but Beethoven was the first I heard when my mother bought cheap 
classical cassettes from Woolworths when I was 15.  
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also its power to come at us from nowhere, as if from some distant country. Here he writes 
of Marcel’s’ grief for his grandmother who has been dead for some time.  
 
And I began once again to listen, and to suffer; when we are waiting, the double 
trajectory, from the ear that gathers in the sounds to the mind which processes and 
analyses them, and from the mind to the heart to which it transmits its results, is so 
rapid that we are unable even to perceive its duration, and we seem to be listening 
directly with our hearts. (2003/4:134) 
 
Given the suddenness of Marcel’s grief, and the way in which the emotion seemed to 
engulf him, it is easy to see why the Stoics considered that emotions were ‘non-reasoning’ 
movements, pushing us around at their will65, as if our emotions were gates to be 
hammered open and shut in the howling wind. The Stoics were not alone. Kant, whose 
views on emotions are complex and more subtle than is generally recognised to be the case 
(Sherman, 1995,2007), argued that emotions could not adequately ground moral practice. 
Emotions, he thought, were too unreliable in motivating us to virtuous action, being too 
capricious and too quick to find new interests or objects. Even in ordinary speech, we often 
dismiss emotions as irrational and inimical to good judgement. Kant also feared that our 
passional natures meant surrender to others, leaving us open to their instrumental use, to 
become, that is, the playthings of other people because of our attachments to them. 
Jealousy leaves us prey to negative thoughts about our loved one, and in jealousy we may 
harm the person we love. In grief we are so overcome by sorrow and depression that we 
leave ourselves vulnerable to being manipulated in some way, assenting unthinkingly to a 
course of action that is not in our best interests, for example. The passions, therefore, had 
to be subject to the ‘sovereignty of reason’ (Sherman, 1997:167).  
 
To claim, as we often do, that emotions are capricious and blind to reason is, however, a 
misconception. We do reason in emotion, albeit that we do so more easily in some rather 
than others (jealousy as opposed to compassion), and more easily in less intense states than 
in intense ones (calm as opposed to boiling anger). Though Kant was suspicious of the 
power of emotions to ground stable moral action, he nevertheless accepted that our 
emotions record moral salience and express candour in the sense that it is difficult to hide 
what is of value to us when we are in the grip of an emotion. Nancy could not let go of her 
anger at X because she was asserting her dignity and her need to be feel moral anger at his 
taunts and mockery. Kant believed, as Sherman (1997:33) notes, that properly cultivated, 
emotions could be important supports for moral duty and could be shaped by reason. Like 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65See Nussbaum (2001:19-33). 
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Aristotle, Kant believed that we are practical agents because we give ourselves reasons to 
act and to make choices that are morally accountable. Put simply, it is not a question of 
emotion versus reason; rather it is that our emotions can be imbued with reason and 
intelligence. Emotions’ epistemic function provides us with the intelligence from the 
outside world, riveting our attention, and preparing us for deliberation and choice. For 
these reasons, our emotions can be said to be intelligent and thinking dimensions of our 
human personalities. The power of emotions can draw us towards ethical reasoning 
because of the judgements they contain and the values they express, as I have begun to 
show in my examples above. These values can move us to act out of compassion, to 
correct a wrong or to strike in revenge.  
 
The relationship of emotions to virtuous action is that virtuous actions are wisely chosen 
actions that respond appropriately to the conditions of human life66. Virtuous actions can 
also be informed by our emotions, themselves appropriately cultivated over time. This is 
the Aristotelian position. Emotions help us ‘see’ what is salient in all of the event’s colour, 
hints and hues67. In Kant’s philosophy, an appeal to reason must be made in order to carry 
out a good action, because reason, if properly grounded, lies outside the contingencies of 
human life such as ill-fortune, the temptation to give in to bad acts, to ignore suffering 
because it is too troubling to get involved. As free rational agents, our duty is to cultivate 
our emotions so as to diminish their more capricious elements, to rein them in so that they 
do not undermine our moral duties to act well in our own and other’s interests, as well as to 
aid us in making good moral choices. While anger is appropriate when someone we care 
for has been badly treated, getting angry and then hitting our spouse for breaking a vase is 
surely excessive. In surprising respects, Kant’s position on emotions, and their importance 
in moral life, is close to Aristotle’s own philosophy. Both hold that being virtuous involves 
practical reason which guides the habituation of good character and sound emotional 
repertoires. Practical wisdom68, very generally, is the knowledge or understanding that we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66Wisdom helps us arrive at truth (NE.1139b15), it is the knowledge of what is beneficial to oneself 
(NE.1141a25-30) and is concerned with human goods. 
67Cf. NE.1105b20-30. Virtue may make us susceptible to feelings of anger, sorrow or pain. The disposition in 
virtue is the condition in which we are emotionally well or ill-disposed. If we express too much anger we are 
ill disposed and do not see salience in the right way. We are moved by emotion and disposed by virtue. 
NE.1106a5-10. The young are not wise in particulars and cannot be philosophers owing to their lack of 
experience though they can easily develop an understanding of abstract thought and principles. NE.1142a10-
22. Education, of course, can play a vital role in cultivating virtuous disposition. 
68As Aristotle says, we are not born with wisdom but acquire it with age and experience. See NE.1143b5-15; 
Rh.1389a-13890a, though Aristotle is not always complementary about the old in the Rhetoric. Those in their 
prime he admires as having continence, neither excessive not deficient in their appetites. This links to the 
previous note about being able to ‘see’ from experience. Diversity of experience gives us moral knowledge 
and practical wisdom, provided we can deliberate well about those experiences, come to the right judgements 
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acquire over time to enable us to do the right thing in any given situation, to pick out 
situationally significant events so as to judge what is morally salient. Practical wisdom is a 
virtue69. I shall now move on to demonstrate70 how emotions may help us see the world 
and deliberate well over time by explicating the characteristics, components and structure 
of emotions. 
 
It may be argued at this point that there are there is a fundamental difference between 
Kant and Aristotle’s ethics and the nature and source of morality. Kant’s morality is 
pure morality (apriori) which he frees from empirical content, and strips from human 
contingency while Aristotle’s ethics are permanently rooted in the particular human 
case. However, there a line of philosophical thought which sees a greater affinity 
between Aristotle and Kant than has traditionally been the case. Barbara Herman 
(1993), Nancy Sherman (1997) and Nussbaum (1999), for example, have questioned 
whether the rigid distinctions between deontology and virtue ethics are necessary or, at 
least, if they are over-drawn. While Kant’s metaphysical conception of morality is 
apriori, his morality is concerned, nevertheless, with how we are to be with others. So 
for Kant (2008:5): 
Morality requires the ‘thought to occur to him (he can scarcely avoid doing so) of 
what sort of world he would create, under the guidance of practical reason, were 
such a thing in his power, a world into which, moreover, he would place himself 
as a member.  
Our maxims must be those that others could (not) or would (not) endorse and so the 
formulae of the CI are expressive of the universalizability of our maxims. Being members 
of a Kingdom of Ends (our community), if we are to enact maxims, we need to have 
thought through ‘what the order of nature would be once the effects of the newly adjoined 
law of nature have had sufficient time to work themselves out’ (Rawls, 2000:169). The 
universalising element of the CI enjoins us to ask: could others, similarly circumstanced, 
endorse or act on my specific maxim?  
Aristotle asks us to judge the particulars of each individual case, but does not generally ask 
us to draw universal principles from the conclusions of our evaluations, and neither do 
these evaluations draw us away from our point of view to other reasoning agents71. By 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and choose the correct course of action. See books II and VI. Youth live by appetite erring towards excess 
but are inclined to pity due to their naivety, their belief in men’s honesty. Rh.1389a-1389b 
69NE.1140a25-35; 1140b5-30. 
70For Kant’s position on emotions, see Sherman (1997). For Aristotle’s account of virtues, see Hursthouse 
(1999). 
71See Sherman (1997, chapter 7) and Nussbaum (1994b, chapter 2). 
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contrast, Kant’s formulae of the CI, as noted, do. Further, the role of rules in Aristotelian 
ethics is not of great importance, since ethics is not a precise science (NE.1103b34-
1104a10). We live in a world of change, and our responses have to be responsive to that 
change. How well we respond will depend on our practically wise response to the 
particulars (NE.1141b13-14). If the account of Kant’s CI-p72 is accepted, then Kant and 
Aristotle may not be too distant from each other. As Sherman (1997:1) notes, ‘it has not 
been appreciated that Kant develops a complex anthropology of morals – a tailoring of 
morality to the contingent features of the human case’. In the Doctrine of Virtue (6:217):  
…a metaphysics of morals cannot dispense with the principles of application, and 
we shall often have to take as our object the particular nature of human beings, 
which is cognized only by experience, in order to show in it what can be inferred 
from universal moral principles. 
 
2.3 Emotions’ Characteristics, Components and Structure. 
On the account I have given here, I have suggested that emotions can be cognitive, 
intelligent and rational, forming part of our ethical reasoning: they are about something, 
rich in different grades of thought that range from being clearly defined to fuzzy and 
inchoate. They result, I will argue, from eudaimonistic judgements73 on what is important 
to our wellbeing and flourishing. Emotions, following Ben-Ze’ev (2000) can be divided 
into four basic components: cognition, evaluation, motivation and feeling, a conceptual 
division of the experience of emotions. The characteristics of emotions’ intensity, that is 
duration and social comparison, are properties of the whole emotional experience.  
 
We typically experience emotion when we have a valenced (positive or negative) reaction 
to individuals, events or objects (Ortony et al., 1988:13) which significantly impacts on our 
personal situation or which disturbs our equilibrium in some way. The intensity of emotion 
will depend on a range of variables such as the degree to which the event is undesirable for 
oneself or for another, judged praiseworthy or blameworthy, appealing or unappealing. 
Emotions can be further classified into wellbeing emotions (with respect to desirable or 
undesirable events), loss emotions, fortune-of-others emotions (schadenfreude), prospect-
based emotions (hope), attribution emotions (gratitude, contempt), and the attraction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72Categorical Procedure. 
73The eudaimonistic judgement is a central component of Nussbaum’s (2001) analysis of an emotion’s 
constituents. Nussbaum’s account of eudaimonia is influenced by Aristotle who argued that the ultimate end 
of a good human life is happiness, a happiness derived from practical activity, the realisation of goals and 
plans, and emotional and intellectual development connected to virtuous activity. 
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emotions74.  The eliciting condition for an emotion is primarily psychological rather than 
physical (Oatley, 1992:19) because physical stimuli tend to produce reliable effects on the 
individual, regardless of who they are. If Nancy, my fictional pupil, were to stand in a very 
cold shower she might shiver, draw in her breath sharply and probably yelp in pain, before 
becoming accustomed, briefly, to the temperature. If Charlie, her classmate, took a 
similarly cold shower, he too might shiver, gasp and yelp, though he might bluster that he 
can take it (he is a boy). Emotions are not like this. Compare Nancy to a shrew and she 
might get very angry indeed, believing herself to have been slighted. Compare Charlie to 
the same creature and he might well laugh and treat it as a joke, taking the view that the 
comparison was not meant to harm him. The differences in the pupils’ reactions to their 
comparison to the shrew lie in their evaluations, their judgements of deliberate harm or 
humour, how they judge their standing in relation to other people (the social comparison), 
and their personal histories.  
 
A discussion of the social comparison element is important to this analysis if we are to 
understand why some people become more excited than, or react very differently from, 
others in a given set of circumstances. Our social world is an emotional one, a theatre in 
which the range of human emotions will be expressed in varying intensities and 
frequencies, and where we discriminately compare ourselves to other people. Whom we 
discriminate for comparison depends very much on our relation to the social comparators 
and the view we take of ourselves. Our social comparators tend to be close to us, though 
they can be casual acquaintances or, in more extreme cases, our idols (our ideal figures). 
More significantly, our social comparators also reveal our ‘ideal’ states (Ben-Ze’ev, 
2000:24) and this, in turn, is heavily influenced by social norms and practices. Those to 
whom we compare ourselves and why, can reduce or increase our sense of stability and 
self-worth, can hinder or aid us in achieving not merely our goals, but simple or complex 
tasks, and they can determine our values and emotional responses. Nancy has no friends. 
She lacks self-esteem. She is often mocked. Her attempts to rise above her lot and assert 
herself are met with ridicule at worst, indifference at best. To whom she compares herself 
is significant, if she dare compare herself to anyone at all. And if she does, it may be to her 
secret idols that she turns in order to give her succour and hope in her lonely world. To 
compare her to a shrew is therefore cruel, an unwitting reminder to Nancy that she is of no 
consequence. Her emotional lot is an unstable set that is likely to be triggered by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74See Ortony et al. (1988) for a very detailed examination of emotion structure and organisation and see, also, 
Ben Ze-ev (2000). 
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seemingly nothing at all. She will ‘lose it’, as the parlance goes, and any chance she might 
have had of completing her class work, of being able to concentrate, will be gone. Charlie, 
on the other hand, can take it in his stride because he does have a good circle of friends and 
is known as a joker. Crucially, Charlie is overweight and tall, with plenty more room for 
growth to continue stretching his limbs. Comparing Charlie to a shrew is incongruous 
because it is so clearly ridiculous, evincing good-natured laughter75 as opposed to the 
malign laughter that Nancy’s comparison elicits. And, unlike Nancy, Charlie can return to 
his work once the laughter has subsided and some calm has again settled on the room.  
 
On the surface, what we have is a single comparison and two pupils. What we end up with 
are two very different outcomes, each circumscribed by complex [in]sensitivities and 
distinct personalities. In one, the comparison is catastrophic, engulfing the pupil in turmoil 
and humiliation, while destroying her desire to learn. There is no emotional stability here. 
Nancy is small and pinched looking: the comparison to a shrew might be apt but it is 
intensely insensitive. Its cruelty lies not only in the comparison to the shrew, but also in the 
chain of imaginative possibilities that are set off in the minds of the pupils. The mélange of 
words, ideas and images will certainly redefine the borders of imagination for Nancy and 
the pupils because she, unlike the pupils, will be placed further outside the social territory 
of her classroom, in a desert of alienation and loneliness, while pupils unlike Nancy will 
remain in the fertile plains of social stability and cordiality, bound together by the single 
object of their malign mirth: Nancy. In the Charlie example, the comparison is so disparate 
it is stimulating, switching the pupils on to different cognitive processes employing 
incongruity, the blending of words and images in amusing ways, and the engagement of 
imaginative possibilities so different from Nancy’s. The moral implications could not be 
clearer. The dignity of one has been violated, while the dignity of another has probably 
been enhanced. In Nancy’s case, the teacher’s discernment of the particulars is obtuse (or 
she is indifferent), inhibiting Nancy’s ability to flourish and eroding her sense of 
wellbeing. The emotions aroused in Nancy then, are likely to be those of anger, shame, 
intense embarrassment, hate directed towards herself and others, envy and fear. Her 
classmates are likely to be experiencing schadenfreude, pity, contempt and disgust. I would 
like to think there might be pupils who would feel compassion for Nancy and show her 
mercy by not joining in the laughter. As for those feeling pity, the typical belief is that she 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75There is interesting work on the role of humour in learning, especially its moral role in promoting 
wellbeing and flourishing. Humour used cruelly is inhibiting and crushing on the esteem of the receiver. 
Used well, and for good moral reasons, humour can be enabling and stimulating. See, for example, Scruton 
(1982); Billig (2005); Davies (2011). 
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is suffering but that there is little they can do to help her for three possible reasons. Firstly, 
is the belief that Nancy brought this on herself and is therefore responsible for her plight. 
Secondly, is the belief that she is inferior and intervening to alleviate her situation will do 
no good (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000:328-329). And thirdly, is the belief that the pitier has few 
resources to help, including moral resources such as courage, moral indignation or the 
requisite interest in justice, because pity is often combined with a ‘repulsive bid for self-
esteem’ (Solomon, 1993:281). The pitier holds herself to be better situated than, or 
superior in some quality to, the pitied and so, in pitying in this way, she augments her self-
esteem at the expense of the pitied. The evaluation of the pitier is contemptuous. We are 
often ashamed of our neediness, and fearful of our vulnerability. Pity is a way out of this 
morass.  
By now, we can start to see that emotions contain complex beliefs and judgements about 
what is of value and significance to our wellbeing and flourishing. They express our values 
and attitudes towards one-self and others, and are sensitive to personal and contextual 
factors. Emotions vary in intensity, duration and stability, and express our vulnerability to 
events often beyond our control. Emotions contain comparative concerns and perceptions 
of available alternatives, expressing what is, what was, what will and could be, the possible 
alternatives available to us, and they are set against a background framework of personal 
concerns (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000:19). Nancy’s anger at her treatment, her despair at the situation 
she was in, was intensified because she could see no alternative but to remain and endure 
this. She could, of course, have got up and left the room. But this is hardly an alternative if 
she knows the laughter will increase and she will be punished for walking out without 
permission. The lack of an alternative can also explain why people do not change boring 
jobs or remove themselves from abusive relationships. The alternative might be worse or 
simply perceived as not available, as in Nancy’s case here in class and at home. While 
there is moral complexity in the instrumental and exploitative use by one partner against 
the other, or one pupil against another, there is moral complexity, if not perplexity, in the 
one who submits to such abuse, in that she abets the moral corruption of her partner by 
failing to resist his abuse. ‘Undue humility makes tyranny; weak concession creates 
selfishness’ (Bronte, 2006:169). While Bronte’s assertion is powerful, in the case of 
domestic violence, this might seem a simplistic take on abuse, especially when the abuse 
has been taking place for some time, or where a powerless girl like Nancy lacks the moral 
and social resources to resist tyranny or to be resistant to the selfishness of others’ 
demands. I shall explore this theme in greater depth in Chapter 6. A genuine moral agent, 
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as Hampton (2007:7)76 remarks, has to have a good sense of her own claims if she is to be 
a genuine partner in a morally sound relationship and be able to respond legitimately to the 
claims of others, such as those of her children, the very children, including Nancy, who sit 
in our classes with their bundles of emotional troubles. What the preceding analyses also 
demonstrate is that emotions are also ‘about’ something. We do not simply get angry for 
no reason (while we may be dispositionally angry, a trigger is still required), or become 
jealous over the beauty of a rose. Emotions, in addition to their cognitive content, complex 
beliefs and judgements, and intensity variables, also have an ‘object’ which is what they 
are ‘about’. So emotions, to use a more technical term, are intentional, as I shall now 
explain. 
 
 
2.4 Intentionality. 
There has been a long tradition, dating from Descartes, that humans are more matter than 
mind. This tradition has woven its threads through the enlightenment, modern genetics and 
physics, behavioural psychology and even into the political realm. We are atoms, moved 
by the selfish, self-protecting (of the organism) will of our genes77, self-sufficient, pushed 
to co-operate by contract78 (we will see similar arguments in Chapter 5). As Midgley 
(2001:4) comments, such atomistic doctrines rest on the belief that the ‘ultimate law of 
life’ is competition between separate units, a stark contrast to Aristotelian eudaimonia for 
which the ultimate object of life is happiness. ‘The individual organism is not fundamental 
to life, but something which emerges when genes … gang together in cooperative groups, 
as “selfish-co-operators” ’ (Dawkins, 1998:308). On such a view, it seems, there is no such 
thing as society, inter-connectedness or dependency. Co-operation, where it occurs, is for 
selfish ends and for achieving self-sufficiency, a view, in fact, that is also shared by 
skeptics of the enlightenment and its ‘masculine’ philosophy, as we shall see in Chapter 4. 
What we strive for is control and dominance79, and our genes, like our emotions, must be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76The importance of moral agency and an awareness of one and other’s legitimate claims will be discussed in 
later chapters. 
77Dawkins (1976). 
78A political idea, of course, dating from Hobbes (1651) that still has currency in modern economics and 
politics. 
79See Nussbaum (2001) for the profound neediness and complete dependency of babies on their carers, and 
their desire to control and dominate their environment. Other good, but different perspective, accounts come 
from Donald Winnicott (2000); Nancy Chodorow (1979); Bowlby (1988). The neediness and dominance is 
not a preface to a life lived in dominance and selfishness, but to a life of sociability and wellbeing as a result 
of good care in infancy and childhood. I return to care in Chapter 4.   
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brought under our control, in order to rid our lives of messy and perplexing realities80. But 
our emotions are not so amenable to control when they are responses to valuable ‘external 
goods’81. Neither can we, as the ancient Stoics advised we should, extirpate emotions from 
our lives82. Were we able to do so, we would have no need of civil society and perhaps we 
would have no need for faith or the arts, or even the close social bonds I suggested above. 
Our very humanity would be compromised. Complex emotions83, which comprise envy, 
shame, disgust, schadenfreude, regret, sympathy, compassion and so on, teem with 
intentional content because they are about oneself in relation to someone or something 
else. These emotions are social emotions, based on complex social comparisons and they 
occur in complex social environments. And these complex, social emotions have existence 
because of our ability to imagine others as having similar intentional capacity, as well as 
our ability to imagine alternative scenarios with regards to our own prospects and goals. 
These emotions, and our capacity for developing them, allow us to develop a moral point 
of view, such that: 
 
Morality is inconceivable without the idea of choice among imagined alternative 
actions, and we cannot consider others to have moral rights and responsibilities if 
we cannot imagine them as having experiences such as suffering and joy that we 
ourselves know. (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000:107)  
 
On Ben-Ze’ev’s84 analysis, second order intentionality manifests information about our 
own and others’ attitudes, wishes and desires. Moral complexity arises when information 
about one’s own intentional concerns (first person information) combines with information 
about another’s intentional concerns (third person information) giving rise to a common 
intentional schema. Within the schema, we can imagine not only our desires and wishes for 
the past, present and the future; we can imagine these same things for others. So, the ways 
in which another’s perspective may differ or be similar to one’s own and our ability to 
make social comparisons becomes the basis of morality and of making moral judgements. 
Earlier Nancy and Charlie were compared to shrews. Nancy took the comparison badly, 
seeing it as a slight to her character and features, which diminished her self-esteem and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80Genes, ironically, are in fact inert molecules that cannot function except in cooperation with other genes 
and can only realise their function within the cell.  
81The Stoics defined external goods as those things over which we have little or no control. ‘We are 
responsible for some things, while there are others for which we cannot be held responsible. The former 
include our judgement, our impulse, our desire, aversion and our mental faculties in general; the latter 
include the body, material possessions, our reputations, status – in a word, anything not in our power to 
control’. Epictetus (2008:221).  
82See Nussbaum (1994a,b, 2001, 2004a).  
83These complex emotions may be contrasted with basic emotions such as fear, anger and happiness which 
can lack intentional content.   
84See Ben-Ze’ev (2000) for a detailed account of intentionality in the affective realm. 
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ability to work (first person information). In her evaluation, the laughter evinced by the 
cruel comparison is indicative of her low standing with her peers (third person 
information). The common intentional schema is that Nancy knows she is not popular and 
cannot move easily among her peers, and her peers have judged her a misfit and best 
avoided. Those who could have come to her rescue have remained quiet. Charlie’s 
situation, as we know, is completely different. 
 
One of the key components of the intentional dimension85 is evaluation (which may be 
expressed as an appraisal or belief). As we have seen, how an event is appraised will 
determine the emotion we experience and, to a great extent, our behaviour in what Frijda 
(2007:4) terms the ‘law of situational meaning’86. If Nancy learns that her father is gravely 
ill in hospital and there is little hope of recovery, she might experience fear at the thought 
of his pending death, as well as compassion for him if he is in pain. If, however, the 
relationship with her father happens to be a distant one because she was estranged many 
years previously, it is less likely that she will feel fear, sorrow or compassion, though she 
might feel slight sympathy for those about to lose him. Nancy’s emotions might be 
different again if her relationship with her father rested on dislike and active hostility, 
having been the victim of his abuse over many years. She may well feel relief, pleasure 
and a sense of ‘good riddance’ that he will no longer be alive to inflict harm on anyone 
unfortunate enough to come within the borders he controls. As we shall see in Chapter 7, 
this is how Nancy feels about her father. He is a violent and an abusive man. 
 
Emotions have objects, and so are intentional87 because they have a reference to, and are 
directed towards, something that often lies beyond our control. The term ‘intentionality’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85I use dimension here for the mental dimension. The two basic mental dimensions of emotions are 
intentionality and feeling, where feeling is the subject’s own state of mind, and intentionality, as noted, that 
of evaluating the object’s significance (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000:49).  
86Emotions, according to Frijda (2007), emerge and develop according to definite laws that can be specified. 
They are natural, fully determined phenomena, even despite personal idiosyncrasies, and they come under 
the laws of situational meaning (context or eliciting conditions), the law of concern (events of personal 
value), the law of apparent reality (events are appraised as real), and so on. They chime closely with the 
analyses of many cognitive-appraisal theorists in the field of psychology such as Arnold (1960); Clore and 
Collins (1988); Lazarus (1991a,b); Oatley (1992); Elster (1999); Ortony and Clore (2000). Amongst 
philosophers following a similar analysis are Solomon (1993, 2003,); Ben-Ze’ev (2000); Nussbaum (2001, 
2004a, c, 2006).  
87‘Intentionality’ should not be confused with ‘intensionality’, a related concept from semantics and logic. 
See Kenny (1963) who uses ‘intensionality’ to explain the language of emotions, as well as to discuss the 
objects of emotions following Brentano and the Scholastics. In the preface to the 2003 ‘Action, Emotion and 
Will’, he acknowledges that the reasons for using ‘intensionality’ no longer seem cogent. The 
phenomenological concept of ‘intentionality’ is the preferred one in both philosophy and psychology, 
bypassing descriptions of the objects of thought in language to go direct to the objects themselves. For Carr 
(2012, personal communication), the notion of intentionality is closely related to that of ‘intensionality’. 
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was introduced by Jeremy Bentham (1780, Chapters VIII and IX) in order to distinguish 
acts that are intentional from those that are not88. Franz Brentano, who borrowed the notion 
from the Scholastics (such as Thomas Aquinas), stated that the unique characteristic of 
mental phenomena is that every mental act is directed at an object, and he used this key 
feature to distinguish mental from physical phenomena.  
 
In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or 
denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. This intentional 
in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical 
phenomenon exhibits anything like it. (Brentano, 1874:88-89)   
 
That is, emotions do not consist of bodily sensations89, but of ‘mental phenomena’ or 
cognitive appraisals. Ben-Ze’ev (2000:49-51) defines intentionality as a subject-object 
relation, the relation of being ‘about something’ of which we have some information. 
Pitcher (1965:326-327) defines it similarly. Emotions which are directed towards an 
object, thing or person, he calls agent-directed emotions. Nussbaum, likewise, says that an 
emotion’s intentional object is interpreted or appraised to reflect the importance of the 
object to the person having the emotion and she, too, refers to the ‘aboutness’ of the 
emotion (2001:27). However, the object is no mere object that is simply appraised and 
targeted by the emotion as an arrow at its target, rather it is internalised, embodying a way 
of seeing something that is of consequence to the person. Hence the emotion’s complex 
intentionality as I noted earlier. Goldie (2002:16) also accepts emotions’ intentionality 
though, curiously, he prefers intentionality to ‘aboutness’ even though, on the analysis 
here, ‘aboutness’ is part of the definition. Arnold (1960) suggests that emotions are 
aroused only when an event is appraised, or evaluated, as being of personal concern: 
‘affecting me personally as an individual with my particular experience and my particular 
aims’ (p.171). The object of an emotion being appraised can be a person, thought, concept, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Modern analytical philosophers, following Brentano, have identified a ‘certain class of psychological reports 
that exhibit some of the same logical (grammatical) peculiarities as modal statements (about possibility and 
necessity) and counterfactuals. What they all have in common is that they are statements or reports in which 
other propositions or statements … are embedded (as in A believes that p, B fears that q, it is necessary that 
p, or if p should occur then q may be expected to follow). On Brentano’s criteria not all reports of mental 
events (such as ‘A is in pain’) are intentional - but all intentional contexts are clearly also intensional’. See 
Deigh (1994, 2000) for a similar discussion. 
88See Deigh (1994) for a discussion on the history of intentionality in emotions. Deigh suggests that 
intentionality was removed from the definition of emotions for a more mechanistic conception in order that 
modern philosophers such as Descartes, Locke and Hume could distinguish themselves from medieval, 
Scholastic thinkers.  
89Goldie (2002) argues, following the analyses of William James’ seminal (1884) and Gabrielle Taylor 
(1988), that feelings should be part of the definition of emotions. Pugmire (2005) also includes feelings in the 
definition of an emotion. The reductionist view of emotions is thoroughly refuted by, for example, Kenny 
(1963); Solomon (1993); Deigh (1994); Ben-Ze’ev (2000) particularly against Paul Griffiths (1997); 
Nussbaum (2001). 
 
 
64 
dream, idea, image, event or insult and have definite or indefinite form. Nancy can be 
angry at Charlie for insulting her, angry at the thought of the particular injustices 
perpetrated against women in the Balkan (or any) conflict90, and angry with herself for her 
insensitivity towards her vulnerable mother. The thought, or intentional object, is as 
diverse as is human experience. To sum up, the intentionality of the emotion is how we 
see, interpret, evaluate or appraise the object of our emotions. Why emotions are aroused, 
in part, by our evaluations now follows. 
 
 
2.5 Beliefs, Appraisals and Judgements. 
As I have indicated, emotions often embody complex beliefs or evaluations of the eliciting 
event. In the appraisal theory of emotions, the evaluative aspect constitutes a stage in an 
information-processing sequence in which the salience of an event is appraised for its 
importance and relevance. According to Clore and Ortony (2000:29), appraisals are built 
by assembling data from the external world, which are then ‘computed’ as likely to be 
good or bad. In cognitive psychology, the appraisal mechanisms tend to be focused on the 
realisation or thwarting of goals, standards (norms and consensus) and attitudes 
(dispositions) (Ortony et al., 1988). Philosophically, the most influential argument for 
emotions containing belief comes from Kenny (1963) who asserted that the object of the 
emotion must have a certain character. What qualifies something as the appropriate object 
of an emotion is the person’s belief that it has a certain character, such as that the object is 
fearful91, and so belief and propositional content are essential to emotion arousal. 
However, stating that beliefs are part of the emotion is controversial and there is some 
disagreement about whether it is sensible to talk about emotions in this way. Deigh (1994), 
for example, considers that Kenny took a step too far in asserting that emotions must, in 
every case, have belief and propositional content. Deigh (1994, 2000) accepts that young 
children and dogs obviously have emotions, but their intentional states cannot contain 
beliefs about their objects, because beliefs require language, and so the subject’s beliefs 
about the object cannot be the best explanation for the emotion. Hursthouse (1999), while 
accepting that young children have beliefs, questions whether they can make judgements. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90Nancy might understand the injustice of these acts given her own personal experience of sexual and 
physical abuse. Understanding the roles of the United Nations and the European Union in the context of 
Balkans’ Conflict was also part of the Modern Studies course until recently. 
91Aristotle suggests we see fear as a ‘kind of pain or disturbance resulting from the imagination of impending 
danger, either destructive or painful’ Rh.1382a.5. The important point is that the danger is close to hand, 
‘impending’ and expected. Things that are far removed from us, such as death, do not arouse fear.  
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On her view, to insist that children make judgements is to make the emotions too rational 
and too theoretical.  
Nussbaum (2000b, 2001) addresses these criticisms well. The evaluations (or cognitions) 
of children and animals may not be sophisticated as they lack the experience to draw on 
critical reasoning to reflect on the events taking place. But this does not mean they 
passively accept the reality before them: they are aware of what is good for them and they 
may experience intense emotions in reaction to what is happening around them. The 
intentionality discussed here is that of being ‘about’ something, of the emotion having a 
target so to speak. Both animals and young children have emotions, not just feelings. Their 
anger, happiness, fear or affection is real. There is evidence that infants and young children 
are capable of cognitive evaluations (Lazarus, 1991a:829). Babies’ distress-panic systems 
respond when the care-giver leaves (Panksepp, 1986). Three month old babies show 
distress as well as anger, becoming distressed if the caregiver leaves. At four months, 
babies show anger at restraint and look at the source of restraint (a wrist, for example), and 
at seven months they will look at the face of the person restraining them. At four months, 
the baby appears to show some rudimentary understanding that the restraint is external and 
that some form of blameworthiness is attributable to the restrainer. At the least, one can 
say that the baby gets angry or distressed because her goal is being thwarted. If goal 
frustration is the cause of her anger, then cognitive processes are involved (Lazarus, 
1991a:829).  
Seligman’s (1975) work on animal helplessness, fear and depression rests on a theory of 
contingency (lack of control in the environment), cognition, which Seligman interprets as 
the way the animal ‘represents’ the world to itself’ and behaviour. We cannot understand, 
Seligman argues, animal behaviour unless we grant that they have cognitive 
representations of that world: the animal’s helplessness is learned behaviour and 
depression is a result of the creature’s realisation that it has no control over the pain 
stimulus. The work of Sarah Hrdy (1999, 2009) and Frans de Waal (2006, 2009, 2011) on 
primates reveals the emotional intelligence of animals. De Waal (2009) links philosophy to 
his work, and in doing so argues that human morality would not be possible without 
emotional development and that such development, involving higher order cognition, is 
very evident in primate societies. He cites the example of Georgia (pp.59-61), a female 
Chimpanzee who liked to ambush spectators with water. Is this evidence of planning or of 
intentional actions? It is hard to conclude that her ambushes were not the product of 
planning and a desire for some mischief at the expense of the human animals that came to 
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see her. Mary Midgley (1979) asks what we mean by conceptual thought. While the upper 
reaches of conceptual thought belong to the human species, and no gorilla thinks of 
relativity theory (and neither do many humans, she quips), what are the lower limits of 
conceptual thought? Dolphins, elephants and apes can make up games or invent new tricks 
on the spot. Midgley (1979) cites the example of Jane Goodall’s chimp, Washoe, who 
regards himself as an ‘honorary person’ but, using cards, classifies other chimps as ‘black 
bugs’. Similarly, Vicki, another chimp, sorted pictures of humans and animals into 
respective piles, save the picture of herself.  This she put into the human file while her 
father’s picture went into the animal file (pp.219-220). Vicki regards herself, like all apes 
brought up by humans, as a person. Does this imply conceptual understanding of the 
difference between species and self-hood? The evidence points strongly towards the 
affirmative. What these examples from the animal world show is that intentionality, rich 
mental phenomena, need not be the sole preserve of the human animal. 
Korsgaard (2006:109-112) examines intentionality in animals at a number of levels. At the 
most basic level, Korsgaard argues, intentionality is about functional organisation of any 
object: the purpose of the heart is to pump blood; a spider moves towards her web. At a 
‘higher’ level, the intentional or purposive functions of these movements are based on 
perception. The spider moves towards her web because her meal is trapped there: she sees 
the moth as food although we might not accept that the spider is entertaining thoughts 
about food. If a group of chimpanzees set out to trap a rhesus monkey are their actions 
mere functions of hunger, or are they engaged in some form of communicative, 
cooperative and coordinated activity? Is the purpose of hunting ‘before their minds’?92 
Arguably, yes. The animal, however, is motivated by its desires and emotions (aided with 
some kind of reasoning powers, I would argue). At a deeper level of intentionality, 
however, we leave animals behind when the question moves to whether our ends are not 
just good, but whether they are justified (Korsgaard, 2006:114). That is, and following 
Korsgaard, we can subject our ends, and their means of realisation, to assessment, and 
reject or adopt them (in Kantian terms). Intelligent animals do not seem to do this.  
As I have indicated, emotions can be cognitive and the cognitions are appraisals of events 
in the environment. A ‘judgement’ might suggest a concept of language. I do not mean 
‘judgement’ to have that connotation. Appraisal might be more appropriate. In any case, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92According to de Waal, these animals have a theory of mind, taken to mean that social animals have the 
capacity to take the perspective of others, an evolutionary strategy that allows social cooperation to occur. At 
the core of empathy ‘is emotional linkage … upon which evolution (or development) builds ever more 
complex manifestations, including appraisal of another’s knowledge and intentions’ (de Waal, 2006:72).   
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some emotions do not need language to be manifested or conveyed. Remorse for an act, or 
fear about the future, does need language and a sense of temporality (Kenny, 1963:43).  
Greenspan (1988) grants that emotions essentially contain beliefs that are partly factual 
and partly evaluative. However, she prefers to include beliefs in a broader evaluative 
framework in order to allow for propositional attitudes that are weaker than strict belief. 
Her concern is that if the intentional component of the emotion is belief, then the emotion 
is justified for and by belief. By way of example, Greenspan cites her persistent fear of 
skidding in icy conditions after a car accident. Because Greenspan’s example might be 
seen as a good reason to discount the role of belief in emotion formation, it is helpful to 
look at how fear is appraised and to consider which part of the brain registers the appraisal 
and subsequent acts. Experiencing a very slight skid and momentary uncontrolled 
movement had Greenspan gasping audibly in fear (1988:18-19). While accepting that her 
reaction was a conditioned judgement to the thought of danger, it was a response to the 
earlier accident in which the judgement of danger was made, and not to a judgement in the 
current situation that danger was imminent. Further, as she had no urge to alert others in 
the car93, this was not a ‘universalised belief’ that she was in danger, but a rather trivial 
lapse from rationality that cannot even be supported by unconscious belief. Thoughts-of 
danger, harm, pleasure and so on, either from memories of past or current events, or 
thoughts which anticipate future events, can, of course, arouse our emotions but whether 
‘thoughts-of’ constitute belief is complex.  
If we accept, and I argue for this below in more detail, that belief belongs to the family of 
appraisals which also comprise judgments or evaluations, then we can use this in 
Greenspan’s example of fear. The language we are using is about evaluating what is of 
importance to the person, of seeing X as Y (Nussbaum, 2001). Nancy sees earwigs as 
horrible little creatures that want to nest in her ears, even though she knows this is untrue 
and that earwigs are harmless. But because she developed this belief as a very young child, 
she cannot, even years later, stop herself from reacting in disgust when she sees these 
creatures. What this shows is that we can hold general beliefs that contradict our specific 
beliefs, especially when the beliefs are the result of long years of habituation94. Using 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93Emotional responses tend to produce action. 
94Ben-Ze’ev (2000:58) suggests that deliberative evaluations are schema in which we consciously think about 
an event, person or idea, and begin to feel emotionally aroused. Such evaluations are under our control, and 
typically use available semantic information in a linear and serial mode. An example might be the feeling of 
pleasure and pride at achieving a long sought-after promotion. Deliberative evaluations have a preparatory 
role, getting us ready for some action but deliberative and schematic evaluations can contradict each other. 
Fear persists in situations we know to be safe; prejudice persists even when we know its harms and believe 
we have expunged the negative evaluations from our schema. These can be explained ‘by assuming that 
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Clore and Ortony’s (2000) analysis, I suggest that the kind of fear that Greenspan 
experienced when she thought the car was going to skid, as well as the automatic arousal 
of hidden or unconscious attitudes, was a reinstatement of prior appraisal95. Significant 
events become embedded in the personality of the person, throwing that person straight 
back into the scene and into the grip of the original emotions. Vietnam veterans are well 
known for their panic attacks on hearing the sounds of helicopters many years later and 
World War 1 veterans, too, are still seized by the smells, sounds and terror of the trenches. 
Nancy, many years after she has left home, might become gripped by fear and feel her 
throat constricting as she watches a scene of domestic violence in her favourite soap opera.  
 
Ledoux’s (1999) experimental work on fear in rats also helps to explain why Greenspan 
would not have been conscious of a ‘belief’ when she felt the car skid. Her momentary fear 
was a protocognitive response. That is, she experienced an early perceptual process (fear) 
which identified the stimulus (skidding and loss of car control) which linked to an 
emotional response (thought of danger and harm to her body or life) which prepared her 
for action, the avoidance of danger. A cognitively controlled process, taking in the data 
from the outside world, appraised the context and its significance to Greenspan. It 
happened so quickly and lasted only moments because the data was processed in the 
amygdala and hypothalamus for the sake of speed and safety, a distinct evolutionary 
advantage. By this time, the information had made its way up to the neo-cortex after which 
she became conscious of her fear and subjectively appraised the reality of danger. LeDoux 
has shown that aversive behaviour can begin before the fear is felt. I would like to suggest 
that this is why Greenspan did not alert anyone in the car to the danger. Although it 
happened so quickly, she had enough time to realise she did not really believe she or her 
companion were in danger. 
 
Goldie (2002) takes the view that the inclusion of belief not only over intellectualises the 
emotions, but risks omitting feelings from the definition itself.  His concern is that beliefs 
could be feelingless, characterising emotions impersonally while ignoring the personal 
point of view of the person experiencing the emotion. As noted in the last section, Goldie 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
certain schematic evaluations become constitutive to a degree where no intellectual deliberation can change 
them’ (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000:58). See too LeDoux (1999,Chapter 7). 
95Spontaneous responses of the kind discussed can also be referred to as schematic evaluations. See, for 
example, Ben-Ze’ev (2000:59-60); psychologists Lazarus (1991b:151); Ekman (1992:187-189); neuro-
physiologists LeDoux (1999); Panksepp (1998). Schematic evaluations are typically fast, automatic, and 
occur with little awareness, arising from structures set during evolution and personal development, and so 
embodying personal historical narratives. Being part of our psychological make-up, schematic evaluations 
need only the right circumstances to be triggered, such as the skidding of a car.  
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stresses the intentional element of the emotion, which he characterises as ‘feeling towards’ 
the object that contains neither belief nor desire. In many respects, intentionality is, he 
claims, more fundamental to emotional experience. ‘Feeling towards, moreover, as it is 
thinking of with feeling, is a sort of thinking’ (p.19). I have some difficulties with the 
argument as Goldie develops it. There is a distinction to be made between true and false 
beliefs, and appropriate and inappropriate emotions. Goldie (2000) agrees that emotions 
will often contain beliefs and that they help make the emotion intelligible. The ‘mistake’, 
he asserts, is to suggest that beliefs ‘exhaust the intentionality of emotional experience and 
that they are therefore sufficient to make sense of emotion …’ (p.18-19). In many respects, 
intentionality is, Goldie claims, more fundamental to emotional experience, and feelings 
can have a ‘sort of borrowed intentionality’ (p.54) where body and mind are fully united in 
the emotional experience towards the object of the emotion. This is largely a 
phenomenological account of the emotions and so quite different from the cognitive 
approach I have adopted here. One of Goldie’s projects in his philosophical exploration of 
the emotions is to give feelings a prominent role in emotions. The strength of feeling 
associated with an emotional experience, what some psychologists might term the 
‘valence’ of the emotion, is the attractiveness or aversiveness of an event, object or 
situation. The bodily feelings that ensue are consequent on what has been appraised or 
believed to have occurred. The intensity of bodily feelings will depend on what is at stake 
for the person so aroused. I am not sure why, in order to give feelings their place, bodily 
feelings need to ‘borrow’ the emotion’s object.  This seems to unnecessarily complicate 
the account.  
Similarly, there is no reason to think that beliefs render an emotion feelingless. Beliefs are 
often predicated, as I have argued, on complex personal factors such as disposition, 
socialisation processes and personal values. Beliefs are also predicated on complex social 
structures and meanings which help define what is beneficial or harmful (Lazarus, 
1991a:821). We can experience strong negative emotions, such as anger or fear, if we have 
reason to believe that what we value is threatened in some way. Or we can experience what 
psychologists classify as positive emotions, such as joy or happiness, if what we value is 
enhanced or promoted in some way. Negative emotions are those which contain negative 
appraisals about an object or event, and may be classified as ‘displeased about’, 
‘displeased for’ or ‘disapproving of’. Anger and fear are the obvious emotions in this 
category. Other such emotions include grief, shame, disgust and resentment. Positive 
emotions usually contain positive appraisals. These might include pride, joy, jubilance, 
gloating (and schadenfreude which is pleasure at another’s misfortune) and esteem. In the 
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appraisals of some of these emotions, the person may not be liked, she may be deemed to 
have deserved the bad outcome or the event is appraised as being undesirable for the other 
person (Ortony et al. 1998:100). 
Following Goldie (2002:46-47) is it correct to talk of a ‘belief’ when jumping out of the 
way of an oncoming bus96? Belief might not be the appropriate construal in the case of the 
oncoming bus because the response is one of being startled (a reflex action preparing the 
agent to act), followed by fear (an adaptational, automatic and rigid response to an 
immediate threat of danger), aware that a dangerous object is coming towards one. Once 
we take into account the role of danger-avoidance reflexes, we might then go on to 
comment that experience plays a greater role than active belief in cases such as this: we 
know from experience that if we do not get out of the way of the oncoming bus, we will be 
seriously injured or killed. That knowledge is a learned belief about the potential harm of 
buses. One acts on that belief unconsciously and so automatically since we jump from fear. 
On this account, it is not that in having beliefs ‘we almost have to post-rationalize’ (p.47) 
the bus story, since post-rationalisation is simply not necessary in cases such as this. 
Neither do beliefs over-intellectualise fear. Goldie is correct in saying that beliefs, on this 
occasion, do not cause the emotion of fear: automatic, non volitional mechanisms do, and 
this kind of fear operates on a different neural network from other emotions97. 
In a second example, an employee receives news that a merger might result in a job loss 
with no prospect of a redundancy settlement because she has only recently been appointed 
(Goldie, 2000:46). The employee deliberates on her prospects and begins to feel fear. The 
role of belief, in this example, is, as Goldie notes, stronger, featuring in the employee’s 
reasoning. Belief alone, Goldie claims, is neither necessary nor sufficient to arouse the 
emotion, as belief gives psychological episodes 'too intellectual a flavour in explaining ... 
action' (p.47). This much is true. On the account of emotions I present in this thesis, there 
needs to be, in addition to the object (fear of losing one’s job), some cognition about the 
value of the salient external object, involving a judgement, interpretation, appraisal or 
belief about the object of value. The employee’s fear, further, may contain a general 
evaluation (the merger is potentially very bad news) and a concrete evaluation (I might be 
made redundant), and a background, ongoing emotion (anxiety because I have little 
experience). Finally, the employee is likely to be engaged in active imagining of the object 
(she is unable to fall asleep for worrying about all the possibilities if she is made redundant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96Goldie’s example (2000: 46-47). 
97See LaBar and LeDoux (2009).  
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and cannot find a job). This fear, which one may describe as a form of reflective fear, is 
given shape by the employee’s psychology and is different from the acute fear aroused by 
the oncoming bus which has little, if anything, to do with disposition of character. Goldie 
relies on a ‘recognition-response tie’ (p.47) to accommodate the deliberative complexity of 
one (fear of redundancy and the thoughts the fear incites) and the ‘animal-like’ response of 
the first (the oncoming bus). This recognition-response tie is, perhaps, too constraining to 
capture the complexity of emotions in the second case, but might accommodate the non-
volitional unconscious emotion of the first.  
Emotions can be justified or not, reasonable or not, depending on the beliefs they contain. 
Pitcher (1966) and Nussbaum (2001:46) both argue that having an emotion depends on 
what the person’s beliefs are, not on whether those beliefs are true or false, so this need not 
imply that they contain ‘truth’ claims. In any case, Pitcher (1965:332), who Goldie 
(2002:18) cites as a philosopher who wishes to capture the intentionality of emotions in 
terms of beliefs98, comments that it would be ‘infelicitous’ to insist that there must be a 
relevant belief in every emotion. Pitcher, in order to allow for a flexible interpretation of 
what a person cognises, uses the portmanteau term ‘apprehension’ to cover diverse modes 
of awareness, of which belief is one. As Pitcher points out, one may simply ‘imagine’ an 
event to experience an emotion but he does take it that a factual belief is required if a 
person is to have either an occurrent (in the grip) or a dispositional (of some duration or 
residing in the background) emotion. If we are unhappy with the idea of ‘belief’, then a 
general apprehension in which we judge, assume, know, evaluate, appraise, apprehend or 
take a view of the object in some way will suffice (Pitcher, 1965:332). As Epictetus 
(2008:228) commented, we are disturbed not by things, but by the view we take of them.  
 
What the preceding discussion alludes to, in discussing beliefs, is whether emotions are 
rational phenomena. Are we right to believe we are being insulted or harmed, and thus to 
be disturbed? Is this a rational response? Epictetus would argue that it is, because of our 
view of the harm done to us. However, he tells us, unsympathetically and in good Stoic 
fashion, that our minds have been ‘complicit in the provocation’ and so should take time to 
cultivate control and be removed from such externals (2008:228). Aristotle, by contrast, 
thought that that a person deficient in anger was not only ‘foolish’, lacking in ‘perceptivity 
and sensitivity’, but was also liable to ‘servility’ if he failed to defend himself or his 
friends and family (NE.1126a5-10). Emotions are not only, often, rational responses to our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98As does Kenny (1963). 
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sense of self-worth and what we value; they are also moral virtues if cultivated in the right 
way. 
 
 
2.6 Emotions’ Rationality and Intelligence. 
In 2007 and 201199 Louis Theroux made two documentaries on the Phelps family who are 
notorious for picketing the funerals of American soldiers killed in Iraq. Titled the ‘Most 
Hated Family in America’, the family is headed by Grandfather Gramps, the preacher in a 
Baptist church comprising, mainly, his extended family of about 70 people. It is the 
family’s belief that the death of soldiers is God’s revenge for the USA’s tolerance of 
homosexuality. They are also rabidly anti-Semitic, believe that President Obama is the 
‘Beast’ in the book of Revelations that predicts the return of Christ, and regard it as their 
duty to celebrate God’s judgements on murders, cancers, natural disasters, and the loss of 
loved ones to fornication. Theroux described the Grandfather as highly charismatic, 
persuasive and a compelling speaker who has passed his beliefs down through three 
generations of the Phelps family. 
 
In the UK, John Sweeney was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2002 for the attempted 
murder of a girlfriend with an axe and knife. In April 2011, Sweeney was sentenced to four 
life sentences when he was found guilty of murdering two other former girlfriends, 
dismembering their bodies and dumping them in canals in Rotterdam and London. The 
court described Sweeney as a ‘hateful, controlling and possessive man’100. Sweeney also 
expressed his misogynistic views of women in his artwork, which the prosecutor at the 
murder trial said revealed his obsessive and virulent hatred of women and a preoccupation 
with dismemberment.  
 
In August 2010, CCTV cameras filmed a woman in Warwickshire, England, dumping a cat 
in a wheelie bin101. She apologised profusely and claimed that it was a split second 
decision that she could not make sense of.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99BBC Magazine (2007) ‘America’s Most Hated Family’ at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/6507971.stm. 30 
March. ‘America’s Most Hated Family in Crisis’ was aired on BBC Two, Monday 4th April, 2011. The first 
documentary was on BBC Two, April 2007. 
100Summers, C.  ‘Killer Planted Clues in Misogynistic Artworks’, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
12749478 Monday 4th April, 2011).   
101‘Woman Who Dumped Cat in Wheelie Bin is Profoundly Sorry’, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
england-coventry-warwickshire-11087061, (25th September, 2010).   
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Nancy sat at her desk, quietly catching up with the work she had missed. She had 
just returned from her latest expulsion from school, this time for swearing and 
shouting at a number of teachers. Her teacher was also catching up with some 
work and had put on music that both agreed they liked. Nancy and teacher 
chatted away, Nancy asking questions about her work, the recent elections to the 
Scottish Parliament and the music being played. Her teacher asked her why she 
had shouted and sworn at her teachers. Her reply was the usual one:  
‘cos they hate me, they’re always pickin’ on me. I get blamed for 
everyhin’ that goes on, e’en when it’s no ma fault. They dinnae see or 
hear what the others get up tae. They just see me. They’re all fucking 
mongos!’ 102   
At that moment, Stephanie walks by. They are awkward friends but they can act 
tough together. Her teacher quietly cautions Nancy to stay and not to leave the 
classroom, reminding her that she was now risking school transfer if she got into 
more trouble. Nancy ignores her and disappears down the corridor. Wearily, Miss 
Cameron picks up the phone and dials the office number. 
 
In the light of the examples I have offered here, the assertion that emotions can be rational 
and intelligent, and that they contribute to ethical reasoning, may seem a gross 
contradiction. Rabid anti-semitism is neither rational nor intelligent: neither is dumping a 
cat in a bin or murdering women one cannot control or possess. Depicting the US President 
as the Biblical Beast is absurd and picketing funerals to celebrate God’s punishment is 
grotesque. Nancy, despite knowing what will happen to her, defiantly chooses those 
actions that will unquestionably land her in trouble. What is rational or intelligent about all 
of this? And to where has ethical reasoning disappeared?  
 
To the people who hold anti-semitic, racist or misogynistic views, these views are perfectly 
rational and perfectly intelligent. The Bible is correct103. Women are inferior to men. The 
dominant emotions are hatred, disgust and pity. The bearers of such beliefs judge their 
views to be correct and based on ‘fact’. On the view I follow (and see earlier), the use of 
‘rationality’ is partly being used here in the ordinary sense of ‘intelligent’ or 
‘understandable’. If we are aware of the facts that give us reasons to act then in most cases 
we should probably respond to those reasons (run from danger, help a friend in need, listen 
to our conscience, not steal). What we rationally want or do depends on our beliefs (Parfit, 
2011:1). Beliefs, be these true or false, give us apparent reason to act, and may be justified. 
Beliefs include assumptions of which we may not be aware, such as moral rightness or 
wrongness. If the beliefs are false or based on ignorance, it may be rational to act on those 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102A ‘mongo’ is a Fife expression widely used by pupils to mean a stupid person, someone of low standing. 
‘Dinnae’ -‘don’t’, ‘e’en’ - ‘even’. 
103This raises questions of interpretation of scripture. How one interprets scripture will be a function of one’s 
beliefs, which in turn will be shaped by faith.   
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beliefs. In cases such as these, we have merely apparent reasons (Parfit, 2011:111). Of 
course, by this stage, some might argue that acts are irrational when they causally depend 
on false or irrational beliefs. I tend to think, however, that such conclusions might mean 
we pass over complex cases too quickly without insight and understanding.  
I, as a reasonably ethical person, with strong moral views, abhor such attitudes, but I do 
not consider them or their underlying emotions necessarily irrational, not when we take a 
closer look at them. What I do hold is that the thoughts the emotions contain are defective 
and the beliefs false and ungrounded (Nussbaum, 2004a:11). If we accept that the emotions 
described here are irrational in a normative sense, then we can agree that they should not 
be guides to ethical reasoning. If people have been brought up to believe that racism is 
right and homosexuality wrong, that sacred texts are to be interpreted in certain ways, then 
their beliefs might be judged reasonable. If the norms of a society are that women are 
inferior to men (and there are plenty of such societies to choose from) it will seem 
perfectly reasonable to many living in that society to assume this to be the case, and 
misogyny will not be out of place, even to the extent of misogyny resulting in murder. I am 
not here necessarily thinking of Sweeney or his like, but of honour killings that occur in 
this country, despite the laws against murder. 
 
Sweeney has a visceral hatred of women. His beliefs about women may be judged 
irrational, along with his fear of women (if that is what motivates his misogyny), since he 
harms them (through control) or murders them. I do not know the origins of his misogyny, 
but if he holds the typical misogynistic beliefs that women are whores, gateways to the 
devil, or that they threaten masculinity, his beliefs might in one way be considered rational, 
not least because such views have an ancient pedigree. Justification for misogyny, which 
Jack Holland (2006) describes as the ‘world’s oldest prejudice’, can be found in many 
passages in many religious, literary and philosophical texts. If one way to judge rationality 
is to look for consistency in the beliefs about reasons that motivate action, misogyny might 
also be judged rational. Looked at from another perspective, if beliefs are based on how 
well they fit the world, then most reasonable people would conclude that women are not 
whores, gateways to the devil or threats to masculinity (though my experience and 
knowledge tell me that such attitudes are faring rather well in the world). If Sweeney also 
thought he was Jack the Ripper, his belief would be patently irrational since he simply 
cannot be Jack the Ripper: Sweeney’s murders are very different in kind and number, as 
are his targets. Sweeney might justify his actions on that account, his belief of who he is 
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giving him decisive reasons to murder. This makes him very dangerous indeed since his 
justified beliefs make (did make) him more likely to succeed.  
The Phelps are acting on beliefs with content that is morally questionable, as are the acts 
motivated by those beliefs. In the ordinary sense of rational, their beliefs and acts are, of 
course, not rational. Rather, they seem ‘crazy’, ‘stupid’, ‘senseless’ and ‘thoughtless’. The 
Phelps may be irrational to the extent that they seem unwilling to respond to alternative 
accounts concerning homosexuality, Obama and Jews (though these prejudices are far 
from extinct in the USA or elsewhere). The Phelps have apparent reason to believe what 
they do since they base their ‘facts’ on biblical text, the ‘truth’ of which gives them, they 
think, sufficient reason to act. Picketing funerals, labelling Obama as the ‘Beast’ of 
revelations are causally related to their beliefs about the immorality of homosexuality and 
the wickedness of the President, even though their beliefs are epistemically irrational104. It 
might seem patently irrational to believe that the President is the Beast of Revelations. He 
clearly is not. But the Phelps appear to hold fast to this view despite the fact the Obama 
looks like a very ordinary human being. It is not about what Obama looks like, of course, 
but what the family believes he represents. The belief, in my view, is not justified. 
Blaming the death of soldiers for a society’s tolerance of homosexuals is surely irrational 
since there is no evidence that this is God’s view. Why wait for a war in Iraq to punish 
soldiers? And why select soldiers for punishment? Are the Phelps’ acts justified by their 
beliefs? In one way, what the Phelps believe gives them decisive reasons to act. Their acts, 
on this criterion, are rational because the acts are rationally derived from, and supported 
by, their beliefs: they believe they are acting on the word of God and ridding the world of 
some evil105. Parfit (2011:117) proposes that acts are best called irrational ‘only when … in 
acting in some way, we are failing to respond to clear and strongly decisive practical 
reasons not to act in this way’. Depending on where one stands on the rationality or 
otherwise of faith and the truth of scripture, one may be judged rational or irrational on 
account of one’s beliefs. There are strong reasons not to picket the funerals of serving 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104But are such beliefs justified? This is difficult to answer because many people are strongly motivated by 
faith and what they take to be the irrefutable word of their God. 
105Even here, an answer to rationality is not straightforward for there is a long history of persecution of 
homosexuals, racial minorities and Jews based on, and inspired by, scriptural interpretation. The Phelps may 
not only be drawing on scripture, but also from social, historical and cultural views about what it means to be 
a homosexual, racial minority or a Jew. They may also be drawing from scripture and social and cultural 
knowledge on the corrective methods required to deal with what they may believe to be deviant or deficient 
characteristics. The Phelps might seem extreme because they are vocal when other like-minded persons now 
keep silent for fear of opprobrium. Society has, thankfully, become more intolerant of discriminatory and 
prejudicial practices but doubtless many individuals continue, privately, to hold views most of us would 
condemn. 
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soldiers, call the President the Beast (though ludicrous, it masks racial prejudice) or engage 
in anti-semitic acts as they cause harm and distress. They are also, on most humane views, 
deeply immoral acts, and therefore irrational because not in accordance with the moral law.  
In sum, and following Parfit (2011:117):  
[T]he rationality of our beliefs depends on whether, in having these beliefs, we are 
responding well to epistemic or truth related reasons … to have these beliefs. The 
rationality of our desires and acts depends on whether, in acting in these ways, we 
are responding well to practical reasons … to act in these ways. We might respond 
well to either set of reasons or apparent reasons, while responding badly to the 
other set. We might be practically rational but epistemically irrational, or 
practically irrational but epistemically rational.  
These claims are based on beliefs and acts with no normative content. The examples I have 
discussed are patently rich in such content. To murder, abuse, treat with contempt or 
disrespect is morally irrational. 
Emotions are affected by influencing belief. Change the content of the belief and we will 
change the emotion. Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian understood this, as have many 
dramatists, poets, writers and speech makers before them and since. There are important 
implications for education here. Beliefs taught early become ingrained and deeply habitual. 
What we teach children to fear, respect, love, loathe or avoid is a matter of moral 
importance and, hence, important to a good society. Racism or hatred directed at groups 
who do not fit our norms of what is right or normal are not necessarily unreasoning or 
irrational but they are problematic. Simply suppressing feelings of hatred will not work: 
we might hope to reason with such people that their views are defective, but this takes 
patience and effort (Nussbaum, 2004a: 34-35). Persuading a psychopath that his views of 
women are unreasonable is unlikely to work without tremendous commitment of time and 
resources: it may never work. But we can work with children to prevent bad beliefs from 
becoming habituated. 
 
The examples I have used here also show why emotions are treated with suspicion and 
regarded as irrational forces that impede the functioning and realisation of our goals. 
Emotions, however, need not impede functioning or the realisation of our goals. For 
Solomon (1993:xviii), our reality is given shape and structure by constitutive judgements 
that tune us into the world. Lazarus (1991b: 467) advises that we should think of people as 
irrational only when the reasoning process itself is illogical. Hidden in the illogicality are 
faulty premises: flawed beliefs, values and commitments. When the Duchesses de 
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Guermantes106 on hearing of her friend Swann’s impending death, nevertheless goes up to 
change her black shoes for red ones to attend the next ball, we wonder at her values. For 
her, it seems, the colour of her shoes is more important than the news that Swann will soon 
die. And though the Duchesses declares she hates the recondite trappings of her social life, 
the wearing of the right shoes, speaking only to the right people, displaying the right 
calling cards on the table, indicate that she cannot relinquish the grip her empty, but 
splendid, life has over her. However, her choice, in her terms and in her world, while vain, 
may be thought of as rational, while we judge her ‘irrational’ in the sense of being 
insensitive or thoughtless. 
 
Oatley (1992:155-156) concludes, on the basis of a number of experiments on logic, that 
irrationality is not particularly characteristic of emotion but is characteristic of thinking. 
The difference in emotional reasoning and unemotional reasoning is that, in the former 
case, the individual has to come up with the solution to a problem that suddenly arises, 
whereas in the latter, the individual can draw on cultural experience, defined and soluble 
problems in some domains, involving skills or technical know-how. New problems, 
whether arising in situations that elicit emotional responses or which confront the intellect, 
often result in errors: errors of reasoning, biases107, misunderstandings, wrong intention 
formations, incorrect selection, giving up too soon, and so on. As Oatley aptly points out, 
‘emotional thinking may seem more irrational than non-emotional thinking because it is 
often applied to insoluble problems’ (p.155-156). And while it is true that the expression of 
emotion is a cultural artefact that reflects a society’s norms and values, as well as being the 
expression of an individual’s personal values, commitments and goals, what is neglected in 
some discussions of rational intellect versus unreasoning emotion, is the fact that 
rationality is itself a social, not an individual, phenomenon. When Fermat devised his Last 
Theorem in 1637, he left many a mathematician puzzling over its solution for over three 
hundred years until its resolution in 1995. Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky and Gogol, among others, 
all absorbed the influence of Dickens into their great novels. Rationality is indeed social 
and founded on the funds of existing and past thought. As J.S. Mill eloquently remarked, 
apropos the lack of great works by women and their supposed lack of original thought: 
 
original thinkers are those who have known most thoroughly what had been 
thought of by their predecessors… . Every fresh stone in the edifice has now to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106Proust (2003/3:595-596). 
107Oatley (1992:156-157) shows that biases in human thinking are a major source of error. There is a large 
body of research that shows how common in thinking are errors in reasoning and biases that result in 
irrational choices and incorrect solutions.   
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placed on top of so many others that a long process of climbing, and of carrying 
up materials, has to be gone through by whoever aspires to take a share in the 
present share of work. (2006:208-209) 
 
We might look at the bias towards intellectual rationality in more philosophical depth by 
considering Hampton’s (2007) original account on culpability and defiance, in Mens Rea, 
or guilty mind. While her focus is on legal culpability, rather on the cognitive slips or 
premature terminations that Oatley discusses above, Hampton is interested in what it 
means to accuse someone in law of being culpable for a wrong they have committed. My 
interest in her account is her analysis of defiance in which people act illegally, immorally 
or irrationally. Hampton (2007) argues that to ‘be rationally culpable is to be irrational, 
though not every mistake made by a reasoning person is irrational’ (p.74). To find myself 
in the wrong village because I read the map incorrectly is a mistake, but it is not the result 
of an irrational act. If, however, I knowingly carry out an act I know is imprudent, plain 
daft or against the law, then my act is wilfully irrational and it might also be termed a 
‘cognitive bias’, as I suggest below. If I undertook an act which I should have known was 
imprudent, then I have been negligently irrational. I cannot, for example, claim I am 
innocent of breaking the speed limit on the motorway or avoiding tax laws because I did 
not know what the particular laws were: the courts will take the view that these are laws I 
should have known about or about which I should have taken steps to be familiar108.  Non-
rational mistakes are different in that while they are a ‘species of irrationality’ (Hampton, 
2007:75) in which we make mistakes in processing information, in the way we reason 
logically, or in how we see the world, there is nothing intentional about our mistakes. 
These are non culpable failures of reason of the kind that Oatley discusses.  
Wilfull irrationality, however, is different and interesting, all too familiar and puzzling. 
Teachers might recognise the following: 
 
A pupil, Sean, is sitting Higher Geography109 against the better judgement of his 
teacher. He has been advised that he must attend class, undertake homework, 
revise regularly, pay close attention in class, and so on. He has also been told that 
if his prelims are poor, he will have to drop a level. He fails to heed any of this 
advice. The prelims have come and gone, and the geography papers marked. Sean 
has achieved 37 percent. Results come into school in August. Sean has been 
awarded a ‘No award’ in Geography and has performed pretty abysmally in his 
other subjects. None of his teachers are surprised. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108A point Aristotle makes. NE.1113b30-1114a5; Pol.1274b18. 
109Scottish secondary school qualification. Scottish students require Highers to enter university. Prelims are 
preliminary exams taken by all Scottish pupils before the final diet of exams. They give a good indication of 
the candidates’ likely performance in the external exams.  
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This is an all too typical example and an endless source of irritation for teachers and 
parents. Given his goal of getting to university, knowing that he had to work to get his 
higher, he ought to have acted rationally. Sean needed to do X in order to achieve Y. 
Instead, Sean thought he could do Z and still achieve Y thereby subverting the course of 
action that reason directed he should take in order to achieve his goal. Following Hampton, 
we can conclude the following of Sean. 
 
The fact that the action he contemplates is irrational gives him not just reason but 
the best reason in the circumstances not to do the action; reason’s directives are 
authoritative in the situation. (2007:77) 
 
How do we make Sean’s action intelligible? On Hampton’s analysis, we can suggest that 
Sean is faced with a choice. He could conform his actions and desires to the dictates of 
reason which would mean temporarily giving up his job and some of his social life, 
attending school or doing his homework.  Alternatively he could defy reason’s authority 
and substitute in its place the authority of his desire to achieve his higher by some 
mysterious, serendipitous means110. Sean chose to be defiant. More precisely, he chose to 
be defiant of practical reason. Sean wanted to do Z, but he knew that in choosing Z he 
could not achieve Y even though achieving was, or so he claimed, his most important goal. 
He chose Z. He wanted his hamburger without collecting it, to jump on his tricycle and 
ride to London from Fife111. Or, to use a more common analogy, Sean wanted the 
mountain to come to him. The point of this line of argument is that when the world does 
not go the way we would like, we rationalise. We justify our irrational acts through 
recourse to all manner of rationalisations. The once in a while heroin user will not become 
addicted; the smoker will not die of lung cancer; Sean will pass his Higher without any 
effort on his part. All supplant reason’s authority with something more congenial to their 
worldview because each sees themselves as being somehow different from the rest of 
humanity. These ‘cognitive biases’ might take the form of ‘confirmation bias’ if we look 
for evidence to confirm our pre-existing hypothesis or biases (Oatley 1992:149) or ‘over-
confidence’ bias when ambiguity is suppressed and coherent explanations constructed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110An interesting alternative to this philosophical interpretation is that of de-Sousa’s (1987) analysis of 
cognitive bootstrapping.  
111I use these examples metaphorically. They originate from Hampton (2007:79-81). The hamburger example 
comes from a child who wanted a hamburger but did not want to go to the only outlet that was still open. In 
‘defiance of an unacceptable directive of practical reason’, she threw a tantrum because she wanted to ‘have 
the hamburger without getting it’. In the other example, Hampton’s son wanted to go to San Francisco on his 
tricycle. Her point is that children throw up the flaws in human reasoning that adults can disguise by the 
veneer of sophistication and civilisation.  
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(Kahneman, 2011). People rely on a small number of heuristic principles to reduce 
complex tasks to simple judgements, often leading to systematic errors, as in assessing 
probability and hypothesis testing (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974)112. Kahneman’s 
extensive research demonstrates that we will often give up rationality (what it is logical to 
do) rather than abandon attractive projects and goals, and Sean is a fine demonstration of 
that abandonment. Further, while sub-processes of the brain cannot be described as 
‘rational’ or ‘irrational’ per se, (they are, rather, efficient or inefficient), these processes 
may, as Stanovich (2011) observed, contribute to personal decisions and beliefs. What is 
important is how the environment in which a person is acting contributes to the quality of 
the decision making process (Oatley’s point as noted above), as well as to a person’s 
personal beliefs, values, and attitudes. Sean may have failed because he was simply lazy. 
However, he was adamant that he could achieve his Higher on his plan of action. The 
Duchess may have demonstrated misplaced values in preferring red shoes to speaking to 
Swann, and so may be judged as morally less than rational, but she was, in two ways, 
rational. She was epistemically rational because what she did was determined by her 
beliefs about her social standing and social mores. And she was instrumentally rational 
because she behaved in a way that allowed her to achieve what she most wanted: the 
preservation of her reputation for exquisite taste and supreme elegance.  
But there is another way in which defiance can make a person culpably irrational, and such 
defiance points to a crucial moral implication to which I will shortly return. If I perform an 
action in ignorance of its effects, prima facie, I am innocent and I might be excused my 
ignorance (Hampton, 2007:84). If, however, my ignorance was such that I ought to have 
remedied it at some earlier time, then I cannot be excused. Even in cases where I might 
have been genuinely ignorant to begin with, there is enough evidence to be had to lead me 
out of my ignorance. In effect, what each lazy student of the Sean kind (junk food eater, or 
silent Auschwitz resident) would have is that: 
 
I defied reason (in its theoretical or practical guise) in order to choose to remain 
ignorant, and for this reason my failure to procure my goals by virtue of that 
ignorance makes it appropriate to call me ‘irrational’ rather than merely 
‘mistaken’. (Hampton, 2007:84) 
 
We might now see the moral implications here. Ignorance of the Nazi project was no 
excuse. Neither is being ignorant of the fact that one’s child is being abused by one’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112This paper is a classic treatment of the errors in cognitive processing and remains one of the most cited 
papers in the Social Sciences (see Kahneman, 2011:8). Stanovich (2011) makes a clear distinction between 
intelligence and rationality. Rationality, for Stanovich, is a more ‘encompassing construct than intelligence’ 
(p.37) because it concerns the actions of a person in her environment.   
 
 
81 
partner an excuse if the behaviour of the child changes so suddenly and 
uncharacteristically, yet the mother refuses to confront what she sees before her for fear of 
losing her partner. But, of course, we are saying far more here than that many Nazi 
supporters and Nazi spectators were wilfully ignorant and negligently irrational, or that the 
mother demonstrated those same dispositions. There is a moral problem inherent within 
these species of reasoning. Sean’s problem is different. I think we can safely say that he 
was wilfully irrational without saying that he was morally negligent of his studies. Like 
irrational people, immoral people know the better but do the worse ‘because they believe 
they can install a new reason-giving authority over their actions that transforms the worse 
into the better’ (Hampton, 2007:91-92). And implicit in the act to disobey the authority of 
reason or morality is choice. Sean, for example, chooses to evaluate a situation or action as 
better, not worse, in order to achieve a goal that is convenient to his scheme of ends or 
reasoning. In the cases we have here, that would have been to rid Europe of undesirable 
human beings and to keep a partner at the injurious expense of a child. 
 
Emotions, then, should not simply be dismissed as irrational and inimical to functioning, 
unless we also, in order to be balanced, say the same of (some forms of) intellectual 
reasoning. Emotions allow us to function very well. We run in fear from an attacker. We 
love our children, parents, siblings and close friends, and we bask in their wellbeing and 
flourishing. We react in anger at watching a dog being beaten unmercifully. While there 
are, unsurprisingly, disagreements about the extent to which emotions are rational, writers 
such as de-Sousa (1987), Oatley (1992), Elster (1999) and Ben-Ze’ev (2000) all argue that 
emotions are rational in the normative sense of being appropriate in a given set of 
circumstances: that is they trigger evaluative appraisals of what is salient and worth a 
response113. However, emotions are not rational in the descriptive sense as they are not the 
product of intellectual deliberation where we consciously and deliberately calculate our 
emotional response, at least they are not always so. We can induce emotions by calculating 
their social worth, for example, such as feigning anger to show our allegiance to our ‘Dear 
Leader’, or happiness to put our customers at ease. But the initial calculation is a 
deliberative one. Our emotional responses are best seen as rule-described behaviour, acting 
in accordance with non-intentional forms of lawful connection114. Nevertheless, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113Though de-Sousa (1987) does not stress the evaluative aspect of emotions, adopting instead an axiological 
apprehension of value. 
114See Ben-Ze’ev (2000:162-164) for the difference between rule-following behaviour and rule-described 
behaviour. For a criticism of over-rationality in emotions, see Elster (1999:290) who says of the accounts by 
de-Sousa (1987) and Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1992) that they put up strawmen of rational choice theory 
where agents always take into account ‘all possible outcomes of all possible options’ and are ‘addicted to 
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bearing the preceding comments in mind, emotions, because they are urgent signals of 
changes in our environment, act like ‘tie-breakers in situations of indeterminacy, and, more 
generally improve the quality of decision making by enabling us to focus on salient 
features of the environment’ (Elster, 1999:284). Emotions, then, have an important 
indicative, mobilising and communicative function (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000:168). Antonio 
Damasio (1994) and LeDoux (1999) describe cases in which a decline of rationality is 
accompanied by a decline in emotion: the power of reason declines, says Damasio (p.54) 
with the emotional experience115. Brain damaged patients tend to be emotionally flat and 
display defective decision-making capacities, leading to irrational behaviour.  
Perhaps a fruitful approach is to consider the appropriacy of emotions in terms of whether 
their judgements, beliefs or appraisals are correct. To develop the point further, and 
following philosophers such as Pitcher (1966), Ben-Ze’ev (2000) and Nussbaum (2001), 
we do not speak of false grief, but we do speak of false propositional (she believed that P) 
content. If Nancy is told that her father is dying because he has terminal cancer, she will 
experience grief at the thought of his impending death. If, however, she comes to believe 
her father is dying because he has cracked his wrist, it would be fair to conclude that 
Nancy’s grief is unfounded and her belief the result of false premises leading to an 
erroneous conclusion. We do not say of headaches that they are reasonable or 
unreasonable; we do not have sensible headaches. Only what we do can be assessed, 
according to Solomon (1993). We can be mistaken about our emotions and their causes, 
but not about bodily states such as a sore stomach or a racing heart. A judgement or belief 
will make truth-claims about its own evaluations: it asserts the real value of the object, 
which of course may be wrong. Pitcher’s (1965:331) analysis of unreasonable fear is 
illuminating. He cites five cases of unreasonable fear: groundless fear (falling of a safe 
bridge), irrational fear (there is no chance whatever of falling off the bridge), superstitious 
fear (fear of falling off the bridge because a magpie has flown by), vain or neurotic fear 
(fear of lambs), abnormal or inordinate fear (fainting at the sight of snakes in a cage at the 
zoo). What counts is the degree of evaluation of danger; the belief, false or otherwise, that 
there is danger; a perceptual/cognitive capacity to see the real, perceived or imaginary 
danger which arouse the characteristic feelings associated with danger, whether or not the 
propositional content is warranted or not. However, intellectual judgements can be wrong: 
they do go wrong, and catastrophically so. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reason’. A person who waited to calculate all possible outcomes of all possible options would be irrational 
and severely impaired by the burden of decision-making or dead, if she were confronted by a gunman 
pointing a gun at her head. I think it fair to say that this criticism is justified in cases of immediate danger 
where our emotions have the adaptive function of preserving our lives by making us act without thinking.  
115The significance of this point becomes clear in Chapter 6. 
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One final comment in defence of the rationality of emotions and their role in moral life is 
that emotions, as I argued at the start of this discussion, can act as our moral compass and 
serve as strong barriers to immoral conduct. So, too, can non-emotional reasoning when it 
does not conflict with a desire not sanctioned by the authority of ethical reason. The deaths 
of Jews, vagrants, disabled people, homosexuals and anyone who did not conform to the 
Nazi Teutonic ideal resulted from loathing, hatred, fear and contempt. This much is true. 
The minds, however, that organised the logistics of deaths, the transport to the death 
camps, that calculated the resources needed to keep the inmates barely alive and the 
quantity of gas to optimally kill them, the minds at the Wannsee Conference of 1942 that 
dreamed up the Final Solution, were cold, calculating, remorseless and utterly 
indifferent116 to the inhumane suffering they had unleashed and would further intensify as 
that war progressed. The Nazis are morally culpable for their actions because they 
preferred to substitute the authority of morality that regards all humans of being of equal 
worth to one which views only an ideal of a human being as of worth: the rest can be 
disposed of or used to serve the ends of the superior human.  
 
 
 
 
2.7 Concluding Chapter Two. 
I am assuming an acceptance of a certain kind of moral theory in which we intuitively 
accept that the basis of morality is to have a sense of one’s own intrinsic and equal value as 
a human being117. The examples I used here of jealousy, grief, shame and anger, 
demonstrate the importance of self-esteem, social standing and the value of external goods 
to us. Emotions also demonstrate our capacity to be and to do in order to be able to flourish 
in truly human ways, an important constituent of moral theory. Our emotions, because of 
their complex intentionality, sensitivity and perception, provide us with a sense of what 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116In this case, they could be excused moral culpability because they were amoral in their attitudes to human 
dignity and human life. Being amoral, such people do not see themselves as participants of moral imperatives 
and so remain outside the moral laws. However, there is a distinction to be made here. Even if agents are 
amoral but know and understand the directives of morality and why they are important to social cohesion and 
human wellbeing, but ignore them anyway, they are defiant (in Hampton’s terms). If amoral agents do not 
know about moral authority, they are either responsible for this ignorance and are thus culpable for their 
immoral acts (because they chose acts which made the agent increasingly insensitive to reason’s directives 
over time); or some other force or circumstance, brain damage or a neglected childhood, is responsible for 
the ignorance. See Hampton (2007:96-97).  
117For fine arguments on these points, see Rawls (1971); Hursthouse (1991); Hampton (2007); Herman 
(2008). 
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one needs, as a particular and distinct person, in order to flourish as that person. Our 
emotions, too, provide us with a sense of what others’ might need as particular and distinct 
persons. Finally, and relatedly, our emotions can develop our capacity to recognise our 
own and other’s neediness and vulnerability, and to understand that these can be satisfied 
with the help and support of others. In accepting this kind of moral theory, I am also asking 
how we can act well in ways that are sustainable, sensitive to the particulars, and go down 
deep into our personalities. Support for this kind of moral theory will be made throughout 
this thesis as I ask how we can act well in difficult situations. I shall make the case for the 
cultivation of a form of moralised compassion that will stabilise forms of ethical reasoning 
which yield, in turn, ethical acts that in themselves realise human functioning in truly 
human ways. And so, I will consider the cluster of emotions that comprise what I regard as 
the family of emotions that are other-regarding: namely, compassion, empathy and 
sympathy118. An account of these emotions, of compassion in particular, helps us to 
understand obstacles to flourishing. For compassion, as I will present it here, says that 
while Nancy may do wrong in some way, it is not entirely her fault. Instead, compassion 
will help us see, for example, that the concatenation of natural, social and familial 
circumstances each have a strong bearing on the formation of Nancy’s character. The aim 
is to cultivate an understanding of compassion that is morally relevant and discerning. 
Following Nussbaum (2001:401-454), our aim is to provide compassion with an 
understanding of agency and fault, a theory of the worth of basic goods that are linked to 
actions and institutions. For what good are our institutions or our actions, Nussbaum 
(p.404) asks, if they are governed by dutiful but dead and empty acts? And what good is it 
if we follow the rules but fail to act in compassionate defiance and with empathy in our 
souls?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118Oatley (1992:196) regards these as complex emotions which correspond to Adam Smith’s (1759) moral 
sentiments. That is, they are contextual emotions that have propositional content involving the evaluation of 
the self in relation to another. Oddly, Solomon (1993) does not have any of the three emotions in his register 
of emotions. To be fair, this is an exploratory effort on Solomon’s part and he acknowledged the compilation 
of the register would be controversial. Ortony et al. (1998:69) refer to this group of emotions as the fortune 
of others emotions where the events in question concern what is happening to others. Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 
follows closely the classification of the emotions set out by Ortony et al. (1998). 
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Chapter Three: Compassion. 
 
Black shapes crouched, lay, sat between the trees, leaning against the trunks, 
clinging to the earth, half coming out, half effaced within the dim light, in all the 
attitudes of pain, abandonment, and despair… nothing but black shadows of 
disease and starvation, lying confusedly in the greenish gloom.  (Joseph Conrad, 
Heart of Darkness, 1995:35) 
 
Compassion119 
 
Intentional components:   
a] cognitive evaluation:  negative, evaluation of seriousness, empathic 
projection of similar possibilities  
b] belief about the object:  undeserved or excessive suffering  
c] value or eudaimonia:  other-concern, desire to alleviate suffering, 
overcoming social barriers, promoting ethical 
concern  
d] object:  anyone subject to serious misfortune. This 
includes animals.  
 
Link to other emotions:  love, grief, anger, disgust. May be prompted by 
hate or anger at perceived injustice. 
 
 
3.1 Introduction. 
In this chapter, I shall argue the need to cultivate moralised compassion as a route to 
nurturing and stabilizing the appropriate moral attitude to perceptions of suffering and 
harm. In the first section, I use two novels: Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness (hereafter 
HD) and Cormac McCarthy’s The Road, both of which powerfully and movingly illustrate 
how human life fares when compassion, pity and justice are absent, and the normal rules 
and conventions of civil society barely exist or have been destroyed. Injustice prevails in 
the contrasting environments of these novels: in the rich and fertile jungle of Conrad’s HD 
and in the world of post apocalyptic devastation in The Road. The external goods are 
abundant in the former world, and ruthlessly exploited, while close to eternal extinction in 
the latter. The choices the characters make darken their moral souls because compassion, 
as ‘guardian’120 of the realm of suffering and harm, has fled their souls, though not souls of 
the father and son in The Road who hold steadfastly to their values. The novels also 
exemplify the themes I wish to explore here and, indeed, to develop in subsequent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119I have provided this summary of compassion in order to remind the reader of what the constituents of an 
emotion and to indicate the emotions to which compassion is related. I provide a similar summary of fear in 
the concluding chapter. 
120Recall this phrase comes from Haidt (2009:859) who speaks of emotions such as shame, disgust or 
compassions, as ‘guardians of morality’. 
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chapters: the consequences to human dignity and respect when humans are treated as 
objects to be exploited for the wellbeing and flourishing of others. In the epigraph from 
HD, the objects are the black shapes that are ‘half effaced within the dim light, in all the 
attitudes of pain, abandonment, and despair… nothing but black shadows of disease and 
starvation.’ The identities of the “shapes” have been erased, their humanity a matter of 
contempt. 
 
In this chapter I discuss, in relation to those two novels, what are commonly termed in 
cognitive science as ‘other regarding’, prosocial emotions of compassion, pity, and 
sympathy, though the primary focus is on compassion. As with other emotions, such as 
jealousy in Chapter 2, here I continue to delineate the main appraisal features and 
components of this family of other regarding emotions. I contrast compassion with pity 
and, though to a lesser extent, with sympathy, in order to show how they are related but 
distinct, mainly because our appraisals in these emotions are different. In feeling pity, for 
example, onlookers may judge that there is suffering, but that it is the fault of the sufferer 
and that there is nothing the onlooker can do. In feeling sympathy, we may judge, again, 
that there is suffering, but feel no compulsion to act in any way to alleviate the sufferer. 
The evaluation of sympathy lacks attentive vigour, unlike compassion which rivets our 
attention to the object. I suggest that all of these emotions are important for seeing how 
people are faring, and for imagining things from their perspective. This, in turn, links to the 
imaginative complexes that emotions permit us to construct for which empathy121, as a 
protean emotion, is essential. These emotions are important because they extend the 
boundaries of our immediate and local concern to take account of people who are remotely 
or differently situated from us. 
 
I will argue that we need moralised compassion if we are to have just relations and just 
institutions. Initially I construct moralised compassion to entail having regard for others as 
ends in themselves, as people who ought to be accorded dignity and respect. Second, and 
relatedly, I construct moralised compassion to entail cultivating appropriate evaluations of 
what merits our compassionate regard. In order to provide examples for this account of 
moralised compassion, I begin the first section with a description of the moral themes of 
the two novels that I judge to be illuminative of the concerns that interest me here. As 
noted in the introduction, the style I adopt is not committed to a single disciplinary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121I will reserve a close analysis of empathy for Chapter 4 in which I argue that empathy, on some accounts, 
is not enough to ensure that ‘caring-for’ or ‘caring-about’ are carried out with the correct motives. 
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conception of discourse, and my task is not simply to adhere to the rather economic 
language of philosophical argument. I draw upon these novels, and those that follow, to 
both exemplify points I make and to introduce the possibilities of using such literature in 
schools as part of a cultivation of appropriate emotions. There is evidence that young 
people who can identify with a character or situation may be likely to remember the story 
and the emotions it evoked when they were imaginatively engaged (see Harrison, 1989; 
Batson 2011), and so the ways in which we preface literature can set the scene for 
imaginative engagement. Vivid presentations, such as those provided here, may arouse 
empathic projection and a willingness to transcend the self to become immersed in another 
world, to simulate, in some degree, the life of the characters in those circumstances. For 
these reasons, I begin the next section with two detailed accounts from a HD and The 
Road. 
 
In that first section, too, I will start to develop the argument that education can play a 
crucial part in the process of shaping our moral emotional development. Children and 
young people, and I include Nancy here, must not only discern their own plans and goals, 
they must be educated to respect the plans of others, to cultivate the virtues of respect and 
tolerance, and to nurture judgements that allow them to enjoy a healthy emotional 
repertoire that includes appropriate compassion, pity and anger. Schools are one of the 
major arenas in which fair procedures are institutionalised and in which individual rights, 
capabilities and mutual respect can be honoured and developed, and so the moves I pursue 
here have, as their rationale, the desire to argue that schools should fulfill these important 
aims. The novel, as I suggest here, and in Chapter 7, is an excellent educative resource for 
inculcating moral regard for others. The novels I use in this chapter depict the debasement 
and exploitation that will likely result if we fail to value fully compassion in our 
institutions and political life and if we host, instead, unethical emotional responses when 
we are confronted with people we have come to regard to as ‘other’ and not quite human. 
In order to retain my focus on the importance of dignity and self-respect, in the second 
section here, I outline a Kantian conception of personhood. Human beings, Kant asserted, 
should never be used instrumentally, but should be treated as ends in themselves, and 
compassion, which he acknowledged as a ‘painful feeling’ (DV.6:457), may ground duty to 
accomplish what it ought: namely the happiness and moral well being of others122. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122See the Doctrine of Virtue (6:393-394) (here and hereafter DV.). Since it is difficult to do good by others 
without love, it is our duty to make ourselves ends for others, and to make others our ends in order to secure 
happiness (wellbeing). We must respect the wellbeing of others and do nothing to cause them harm whilst, of 
course, avoiding self-sacrificial behaviours. 
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feeling compassion for others, we record and respect their value as dignified beings worthy 
of respect. In combining these two moral conceptions of compassion and Kantian 
personhood, we have, I propose, moralised compassion.   
 
Following this outline, I will sketch the morphology of compassion and the related 
emotion of pity to show their common features and distinct value appraisals. Contrary to 
the view that compassion is too unreliable to ground justice, I argue that compassion need 
not be, necessarily, an unreliable source of moral judgement that is antithetical to personal 
achievement. Moralised compassion, cultivated to an appropriate degree should enable us 
to feel compassion for the right objects, in the right way and in the right circumstances, 
acting as a powerful guide in our ethical endeavours. I suggest, following Nussbaum’s 
(2001) account, that compassion has three cognitive elements: that the suffering is not 
trivial, that it has ‘size’, and that we are all susceptible to ill fortune. The eudaimonistic 
judgement in compassion, Nussbaum’s fourth element, is that the wellbeing of others is 
important to my own wellbeing, because I value their goals, plans and aspirations as I do 
my own. This conception links us back to the claims of moral theory elucidated in Chapter 
2, and which I will develop further in this chapter in my later discussion of Kantian and 
Rawlsian ethics. In addition, I will illustrate and exemplify the discussion on compassion 
by reference to Nancy and to Christopher Crisp’s (2008) criticisms of Nussbaum’s 
articulation of this emotion. Crisp presents three scenarios in an attempt to argue that 
compassion is a feeling rather than a cognitive experience. I take two of his examples to 
demonstrate why his non-cognitive analysis cannot take us very far. 
 
This exposition leads on to a more detailed discussion of other-regarding emotions in the 
fourth section, where I move to contrast the appraisal structures of compassion, pity and 
sympathy, while constructing in more detail the case for moralised compassion. In the final 
section, I argue that we should aim for just institutions if emotions, in particular moralized 
compassion, are to be realised in the ways I propose here. Returning to the theme of 
education, I will argue that schools should be considered as important loci for thinking 
about just institutions and for cultivating moralised concern in children123. To make my 
case, I follow Rawls’ (1971) assertion that in just societies, and within just institutions, 
individuals acquire the desire to act justly124. Individuals will be accorded respect to have 
the freedom to choose their life plans, provided they conform to just actions and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123And again, my focus is on schools but that is not to suggest that all institutions would not benefit from 
similar attention. 
124Cf. Aristotle: Legislators make their citizens good by habituation. NE.1103b-5. 
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legitimate claims of others. By agreeing to follow the principles of justice, citizens in a 
well ordered society will be motivated to ensure that everyone’s good is included in a 
scheme of mutual benefit. Such a conception accords closely with Kant’s assertion that we 
should include others’ ends in our own scheme of ends (DV.II) and it develops the 
Aristotelian themes of virtue and practical reason introduced in Chapter 1. Now we can 
add a Rawlsian analysis that enriches and adds layers to the argument for compassion and 
compassionate institutions. I then draw briefly on empirical research to demonstrate that 
compassion can reduce the likelihood of derogation and blaming victims of injustice, all 
too important if we are avoid the injustices depicted in HD and in The Road in real life.  
 
The chapter’s argument is extensive because I endeavour to show how easy it is, without 
the support of well cultivated emotions, and compassion in particular, to revile human 
dignity and autonomy and to revile, above all, the morality inherent in humans as rational 
beings. Additionally, the chapter forms a theoretical prelude to Chapter 4, introducing key 
threads that will be rewoven in subsequent chapters on gender, the novel and domestic 
violence. Reason, as rational activity, as I have shown, is fundamental to all that we do and 
aims at some ultimate end or good: eudaimonia. As we will see in Conrad’s novel, 
contempt and loathing for the ‘black figures’ of the jungle kept the European’s boundaries 
tight to their own self-interested concerns, driving to disease and death the victims they 
chose to see as brutish and primeval. In The Road, it is starvation that is corrupting the 
cannibals’ souls as they attempt to delay their inevitable death by predating on human 
survivors. The choice the cannibals make, though grim, is not inevitable as the boy and his 
father show: they choose to succumb to slow death as a more honourable alternative to a 
life of predation, depravity and torture. The Road arouses our deep compassion and sorrow 
because its fictional inhabitants failed to cherish the world when it was living and 
abundant. Eudaimonia is nowhere to be found in a HD or The Road. In these fictional 
worlds it is debased action issuing from deformed reasoning that is sovereign, yet 
moralised compassion can persist against all the odds.  
 
3.1a Dark Souls in a Heart of Darkness. 
In Conrad’s Heart of Darkness neither compassion nor justice exists. No one possesses, or 
can possess, an inviolability founded on justice125. Neither is there, nor can there be, pity. 
The black shadows that wander, march or sit silently in the green gloom of HD do not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125These concepts come from Rawls (1971). I will return to these later in this chapter. 
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elicit pity or compassion, at least not from their exploiters, though they might from a 
reader such as Nancy (and I return to Nancy as a reader in the final chapter). We cannot be 
stirred beyond ourselves, to reach out to the suffering of another126 if we see only the 
surface of black skin and flattened noses of creatures who are simulacra of humans, so 
deformed that they can be ruthlessly exploited without conscience or restraint. Neither 
compassion nor pity can take hold here while the colonizers remain free from all moral 
restraint to murder and plunder for the debased aggrandizement of an immorally privileged 
‘race’ of Europeans. No creature is inviolable while there is money to be made, by 
whatever means, or while human dignity is seen as an affront to economic efficiency and 
an impediment to unfettered profit. The peoples of the Central African Region are as 
fungible as the primary goods the Europeans extract and export abroad. The principles of 
inviolability, liberty and equality, the enlightenment ideals of a progressive society that 
enshrine the constitutions of modern European countries today, are absent in Conrad’s tale 
of Central Africa’s conquest. What I am so far suggesting is that the forces of debasement 
and exploitation are never too far from the surface if we fail to nurture, and to value fully 
in our institutions and political life, the emotions of compassion, as well as empathy and 
sympathy, in moralised forms, that is, to cultivate moralised compassion so as to see the 
value and worth of all human beings whoever and wherever they happen to be. If we do 
not cultivate our emotions in this moralised way, we may fail to provide the conditions in 
which human flourishing can occur, and that is not compatible with anyone’s wellbeing, 
whether material, moral or both.  
 
Conrad’s novel comments directly and unambiguously on the pitiless, immoral acts of the 
European enterprise in the Belgian Congo127. The barbarity and rapacious greed of the 
European, here exemplified as Kurt, his indescribable inefficiency in exploiting the region 
and its peoples until they are diseased, starved and dying, is an instructive moral lesson on 
what goes wrong when pity or compassion are absent from our regard for the ‘other’, 
whomsoever that ‘other’ might be. Of moral significance are Conrad’s frequent references 
to the ‘darkness’ that shrouds this ‘prehistoric continent’, on which Marlow and the 
Europeans travel as if ‘phantoms … in the night of first ages, of those ages that are gone, 
leaving hardly a sign – and no memories’ (p.62). Conrad’s darkness hums in the humid 
fecundity of the impenetrable forest, a vast and hellacious unknown. While Europe’s own 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126See Rousseau (1993). 
127The region in which Marlow is travelling is never actually named but because the fictional character, 
echoing Conrad’s own real life career, goes to Belgium to receive his commission, it is assumed to be King 
Leopold’s Belgian Congo. 
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first ages are enshrouded and lost to time, they are imagined here in Africa where all 
drones with unearthly brutality, savagery and the primitive, drawing the European back in 
time to his beastly self. The pervasive darkness speaks of the Europeans’ own internal 
darkness, the truth of who and what we are when compassion and fellow feeling become 
rarer than ivory: brute, savage and primitive when our conceptions of human worth and 
dignity are released from their moral anchors. This is a region, which, because it is not yet 
quite human, humanity can be forfeited. 
  
In a HD truths are reversed. Darkness, because it reveals our true nature, is truth; while 
white is evil and falsehood. The trade in ivory is degrading. It corrodes the souls of the 
hunters, and is merciless towards the creatures that are slaughtered to yield the dentine. 
When moral sentiments are overthrown by immoral attitudes or by situations we have not 
confronted before, humanity itself can disappear into something akin to the metaphorical 
dark gloom that Conrad so vividly evokes. The consequences for human wellbeing and 
dignity can be as dire as the silently dying shadows of disease and starvation the excerpt 
avers. Failing to recognize that we are that ‘other’, meaning African and human, as the 
travelers head upstream towards the physical heart of darkness of the forest, their 
psychological and emotional hearts of darkness fuse in a symbiosis of racial prejudice and 
lust for cruelty. This is the moral horror at the heart of this complex tale. Whilst emotions 
may serve as our moral compass, that compass can be skewed by the cultivation of 
immoral beliefs that incite unethical emotional responses when we are confronted with a 
people we have come to regard to as ‘other’ and not quite human. Emotions express our 
deepest values, though here, these values are corrupted into contempt for the appraised 
primitiveness and supposed animality128 of the black figures. If we justify a corrupted 
emotional repertoire, we support that justification, as we saw in Chapter 1, by recourse to 
deficient intellectual deliberations, creating, in the process, societies that are cruel and 
barbaric to some, while privileging others for no good moral reason. This is in contrast to 
compassion, for, as I shall presently argue, compassion, tethered to a moral conception of 
the worth and value of all, would help inhibit these dehumanizing tendencies. We can see 
the effects of European beliefs of superiority in the colonization of Africa (around the 
world, indeed), the industrial scale murder in Nazi Germany, the near total suppression of 
the individual under Communism and in gender based violence, a phenomenon which has 
universal expression. Our emotional evaluation of, and resistance to, a bad state of affairs 
signals that there is a problem that ought to be addressed. As I react with compassion, pity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128See Nussbaum’s (2004a) account of our abhorrence of animality and our primitive shame. 
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and horror at the treatment of the Africans, I am aware that my reactions stem from my 
beliefs that such treatment can never be justified on any grounds. 
 
3.1b The Road. 
I experience similar reactions to McCarthy’s The Road, but for very different reasons. This 
is a post-apocalyptic narrative of complete and irreversible devastation. Here the forests 
are dead and dying, the cold unceasing, each day unremittingly grey and wet, a landscape 
everywhere covered in the ash of all that once lived and thrived before the earth was 
destroyed by a mysterious catastrophic event. Life’s fecundity has been erased. Here the 
gloom never lifts, and is too dense for shafts of sunlight to penetrate. There are few 
humans left alive, and those that remain are either ‘bad’ or ambiguously ‘good’: save for 
the boy who is unremittingly good. 
 
While the man and his son travel the road south in the hope of reaching the sea and a 
chance of survival, their journey is dangerous and likely to end their lives if they are 
caught by the cannibals that lie in wait to trap and devour human flesh, a devourment of a 
different kind from that depicted by Conrad. Human flesh is all there is left on which to 
survive. Despite the pitiless landscape that yields nothing but what the man and his son can 
scavenge from the dead cities and countryside, the values they carry from the old world 
remain alive and strong. The bond of love between father and son never diminishes. Their 
love for each other, and the love the man still feels for his dead wife and lost life, is an 
essential part of their morality, as well as of their capacity to be other-regarding when they 
encounter living creatures on their journey south. The bonds of affection, compassion, 
empathy and pity are deeply embedded in their natures, evident in the sparse dialogue 
between them, and in the thoughts of the man while he worries about his son’s health and 
their survival. The boy, despite his years of grueling hardship, remains sensitive and 
compassionate, optimistic that the fire within will guide them to the right people and to a 
place of survival. One senses that if humans can somehow survive then they will need the 
values this child embodies if they are to prosper. The boy and the father have retained their 
dignity, refusing to trade it in for immoral goods, here, human flesh, or what is left of any 
survivors’ goods. The compassionate person is usually sensitive to suffering, vulnerability, 
and other harm-related concerns129. Like the boy in the The Road, she is motivated to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129Goetz et al. (2010:366) assert that the research on compassion’s role in alleviating suffering and reducing 
harm is unequivocal. Batson (2011) takes a similar view. 
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remedy unjustified suffering or need. For these reasons, and as I have already emphasized, 
compassion can be viewed as the ‘guardian’ (Haidt, 2009) of the moral domain of 
suffering and harm, and the virtue required for justice. Schopenhauer (1999) takes justice 
and loving kindness to be the ‘cardinal virtues’130 (p.148) so described because from these 
all other virtues follow. As justice and loving kindness are rooted in compassion then 
compassion, for Schopenhauer, is the foundation of all morality. 
  
In The Road, there is a reversal of a different kind from that in HD. In the permanent 
gloom, a world ineluctably dimmed as if by ‘glaucoma’ (p.1), the protagonists carry ‘the 
fire’, as the boy calls it, within them. This fire guides their decision-making and 
consequent conduct, helping them adhere to their values and dignity, despite unimaginable 
adversity and their pointless quest. Unlike the cannibals who farm human flesh, harvesting 
limbs while their owners are still alive, or eating babies as soon as they are born, the man 
and his son eat nothing that is alive. They pursue neither the dog that will soon be killed, 
nor the boy sighted in a window. They do not pursue Old Ely, whom they chance upon on 
the road, and to whom they offer, on the boy’s insistence, a tin of fruit from their meager 
stores. As the boy is suffering terribly for not saving another child, his father knows that he 
will suffer even more were he to refuse his son’s request to give Ely a tin of fruit, even 
though this source of rare sweet sustenance is a few tins away from being forever absent. 
In giving the fruit away, they know they hasten their death. The glaucoma that settles on 
the HD has a different texture and substance: here we see the compassionless, frenzied 
pillaging of Africa’s rich resources by men who have abandoned all moral scruples for 
wealth and adventure. In The Road, humans have come to the end of what they can exploit. 
Memory will soon cease, abandoned to extinction, which is why, perhaps, the characters, 
apart from Ely, have no names: there will be no-one to record or honour their existence. 
 
Justice, of course, is alien and pointless in The Road. If there is justice, one might reason 
that humans have received their just deserts if the environmental catastrophe has come 
about because of their reckless activity. There is no justice, of course, for the other 
creatures that inhabited the earth ‘cannot be put back’ or ‘made right again’ (p.307). In 
what sense, then, can we talk here of the inviolability of the person? Even in this 
glaucomic world, the man and the boy embody the inviolability that Rawls (1971) believed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130As Schopenhauer observes, while justice was recognised as a virtue in the writings of classical antiquity, 
loving-kindness was not so regarded. Kindness was formulated as the greatest of all virtues in Christianity 
which Schopenhauer regards as Christianity’s greatest ‘merit’ (p.164). The maxim of ‘caritas’ (charity) is to 
‘help everyone as much as you can’ (p.167). 
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underpinned the principles of justice and the well-ordered society, though, in these 
narratives, society either does not exist or is being destroyed. Advancing the good of others 
is not possible, and there is no Rawlsian (1971:397) public conception of justice to regulate 
the activities of either humans or institutions. However, unlike in a HD, there is, in The 
Road, a concept of the moral worth of persons and of self-respect in the hearts of the man 
and his son, strained to the limits of physical, psychological and emotional endurance 
though they may be. Both narratives also illustrate how human life fares when the concept 
of good disappears from our personal interactions and from society. A good human life, as 
conceived by Aristotle, will be one in which humans will be free to plan their life as they 
please, realizing their capacities and talents to the fullest degree possible, provided that 
these plans do not infringe the plans and, hence, the dignity and self-respect of others131. 
Our plans are chosen by deliberative reason132 and plans, ideally, give us pleasure in their 
pursuit and realization. The desire to pursue a life plan that enables us to train and educate 
our capacities to a satisfactory, if complex degree, is a deep psychological feature of 
human nature (Rawls, 1971:379). The extent to which we can pursue our rational life plans 
is an important constituent of our flourishing or eudaimonia and a crucial part of the 
process of realizing our latent capacities will be shaping our moral emotional development. 
Education has a key role to play here. Children must not only be able to discern and to 
realize their own plans and goals, they must be educated to respect those of others, to 
cultivate the virtues of respect and tolerance, and to nurture judgements that allow them to 
enjoy a healthy emotional repertoire that includes, for example, moralised compassion, 
appropriate shame and anger. Schools are a major site in which fair procedures can be 
institutionalised and individual rights, capabilities and mutual respect honoured and 
developed. And of course, given the context of Scotland’s curricular reform, Curriculum 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131NE.VII and X. I am not, here, suggesting that Aristotle is an egalitarian. The account here is about the 
realisation of an individual’s goals and plans, and exercising one’s powers in order to effect a good life, a 
project which Aristotle endorsed and commended in achieving eudaimonia. The idea is also captured by 
'eudaimonia'. At 1098b21-2, Aristotle says, ‘our definition is also supported by the belief that the happy man 
lives and fares well; because what we have described is virtually a kind of good life or prosperity'. If a man is 
‘eudaimon’ we know something about how well he lives, what he does, and how he makes a success of his 
life. Rawls (1971) developed his moral theory from that of Aristotle, as well as from Kant, Rousseau and JS 
Mill. As I am discussing Rawls and his conception of the good society, it seems reasonable to discuss such a 
society in terms of realising 'a good life’, since the basic institutions of society are amongst the primary 
means by which we can realise such a life. Moral persons, with morally cultivated emotions, are important to 
realising a just society. 
132Following Rawls (1971:366-367), deliberative rationality entails choosing a plan after careful reflection on 
all known facts, imagining all the possible outcomes and selecting a course of action that would best realize 
one’s desires. It also entails knowing one’s desires, beliefs and capacities. Of course, no-one has perfect 
information, but the point is that a rational person will have a good idea of what she wants to achieve and 
how best to achieve it given her particular set of circumstances. The processes of reflection can go wrong for 
many complex reasons, but the plan is still a rational one if the agent does her best with what is available to 
her at the time.   
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for Excellence, pursuing and nurturing in children the values I emphasized above, ought to 
be commensurate with, and embedded in, achieving academic excellence and excellent 
character. These values are inclusive and are critical to developing not only good citizens 
who can contribute to the maintenance of a healthy liberal democracy, but also moral 
citizens who are concerned for the wellbeing and flourishing of all. One way in which we 
can show respect for others, to value others as ends-in-themselves because they have 
intrinsic worth, is to cultivate in young people an appropriate emotional repertoire and I 
turn now, in particular, to the cultivation of moralized compassion by briefly exploring 
some elements of Kantian ethics that relate to dignity and human worth; and secondly, by 
discussing the morphology of compassion.  
 
 
3.2 Kantian Dignity, Compassionate Individuals. 
 
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of 
society as a whole cannot override. (Rawls, 1971:3) 
 
In Kantian ethics, human beings, as rational beings, have dignity. To have dignity means to 
have supreme value, incomparable quality, and unconditional worth, and having dignity is 
an end in itself. In the Groundwork (4:435, hereafter GW), Kant claims that everything has 
a price or dignity. What has price can be replaced by an equivalent item. Human interests 
and skills have a market price or a ‘fancy’ price. So artistic talent might command a market 
price whilst wit and imagination will have a ‘fancy’ price. Dignity, however, has no price. 
Further, morality and humanity expressed as, for example, benevolence arising from duty, 
have an inner worth. On this account rational beings are ends in themselves who ought not 
to be used as a mere means by others but whose value we acknowledge by respecting their 
intrinsic worth133. One of the most profound questions in ethics is how is what is good 
related to what is right or what we ought morally to do. There are good things which 
should be promoted, such as the relief or prevention of suffering and good health, such 
goods being good ends in their own right, and so providing reasons to wish to acquire 
them. Our attitudes towards achieving good ends, and preventing bad ones, are also 
important and so, fearing illness or premature death, we take steps to promote good health. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133For a fine discussion of the mere means argument see Parfit (2011) who calls possible acts and events 
good ends when they have intrinsic properties or features that give us reasons to want them to be actual 
(p.236). However, good things do not have to be an act or event to be valued and actualized: books, works of 
art and people can be good and can command our respect, admiration, feelings of wonder and awe. Knowing 
which attitudes and acts are called for in a given situation is partly about knowing how to value something. 
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If we regret our part in an act that caused suffering, we try to ensure that such an act does 
not occur again. What is important to my thesis is not to apply a full account of Kantian 
ethics, for example with respect to how we ought to behave in terms of our duty and the 
maxims of the categorical imperative, but to take his conception of personhood and relate 
that to a moral account of emotions, and to compassion in particular. 
 
 
3.3 The Morphology of Compassion.  
Compassion has three cognitive elements134. The first element is the belief that the 
suffering is serious. In Aristotelian terms, it has ‘size’135. The situation occasioning our 
compassion threatens the flourishing of another individual through events such as death, 
illness, disability, disfigurement, loneliness or abuse and neglect. Nancy has recently made 
a pernicious claim about her teacher, one that, if she persists in saying it is true, could 
certainly see her teacher suspended for inappropriate conduct towards a minor. Her 
accusation may be an occasion for alarm, fear, even anger. At the same time, we may pity 
her for seeking status amongst her peers by accusing her teacher of a sexual act. However, 
we might also be moved by compassion when we learn that Nancy has witnessed her 
mother being abused again the previous evening. Nancy’s aggressive behaviour, her 
inability to flourish academically, socially and emotionally, may stem from years of 
watching her mother abused by her father, and, knowing no other way of interacting with 
her peers and adults, having internalized the behaviour as normal and appropriate. As a 
secondary school teacher of some years, I have watched boys and girls behave like this 
many times. The reasons are often a lack of discipline, parental indulgence, or violence, 
neglect and abuse in the home136, Such behaviour undoubtedly meets the criterion of ‘size’, 
the necessity for what is happening to be judged ‘serious’ and so it matches this first 
cognitive element of compassion. Nancy’s acceptance of brutality as a normal fact of life 
may also be accepted by her mother who is unable or unwilling to resist her treatment. 
Additionally, ill-treatment of young people by their carers is not, of course, unknown.  
 
A study carried out by the NSPCC and Bristol University in 2009137 reported that 25 
percent of girls and 18 percent of boys reported some form of physical partner violence, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134In setting out this account of compassion, I draw predominantly on Nussbaum’s (2001) analysis. 
135NE.1386a6-7. 
136See Okin (1989, 1994, 2004, 2005); Charlesworth et al. (1991); Estlund and Nussbaum (1997); Minnow 
(1997); Nussbaum (1999a); Charlesworth and Chinkin (2000); MacKinnon (2005,2006). 
137A follow-up to this report was discussed on BBC Radio 4’s All in the Mind, 1st June 2011. It focused on 
children not in school who were in foster or residential care. Like the first report in 2009, Christine Barter, 
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and that experiences of family violence and wider peer intimidation were risk factors 
associated with physical partner violence for both girls and boys (pp.54-55). The 
researchers noted that violence has serious consequences for the wellbeing of victims and 
their future life prospects, and is associated with a range of adverse outcomes for young 
people, including poor mental health, depression and suicide (p.8). This is clearly a child 
welfare issue, and one that is differentiated by gender (pp.179-178). This is a theme I 
return to in Chapters 4 and 7 but it has implications for teachers who might be, 
understandably perhaps, too quick to dismiss or punish bad behaviour without due 
consideration of the nature of and ‘seriousness of any surfing that may have occasioned 
that behaviour. Importantly, too, if young children are not acculturated to the importance 
and value of self-respect and dignity, and are not habituated to compassion’s other-
regarding force, we can see how the judgement of size can go seriously wrong. Many of 
the girls in the NSPCC (2009) report acquiesce to the controlling behaviours that underpin 
their boyfriends’ violence, handing over their mobile phones, for example, to be checked 
and locked away overnight. While the girls do not like the behaviour or the control, they 
judge it as ‘normal’. When girls as young as 11 accept this level of control and violence, 
having in many cases been brought up witnessing the same treatment of their mothers (and 
fathers, though violence against men by their partners is under-reported), the size of the 
problem gets lost in the struggle to cope. The boys and girls report adaptive responses138 to 
their suffering that is neither educative nor ennobling, reinforcing coercive and oppressive 
practices that perpetuate inequalities by gender and age (the bigger the age gap, the more 
abusive the relationship is likely to be). I shall return to the importance of compassionate 
institutions shortly and in the final chapter where I shall demonstrate that abuse disfigures 
the development of the child in so many pernicious ways139. For the moment, my point is 
that it is important that we can see the ‘size’ of the event, to judge its importance with 
sensitivity, insight, and with a concern for eudaimonia. Nancy needs fair and reasoned 
judgement from her teachers, as well as admonishments that will encourage her to modify 
her behaviour. What she also needs, but is less likely to receive, is for her peers and 
teachers to accord her dignity and respect, to acknowledge that her life is difficult and that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the lead researcher, commented that the most worrying thing was the normality of violence and control, 
though victims may not like it, and that the victims were as young as 11 or 12. 
138See Nussbaum (2000a, 2006) for an account of adaptive preferences. 
139See also the Marmot Review (2010) of health inequalities in England and its conclusion that inequalities in 
educational outcomes are as persistent as those for health despite many decades of policies aimed at 
equalising educational opportunities. Evidence on the factors influencing educational attainment suggests 
that it is families, rather than schools, that have the most influence on a child’s wellbeing (p.18). That does 
not, of course, mean schools should stand back and do nothing to ameliorate this, and other, situations.  
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she needs to be cared-for and cared-about140. I doubt she would want our pity but she is 
more likely to get pity than compassion because she is so often regarded as inferior to her 
class mates or, at best, beyond their help.  
 
The second cognitive element of compassion is non-desert or blamelessness and this is a 
more controversial claim, over which there has been some dispute141. However, I shall 
suggest that the subtleties and complexities of compassion are much greater than, for 
example, Crisp’s (2008) critique of Nussbaum’s (2001) version of compassion suggests.  
On Nussbaum’s (2001) analysis of compassion we take into account the particulars of the 
situation, the narratives that cluster around the event, along with a variety of judgements 
and beliefs about salience, fault, responsibility and the event’s ‘size’. These will all affect 
the judgement of [non-] desert and blameworthiness. We also bring to bear our own 
values, cultural norms, personal history, and our dispositional and occurrent emotion 
states. Emotions, as I suggested in Chapter 1, rarely consist of a single judgement of a 
single event. Crisp (2008) rejects the non-desert requirement and provides three examples, 
two of which I discuss here, that, he argues, counter Nussbaum’s claims about non-desert 
and blamelessness. The Old Testament God (p.282) punishes ill-doing while feeling 
compassion as great as the mercies he has the power to grant: desert can, therefore, form 
part of the compassionate evaluation, according to Crisp. I am not sure how this example 
shows that non-desert is not required for the belief component of compassion. There are 
different evaluations involved because, importantly, there are at least two emotions which 
are being felt: compassion and love. God may, firstly, judge that ill-doing has to be 
punished (desert), while also, secondly, judging at the same time, that sinners deserve his 
compassion because they do not understand or do not have the wisdom to understand what 
God requires of them: they are weak. Thirdly, God also loves those he has created and, in 
loving them, is moved by compassion, despite their sins, to set them on an honourable 
path. Sin deserves righteous punishment in order to cleanse the sinner of his sins. Recall 
that Man is born into sin because Adam and Eve found sin in the Garden of Eden, for 
which all subsequent human beings must be punished. There is, in a sense, an element of 
non-desert, of non-blame, as Nussbaum (2001) suggests. Of course, God’s creatures have a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140CfE Health & Wellbeing Outcomes, and the various documents that have been written about CfE since 
2004, yield numerous references to care, confirming its importance in fostering good relationships in 
school communities, with the expectation that the ‘mental, emotional, social and physical wellbeing of 
everyone within a learning community should be positively developed by fostering a safe, caring, 
supportive, purposeful environment that enables the development of relationships based on mutual respect’ 
(http://www.ltscotland.org.uk/Images/health_wellbeing_experiences_outcomes_tcm4-540031.pdf).  
141See, for example, Deigh (2004), and Nussbaum’s response (2004c) to Deigh; Crisp (2008). 
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will and they are rational: they can make choices about good and bad actions, and they 
must take responsibility for those actions. God exacts punishment as something that ought 
to be done, as being deserved. It is in the gift of those with power to grant mercy. Mercy is 
not an emotion, and so not the same as compassion, but it is an intended and deliberated 
course of action. Mercy is an act that grants reprieve or help to the sufferer or victim by a 
person with the power to provide this. It is an act of leniency. Seneca, the renowned Stoic, 
urged cultivating clemency, as he called mercy, as a good and expedient thing for humans 
to do (1-2), but especially for a Prince (in this case, Nero) as a virtue of willing restraint 
exercised by the freedom of judgement. Clemency ‘makes its determinations not according 
to a set formula but according to what is fair and good’ (2.4.3). The opposite of clemency 
is cruelty. Does God, in Crisp’s example, wish to be cruel? The Old Testament God is 
already wrathful and revengeful. Pity, which is often confused with clemency, Seneca 
condemns as a vice of the mind that blunts rationality with gloominess (2.4.4-6.4). 
 
God may therefore, taking a fourth option, grant mercy because he is inclined, perhaps, 
towards leniency, given the innate weakness of his fallen creatures, so taking account of 
their human nature. Mercy, and the compassion which guides his act of mercy, is 
expressive of his love for his creation, as well as his own greatness and dignity. Perhaps in 
this case, the emotion which respects the element of desert may be the evaluation we make 
because of love, rather than compassion. It might also be God’s pity that moves him to 
grant mercy. Mercy, as an act of leniency, may call upon love, compassion, pity or 
sympathy or no emotion at all if one acts in the fashion of a Stoic. There are occasions 
when ‘non-desert’ may seem appropriate depending on the ‘size’ or weight of the act, or 
the level of punishment to be meted out. If we believe that punishment is merited, and no 
other facts can be brought into consideration, compassion will be blocked and without 
compassion as a guide, deserved punishment may become cruel.  
Crisp (2008:236) gives a second example of a kindly but misguided woman who defrauded 
a company. Such a person, he argues, can elicit our compassion even while we attribute 
responsibility to her. I agree, but if we are neither vindictive nor vengeful, we might also 
want to ask some questions that take us beyond the mere fact that she committed fraud. 
Might she have had a seriously ill child in need of unaffordable health care? Did she 
defraud because she enjoys a lavish lifestyle? Did she defraud to wreak revenge on her 
boss who failed to fulfil his promise of promotion?  If they are known to us, the 
motivations and intentions that lie behind bad actions will influence how we feel towards 
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the individual. As I proposed for the first of Crisp’s examples, the Old Testament God, the 
evaluation of compassion may, following Nussbaum (2001:311), attend to the ‘non 
blameworthy increment’. A close family friend killed his children while driving under the 
influence of alcohol. I instantly felt deep compassion for him while berating him for being 
so foolish. To wake up from a coma to be told that you are responsible for the death of 
your own children must be a torment to one’s conscience, and one that will likely endure 
until death. It was not that the friend was undeserving of punishment, or that he was not 
culpably negligent: he was but, nonetheless, I felt compassion. That compassion was 
aroused by the thought of the pain that would probably always oppress him, by the 
knowledge he was a good father, a generally decent person, who made a fatally bad 
decision that day. The shame, regret, disgust and sorrow at the pain he caused his family 
was surely punishment enough. That he felt such deep remorse aided my compassionate 
concern. Had he been indifferent, his callousness would have aroused my contempt. As 
with the other examples, the important point here, again, is the different evaluations that 
are taking place, because different aspects of the situation are being assessed, at least by 
those who seek to avoid simplistic and precipitous judgements. Accordingly, a number of 
emotions with different intensity come into play. There may be reproach and anger at the 
decision to drive; pity and contempt at the loss of reason; compassion at the magnitude of 
the event, and the grief and despair that will ensue; and compassion for a friend who would 
go on to become afflicted by depression, ill-health and alcoholism. His family will suffer 
in similar ways, but without the effects of guilt and remorse.  
To sum up this part of the discussion, whilst compassion does suggest non-desert it need 
not be devoid of the judgements of fault and responsibility, as Crisp (2008) proposes. The 
thought content of the emotion is that bad people, as well as good people for whom we are 
more likely to feel compassion, can elicit our concerned regard even when they are 
culpable. It is the size of the ill-fortune and the consequent punishment that need to be set 
side-by-side to see how just the outcomes are. Bad characters may themselves be the 
product of malign forces, such as a poor upbringing or entrapment into sexual slavery or 
drugs misuse. For anyone concerned to be compassionate and discerning, well-reasoned 
rather than judgmental and harsh, these are important moral considerations that should 
temper our judgements and beliefs about fault and desert.  
 
The third cognitive element of compassion is that of ‘similar possibilities’, an awareness 
and an acceptance of one’s own weakness and vulnerabilities, without which we will be 
immune to the hardships of others. Rousseau (1993) expresses this well in Emile where he 
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exhorts Emile’s teacher to make him aware that all the misfortunes of the world can be 
equally his and that there is no need to rely on birth, health or wealth to avoid hardship. 
Wisely, Rousseau also warns that, though we are inclined to inure ourselves, or avert our 
eyes from, classes of people we either do not like or pity, we should not cut ourselves off 
from people who are not similar to us. Showing compassion only for those who are 
superficially like us limits social cohesion and is iniquitous to the development of 
compassionate institutions. Nussbaum (2001:315-322) extends Aristotle’s account of 
similar possibilities to include not just those we love, but also people distant from us in 
terms of class, race, religion, ethnicity, custom and sexual orientation. However, even this 
important requirement is not enough for compassion. Similar possibilities have to be 
placed within the eudaimonistic judgement. That is, in taking the vulnerability of another 
as an important part of one’s own flourishing, we are more likely to be compassionate 
because we take the other further into our own circle of concern. If we are prepared to 
accept that hunger, disease, disability, death, infringement of rights, are as likely to happen 
to us as to another or that, had we been in a different place and different circumstances we 
may have been similarly placed, then we have something in common: vulnerability to the 
vicissitudes of life. So as to lessen the effects of life’s hardships we need to think about 
how we share resources, to ask questions about policy and social arrangements, to examine 
whether our schools, and other public institutions such as the courts, the police, Social 
Services, and so on, are just and fair, concerned with wellbeing and flourishing. How we 
might tackle these hard questions is the subject of the next section on just institutions. 
 
Finally, following Nussbaum, compassion has a fourth element: it contains complex beliefs 
about the object that will be evaluative and eudaimonistic, expressive of our goals and 
plans, as well as of things that have value for us. Compassion entails the cognitive 
evaluation that an event has occurred that is negative in some respect, that is serious and 
that has some weight. In experiencing compassion, we will have an empathic projection of 
similar possibilities, meaning that we will recognize that another person’s vulnerability is a 
possibility for us, acknowledging that we could find ourselves in similar circumstances. 
Compassion, further, is elicited when there is a judgement, or belief, that the suffering of 
the ‘object’ (as in the object of the emotion, here the person for whom we feel compassion) 
is undeserved or excessive. The eudaimonistic value is concern for the other, that is ‘other-
concern’, a desire to alleviate suffering. Compassion is an acknowledgment that anyone, 
however situated, is vulnerable to misfortune and it is linked to other emotions such as 
love and sympathy, hate or anger, when these are aroused by perceived injustices. In 
 
 
102 
compassion we recognize others as distinct, autonomous beings whose welfare we value as 
one of our own important ends, just as we might in love, but compassion results from our 
perception that the other person is in need, suffering in some way. This, I suggest, is 
moralised compassion. In perceiving another’s need we are motivated to alleviate the 
suffering, not for egoistic reasons, but because we value the other person’s wellbeing and 
capacity to flourish as an end in itself. Nurturing moralized compassion, understood in this 
way, can aid us in acting well, in promoting the right attitude so that we have an attitude of 
respect towards others. A person’s life, argues Kant, has a kind of value we ought to 
respect in ways that do not conflict with wellbeing and autonomy and our capacity to act 
morally gives us dignity. In valuing our own and other’s dignity, we treat others in ways to 
which they could rationally consent. As the opening excerpt for this chapter suggsts, the 
acts that have degraded the natives to black shadows of disease and starvation in Conrad’s 
HD revile human dignity and autonomy, and revile above all the morality inherent in 
humans as rational beings.  
 
I argued in Chapters 1 and 2 that, contrary to some views, both ancient and contemporary, 
emotions can be rational and reliable forces upon which to make judgements and to act. I 
argued the case there that we could rely on emotions for ethical deliberation and for 
choosing the right course of action. This applies to compassion although I shall 
acknowledge that advocating compassion as an ethical guide is controversial (Nussbaum, 
2001; Goetz et al. 2010). While there are strong advocates142 of compassion as a good 
foundation for ethical deliberation and treating others as ends in themselves, there are 
equally vociferous opponents143 who regard compassion as an unreliable source of moral 
judgement, believing it is fickle and antithetical to personal achievement because of our 
propensity to care for our own close kin and those close to us in class, rank or position. 
However, as I will presently show, compassion, as an other-regarding emotion, need not be 
fickle. As Nussbaum (2001:405) has suggested, our ability to be other-regarding, to 
empathise in a morally appropriate way, is influenced by how we are situated in relation to 
others. Sharp separations, as in hierarchies, or with favoured and less favoured groups, 
impede morally appropriate concern, as Conrad perceptively observes in HD. Whites 
appropriate all the privileges deemed to be their natural entitlement as a result of their 
superior ‘race’, while the blacks are treated with brutality and savagery. Compassion, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142Rousseau (1993); Schopenhauer (1995); Smith (2007); Nussbaum (2001); Scheler (2009); Batson (2011), 
for example. Compassion is a central theme in Buddhism and Christianity, with adherents to those faiths 
seeking a way of life that promotes meaningful and coherent existence in community with others. 
143Nietzsche (2003,2008) and, on some accounts, Kant, although he is not entirely dismissive of compassion, 
as we shall see shortly.  
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guardian of the moral domain of suffering and harm, has fled from the souls of the white 
men, for they feel no compunction to alleviate the suffering that they inflict and neither do 
they seem to feel pity or sympathy for the blacks. 
 
 
3.4  Other-regarding Emotions. 
‘Other-regarding’ emotions are emotions concerned with the good or bad fortunes of 
others, and may be classified as ‘happy-for’ or ‘sorry-for’. They may also be understood as 
‘pro-social’ emotions, Major emotions in this group include joy, delight, compassion, pity 
and sympathy. Another group of emotions in the ‘happy-for’ class are those classified as 
‘ill-will’ emotions such as gloating, schadenfreude and variants of pity. The family of 
emotions that are considered to be other-regarding144 and negative with respect to the bad 
fortune of others are invariably subject to lexical interchange, there being no settled 
agreement on how the terms are to be defined and subsequently used. One emotion term is 
frequently substituted for, or elided with, another, as in compassion for and with pity, 
sympathy or empathy. The pre-eminent enlightenment thinkers on ‘empathy’ are Adam 
Smith, David Hume and, later, Arthur Schopenhauer and Max Scheler.  It is important to 
note that empathy was variously described as compassion, pity or sympathy with empathy 
emerging at the beginning of the 20th century from the psychological literature145. These 
philosophers understand that ‘empathy’, as a mechanism of imaginative reconstruction, 
disposes us to altruistic concern which contemporary social and moral psychology has now 
amply demonstrated (see Batson, 2011, especially his appendices which summarise the 
range and kinds of experiments that have empirically tested the empathy-altruism 
connection). Some of the ambiguity in the terms that Smith and Hume use may result, as 
Sherman (1998:83) suggests, from the lack of technical terms to mark the distinction 
between empathy and sympathy and empathy and pity. Smith suggests that in ‘empathy’ 
we are ‘bringing the case home to our own breast’ (2010:12). However, despite his astute 
account of empathy, Smith seems to compromise it with a judgement of credit-worthiness 
or ‘propriety’ of emotional response. The guiding terms are ‘reasonableness’ rather than 
empathic understanding for its own sake. The focus is on how the emotion seems to be 
from the perspective of the spectator.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144See Ben-Ze’ev (2000). 
145Kant referred to compassion as ‘sympathy’. 
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Rather than use these emotion terms generally to denote a class of emotions, and in 
preference to assuming a generalised understanding of what I mean when I refer to 
compassion or pity, I will apply the general framework for what an emotion is to the 
specific emotions, compassion, pity, and sympathy, that are the object of my interest here. 
Each emotion has a complex narrative structure, elicited by perceptions of value that may 
or may not propel us to act. The evaluation common to all of these other-regarding 
emotional states is that there is suffering that arouses feelings of concern or distress in the 
onlooker, who, depending on her perception of a threat to the other’s wellbeing, may be 
moved to act in some way. If, how and to what degree the onlooker acts will be 
qualitatively different depending on whether the onlooker feels pity, sympathy, empathy or 
compassion. If the onlooker feels pity for the sufferer, for example, she is likely to judge 
that there is little to be done, or that help can only be given in limited or restricted ways. 
Pity often contains evaluations that the sufferer’s position is unalterably inferior, she is 
responsible for the position she is in, or there are limited resources available to alleviate 
the suffering which, in any case, would probably not make much difference to the welfare 
of the individual (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000:329). For example, giving money to beggars might 
seem a lost cause, even while we pity their plight. We may pity too, the exhausted 
creatures in a HD, and, for different reasons, the father and son in The Road. When father 
and son come across an underground store of food, clothes, gas and clean water, one can 
feel their joy and relief at finding such rare goods: they can feel clean, warm, well-fed and 
well-dressed humans who are, for a while, safe from the hunters. There is some relief from 
the permanent gloom and cold but it also seems so pointless, putting their life in danger 
because their store might attract unwanted attention and it prolongs, too, their existence in 
a dead world. We feel pity because their situation is hopeless: short of a miracle (and the 
father asks God where he is now) their situation is irredeemably unalterable and they are 
bound to die from pollution and starvation. We may also, however, feel compassion 
because this is a calamitous misfortune that neither the father nor his son brought about. 
And we may feel both compassion and horror because the planet’s ecology, eons in its 
evolution, has been unalterably changed in mere moments, and will slowly cease to exist. 
So, we may feel compassion brought about from our judgement of undue, undeserved and 
excessive suffering and pity at the hopelessness of the situation.  
 
So these other-regarding emotions are not always mutually exclusive. I can feel sympathy, 
pity and compassion for the father and his son in The Road but in being aroused by 
compassion, we judge that the suffering is undeserved or brought about by ill-luck; it is 
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serious rather than trivial146. Sympathy might attract our attention, drawing us closer to the 
other, but without compelling us to act or hold our attention for long. We might need 
another, stronger, emotion, such as compassion. In compassion, we are frequently 
compelled to act because of the pain we feel at another’s misfortune or vulnerability. 
Compassion rivets our attention onto the person’s unfortunate situation and draws from us 
a deeper commitment to help than sympathy or pity might elicit. Unlike compassion, pity 
can take up an egoistic perspective when it judges that the other’s situation is not one that 
it would like to share, shrinking the boundaries between self and the other so as to avoid 
the fear of imagining a similar possibility. Compassion and sympathy, by contrast with 
pity, push the boundaries of the self out towards the person, extending those boundaries 
beyond one’s own immediate circle and interests (Nussbaum, 2001:300). Blum (1980) 
suggests that compassion involves a sense of shared humanity, promoting the experience 
of equality because ‘… it forbids regarding social inequality as establishing human 
inequality … by transcending the recognition of social inequality’ (p.512). This is a key 
element in the moral force of compassion. Properly cultivated as an element of our moral 
repertoire, compassion can have the strength, stability and reliability that Kant thought 
could only be guaranteed by a sense of duty and compliance with the categorical 
imperative. However, this needs to be qualified. Because humans are endowed with 
reason, Kant asserts, we have an indirect duty to cultivate the natural feelings, such as 
sympathy and pity, and a duty to sympathise actively in the fate of other’s sufferings 
(DV:6:457). Importantly, too, compassion, if cultivated as a moral force within our 
emotional repertoire, can compel us to act contrary to our moods and inclinations, to 
become a guiding condition for other-regarding, non-instrumental, beneficent acts.  
 
I am now starting to anticipate some of the arguments of the following chapter. Emotions, 
their evaluations, appraisals, beliefs, and ties to objects of value, may be moral if they are 
cultivated to connect to the interests or welfare of others. To be appropriately 
compassionate requires that we be contextually attuned, reasonably well informed, able to 
judge issues of moral salience and to be responsibly concerned147 It requires, in addition, 
being discerning of, and sensitive to, the other person’s understanding and interpretation of 
events, and her special vulnerabilities, anxieties and fears. It entails having respect for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146Aristotle, Rh.1385b13ff.  147Carse (2005) raises similar concerns with respect to care-giving that should be morally contoured. Morally 
contoured empathy, on Carse’s account, is a form of ‘reasonable partiality’ (p.169) which is necessary for 
determining proper moral regard.  
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other’s dignity, and treating her personhood with a comparable degree of respect as we 
would our own. To be appropriately compassionate, we need imaginative insight and 
empathic attunement, what Blum (1980) speaks of as ‘imaginative reconstruction … 
imagining what the other person, given his character, beliefs, and values, is undergoing 
(p.50). Acting towards others appropriately, treating as irrelevant their appealing or 
unattractive qualities, and avoiding self-absorption, incuriosity or vicarious possession are 
a demanding set of tasks. And, assuming we have all these qualities and talents, we need to 
be able to regulate and fine tune our compassionate concerns: to have, and to cultivate, 
good habits in this regard, and to avoid our own prejudices. This, I suggest, is a picture of 
morally structured compassion. This is moralised compassion informed by practical 
wisdom (See Sherman, 1997:chapters 6-8).  
There may be immediate objections. These are demanding tasks and require moral 
discipline. Few could always sustain such moralised compassion. We are easily swayed by 
other concerns, selfishness, ill-temper, pressure and obtuseness. We are apt to console 
ourselves with ‘wishes and dreams which prevents one from seeing what is there outside 
one’ (Murdoch, 1971:57). It assumes that we have proper respect for our own personhood: 
what if we do not? What if we happen to be self-sacrificing, self-effacing, fragmented, 
timid, easily aversive to unappealing people, or people who hold ourselves in very high 
self-esteem? A further problem, as highlighted by Sherman (1998:110), is ensuring that we 
do not simply endorse ‘another’s self-conception or self-conceived means’ of justification 
or amelioration.  Such are the contingencies of ordinary human life: we will all have to 
contend with lapses in character and less than desirable actions. 
Supported with a normative and defined conception of the teacher’s role, however, the 
principles entailed in moralised compassion may act as guides towards appropriate concern 
and action. A teacher confronted with an angry Nancy, a cheeky Charlie, or a shy Janet, 
might differentiate between them with respect to present or general circumstances, their 
character and particular needs. She might sensitively and respectfully discern the reasons 
for Nancy’s anger, Charlie’s cheek and Janet’s shyness, interacting with them accordingly 
in felt compassion that is conveyed to the pupils. Circumspect acknowledgment of these 
pupils’ concerns can help build mutual trust and respect. The content of Nancy’s angry 
outbursts at Charlie, or her sneering remarks about Janet’s studiousness, and the reasons 
why she makes them, could be re-directed to a general discussion of the harms of such 
remarks. Such remarks could be challenged on the grounds that anger or sneering, as 
Nancy’s self-conceived means for ameliorating her status at the expense of Charlie’s or 
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Janet’s, is ill-conceived. This is the usual practice, but such behavior could also be 
examined and explored by means of an aptly chosen literary analogy.  
The moral principles inherent in compassion accord well with both Aristotelian148 
eudaimonistic and Kantian ethics (Annas, 1993; Sherman, 1997). Ancient ethics, according 
to Annas (1993), specified that the final good included virtues that were other-regarding in 
non-instrumental ways. To fulfil the goal of a happy life entails helping loved-ones, friends 
and distant others for their own sake as an intrinsic good, out of genuine altruistic regard149 
and independent of one’s own interests150, This differs from Kantian ethics on the question 
of how one takes into account the interests of others. The general formula of the 
Categorical Imperative is that we should act on maxims to which all could rationally 
assent, perspicuously emphasising our standing with others in terms of our actions 
(GW:4:432; Sherman, 1997:8). What motivates us to act is the end we have in mind: these 
can be personal ends or ends we share with others, but they must be in conformity with the 
law of humanity (GW:4:431). The kingdom of ends, as a system of all good ends, and as a 
‘commonwealth of reason’ (Sherman, 1998) constitutes the laws of freedom because free 
citizens make their own (self-legislating) laws, and because the content of those laws 
enjoins us to respect each citizen’s free use of her own reason (GW:4:433). What Kantian 
morality seems to tell us is that we ought to promote others’ agency for its own sake and to 
beware actions that limit the agent’s capacity to act autonomously with dignity intact. 
Kantian morality also tells us that the shared reason of persons takes into account the 
interests of others. Misfortune can limit the agent’s autonomy to act when, for example, 
she is depressed or grieving. Misfortune can inhibit reason when she is ill, hungry or 
diseased, or limit opportunities for rational deliberation when her plans are thwarted by, for 
example, considerations of gender or by domestic violence. We begin to see how 
moralised compassion, in a commonwealth of reason, might start to provide us with the 
capacities to evaluate the salience and size of another’s misfortune. Moralised compassion 
enables us to act on our judgement that another’s wellbeing, and her capacity to exercise 
her rational faculties, matters to everyone’s flourishing in our shared humanity. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148Aristotle does not use ‘compassion’ but speaks instead of ‘pity’. We are good or bad on the basis of our 
virtues, rather than on our emotions (NE.1105b29-31). Pity is an emotion along with anger, fear and friendly 
feeling (NE. 1105b21) while virtues are states of character (NE.1106a11). However, virtue lies in the way an 
emotion is felt (NE.1105b31-1106a2). The virtue of an emotion is in the extent to which we ‘feel them at the 
right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with right motive, and in the right 
way (NE.1106b15-25). Yet there are emotions for which there is no mean such as spite and malice 
(NE.1107a9-14). That is, one cannot feel spite or malice at the right time, towards the right people, with the 
right motive and in the right way.   
149See, too, Batson (2011).  
150Though personal and other-regarding concerns can be combined in a final scheme of ends.   
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Some might immediately charge that Kant was a philosopher who eschewed the emotions 
as capricious, partial and unable to ground moral practice for all persons in all 
circumstances (Sherman, 1997:32) but this is not so clear cut. In the DV, Kant 
acknowledges that emotions are important sources of information on urgency and moral 
salience, providing a kind of moral ‘play-ground’ in which to discern how to translate our 
judgements into moral practice. Kant’s concern is that emotions such as compassion are 
concerned with ‘feelings, impulses and inclinations’ (GW:4:434). While Kant does not 
provide a systematic analysis of the emotions in his moral philosophy, he does not, 
however, forfeit emotions’ epistemological function. What Kant desires is to place 
morality safely outside the bounds of human contingency, shifting it into the metaphysical 
realm of abstract a priori laws that cannot borrow from the specific circumstances of 
anthropology and become corrupt doing battle with duty (GW:4:390). Kant, with Aristotle, 
requires that emotions be subject to slow and steady cultivation or habituation, engaging 
practical reason at all stages. Kant distinguishes between emotions on impulse and 
emotions cultivated as supports for duty, shaped by reason (Sherman, 1997:33). For 
Aristotle, not only are emotions varied and complex, they can also be subject to a 
considerable degree of control and consent, being ways of assenting to beliefs and 
construals (and see Nussbaum, 2001). Sherman (1997:145 referring to GW:4:394) 
proposes that Kant’s list of qualities that are conducive to the goodwill, such as wit, 
courage or perseverance, can be expanded to include cultivated emotions. Emotions can, 
accordingly, serve Kantian ethics well by directing modes of attention to circumstances 
that elicit our response and motivate us to act. Of our duty to humanity to cultivate the 
sympathetic natural sentiments to give us a richly varied response to need and misfortune, 
Kant tells us that: 
 
It is therefore a duty not to avoid places where the poor who lack the most basic 
necessities are to be found but rather seek them out, and not to shun sick-rooms or 
debtors’ prisons and so forth in to avoid the sharing the painful feelings one may 
not be able to resist. For this is still one of the impulses that nature has implanted 
in us to do what the representation of duty alone might not accomplish. 
(DV:4:457)151 
 
Compassion, as I have argued following Nussbaum (2001:19), is the ‘hook’ by which we 
can think and act morally. The discussion of compassion should now pave the way for a 
discussion on how public institutions can tap into and develop this important emotion so as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151Kant, of course, does not analyse the emotions, stating neither their cognitive components nor accepting 
the importance of external goods to wellbeing. See Nussbaum (2001:378-383) for tensions in Kant’s ethics 
stemming from his Stoic and non Stoic interests. 
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to contribute to the creation of well-rounded, other-regarding moral individuals. Here I will 
draw on the work of Rawls, particularly his Theory of Justice, in order to place compassion 
within an enriched account of moral philosophy in public life. I will also refer back to HD 
and The Road as relevant themes emerge. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of 
empirical research on the benefits of cultivating compassion enhanced by habit and 
practical reason152. 
 
 
3.5 Just Institutions. 
 
Political institutions are human, and they are only good if they are alive in a 
human way. If we produced an excellent social welfare system and yet dead, 
obedient, authority focused citizens, that would be a failure no matter how well 
the system worked. (Nussbaum, 2001:404) 
 
Institutions, including schools, and societies that permit individuals the freedom to pursue 
their life plans, are just to the extent that they do not uphold a single conception of what a 
good plan or a good life is, but support a rich plurality of interests or an ‘overlapping 
consensus’ (Rawls, 1971:340)153. As human beings are as varied in their capacities and 
interests as they are in their realization, just institutions are those that embody the 
principles of equality and liberty, and celebrate diversity when that enables their members 
to flourish. That is, individuals are accorded the respect to have the freedom to choose their 
life plans and all are equally entitled to do so154, provided they conform to just actions and 
the legitimate claims of others. In just societies and within just institutions, individuals 
acquire the desire to act justly, argues Rawls (1971:399), and acting justly is part of our 
good because it is regulative of our rational plan of life. By agreeing to follow the 
principles of justice, citizens in a well-ordered society ensure that everyone’s good is 
included in a scheme of mutual benefit (p.156). Publicly expressing respect for one 
another, recognizing the value of all citizens and their endeavours, ensures that self-esteem 
is supported and enhanced. What emerges from these considerations is that citizens desire 
to treat one another not merely as a means to a desired end, but as ends in themselves155 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152NE.1103a25; 1144b30-32. 
153Whilst citizens will have different conceptions of justice, they will agree to common political principles as 
well as to the principles of justice. 
154Though for obvious reasons children have less freedom than adults.  
155Aristotle, NE. See also Kant’s GW (4:429) in which he introduces the second formulation of the 
categorical imperative, The Formula of Humanity: So act that you use your humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means. Given that 
Rawls is influenced by Kant’s moral philosophy, there will be a consonance with Kant's conception of the 
person. See TJ ‘Main Grounds for Two Principles’, for example, ‘The contract view as such defines a sense 
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and, in so doing, a desire to resist the temptation to gain at the expense of others for that 
would lower not only their prospects and aspirations, but also their self-respect and 
confidence in their own worth. If citizens (pupils, private individuals) are less favoured, 
exploited for the good of others while their own life plans are subverted, then the 
principles of justice will be undermined. Such a diminution in self-esteem and in the worth 
of one’s goals and aspirations has moral implications for emotional and psychological 
wellbeing. The implications for educators are clear. The moral psychology, including the 
emotional wellbeing, of those we teach should be one of the aspirations at the heart of the 
educative enterprise.  
 
Following Kant, Rawls stressed the central importance of self-respect to morality, in 
particular to just institutions in the well-ordered society. Following Aristotle, he also 
argued that just institutions were those that developed the class of goods defined as the 
human excellences156. Self-respect is a primary good in that it expresses our value and 
confidence in what we can do and what is worth pursuing. Without it: 
 
 … nothing may seem worth doing, or if some things have value for us, we lack 
the will to strive for them. All desire and activity becomes empty and vain, and we 
sink into apathy and cynicism. (Rawls, 1971:386). 
 
Lacking self-respect, it becomes very difficult to cultivate and express our moral emotions 
in the right way, to the right extent, at the right time. We must have a rational plan that 
satisfies the Aristotelian Principle157 and which others can affirm and enjoy as being of 
value in some way (beautiful, intricate, intelligent, altruistic, charitable, and so on158). A 
companion effect of the Aristotelian Principle, and one which has important moral worth, 
is that the more we are able to experience our own way of life, that is fulfilling and 
expressive of our desires, goals and talents, the more we are likely to enjoy and encourage 
the attainment of others (p.387). The goods that constitute the excellences, such as 
imagination, beauty and the pursuit of knowledge are characteristics and abilities that it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in which men are to be treated as end and not as means only’ (1971:57). It is Rawls’ argument that the two 
principles of justice, equality and fairness, can convey the idea of ‘ends in themselves'. Because the 
difference principle ‘interprets the distinction’ between treating men as a means only and treating them as 
ends in themselves, members of a just society will ‘forgo those gains which to do not contribute to 
everyone’s expectations' (p.57). To fail to regard persons as ends in themselves is to impose a greater burden 
on those already less favoured. See in addition Part Three ‘Ends’ and ‘The Good of Justice’ (p.460; p.458). 
156CfE includes in its curriculum ‘Health and Wellbeing’. 
157See Rawls (1971:374-5; p.379). This is the exercise of realised capacities which are enjoyed more as their 
complexity increases, satisfying novelty and variety of experience that includes room for ingenuity, personal 
expression and individual style. Motivation is a very important component of this principle in moving us to 
excellence and in attracting the esteem and respect of others who appreciate and enjoy our efforts. These 
psychological events help account for our judgements of value. 
158The virtues, in other words. 
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rational for everyone to want to have, since they are goods that enable us to realize 
satisfying plans of life (p.389). These are goods that others can appreciate and participate 
in to some extent (music, say, or a work of art). The excellences, activated by meaningful 
activity, support self-esteem and are a prerequisite to the conditions of human flourishing. 
Stunt a person’s capacities and we stunt their prospects to flourish. Taken more broadly, 
stunting the capacities of anyone for the benefit of a few, or a group of people for the 
majority group, a continent for a country, is inimical to society and human wellbeing. This 
is one reason why I would argue that references to the kind of literature I mentioned above, 
singling out apposite excerpts that reveal the effects of thoughtless or calculated 
inhumanity, can strengthen moral reasoning and act as a valuable means of enhancing and 
sensitizing moral emotional capacity159. Promoting and supporting our human goods or 
excellences, along with self-respect and emotional health, is a vital task of schools and my 
project here is to argue why this is so, and to do so propose ways in which schools can 
complement and, as necessary, ameliorate the moral life of a child that has begun at home. 
 
In order to ensure that institutions are secure with respect to justice, it is necessary to 
cultivate the moral sentiments as I have sought to show. Cultivating our emotions limits 
our egoistic impulses. It also helps us to act in accordance with the just claims of others to 
become, in effect, other-regarding, concerned with their welfare. All this depends, of 
course, on how we cultivate our emotions. Kupperman (1999160), for example, discusses 
what is needed for good character, including pleasure and pain, the formation of habit, and 
the development of moral imagination. Speicker (1999) makes the well-understood point 
that parent-child relationships are crucial from the start of a child’s life, and that the 
acquisition of ‘multi-track habits', which he defines as the capacity for 'appropriate rule 
observance in different circumstances' (p.213), will aid in the formation of good character. 
We understand from these two contributions what is generally required for the cultivation 
of good character, and how, in general and in widely accepted terms, character is to be 
achieved via parental and other social relations. In educational settings later in a child’s 
life, for example in secondary schools, many aspects of character will be well formed and 
so the task of shaping character becomes more challenging. But one way in which we 
might shape character, as I have suggested and will develop further, is to use the 
‘suggestive capacities’ of literature (Zamir, 2007:11) to [re] imagine or [re]conceive 
certain beliefs or attitudes, to cultivate perception, discernment and responsiveness. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159I shall be arguing, in the concluding chapter, for the importance of literature in this regard. 
160In Carr and Steutel (1999), ‘Virtue Ethics and Moral Education’, Part 6: Educating the Virtues: Means and 
Methods.  
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Reading to cultivate such habits of perception, discernment and responsiveness would need 
to be an active task, a form of practical learning in which we might engage in 'vigorous 
conversation' (Booth, 1988a:136). One might see the extracts from a HD and The Road as 
examples of texts we could use for such a task as well as examples of the philosophical 
arguments that I am seeking to make. 
The argument I am pursuing rests on the assumption161 that compassion and pity are 
natural dispositions but that they require cultivation and nurturing over time through moral 
education. Smith (2006), Mill (2006) and Rawls (1971) focus on shame and guilt as moral 
forces that stabilise our dispositions to act justly. In experiencing moral shame we 
acknowledge that we have not lived up to our excellences in some way, thereby reducing 
our value and esteem in the eyes of those whose regard is important to us. In feeling guilt, 
we acknowledge that we have acted contrary to our sense of justice, transgressing the right 
claims of others (p.391)162. While I will discuss the moral importance of these emotions on 
our attitude and conduct in Chapter 6, I will follow Rousseau (1993), Nussbaum (2001) 
and Batson (2011) on focusing on compassion and empathy as powerful, motivating forces 
to act for the good of others. When we fail to perceive the needs of others and 
consequently fail to alleviate their suffering; when we fail, indeed, to accord them dignity 
and respect, paying scant regard for their self-esteem and sense of worth, we are in some 
metaphorical sense reducing them to mere shadows wandering, sitting or marching in some 
glaucomic gloom of apathy, listlessness or drudgery, as if in a HD. In these perceptions 
and in our emotional responses we need to get the judgments right and to view them with 
appropriate size. It is not everyone and everything that should elicit feelings of compassion 
as that would be indiscriminate and obtuse, liable to cause harm if it effaces concern for 
self, becomes overridden by self-concern, produces immoral action or becomes a threat to 
the common good (Batson, 2011).  
 
Having now set up the philosophical argument for compassion, I will turn briefly to 
empirical evidence that suggests compassion is worth pursuing and cultivating. Batson’s 
latest work (2011) provides a wealth of data and experiments that demonstrate the 
importance of compassion to flourishing and wellbeing. Batson and his colleagues have 
conducted over thirty experiments to test empathy, the term used by these researchers to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161Though there is plenty of empirical evidence to show that the capacity for compassion/altruism (as it is 
termed in psychology and biology) is a very strong feature of human psychology. Humans value the welfare 
of others as an end in itself, and act to alleviate suffering for its own sake, not necessarily for egoistic gain. 
See Batson (2011).  
162See also Wollheim (1991); Ben-Ze’ev (2000); Nussbaum (2001); Smith (2007). 
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denote altruism. Empathy is other-concerned in the way compassion has been defined here 
and Batson (2011) acknowledges that he is in close agreement with Nussbaum’s (2001) 
analysis of compassion in humans. The basic experimental design is one in which 
randomly assigned participants are induced to feel either high or low empathic concern for 
someone in need with conditions varied to test the participants’ motivation to help163. 
Empathic concern for someone in need was either manipulated, measured or both 
(2011:110). While there are, of course, limitations to laboratory research, the results 
demonstrating altruism, Batson claims, are ‘consistent and clear’ (2011:109). 
Further, citing the meta-analyses of Miller and Eisenberg (1988:167), Batson argues that 
compassion may lead to less aggression towards the person for whom empathic concern is 
felt. What Batson calls empathic concern, in which compassion dominates, may be an 
important antidote to child abuse and neglect, as well as to sexual assault. Clinical 
interventions aimed at increasing empathy have been found to reduce the reported 
likelihood of abuse, rape and sexual harassment by men identified as being at high risk 
(Schewe and O’Donohue, 1993; Schewe 2002;). Compassion, further, has been seen to 
reduce the likelihood of derogation and blaming victims of injustice. Batson (2011:168) 
suggests that people who believe in a just world are more likely to derogate a victim, 
motivated by a desire to maintain a belief in a just world. By blaming victims of poverty 
and injustice, derogators can reassure themselves that they deserve their relative advantage, 
as did the Europeans who ‘believed’ they were saving the savages from their own brute 
existence in a HD.  
 
 
3.6 Concluding Chapter Three. 
Compassion, as I have argued, characteristically involves imaginative dwelling on the 
condition of the other person, an active regard for her good, a view of her as a fellow 
human being, and an emotional response of a certain degree of intensity (Blum, 1980:509). 
What is the correct moral response to the baby on the spit or to a scene as grim as the one 
depicted in the excerpt that follows? In exposing young readers such as Nancy to scenes 
such as the baby on a spit who was, perhaps, fathered to provide food, and to the many 
scenes of awful destruction in the HD, we can use compassion to act as our ethical guide in 
matters of valuing.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163See Batson (2011), Part II and appendices B-G which summarise the procedures and results. 
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Huddled against the back wall were naked people, male and female, all trying to 
hide, shielding their faces with their hands.  On the mattress lay a man with his 
legs gone to the hip and the stumps of them blackened and burnt… In the night he 
heard hideous shrieks … (Cormac McCarthy, 2006:116) 
 
The response would be one of horror, surely, at the idea of harvesting human flesh for 
consumption. Hunting, harvesting and predating human flesh, albeit in extremis, is not 
simply the breaking of a taboo, it is the extreme expression of instrumental use: 
cannibalism. These are the kinds of questions that can be explored with Nancy and I 
shall do so in the subsequent chapters and, especially, in the concluding chapter. 
 
From compassion, I now turn to the ethics of care and to a more focused examination of 
how emotions are gendered. Care ethics have been seen as a feminine ethic because care 
and caring tends to fall to women, sustaining the traditional view that women are more 
caring and compassionate than men, and are more emotional than men because of their 
close attachments to those they care for. This traditional function has not served women 
well in the sense that it is a role that has kept women at home, interrupted or curtailed their 
careers, and it has commanded far less respect than professional activities, traditionally 
dominated by men in the public sphere. This traditional function too, and the emotions 
associated with the caring role is, I suggest, where the asymmetries of power between men 
and women begin. Further, many prominent care theorists such as Noddings164, Gilligan 
(1982) and Slote (1997) base their ethics of care on empathy and sympathy, rather than on 
compassion.  While empathy can be an important route to compassion, it is problematic on 
the construction that I will offer. Batson (2011) argues that empathy, or perspective taking, 
is not enough because it, empathy, need not induce compassion or sympathy because no 
value is placed on the other’s welfare. When we argue for care in schools, as in Scotland’s 
Curriculum for Excellence, there is also the danger that we might ‘care’ by ‘perspective 
taking’ and by following procedures that lack a genuine regard for the value and dignity of 
our pupils. On some accounts, care, as I shall argue next, is not enough and neither is 
empathy, the main emotion that is advanced to support the calls for care. An action, as I 
have tried to show here, is morally virtuous only if it is guided by the correct motives. 
Actions that are begrudging, as can occur in caring, are likely to be indifferent or callous to 
need and I shall pursue this line in the next chapter. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164See References for numerous dates. 
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Chapter Four: Why an Ethic of Care Needs Moral Theory. 
 
… the world is split in two, between those who are handed power at birth, at 
gestation, encoded with a seemingly random chromosome determinate that says 
yes for ever and ever, and those like… all of us who fall into the uncoded 
otherness in which the power to assert ourselves and claim our lives has been 
displaced by the compulsion to shut down our bodies and seal our mouths.  
(Carol Shields, Unless, 2002:270.)  
 
 
4.1 Introduction. 
Aristotle sagely perceived that external goods are essential for happiness, for realizing 
eudaimonia, because we cannot do ‘fine deeds without any resources’ (NE.1099a34). As a 
basic need, and as an external good, care is instrumental to our emotional development, 
wellbeing and happiness. If we accept that care in a ‘real society’ is care-giving and care-
receiving (Nussbaum, 2004b:105) then good care is a basic need: we cannot survive or 
flourish without it165. We all need care. The emotional and material care we receive as 
children and adolescents helps to form our personalities and habituate our moral and 
intellectual virtues over time. Care is also a feature of all our lives, all of the time, though 
how much care we will need will vary depending on our circumstances and health166. 
Taking care of others, while respecting their status as persons with dignity and agency and 
interacting with them in morally appropriate ways, is a virtue. As dependents, receiving 
care that is loving, compassionate and respectful is essential to our development and 
wellbeing.  
 
Care, then, is important and if, following Nussbaum (2001:1), emotions ‘shape the 
landscape of our mental and social lives’ then the emotions involved in care and caring, 
receiving or providing care, merit attention. Because emotions such as empathy, sympathy 
and compassion are so deeply implicated in care, my claim, here, is that a theory of care is 
important to an understanding of the emotions and any theory of care will require an 
adequate understanding of the emotions. Deferring a detailed consideration of these 
emotions to the following chapter, I focus here on the philosophical constructs of care to 
prepare the ground for subsequent work on the emotions and gender. I seek to defend the 
claim that an ethic of care ought to combine the human capacities for reason and emotions, 
and that care should be grounded in justice. That defence, as we shall see, is important if 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165Parts of this chapter are now published in a paper on care (Hedge and MacKenzie, 2012a). I wrote the text 
that appears in both this chapter and that paper. 
166Kittay has written extensively on care and dependency, (1999,2002, for example). See also Fisher and 
Tronto (1990); Tronto (1993,2010); Held (1995,2006); Houston (1990); Nussbaum (20004b, 2006).  
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we are to uncouple emotions from gender and to locate the cultivation of healthy emotions 
in a view of personhood that affords each individual dignity and respect. Held (1995:131) 
maintains that, without care ‘there would be no persons to respect, either in the public 
system of rights…or in the family’. But who should do the caring? And, given its ubiquity, 
what does caring mean for emotional wellbeing and the cultivation of morally appropriate 
emotions?  
 
In the vast majority of cases, it is still women who do the caring work. Despite the fact that 
increasing numbers of women participate in the public sphere of work, and have achieved 
greater equality in law with men, women have retained the burden of care in the private 
sphere of the home. Carol Gilligan (1982), in her much cited work on how men and 
women reason differently, presented us with two opposing voices: one of inclusivity and 
other-regarding values (Amy) and one of autonomy and self-regarding values (Jake). The 
thinkers of those voices, Gilligan concluded, reasoned differently. Here we had empirical 
evidence, from an eminent psychologist, that women think differently from men. Certainly 
women are often raised to be other-regarding, to be carers and to express the range of 
emotions stereotypically associated with caring work. The still prevalent belief that women 
are different from men probably accounts for why they are still expected to do the caring at 
home and, to a large extent, in the public sphere too. Women, after all, are more emotional. 
Not surprisingly then, women care and feel more, certainly differently, from men. Men, 
because they reason autonomously and self-interestedly in order to assert their 
independence, are perhaps less able to do the work caring requires. Men seek justice: 
women seek to care. It has been claimed too, that care does not need justice; it does not 
need to be fair but needs only to be imbued with good moral ‘feeling’ (Noddings, 1984167).  
But as Kittay (1999:19) has observed, the ‘simple opposition between care and justice is 
inadequate to the needs of our moral and political lives’. So, too, is the simple dichotomy 
between men and women’s reasoning and emotional natures, a dichotomy that is fixed 
‘beforehand on some general presumption, that certain persons are not fit to do certain 
things’ (Mill, 2006:151) and then fixed again, as Shields (1992:270) would say, at 
‘gestation’. The dichotomy is perilously effective in sustaining ‘innate’ sex and gender 
difference. Also skeptical about the division of justice and care, Okin (1989) suggests 
society regards the ‘innate characteristics of sex as one of the clearest legitimisers of 
different rights and restrictions, both formal and informal’ (p.5). Whilst I will re-thread 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167Noddings (1992,1999,2010) asserts this about care throughout the body of her work, emphasising 
‘receptivity’ and ‘engrossment’, though she now uses the term ‘receptive’ instead of engrossment.  
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these themes together again in Chapter 5, they reveal, for the moment, reasons to deliberate 
on care. 
 
On any account, care is ubiquitous. Care is reliant on and revealing of the emotions it 
entails and so, as noted above, care merits investigation to further understanding of 
emotions. But because care can be so gendered, it also provides an opportunity to start 
interrogating emotions as gendered constructs. Importantly, too, care reveals ways of 
looking at emotions and personhood, at the relationships between individuals and those 
who care for them and for whom they care. On some accounts, however, care raises issues 
of personhood and justice that sit uncomfortably with my arguments to date on emotions as 
rational and cognitive. I argued, in the last chapter, that we should seek to cultivate 
moralised compassion as a route to nurturing and stabilizing the appropriate moral attitude 
to perceptions of suffering and harm. I might, just as well, argue that we should seek to 
cultivate moralised compassion as a route to nurturing and stabilizing the appropriate 
moral attitude to care. But, on some accounts of care, my argument will not hold. Nel 
Noddings’ seminal work on the ethics of care continues to be influential and widely 
admired168 but her theoretical postulations raise substantial issues of concern for my 
account of emotions169. Contrary to Noddings’ assertions, I argue, in accord with previous 
chapters, that moral and abstract reasoning is a necessary component of good moral 
judgement and consequent action and that both sexes should exercise these capacities. I 
will suggest, too, that unless an ethics of care is carefully formulated and supported by 
moral theory, it cannot prevent the exploitation of women as carers, empathisers and self-
sacrificers, let alone discourage asymmetries of power in close relationships. I focus on 
Kant and Rawls defending, contra Noddings and some other feminist critics, the 
rationality, abstract processes, universal principles and the importance of the individual. 
Drawing on the work of Onora O’Neil, Jean Hampton, Marilyn Friedman and Barbara 
Herman, I contend that Kant’s and Rawls’ work offers us a more useful and nuanced 
approach to concepts important to cultivating the emotions than is sometimes perceived.  
 
The argument here is complex and, in addition to this introduction and a conclusion, 
comprises eight sections. Initially, I examine Noddings’ arguments on care, moral 
reasoning and universals. I then, contra Noddings, support the ideals of liberalism, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168Noddings continues to be, arguably, the most frequently cited theorist with respect to care in education. 
Halstead (2010:266) claims that moral education programmes focussed on caring are becoming more 
widespread in the USA, and Engster (2004:114) goes so far as to suggest that Noddings provides the 
‘landmark work on care ethics’.  
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particularly its defence of reason, its focus on the individual as a person of dignity worthy 
of respect, and the importance of emotions in moral behaviour, arguing that these ideals 
are important to upholding women’s equality. In the third section, I add another layer to 
my argument by drawing upon Kantian and Rawlsian ethics, putting these to work in a 
version of care that does respect the role of moral principles and reason. I argue for a care 
ethic that promotes dignity, emotional, physical and mental health, all of which support 
agency and autonomy, allowing an individual to be caring but, simultaneously, separate 
and unique with a sense of her own legitimate entitlements170.  
 
From this discussion, I am then in a position to defend a view of the individual which is 
not, by definition, a ‘masculine’ construct but one that ensures caring does not erase who 
an individual is or subsume her into others’ needs and claims. If we wish to support 
equality and justice for women, we ought, I assert, to base our theoretical arguments on a 
further important principle of liberalism: namely, human entitlement, and that entitlement 
begins with a conception of a person as a separate and unique being, whose emotions are 
an integral part of her being. In section five I return to Rawlsian ethics to add a further 
layer to my defence of a liberal view of personhood suggesting that some feminists, 
including some care ethicists, have ignored his focus on the moral, social and emotional 
development of the child and that they have, mistakenly, sought to distinguish care from 
justice. This leads me to section seven and further consideration of Rawls’ moral theory 
and the importance of emotions in moral development and, consequently, good care. 
Finally, in section 8, having undertaken the philosophical groundwork summarised above, 
I consider gendered morality, applying Herman’s (1993, 2008) articulation of moral theory 
to care, and using Nancy as an illustration of those principles in practice. My argument is, 
in sum, that if women are socially and culturally moralised to be the primary carers, and to 
express or repress certain emotions, it will be hard not to conform to that role, thus 
perpetuating the belief (and its effects) that women are different from men. I end this 
section by suggesting why we should embrace moral reasoning and principles of 
judgements in order that our choice of action will be influenced by our commitment to 
principles, values and moral rules. To care well, I shall suggest, requires being sensitive to 
what is morally salient in our environment and being able to reason well on what to do 
next. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170Jean Hampton writes very well on this issue. Selfless people, having ‘few ends of their own’ (2007:54), 
are in danger of losing themselves and indirectly harming those for whom they care (p.40). Hampton also 
advocates Kantian and Rawlsian contractarian principles for feminism because their ethical procedures have 
an inbuilt respect for the intrinsic worth of the person.  
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An ethics of care that repudiates the value of reason, rationality, autonomy or 
individualism, and fails to see the fertility of liberal ideals, surrenders, on the account 
provided here, some important tools by which to judge the quality and justice of care 
relations and the cultivation of morally appropriate emotions. The consequence to women 
may be that they: 
 
…fall into the uncoded otherness in which the power to assert ourselves and claim 
our lives has been displaced by the compulsion to shut down our bodies and seal 
our mouths and be as nothing… . (Shields, Unless, 2002:270) 
 
I shall now ask how we can prevent women falling into uncoded otherness.  
 
 
4.2 Care, Moral Reasoning and Universal Principles. 
Here, I indicate ways in which Noddings’ work on care deviates from the account of 
emotions offered to date, focussing on ways in which her theory fails to respond to my call 
for the cultivation of morally appropriate compassion across the sexes. Noddings maintains 
that moral reasoning is masculine, dominated by the father, promoting individualism, 
autonomy and independence. By contrast, she claims, feminine reasoning embodies 
relatedness and receptiveness, attitudes which an ethics of care should embrace. Rather 
than start with moral reason, Noddings would have us begin with ethical ‘feeling’ so as to 
sustain moral relationships. The ethic of ‘feeling’ she advocates is similar to that of the 
non-cognitivist theorists on emotion we encountered in the previous chapters and means I 
have difficulty following her arguments. She does not specify what an emotion is other 
than to say that we can understand it as ‘attention, empathy and motivational displacement’ 
(2010:9-10) but sometimes the order is reversed, as when a ‘dramatic hurt’ occurs. Ethical 
caring can occur ‘as if’ natural caring were ‘active’ because there is a ‘deontological’ 
element to caring. Further, and against Michael Slote (2007), with whose work she is 
generally sympathetic, we might not feel empathy for a person who has aroused our 
disgust but we will still ‘feel’ for this person. In other cases, we can be ‘prepared to care’ if 
the carer feels ‘sympathy’ for the other. I am unclear how such an approach could help us 
with abusive relationships and how a carer could move a relationship in a ‘healthier’ 
direction. Women continue to care for their partners, suffering years of abuse, in the belief 
they can alter their behaviour. On Noddings’ (2010) account, we could ask whether we can 
‘sustain’ the relationship. Very many women do, at great cost to themselves and their 
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children. I am not suggesting that Noddings would endorse abusive relationships, but I am 
suggesting that her analysis does not help us understand how to rectify inequalities and 
does not move us very far with respect to cultivating emotions, the single most important 
capacity in relations. Whilst I shall say more about this in the next chapter, I will argue 
here, as previously, that it is difficult to have relationships without thought. But now I will 
go further: an ethic of care without reason and thought is inimical to women’s emotional 
wellbeing.  
 
If emotions are, as Nodding (1984:34) suggests, but ‘degradations of consciousness’171 
lacking reason, judgement or appraisal, then women, being emotional creatures, are no 
better than the sheep that graze contentedly on grass and flowers. Noddings asserts that we 
should not include moral principles in caring because they necessitate the application of 
universal judgements which disdain the particularity of local context. Following, O’Neill, I 
reject Noddings’ account of Kantian and Rawlsian ethics and her take on universalism, 
which I regard as simplistic. Noddings (1984:2) has argued that ethics has been dominated 
by the ‘father’ with its ‘principles and propositions’ rendered into terms such as 
‘justification, fairness and justice’. The nature of ethics, further, has a ‘mathematical 
appearance’, proceeding as if governed by the ‘logic of geometry’172. Ethical decisions are 
made on the basis of logico-mathematical reasons (2007:223) and in ‘solitude’ (p.2). Here 
Noddings is attacking Kant and his abstract complex system of moral thought, which, she 
claims, is individualistic, autonomous, and independent173. Masculine moral reasoning is 
seen as being a solitary endeavour, requiring no input from other reasoning beings. This 
contrasts with women’s forms of reasoning which are completed, following Noddings, in 
relation to others. Because moral reasoning is masculine, the mother’s voice has been 
silent but is required in an ethics of care because it will provide ‘receptivity, relatedness 
and responsiveness’ to concrete situations (1984:2). Noddings does not want to say that 
logic has no place in reasoning, that women cannot embrace it, or that men cannot adopt a 
more feminine form of ethics. Rather, she wishes to present an alternative that does not 
begin with moral reasoning, but an ethic of care which ‘long[s] for goodness’ (p.2) or the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171Noddings citing Sartre. 
172This claim is reminiscent of Carol Gilligan’s (1982:37) analysis of moral reasoning as a mathematical 
equation. It is Jake’s view, one of the participants in her research, that if one has to choose between oneself 
and others, ‘three-quarters goes to oneself’.  
173See also Noddings (2002a,b; 2005) for her criticisms of Kantian ethics. For defences against charges that 
Kant ignored the role of emotions, relationships in favour of reason, detachment and impartiality, see Guyer 
(1996) who argues that by the 1790s Kant had made some essential modifications to his moral epistemology 
and psychology to include the role of ‘feeling’ in the motivation of duty and to virtuous acts. See also 
Sherman (1995,1997); Baron (1997); Herman (2002,2008); Johnston (2007) and Wike (2011).   
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‘moral attitude’ and in which what matters is the preservation and sustenance of 
relationships and connectedness to others. Noddings (1984:3) eschews so-called masculine 
moral reasoning because we understand ‘ethical feeling’ without needing to ‘prove’ 
anything, and without, she continues, seeking ‘moral truth or knowledge’. I shall return to 
these issues throughout this chapter, but, for the moment, Noddings compares this ethical 
feeling to a child learning to ride a bike. The child does so without ‘propositional 
knowledge’ (which Noddings does not explain), relying initially on a supportive hand, 
until she gradually acquires the skill to ride the bike alone. The child simply comes to 
know, presumably, by practice and without deliberation.  
 
There is a problem with this analogy. Learning to ride a bike is not an ethical act. That 
much is clear. But learning to ride a bike is not necessarily without critical thought, 
reflection, or emotional response, and the child needs much more than the steady parental 
hand. One learns to ride a bike in a series of steps, becoming skilled in the act through trial 
and error and by learning to read the environment in which one cycles. Contrary to 
Noddings’ child rider, and following Aristotle’s ethics of character habituation, a novice 
cyclist would have a goal in mind towards which she must work, to learn to ride, to have 
fun and to avoid accidents. She will need some critical conception of the need to vary her 
trials and learn from her errors (see Sherman, 1989:177-181). Being aware of the goal 
requires critical capacities and cognitive processes: taking instructions, making mistakes 
and learning from them, estimating distance and slope, adjusting the gears to take account 
of these, adopting the right posture, and so on. A beginner cyclist is, in some rudimentary 
ways, similar to a beginner in ethical and moral life and, I suggest, that virtuous action and 
moral development, which require the kinds of actions discussed, are complex activities 
combining critical judgement with sensitivity to context and to the appropriate emotional 
responses on how best to act174. The child is not an empty jug. She has a character, a set of 
dispositions and the capacity to reason, all of which need to be stimulated, educated, and 
habituated to be sensitive to the particular and the general. How she reacts, why, and to 
what extent, will depend on the maturity of her deliberative capacities, and her ability to 
weigh up and choose among competing possibilities. The role of the parent or educator is 
to help prepare the child for the choices and judgements she will make175. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174The line of argument I follow here continues to be influenced by Aristotle’s analysis of the critical 
habituation of character for which the cultivation of the emotions is prerequisite. See the NE.I and II, and 
also Sherman (1989) and Hursthouse (1999).      
175On this point, see for example, Pol.1253a12, NE.1143b11-13. 
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Noddings (1984:5)176 claims that we want to be moral because we wish to remain in caring 
relations and ‘to enhance the ideal of ourselves as caring’. Everything in the caring relation 
depends on the ‘nature and strength’ of that relationship since ‘absolute principles’ are not 
there to guide us in our actions. Noddings rejects the need for moral principles, arguing 
that these could dilute or obliterate care because they imply exceptions which, one 
presumes, might weaken the relation of carer to cared-for and might act to ‘separate us 
from each other’. Presumably, separation might occur because the abstract reasoning 
demanded for moral principles will be a solitary process that could isolate us from our 
intimate relations. Moreover, in being guided by principles, she avows, ‘we may become 
dangerously self-righteous when we perceive ourselves holding a precious principle not 
held by the other’. However, an awareness that we hold a ‘precious principle’ that is not 
shared by the carer, or the cared-for, need not lead to self-righteousness, especially if our 
moral principles hold to respect for the other.  Noddings also rejects the ‘universal’ 
(1984:7) in moral judgements and the Kantian injunction that all acts be universalised so 
that all in similar circumstances can accept them. Noddings is sceptical of such judgements 
for two reasons. First, she claims, the attention of the one-caring should not be on the 
judgement or the particular act, but on how ‘we meet each morally’ (p.5). Secondly, each 
encounter is unique with cultural and personal differences resulting in different forms of 
care that will not lend themselves to universal judgements (2007:223).  This latter point is 
a familiar concern amongst particularists and those sceptical of universal principles. 
However, the application of universal judgements or principles to ‘all’ is not, as has been 
traditionally understood, an ‘all’ that is necessarily standard, homogenised and rigid over 
place, culture and time. It is an ‘all’ that, following O’Neill (1996:52), will vary with 
context and so be potentially applicable to each different caring encounter.  
 
Particularist reasoning is, itself, a form of ‘insider’ reasoning (O’Neill, 1996:53) which 
does not allow for reasoning that includes differing and multiple audiences. Particularist 
reasoning, O’Neill argues, may be ‘ethnocentric’ or ‘egocentric’, confined to one’s group 
or community, or to oneself. The point is that while some reasoning may, of course, be 
restricted to those we know intimately or well, contra Noddings, I suggest that there are 
forms of reasoning which should be extended to groups beyond our intimate circles, 
drawing us away from insider to more universal reasoning. Each caring encounter is 
universal and human, reflecting our sociability, our vulnerability, our need for care and to 
care, our desire for intimacy, as well as our propensity to exploit, abuse and neglect from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176The short quotations in this chapter are all from Noddings (1984:5) unless I indicate otherwise indicated. 
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self-interest or ignorance of human value. Universal reasoning, on such a view, can be both 
insider (what are the goals and plans of the individual or the community, how can I live 
with others?) and inclusive (how can different groups cooperate to follow principles and 
actions that are reasonable and respectful of norms and values taken generally and 
specifically?) so that we can ask what are to count as reasons for action and, for the 
purposes of this argument, what are to count as reasons to care. Caring, I contend, is a 
moral act because of the judgements it entails, because of the moral principles we draw 
upon and the reasons we give for acting. 
 
However, there remain three major objections to universal judgements that pertain to (and 
beyond) care. First, such judgements, some feminists suppose177, may be dangerous to 
individuality and difference. Secondly, they may incline us to self-righteousness, as 
Noddings supposes and, thirdly, we, perforce, may reason atomistically, as many anti-
universalists suppose178. The assumption is that universal prescriptions, proscriptions, 
recommendations or rejections are uniform in character. However, whether a principle is 
uniform or not is a matter of its content rather than of its range or form (O’Neill, 1996:75). 
A universal principle, as noted above, can be differentiated to take account of differences 
in circumstances or experience. All parents should care for their children in loving and 
compassionate ways, but that care will inevitably differ depending on the age, 
circumstances and needs of each child. The second rebuttal against anti-universalist fears is 
that even if the prescription, proscription, recommendation or rejection calls for some 
degree of uniformity of action or treatment, these are underdetermined (O’Neill, 1996:76) 
leaving agents or institutions free to decide the content of their universal principles179. 
Finally, universal principles need only apply in certain domains (O’Neill, 1996:75) or 
within restricted time periods. Within the domain of education, that all children must be 
taught to read, write and count is, today, a universal requirement but quite how teachers are 
to achieve literacy or numeracy will vary according to policy, custom, regional authority or 
country, as well as the needs of the individual pupil180. In sum, universal principles, such 
as those I draw on for a discussion of moral compassion and those upon which I argue 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177Gilligan (1982). 
178See, for example, McIntyre (1981); Sandel (1982); Taylor (1985); Butler (1999). 
179An example of a universal approach which is general and underdetermined is Nussbaum’s Capabilities 
Approach. Governments should provide threshold levels of functioning but what that threshold is will be 
determined by the economic, social and political development of that country. This approach, which I return 
to later, can be applied universally and it is a ‘species’ of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(Nussbaum, 2006:7). 
180In Scotland, CfE specifies the outcomes and experiences for achieving literacy and numeracy at certain 
levels, but schools are free to adopt the approaches they think would best realise the aims of the curriculum. 
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good caring must rest, do not suppose the erasure of difference, individual need or context. 
Neither do they suggest treating people as atoms in an impersonal world, blithely 
reasoning in solitary confinement. Issues still remain, however, with Noddings’ version of 
care and so I turn now to a defence of the ideals that are critical to a theory of care if it is to 
protect women against stereotypical beliefs, abuse or oppression; and if a theory of care is 
to support the cultivation of morally appropriate emotions for both men and women.  
 
 
4.3 In Defence of Liberal Ideals  
Here I defend the ideals of liberalism181, with particular respect to reason and the 
individual, critical elements of the liberal platform necessary to uphold my claims for the 
role and importance of emotions in moral behaviour. I shall suggest, too, that these ideals 
are important to feminism and to upholding women’s equality, including their dignity and 
self-respect. Of course, liberalism, along with two of its key figures, Kant and Rawls has 
often been the target of feminist, postmodernist and communitarian attacks. These attacks 
are misguided. Despite their abstract theorizing (and I will return to this shortly), Kant and 
Rawls, for example, insist on placing the individual at the centre of their philosophies in 
order to reason on the best principles and practices that protect agency, dignity, freedom 
and equality. Further, and contrary to widespread and prevalent interpretations of 
liberalism, a focus on the individual does not preclude loving, caring, compassionate 
relationships. Taking their cue from Aristotle, human beings are social animals and the 
ethical formulations of Kant and Rawls make it very clear that human beings cannot be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181Please note that I am not defending neo-liberalism which gives many of us cause for concern, not least 
because of its impoverished conception of the person, her interests, motives and relations to others. My 
interest is in justice, fairness, respect for the individual, social, political and economic equality and 
responsibility, opportunities to be and to do, according to one’s one plan of life. In the tradition of Locke and 
Kant, I am interested in the moral sovereignty of the individual. Whilst Taylor (1989), McIntyre (1994) and 
Sandel (1998) have tried to evade the communitarian label, aspects of a communitarian line cause concern 
with respect to subsuming the individual and scant regard to issues of feminism and gender (see Friedman, 
1989). Communitarianism and postmodernism also makes the error of tending to assume that liberalism, of 
the Rawlsian kind, constructs individuals as fundamentally self-interested and radically separate. This is a 
caricature. Individuals belong in communities, and communities make up society (Rawls, 1971, Chapter 
VIII). The theories of Hayek (1974) and Nozick (1974) which were adopted so enthusiastically in the UK, 
first by Thatcher and then by subsequent governments including Blair’s Labour government, may have tarred 
all forms of liberalism with a neo-liberal brush. Taylor and McIntyre’s critique of Rawls’ ‘asocial’ 
individualism did not help, and neither did Sandel’s (and McIntyre’s) charge that such an individual was 
detached from her community and so devoid of community influences (see also Mulhall and Swift, 2003). 
However, Rawls was very clear about the importance of the community. In a TJ, the ‘sociability of human 
beings must not be understood in a trivial fashion’ and it was a truism that ‘social life is a condition of 
developing the ability to think and speak, and to take part in the common activities of society’. Human 
beings, in fact, ‘have shared final ends and they value their common institutions and activities as good in 
themselves (1971:458 and see p79 also). Please see pps.137-9 here for a related consideration of Rawls’ 
attention to individual as rational calculators of their own interest in the Original Position. 
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moral without close connection to others. As we saw in the previous chapter, to be moral is 
to take others’ ends as our own, respecting the plans, aspirations and ends of other people, 
regarding people as ends in their own dignified right. That we have a moral duty to respect 
and promote the wellbeing of others is indicative of the importance of human relations to 
eudaimonia. Kant and Rawls, as I will demonstrate, value the unique individual in her 
many ties to others by contrast with an ethics of care, as formulated by Noddings, which 
may not provide such a platform and may not protect women against perniciously 
gendered emotions and the need to care, not least because Noddings’ ethic demotes reason. 
Neither will such an ethic promote the equal standing of the ‘feminine voice’ with that of 
the ‘masculine’ (Gilligan, 1982182), nor end the gendering of emotions. 
 
Noddings’ preferred term for ‘feeling with’ someone was ‘engrossment’ which could be 
defined as empathy. However, she is reluctant to make such a link because the dictionary 
definition of empathy as a projection into another’s situation is too ‘rational, western and 
masculine’ (1984:30). In the caring relation, one receives the other into oneself, 
temporarily, as if this receptivity of feeling and seeing were ‘on loan’ (p.30). While an 
ethic of care involves judgements about fact and feeling, it nevertheless allows for 
‘situations and conditions in which judgement (in the impersonal logical sense) may 
properly be put aside in favour of faith and commitment’ (p.25). This is because ‘caring is 
essentially non-rational’ and ‘one of the greatest dangers to caring may be premature 
switching to a rational-objective mode. Objective thinking is of limited and particular use’, 
natural caring requires ‘no moral effort’ (1984:26).  
 
The concern with abstract, masculine forms of reasoning, and concerns for principles of 
justice rather than an ethic of care and the role of emotions in women’s lives is also a 
feature of Carol Gilligan’s (1982) work. Like Noddings, Gilligan argues that women, being 
concerned with caring relationships and emotion in their lives, have a different moral 
perspective from men. Men, according to the male voices in Gilligan’s data, have a 
‘justice’ perspective, reasoning impartially and acting on universal principles without the 
messy distractions and distortions of emotions. Already, we begin to see the gendering of 
rationality and emotions. As emotions belong in the domestic domain, where much caring 
and nurturing occur, this is the woman’s realm where she may reign as Queen of the 
particular and the concrete. Men, because they reason impartially, with reflection and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182Gilligan’s work was influenced by feminist  neo-Freudian psychoanalytic theorists such as Nancy 
Chodorow (1978). 
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without emotion, are rational. On such an argument, the logic of this particular critique of 
masculine reasoning seems to be that women are too partial and too emotional to be 
rational. If we follow Noddings’ (1984) articulation of the emotion of joy, for example, we 
may see why emotions are not conducive to rational thought (or conduct). Noddings tells 
us that while emotions may be ‘facilitative in a non reflective way’ and may restore one to 
a ‘less stressful state’, neither effect raises emotions to an ‘exalted state’: the emotional 
state remains a ‘degradation, a necessary evil in a world too difficult for constant 
rationality’ (p.143). Joy need not contain either ‘belief’ or ‘conscious assessment’ (p.137). 
This kind of thinking, along with Gilligan’s analyses, gives theoretical and empirical, and 
hence apparently authoritative, support to beliefs that the differences between men and 
women are real. Women are irrational because emotional, men are rational because 
intellectual. Our differences are sexed and gendered183. The other logical outcome of this 
kind of feminist criticism184 is that if women are not rational, and if rationality is the stuff 
and essence of morality, then women are not capable of morality. This is clearly absurd185. 
Criticisms of this aspect of liberalism, by ethicists such as Noddings and Slote (2007), are 
based on the belief that liberalism relies too much on autonomous, rational agents and 
traits which men prize and exhibit, and which women lack. However, this is to 
misunderstand the overall goal of the liberal tradition. 
 
I am inclined, following Hampton (2007:154-55), to think of the liberal tradition as an 
umbrella for a variety of philosophies which derive from such diverse thinkers as John 
Locke (1988) and his political descendants concerned with protecting private property, free 
markets and liberty, while limiting the power of the state, and Jean Jacques Rousseau 
(1993) and his descendants concerned with inequality and injustice. John Stuart Mill 
(2006) tried to unify both strands of liberalism in On Liberty. John Rawls (1971) in A 
Theory of Justice sought to reconcile equal basic liberties with reasonable social and 
economic inequalities, provided these were to the greatest benefit of the least well-off186. 
There are, as a consequence of these different positions, differences of opinion on how we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183I shall have more to say about sex differences in Chapter 5. 
184And I am here talking of a feminist ethic of care that derives some of its influences from the ethics of 
Hume’s (1985) moral sentimentalism which took into account intimate, involuntary and unequal relations 
and regarded justice as an important constituent of good relations. Hume also denied the pre-eminent role of 
rationality in morality: it was certainly not superior to passion and the role of reason was to direct our 
judgements concerning cause and effect with emotion motivating us to action (Book II, section III). Hume’s 
Treatise influenced Kant’s thinking (Guyer, 2006:12-13) and Kant, as noted, concluded that reason could not 
work unaided by emotion but reason was not subservient to passion as in Hume’s ethics (1985:462). For an 
excellent critique of Hume’s interpretation of the emotions and their causes see Pitcher (1965).  
185Blum (1980); Homiak (2002); Wollstonecraft (2004) and Mill (2006) reach these same conclusions.   
186 Other important philosophers in this tradition include Hume (1985) and Adam Smith (2007). 
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are to conceive morality and how we are to understand reason but uniting liberal theories, 
according to Hampton, are five fundamental commitments. 
 
1.  Freedom of all citizens.  
2.  Equality of all citizens. 
3.  State protection of freedom and equality in a) democracy; b) toleration and 
freedom of conscience for all citizens and c) freedom of individuals to choose 
their own life plans.  
4.  Legitimate existence of the state.  
5.  Reason. (adapted from Hampton,2007:158-159) 
 
These commitments are important to women’s equality and to my analysis of gendered 
emotions. By virtue of our capacity to reason we can eventually understand normative 
matters through reasoning with each other, or with ourselves in private: a fundamental 
tenet of liberalism187. Having different points of views, beliefs, and conceptions of what a 
good life means, is to respect difference, the individual and the autonomy of the individual, 
to oppose practices which deny freedom and equality and, in turn, the dignity of the 
person. For these reasons, the moral philosophies of Kant and Rawls, with their desire to 
place the individual at the centre of their contract philosophies so as to reason on how to 
protect their agency, dignity, freedom and equality, are important to any consideration of 
care ethics and the emotions. This is especially so in opposition to the view that women 
lack reason or have diminished powers because of their emotional natures. The implication 
of diminished reasoning capacity is that we do not need to take the concerns, perceptions, 
and experiences of women into account, since they are likely to result from defective 
understanding. Such a view implicitly supports the stereotype that women need to be 
guided and influenced by men. Indeed, in extreme cases of control by men, there is a 
tendency to erase a woman’s identity so that she is subsumed into her partner, having 
sufficient form to meet his needs and supply that to which he is entitled188. 
 
The ideals of liberalism, Kantian, Millean or Rawlsian, are important to feminist concerns, 
despite some critics’ claims that liberalism subverts feminist aims189. Liberalism is 
important to how we conceive of women because it treats every person with respect. In 
Kant’s conception of the kingdom of ends190, human beings are sociable, dependent, needy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187Hampton (2007:160) and see Nussbaum (1999a,b). 
188See Chapter 6. 
189See for example, Jagger (1983); Benhabib (1987); Held (2006). For supporters of Feminist Liberalism see 
Friedman (1993:221-230); Nussbaum (2000b); Hampton (2007). See too the collection of essays in 
‘Varieties of Feminist Liberalism’ (Baehr, 2004) which defend liberalism’s importance to feminist concerns. 
190Put simply, a community of rational beings who act on maxims accepted as part of a moral social order. 
See GW:4:433 and Herman (2008). The kingdom, ‘a systematic union of rational beings through common 
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and have limited resources, even while we are autonomous (Nussbaum, 1996; Herman 
2008). We are self-legislating to the extent that we can follow our own will (practical 
reason) and set our own ends and this applies to both sexes, albeit that one sex usually has 
greater freedom to set ends. The importance of Rawls’ Original Position (OP) is to be seen 
in a similar light: how can we reason so as to create a community of moral beings who 
have respect and regard for dignity and personhood, without, as far as is possible, being 
diverted off course by the usual array of human contingencies, selfish self-interested 
projects and vices? The common fear expressed by feminists, namely that Kantian, 
Rawlsian and other liberals aim at reasoning in isolation and self-sufficiency, has rather 
missed the point. Women do desire some forms of self-sufficiency in order to be free from 
complete dependence on men for their income and status191, even while some accept the 
burden of responsibility for caring for children and relatives. Selfless women, however, 
who sacrifice themselves in caring for others, lose their identity and their self, harming not 
only themselves, but also potentially those for whom they care192. Women and children 
continue to be objectified because of persistent beliefs that they are deficient in important 
domains of reasoning (women are more intuitive) and emotional capacity, particularly with 
respect to emotions such as love, compassion and sympathy. That emotions are irrational 
and that rationality is to be passed over in favour of ‘feeling’, compassion and altruism, is 
a further consequence of such criticisms of liberalism. I have already argued that emotions 
are not irrational, but I will briefly reiterate the arguments against this commonplace 
opinion. On the view that emotions are a form of ‘degradation of conscience’ (Noddings, 
1984:34), and that rationality has no place in emotional life, following Nussbaum (2001), I 
assert, to the contrary, that an emotional life without rationality, without, that is, thought 
and discernment, may become unhealthy, oppressive and destructive193. Noddings’ theory 
of care, as I have suggested, does not seem to be cognisant of the extent to which her 
formulation could degrade into abusive or neglectful forms that would render moralised 
emotions, on my account, impossible. We need, and as I suggest below, a view of care 
premised on Kantian and Rawlsian ethics, put to work in support of a care ethic that does 
respect the role of moral principles and reason whilst promoting dignity, emotional, 
physical and mental health, all of which support agency and autonomy.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
laws’, is a metaphor for an ideal state and archetype as a standard for judgement of common values (Herman, 
2008:69). 
191See Nussbaum and Glover (1995); Nussbaum (2000a); Sen (2009) for accounts of women in the 
developing world who have established organisations and self-help groups to achieve forms of self-
sufficiency. Nussbaum (1999a:61) suggests women take care of others best when they can take care of 
themselves. See also Hampton (2007).  
192This point becomes more salient in Chapter 7. 
193Card (1988,1990); Houston (1990); Homiak (2002:5). 
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4.4 The Importance of Care. 
In criticising some conceptions of ethics of care, I do not wish to disparage the importance 
of care in our lives. Care, understood as a ‘labor, an attitude and a virtue’ (Kittay, 2002: 
259-60), is a feature of all of our lives, all of the time. If caring includes all we do ‘to 
maintain, continue, and repair our “world” so that we can live in it as well as possible’ 
(Fisher and Tronto, 1990:40) and society cannot be just if it fails to recognise that there 
will be times when all of us will experience, to some degree, asymmetrical dependency 
through ill health, incapacitation, grief. But we must be careful. Given care’s importance to 
a healthy and flourishing live, the capacity and responsibility for care should not attach 
only to women. Neither can care make its way unaided by reason or discernment: to think 
so would be revelatory of a degraded conscience imprisoned in a cave of flickering 
shadows194. However, beliefs and opinions persist with the obstinate tenacity of knotweed, 
despite assaults by spade and weedkiller195. Good caring requires support from moralised 
emotions such as compassion, sympathy and appropriate forms of love. 
 
While it is right to value the care we invest in our relationships, and while it is true that 
women have historically valued their labours in this regard while men have underestimated 
care’s importance, there is a need to think very carefully about what some feminists are 
actually saying when they criticise a liberal version of the person. Philosophers such as 
Aristotle, Rousseau, Kant, Adam Smith, Mill, Rawls and Nussbaum proclaim personhood, 
autonomy, rights, dignity and self-respect as belonging to everyone, everywhere, but many 
women have been denied, and continue to experience the denial of, these fundamental 
entitlements. These philosophers do not argue for the kind of radical individualism and 
self-interested motivations of Thomas Hobbes’ contract theory in which, contra Kant, the 
value of the person is his ‘price’ (1985:151). Individuals have intrinsic worth as human 
beings. Being social creatures we have emotion based connections to others, and we 
‘cooperate’ with those with whom we need not, such as the elderly, the disabled, the 
young, or people from other cultures and societies (Hampton, 2007:12).  
 
Models of healthy dependency and respect for caring relations are not absent from 
‘masculine’ liberal philosophies: they are present in deep, interweaving ways. In having 
and exercising entitlements to fairness, justice, comes the power of moral choice, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194This, of course, is from Plato’s simile of the cave. I will return to the value of metaphors later in this 
chapter.  
195I developed this from Proust (2003/4:25): ‘the man woman will have found the means of attaching himself 
to a man, just as the convolvulus throws out its tendrils where ever a rake or hoe is to be found’. 
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power to choose one’s plans and goals to achieve a rewarding and flourishing life. Women 
are entirely capable of making such plans and goals. But how many women have been 
denied, and continue to be denied, the power of moral choice? And how can they exercise 
moral choice if they are by nature irrational, because emotions are irrational? Any critique 
of reason must be carefully considered. We all have the capacity to reason. The Western 
philosophical tradition holds that our ability to reason, properly cultivated, confers dignity 
upon us, and is a source of equal human worth. The kind of reasoning that philosophers 
such as Aristotle, the Stoics, and Kant valued was practical reasoning, the capacity to 
understand moral distinctions, evaluate options, to be able to select the means by which to 
realise our goals (Nussbaum, 1999:71). Theoretical reasoning also has its place when we 
engage in abstract thinking on what it means to have a decent and just life, a topic I shall 
consider shortly. But women have been denied, and continue to be denied, the opportunity 
to exercise practical reason196.  
 
On a liberal view, whilst healthy dependency is a relationship with ‘another me’, that other 
me remains a ‘separate self’ distinct and different from me (Sherman 1989:138)197. 
Friedman argues that Aristotle’s analysis of friendship provides us with a model for 
healthy relationships in general.  
 
Friendship is a close relationship in which trust, intimacy, and disclosure open up 
for us whole standpoints other than our own. Through seeing what my friends 
count as a harm done to her, for example, and seeing how she suffers from it and 
what she does in response, I can try on, as it were, her interpretive claim and its 
implications for moral practice’. (Friedman 1993:198) 
 
Friendships can help us examine the nature and quality of our intimate relationships, if we 
are so minded. The explicit point I am re-iterating here is that models of healthy 
dependency and respect for caring relations are not absent from ‘masculine’ philosophies 
but are, instead, the very bases of these philosophies. However, these powers were, and 
still are, associated with men because only men, and men of a certain class, were permitted 
to pursue a life of rational activity and freedom. The passions, emotions, feelings, along 
with bodily care and functionings, were associated with women, and so valued less. 
Aristotle and his successors (Rousseau, for example) were able to justify the lower status 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196A notable exception might be Plato, who, in The Republic, had Socrates reasoning that women could be 
among the philosophical rulers in the ideal state if they were educated and trained equally to men. In Meno, 
Socrates asserts that virtue is of the same quality in women as in men. Yet women nowhere participate in the 
dialogues, and women are deprecatingly spoken of prior to the dialogues on women’s equal participation in 
the revolutionary Republic. For further discussion see, for example, Moller-Okin (1979). 
197See also Homiak (2002:13-16). In NE.1170b7 a friend is a ‘second self’. 
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of women and to deny that either their emotions or intellect could be educated to any great 
degree. The function of women (and inferior classes) was to serve men (Okin, 1979:89-93) 
and their virtue laid in their capacity to serve well and to run the household efficiently, 
rather narrow activities that did not demand great intellectual powers198. If some feminists 
continue to eschew reason in favour of sentimentalism, it is my view that women will not 
be respected for having an equal faculty for reason as men, but may continue to be 
encouraged to stop ‘reasoning’ and to accept extant power structures without thought. The 
belief in a ‘maleness’ of reason and in the ‘emotion, perception and intuition’ of women 
simply perpetuates sex and gender difference and stereotypes, eradicating or diminishing 
in the process, the individuality of women. 
 
 
4.5 The Intrinsic Worth of the Individual. 
The attack on individualism inherent in ‘masculine morality’ and the liberal tradition might 
be credible if it could be shown that individualism referred to people concerned only with 
self-interest and gain at the expense of others. The liberal tradition’s insistence that no 
person was to be the instrument to achieving another’s ends, that each person had equal 
dignity and inviolable worth, would repudiate the crudely conceived individual of neo-
liberal conceptions of the self-seeking and self-maximising individual. Systems which 
subsume the individual to the community, collective or state, as in the totalitarian regimes 
of the former USSR or North Korea now, have had disastrous consequences for large 
numbers of their populations, almost obliterating individuals’ rights to exist as individuals, 
as well as their right to exist if they refused to conform to ‘creedal unanimity and uniform 
standards of behaviour’ (Shklar, 1984:4). Shklar repudiates the accusation by clerical and 
military critics (of the 18th century) that liberalism promotes selfishness because it lacks 
the discipline of faith and military virtue.  
 
Nothing could be more remote from the truth. The very refusal to use public 
coercion to impose creedal unanimity and uniform standards of behaviour 
demands an enormous degree of self-control. Tolerance consistently applied is a 
more difficult and morally more demanding than repression. (Shklar, 1984:4-5) 
 
The common cruelties against women and children by tyrannical or bullying husbands, 
partners and fathers, the attacks against Liberal Democracy by fundamentalist terrorists, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198In NE.1158b14 and 19-20, the wife is subordinate to her husband on account of her ‘different excellence 
and function’.  
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a return to the nuclear family to save Britain from moral decay199 testify to Shklar’s 
insight. Societies and men who do not see women as separate entities, entitled to their own 
personhood and use of their capacities to choose and reason, do them great harm. If care 
ethics, following Noddings, assumes a naïve perspective on how women can overcome 
violence by engrossment or caring role models, it will do very little to diminish the control 
that some men, families, community, religious and political institutions, exercise over 
women. A 1989 UN report on the global violence against women stated that:   
 
The risk of violence and violation within the household is one thing women, 
irrespective of their social position, creed, colour or culture share in common… 
by men to whom they have committed themselves. (cited in MacKinnon, 2005:30) 
 
For Charlesworth and Chinkin (2000:12), to be a woman is to be universally vulnerable to 
all forms of physical and psychological violence, resulting directly from the manifest 
imbalance in power between men and women (p.13). In every region of the world, abuse 
issues most frequently from a husband or partner. We can see how urgent it is that we see 
all human beings, including women, as rational, separate but connected to others, capable 
of reasoning practically and theoretically, engaged in care that is ethical and just, respectful 
of all as beings of dignity to desire to pursue ends that are of value. Bad thinking, 
unreflective and unquestioning thinking where moral discernment and judgement is absent, 
is inimical to decent human relationships. Where we have defective thinking, we often 
encounter cruelty. And with cruelty stalks inequality in malign companionship. 
Accordingly, an ethic of care should combine capacities for reason and emotions and be 
grounded in, not bifurcated from, justice if, as noted in my introduction, we are to 
uncouple emotions from gender and to locate the cultivation of healthy emotions in a view 
of personhood that affords each individual dignity and respect. In the next section, I return 
to Rawlsian ethics to add a further layer to my argument, suggesting that some feminists 
have focused too much on Rawls’ abstract formulations on how to reason for a just society, 
ignoring his extensive and detailed analysis of the moral, social and emotional 
development of the child in Part Three of A Theory of Justice.  
 
 
4.6 Metaphors of Reason and Justice. 
Just citizens will probably have been nurtured on compassionate and loving care. Part one 
of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice develops the theory of a just society, including the Veil of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199This is much in the news currently because of the riots and looting in London, Manchester, and other 
English cities in August 2011. 
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Ignorance, the device Rawls constructed so as to have the citizens of a well ordered society 
deliberate on how best to achieve good ends. The Veil is abstract and metaphorical, as 
theory must be if we are to extract important information from the world in order to 
ruminate on how to understand and interpret that world. Put another way, metaphors and 
ideals are pictures of the world in which we live, embodying what we desire while 
permitting us the conceptual space to explore how we might achieve an ideally just state of 
affairs. However, like Noddings, Susan Moller Okin (1989a, 1989b, 2005) is critical of 
Kantian and Rawlsian ethics for being unnecessarily rationalist, individualistic and remote 
from real human beings and contingency. Nonetheless, whilst Okin (1989b:247) is critical 
of how Rawls’ rules200 have been derived, she does not reject moral rules in favour of 
contextual caring. As moral agents deliberate behind the Veil, they must take account of 
permissible inequalities and consider the position of the least well-off (Rawls, 1971:151-
154). In order to do so, the deliberating agents need to have powers of empathy and 
compassion to formulate principles that ensure justice and equality, particularly if they are 
agents accustomed to power and privilege (p.176). To attack Rawls’ theoretical processes 
on the grounds that they are remote from real human beings, subject to the vagaries of 
fortune, and too concerned with individualism and rationality, is to misrepresent or to 
misunderstand Rawls’ philosophical purpose. 
 
Rawls was acutely interested in the moral and emotional development of the child, 
development which occurs best in positive affiliations with the child’s parents, siblings, 
friends and, later, in the child’s membership of organisations and institutions201. Embedded 
in Rawls’ theory of moral development is a concern that moral agents act benevolently to 
each other, showing care and concern for those who are different and least advantaged 
(Rawls, 1971:VIII). In this respect, the Veil is an excellent tool by which to exercise moral 
impartial judgement on the lives of women202. Noddings’ (1984) argument that justice is 
not essential to care and is overly masculine seems ill founded on this account. If 
principles of justice include empathy and concern for others, then, following Okin 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200While respectful of Rawls’ theory, Nussbaum (2006) is concerned that those in the OP are to be rough 
equals with regard to powers of rationality. Asymmetrical power relations are a fact of life: we will all be 
needy and dependent at some points in our lives but those impaired by mental or physical disability will not 
be able to enter Rawls’ bargaining process. See also Kittay (1999,2002). 
201Cf. Aristotle’s model of friendship as an ideal for healthy moral development and flourishing. 
202Okin (1989a, 1994,2005) was critical of Rawls for assuming that the parties to the OP would be  
‘heads of households’ acting on behalf of the interests of their households, for his unquestioning acceptance 
that families were just and because he ignored the deeply gendered structure of society. Rawls (1975) revised 
his theory slightly to say that sex was a morally irrelevant feature and gender should not affect one’s 
entitlement to justice. In Political Liberalism (1993:xxviii) he notes that gender is one of the basic problems 
of society which his theory can accommodate. 
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(1989b:247) we need not be concerned that arid moral rules could lead to tragic 
consequences for those for whom we care and love for ‘…to love means not only to be 
concerned for [a child’s] wants and needs, but to affirm his sense of worth of his own 
person’ (Rawls, 1971:406). Further, and against the charge that Rawls’ version of social 
contract philosophy is indifferent to particularity, for the child to grow up as a decent 
moral person, parents should provide and explain clear (justified) rules, which they 
themselves exemplify, to arouse ‘not only the child’s inclination to accept these principles, 
but also to convey how they are to be interpreted in particular cases’ (Rawls, 1971:408). 
   
Noddings and other critics of social contract theory also target the process of deliberation 
and the hyper-rationality of the agents who are not in fact real people (2007:180). Seyla 
Benhabib (1987:89) fears that otherness and difference is made to disappear for a 
generalised, universal other who is ‘everyone and no-one’. Sara Ruddick (1989), in her 
criticism of contract theory and the Veil of Ignorance, argues against the device for its 
abstraction from real bodies and detachment from feelings, and for seeking protection (by 
means of the Veil) from difference and dependency which it can only partially hide. If we 
begin the analysis by suggesting that the Original Position (OP) and the Veil of Ignorance 
(VoI) are devices by which to imagine a just society, and how agents might deliberate 
about how to arrive at principles of justice and equality, we might begin to see the value of 
this method of deliberation which incorporates social and moral values. Of course, the OP 
and the VoI are metaphors for an ideal person deliberating for an ideally just society but 
the criticisms here miss important points.  
 
Metaphors and ideals can reveal what we desire most while permitting us the conceptual 
space to explore how we might achieve an ideally just state of affairs. So, too, metaphors, 
as Murdoch (1970:75) claims, are not mere ‘peripheral decorations’ but ‘fundamental 
forms of our awareness of our condition’. Philosophy often resorts to metaphorical image 
play, using the metaphors of the social contract203, the categorical imperative204, Plato’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203Classical theorists of the social contract tradition include Hobbes (1985); Rousseau (1993); Locke (1988) 
and Kant. Modern exponents include Rawls (1971); Gauthier (1986) and Scanlon (1999). The principle idea 
of the contract is that people come together to agree on how society should be organized. 
204The categorical imperative is a metaphor for how we reason. The theoretical structure that underpins the 
categorical imperative is complex but, briefly, Kant has a supreme principle of morality: the categorical 
imperative (CI). The CI is to be applied universally to all human beings and, in its most basic formulation, 
states that we should act only as we would wish others to act towards us, or ‘act only in accordance with that 
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law’ (GW:4:421). On 
Herman’s (1996:43-44) analysis, the CI is a higher-order deliberative principle, a principle of judgement, that 
assesses maxims (motives). 
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cave205, for example, to explain intricate, dense concepts which themselves ‘cannot be 
analysed into non-metaphorical components without a loss of substance’ (Murdoch, 
1970:75). Contra Noddings (1984), if care relations are better because those who care 
eschew mathematical formulae, propositional and moral truth in favour of intuition, 
receptivity and engrossment, then such a carer might be like the prisoner of Plato’s cave 
gazing at flickering shadows rather than at the reality behind them. Acts done out of 
unthinking love may harm and all the ordinary vices that stalk human relations may go 
unchecked. So, if judgement and reflection have no place in the caring relation, and 
unappraised joy is allowed to consume all rational thought, then:  
 
Any shadowy notion such a man gets hold of is the product of opinion rather than 
knowledge, and he’s living in a dream from which he will not awake on this side 
of the world, where he will finally sleep for ever206. (Plato, 534a)  
 
We may also be confined to the cave if we avoid or deny the exercise of abstract thinking 
because we think it too difficult. The process and purpose of abstraction, so criticised by 
care ethicists such as Noddings, and the paucity of particularity that abstraction implies, is 
ethically important because we abstract from known facts of human existence such as 
inequality, injustice and misogyny. Straightforward abstraction, as O’ Neill alerts us, ‘is a 
matter of bracketing, but not of denying, predicates that are true of the matter under 
discussion’ (1996:40). It is not the purpose of moral theory to abstract principles from 
particles residing in thin air, to be reasoned over by an esoteric gendered mind and applied 
to one half of the population, or class, ethnic group or geographical region. Such an 
exercise would be fruitless for it would yield little that could be meaningfully applied to 
real human lives. Rawls’ purpose was to construct a moral theory to give answers to deep 
and persistent ethical problems of common and individual life, taking contract theory to a 
high level of abstraction, using a minimum number of assumptions, whereby agents could 
work out how justice was to be achieved207. Particularists remain unconvinced, believing 
that abstract conceptions of human relations or actions lead only to ‘abstract ethical 
principles and to impoverished ethical vision that concentrates on rights, obligations and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205The allegory of the cave comes from Plato’s The Republic (2007, VII:VI) in which the prisoner escapes 
from illusion (the flickering shadows of reality on the caves’ walls) to see the world as it is really is. Moving 
from the shadows to the light, from illusion to understanding, to seeing things for what they really are, is a 
painful process, which many do not wish to undertake, finding ignorance preferable and easier. Educating the 
mind is not merely about implanting knowledge. It is about training the mind to have a vision of the good, 
one such vision being the well-governed state. The metaphor of the Sun and The Divided Mind (both Book 
V1), which precede the metaphor of the cave, may be understood as metaphors for intellectual development. 
206Nussbaum wittily cites Nietzsche (from Thus Spoke Zarathustra) to critique Noddings: ‘Blessed are the 
sleepy ones – for they shall soon drop off’. Nussbaum substitutes ‘drop off’ for ‘nod off’ (see fn.88). 
207Rawls’ theory can be criticized for his idealization of agents and their conditions of action, but without the 
idealizations, his theory could be paralysed. See O’ Neill (1996).  
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blame’ (O’Neill, 1996:40).  However, arguably all reasoning is abstract, as are our 
concepts of language, our use of metaphors and mathematics (as I have tried to show 
above) the Arts (consider Cubism, Joyce’s Ulysses, Philip Glass’ music) and so on. 
Reasoning about the ‘good’ and what the good is will also be abstract, including the ‘good 
relational care’ that care ethicists seek to understand and recommend. Reasoning and 
imagining in abstract ways tie us to the world: they are not escape routes taking us beyond 
human territory, but to (sometimes) difficult conceptual or metaphorical realms so as to 
gift us with new vision.  
 
While Rawls used the language of rational choice208 and idealised the individual as rational 
and mutually disinterested, with no knowledge of his individual characteristics, he saw the 
dangers for his theory if critics focussed only on single assumptions about the parties in the 
OP, rather than considering the device as a whole (TJ, 1971:129)209. The combination of 
mutual disinterest and the VoI achieves benevolence because each person in the OP must 
take the good of others into account. The parties are not egoistic or atomistic, as has been 
suggested by Noddings, but (metaphorical) representatives engaged in thinking and 
reasoning on how to achieve a minimally just society. The problem with a Rawlsian view 
is not, as has been supposed, that it stems from primary consideration of one’s own good 
or prospects, or that it is primarily about individual rational calculation of one’s own 
interests. One’s own good and the rational calculation of one’s own interests pertain only 
to the initial situation in order to arrive at principles of justice and to ‘avoid introducing 
controversial ethical elements’ (TJ:12). Further, while they are rational, in a narrowly 
conceived sense, in order to take the ‘most effective means to given ends’ (TJ: 25), 
individual persons do not know their conception of the good, the details of their plan of 
life, or their particular ends and interests. What they do know is that ‘they prefer more 
primary social goods rather than less’ (p.123). While persons in the OP rank their 
preferences according to how well they further their interests, Rawls makes a ‘special 
assumption’: they do not ‘suffer from envy’ (p.124) so long as differences do not exceed 
certain limits and are not based on injustice. Rawls is clear that the OP is a proposition for 
a theory of justice. In real life, humans will be guided by their practical reason. Further, the 
two principles of justice and the principles of obligation and natural duty, ‘require us to 
consider the rights and claims of others’ (p.128). In having a sense of justice, one cannot 
solely be moved by a consideration of one’s own good. Part three of a TJ makes very clear 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208In Justice as Fairness (2001), Rawls considers rational choice to be a serious error if it is taken as the only 
normative idea.  
209See, too, Okin (1989b). 
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the congruence of fairness, goodness, and justice to social values and the good of the 
community.   
Further, if particularists charge that universal theories such as those of Rawls’ begin with 
assumptions of ideal humans, they too must face the charge that they themselves may 
idealise the caring relationship, or the local context, community, norms, values and 
practices. The gritty reality of many women’s and children’s lives is that they are in 
anything but an ideal relationship. Their capacities for love and care are routinely 
exploited. Customs which subordinate women, practices which mutilate their bodies, and 
attitudes that deem it acceptable for women to sacrifice their abilities and skills in favour 
of the family, are far from ideal210. Ordinary social vices such as selfishness, cruelty, 
bullying, torture, and so on, can have devastating emotional consequences that impact 
seriously on people’s capacity to function and flourish, as we have seen, and will continue 
to see with Nancy. The same social structures of family and community can, of course, 
sustain positive social virtues of care, love, respect and friendship, allowing individuals’ 
capacities to develop and function, and lessening their vulnerabilities to misfortune and ill 
health. But we must be alert to these social structures’ corrosive powers when they are, or 
become, deformed and inhere negative attitudes, beliefs and practices towards or about 
those who less powerful. 
 
 
4.7 Rawls’ Moral Theory: Emotions and Moral Development. 
Rawls constructed part three of a Theory of Justice in order that the OP and VoI could 
work successfully, by developing, firstly, a theory of the good to characterise primary 
goods and the interests of the person in the OP; and, secondly, by considering how the 
sentiment of justice could be acquired so as to stabilise justice as fairness in a well-ordered 
society, and to link these sentiments to social values and the good of the community 
(p.347). If families can be taken as akin to ‘miniature social systems’ (Friedman, 
1993:129), with their complex relations of interdependency, distribution of moral, 
emotional and material resources, the extent to which each individual becomes a healthy, 
well-rounded individual, willing and able to contribute to and respect the agency and 
dignity of others, will be reflected in society. Rawls claimed that being a good person is a 
good, and the cultivation of moral sentiment as well as instruction in moral rules is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210See for example, Patemen (1988); Okin (1989a,b, 1994, 2004); Houston (1990); O’Neill (1996); Minnow 
(1997); Kittay (1999, 2002); Nussbaum (1999a,b); Charlesworth and Chinkin (2000); Homiak (2002); 
Hampton (2007); MacKinnon (2006, 2006). Recent reports, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 7, (NSPCC, 2009, 
2011)  reveal how young girls are routinely abused by their boyfriends.  
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important to a just society and for cooperation. This is the first stage of moral 
development. According to Rawls, the second stage concerns the morality of association of 
which there are many types: school, clubs, organisations, institutions of various kinds, the 
neighbourhood and so on. Here the child learns the standards of social conduct from 
parental approval and disapproval, as well as from friends and people in authority. This is 
important preparatory work for the ideals that the child will have as an adult and citizen. In 
her many associations with many different types of people, the child, as she grows, learns 
that other people have different goals and plans, they come from different circumstances 
and backgrounds. The morality of association means that the child and young adult learns 
to take up the perspective of others, developing the intellectual skills to see things from a 
variety of points of view in a complex process culled from speech, conduct, and 
countenance (Rawls, 1971:410). Knowing the beliefs, opinions, desires and motives of 
others helps the young adult to understand and assess the actions and intentions of others, 
and to take up others’ perspective. Of course, being able to take up the perspective of 
another does not necessarily lead to good moral conduct but can, instead, be manipulative 
and exploitative, as we have seen with Nancy. For Rawls, we can acquire moral fellow-
feeling through our attachments to others, through bonds of friendship and trust. These are 
the bases for affiliating well with others211 and the moral motivation becomes that of living 
up to the expectations of one’s family, friends and colleagues, to fair rules and the bonds of 
friendship, sustained by feelings of shame or guilt at the thought of betrayal and sub-
standard behaviour, and feelings of love and affection. Certain emotions, when properly 
cultivated and nourished, act as important constraints to bad conduct such as shame. Other 
emotions, such as love, indignation (a form of anger) and resentment, and attitudes of 
respect, act as positive forces for good moral behaviour. Affection for particular persons 
plays an essential role in the acquisition of morality, and in developing an appropriate ethic 
of care. When care goes wrong, as in Nancy’s situation where there is domestic violence 
and abuse, the orientating role of emotions can go awry because the emotions themselves 
must undergo some transformation if the abused are to cope (they may develop 
maladaptive emotional responses) or the abuser is to justify his actions (by switching off 
compassion, and relying on righteous anger). I will examine these effects in greater detail 
in Chapter 7. 
 
If, however, the care the child receives is morally appropriate and she is able to affiliate 
with others in healthy and respectful ways, we may suppose that there is a ‘morality of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211I shall revisit the concept of affiliation, one of Nussbaum’s 10 central capabilities, in Chapter 7. 
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association … a system cooperation known to be for the advantage of all (Rawls 
1971:413). In order to achieve this state of cooperation, one needs to understand and apply 
rules of moral salience, to engage in some form of deliberative judgement, not always 
consciously or with effort, but lightly sometimes because our sense of what is morally 
appropriate will be so deeply embedded in our natures, provided we have been brought up 
in the right environment. Noddings, recall, does not judge such rules and deliberative 
processes as necessary to her care ethics but the preceding argument has advanced reasons 
why a theory of care should contain moral judgements and deliberative reasoning. Quite 
apart from the danger of Noddings’ own reasoning to women’s wellbeing and entitlements 
to equality and respect, there are situations in which those who have responsibility for care 
cannot reason morally or deliberate on issues of moral salience. Women and children who 
live in adverse conditions, in fear of violence or abuse, will, over time, have reduced 
capacity to reason well and act well in morally appropriate ways. Forced to be hyper-
vigilant around the abuser in order to pre-empt or prepare for potential harm, such women 
and children will develop a capacity for anger and fear, and an underdeveloped or stunted 
capacity for compassion, sympathy or empathy. We have begun to see this in the case of 
Nancy. A study by Tull et al. (2007:581) on the impact of the negative effects on victims 
of childhood violence, found that they had poor emotional regulation as a result of a 
limited awareness of their emotional responses, non-acceptance, and/or negative evaluation 
of and reaction to responses. The study also demonstrated that psychological problems can 
result from unhealthy emotional responses, such as avoiding emotional experiences. 
Reduced functional emotional processing reduces the capacity to read the environment for 
emotional clues (p.584).  
 
Ideally, however, and in complete contrast to the lives of abused women and children, 
when citizens enter Rawls’ OP they have fully defined moral principles and emotions, and 
are sensitive to the feelings and wants of others (p.419): they are neither emotionless nor 
abstract, hyper-rational beings, but beings rooted in relationships and communities, 
socialised so as to have developed moral sentiments and attitudes. Further, having moral 
sentiments, ‘presupposes an understanding and an acceptance of certain principles and an 
ability to judge in accordance with them’ (Rawls, 1972:427). However, that is not to say 
that well brought up, highly socialised children who are emotionally literate have not been 
nurtured to have certain beliefs about the sexes.  
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4.8 Gendered Morality. 
A perspective on morality that uses sound judgement in caring for and nurturing the 
wellbeing of others will be richer and more fulfilling of individual ends if those who care 
have a sense of entitlement to their own legitimate concerns and goals (Hampton, 2007)212. 
How we come to see ourselves, how our expectations are formed over time, are shaped by 
gendered assumptions about our supposed innate natures and hardwired differences which 
begin before birth (Fine 2010)213. Citing studies on preferences and expectations of parents 
about their children, motivations to have a boy or a girl were different. A boy was good for 
playing sport with dad whilst girls were often wanted because of the emotional content and 
intimacy they could offer, and for remembering things like birthdays, leaving Fine to 
comment ‘not yet conceived, and already sons were off the hook for remembering to call 
or send birthday flowers’ (2010:192). Parents, even gender sensitive parents, socialise their 
children into gender roles before they are born. The problem, as Fine sees it, is that our 
actions and judgements do not always stem from ‘reflected, consciously endorsed beliefs 
and values’ (p.193).  
 
If women are socially and culturally moralised to care, to be concerned for relationships 
and to express their emotions, they will likely conform to that behaviour. Men likewise 
will exhibit and conform to behaviours associated with agency, self-assertion and 
independence. So while the reasoning processes of the sexes is more about ‘how we think 
we reason than of how we actually reason’ (Friedman, 1993:125), children will be nurtured 
to develop the skills and capacities that conform to gender stereotypes. But agency need 
not mean that it is masculine, remote from our contingent ends, and free from our personal 
histories, relationships or culture. The ‘fundamental moral equality of agents requires that 
we attend to difference when it affects the capacity for effective agency’ (Herman, 1993: 
206). So a mother’s agency is limited when she has to meet the needs of her family while 
displacing her own, or when she has to appear in public in modest attire, or when she limits 
her interests to what the community deems acceptable. Her autonomy is thus 
circumscribed. Although agency is a condition of both sexes and that is context dependent, 
we can deliberate abstractly and concretely about how much is available to whom and 
why. The focus then, for moral enquiry, becomes how far I acknowledge the agency of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212See also Homiak (2001).  
213See for example, Chodorow (1978); Fausto-Sterling (1992, 2000); Friedman (1993); Fine (2008, 2010a,b) 
and Jordan-Young (2010) on the persistent belief that men and women are different, now aided by what Fine 
(2010) describes as ‘neuro-sexism’: old-fashioned stereotyping given a sheen of scientific credibility. Fine 
suggests that it is not biology that is implacably resistant to equality between the sexes, ‘but our culturally 
attuned minds’ (p.xxix). I return to these themes in Chapter 5.   
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others, how willing I am to allow others to express their agency, and this will reveal the 
extent of my respect for others as ends in themselves. Kant’s categorical imperative 
procedure (CI-p), far from being a device remote from human contingency and real life 
grit, helps us to formulate principles by which to act for the wellbeing for others. 
According to one formula of the CI, to act permissibly is to act on maxims (motives) that 
others, similarly circumstanced, could endorse. Making this claim might seem 
controversial given how the CI is traditionally understood. The CI is apriori, an abstract 
formal principle of an ‘unconditioned ought’ (Herman, 1993:134) that formally assesses 
the permissibility of our actions. The traditional view, based largely on the arguments laid 
out in the GW, is that the CI-procedure is the source of ‘absolute, exceptionless 
prohibitions’ (Herman, 1993:133). However, while Kant asserts, in the GW, that the 
imperatives of duty can be derived from the CI, he does not use the CI-p in the DV (and 
see Herman, 1993, chapter 7). In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant presents a variant 
of the CI, the ‘Typic of pure practical judgement’ (2003: 5:67), as the formal statement by 
which we can ask if our actions are morally permissible or not, as a rule of deliberation. 
Kant’s purpose in the GW, following Herman (1993:134), sought to demonstrate that the 
‘formal principle derived from analysis of the unconditional ought of morality (the CI) is a 
moral principle’ because it can explain the ‘judgements we take to be incontrovertibly 
moral’. The canonic cases of the GW (lying, acting from sympathy, suicide) can be viewed 
as ‘generic’ maxims (Herman, 1993) against which we can test specific examples and ask 
about our motives. Lying for personal gain is universally rejected. Lying to save lives 
might not be so rejected if the motive is respect for the dignity of those to be saved and to 
defy evil in the process. Here we need to know more about the form of the maxim (the act 
and the end for whose sake the act is done).  
As a deliberative procedure then (see O’Neill, 1975 and Herman, 1993) we can apply the 
CI to our situation (Rawls, 2000:167). When we test the permissibility of an action, we do 
so taking the details and textures of our particular situation into account (and see Herman, 
1993:135). Kant, in the second Critique, tells us to ask ‘yourself whether, if the action 
which you propose should take place by a law of nature of which you yourself were a part, 
you could regard it as possible through your will …’ (70). In asking about our action, we 
deliberate about the novel situation and special features of the particular circumstance. We 
ask, further, during the assessment procedure, whether others could endorse what we 
propose to universalise.  
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Kant’s categorical imperative (CI) and the CI-p, far from being remote from human 
contingency and real life grit, help us to formulate principles by which to act for the 
wellbeing for others. According to one formula of the CI, to act permissibly is to act on 
maxims (motives) that others, similarly circumstanced, could endorse (the law of nature). 
According to another, it is to act in such a way that those who are the recipients of your 
actions could endorse your ends (the law of autonomy) and, according to yet another, it is 
to act in such a way that those who are the recipients of your actions could endorse your 
ends. Could Nancy endorse her ill-treatment by her father? Could anyone endorse this 
treatment? If they were moral beings, they could not.  
 
4.9 Concluding Chapter Four. 
Literature abounds with the consequences of gender stereotyping for women. In Unless, 
Reta Winters, a mother confounded by her daughter’s retreat from the world to sit behind a 
placard proclaiming ‘Goodness’, muses that women are either destined to say ‘yes for ever, 
or to lack the power to assert themselves because they are mere incidentals of nature’ 
(Shields, 2002:70).  Having introduced the necessary layers of philosophical consideration 
for an alternative version of care, let us return to Gilligan’s (1982) Amy and Jake. Amy 
seems to exhibit a form of moral immaturity that reveals her uncertainty about her own 
legitimate entitlement to plans and goals if they conflict with others’ plans and goals. 
Where Amy is sensitive to the needs of others, Jake is more confident about his right to act 
independently and to afford himself more time and resources when these conflict with the 
demands of others. Both Amy and Jake exemplify gendered expectations of roles. Amy 
will probably grow up to be a carer, a member of the dominated group; Jake will most 
likely become a member of the dominant group, taking for granted that his interests will 
predominate (Hampton, 2007:8).  
 
Noddings’ (1984) use of the feminine pronoun ‘she’ for the one-caring, and the masculine 
pronoun ‘he’ for the one who is cared-for, describes too well the status quo that exists 
between the sexes. While other-regardingess can have a strong moral component in 
emotions such as compassion and sympathy, and while care is important to a flourishing 
life, concern for others that results in self-abnegation is not a good moral outcome for 
anyone concerned. Noddings’ frequent reference to the ‘she’ who cares for the ‘he’ who is 
cared-for may encourage the belief that this gendered division is acceptable, desirable and 
natural. We can see the effect of this kind of thinking and reasoning in another of 
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Gilligan’s interviewees. This time we have a divorced middle-aged woman, with two 
teenage daughters: 
As a woman, I feel I never understood that I was a person, that I could make 
decisions and I had a right to make decisions. I always felt that that belonged to 
my father or my husband in some way, or church, which was always represented 
by a male clergyman ... and they had much more to say on what I should or 
shouldn’t do. They were really authority figures that I accepted…  I still let things 
happen to me rather than make them happen, than make choices, although I know 
all about choices…I think in one sense there is less responsibility involved…if you 
don’t grow up feeling that you ever have any choices, you don’t have the sense 
that you have emotional responsibility. (1982:67, italics mine) 
 
What I read from this is a woman who has grown up to be dependent on men for her 
choices, a dependency that has infantilised her in some important respects. If the capacity 
for moral reasoning is one of the essences of morality, so too is taking responsibility for 
the choices one makes. However, we do not have to look too far to find ingenious 
arguments that modern educated women still have restricted choices, adhering to their 
traditional roles of care and motherhood214. The danger inherent in some conceptions of 
care, what Card (1988) and Houston (1989) might describe as ‘contingently’ dangerous, 
and Hoagland (1988:104) as ‘necessarily’ dangerous, is that they continue to keep women 
in situations of inferiority. Care, as Gilligan acknowledged, has not been ‘sufficiently 
noted and valued’ (1982:xix). Women take care of men, children and relationships: they 
act as nurturers and caretakers. But men tend to devalue care while depending on it to 
pursue their plans and goals. Concern for relationships is seen as a weakness (Gilligan, 
1982:17) because it may mean that women lack objectivity, warping their judgments 
through sympathies and antipathies, as we saw earlier. So, the private world of the home is 
the appropriate domain of women. By contrast, argue Charlesworth et al. (1991:626), the 
workplace is the natural province of men, a distinction maintained primarily by arguments 
about what is innate to the sexes. The two domains are asymmetrical in power and status, 
generating a distinction in the division of labour. The realm of work has greater value, as it 
is the realm of ambition, success, autonomy and earning potential. The home is where 
routine and dull tasks prevail, demanding very little by way of intellect or the exercise of 
rational faculties. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214See Bloom (1988) in which he attacks feminism and women’s resistance to sex roles as unnatural, 
emasculating men and eroding of the family. For a sustained critique of the book see Nussbaum (1987) at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1987/nov/05/undemocratic-vistas/?page=1, Okin (1989) and 
Faludi (1993). 
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Noddings (2007:225) insists that, contra Houston (1989) and Hoagland (1989), an ethic of 
care does not promote the exploitation of women because it constrains the parties to care. 
The carer is a cared-for and the cared-for does not enjoy unconditional respect. But 
Noddings’ assertions do not seem adequately robust to guard against women’s exploitation 
and abuse. It is women’s dependency and vulnerability, allied with beliefs about sex 
differences and what is it is natural to do and be, that ensures their exploitation. If the 
parties to care are infested with misogynistic, stereotypical views of the sexes’ innate 
capacities, the constraints to care will be easily overcome, if they could stand at all. 
Noddings claims that natural caring requires no moral effort. I have argued that it does, and 
urgently so. 
 
There is a danger, too, in asserting that women speak in a different moral voice from men. 
Perhaps, as MacKinnon (1989:51) argues, women’s moral reasoning is different because it 
is convenient for men to believe that it is. Women are how they are, and think as they do, 
because that is what they have been permitted and encouraged to be and think. Their 
emotional natures too reflect the norms and values of their societies215. Friedman 
(1993:126) persuasively suggests that moralised gender differences persist, in part, because 
of the separation of an ethic of care from an ethic of justice, and because of the conceptual 
limitations of each. One can care for someone without having any feeling for the cared-for, 
caring for a loved one while routinely engaging in cruel practices ‘for her own good’. One 
can care-for someone while suffocating them through excess fear and anxiety for their 
wellbeing. One can care for the family so much that one’s legitimate claims to personhood 
and agency are renounced (or suppressed) for the good of that family. In each case, an 
ethic of justice is important for correcting the moral and ethical imbalances that exist in 
care. If we follow Friedman’s216 view that close relationships are akin to ‘miniature social 
systems’ (p.129), providing, ideally, care and affection, moral, social and emotional 
development, and so on, we can apply the constraints of justice to limit imbalances of 
power, care or distribution of resources. This is of considerable importance in families 
where there are likely to be children of different ages, abilities and capacities, with the 
consequent conflicts of demand and attention, as well as of resources, that differently 
maturing individuals require. Good care is of monumental importance, impacting as it does 
on the life chances of the children within each miniature society. Considerations of each 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215See Syed (2008). 
216I have reservations about Friedman’s analyses of Rawls’ OP and her criticism that it may not disclose 
special duties of justice in close relationships. I understand her doubts but she does not adequately take into 
account Rawls’ (1971) moral development of the child in Part III.  
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member’s fair and equal entitlement, the development of individual capability and 
functioning, take place in a morally complex environment. This environment requires the 
moral practitioners, the parents (and each member depending on age and maturity), to be 
morally discerning, capable of ethical caring and of applying principles of justice both 
impartially and partially, depending on the context and particulars of the case.  
 
There is, as I have shown, some considerable debate as to whether we should apply 
abstract, universal moral principles or an ethic of caring towards a particular person or 
persons that eschews abstraction and universality. Noddings, as noted, dispenses with 
abstract principles, Benhabib prefers particularity, and Gilligan hears gendered division 
between forms of moral reasoning. Both particularity and universality are necessary to 
reasoning about morality, and both impartiality and partiality are required. If my sibling 
engages in practices that demean and hurt my parents, and I challenge her, I do so because 
I ‘consult’, so to speak, the high court of my moral principles asking, impartially if my 
sibling’s conduct is fair or right, and what I should do about it. With principles guiding 
action, the judgement I make will be sensitive to the character of my parents and sister, 
their relational history, and the context in which the negative practices arose if I am 
sensitive to the ‘rules of moral salience’ (Herman, 1996:77). Critics of Kant who argue that 
his philosophy cannot register the importance of caring because of its highly abstract and 
universal nature miss (understandably) the point that moralised rules are ‘neither 
memorised rules nor are they present as mere habits of responses’ (Herman, 1993:26). 
Rather, as Herman (1993:26) argues, ‘moral action can be an arena for self-expression’ 
being constitutive of the particular person and her unique, perhaps even idiosyncratic, 
nature. Respect is due to persons because of their dignity, personhood, vulnerability, worth 
and need, wherever they are situated.  
 
Care ethicists who reject Kantian and Rawlsian forms of reasoning do so from a fear that 
personal attachments will somehow diminish what is good and natural about them if we 
subject them to critical analysis and assess them by impartial moral considerations 
(Noddings, 1982; Slote, 2007). However, as I have argued here, personal relationships can 
be the sites of cruelty, exploitation and other vices. What morality can do for us, as 
Herman (1993:198) suggests, is to ‘detect the fault in a relationship and give reasons not to 
accept the bad relationship’. There is a ‘moral core’, Herman (1993) argues, that 
individuals learn as they as they mature into adulthood, allowing them to ‘identify morally 
significant elements in the situation[s] ... [they] ... encounter’ (p.82). This ‘moral core’ is 
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what Herman terms the ‘rules of moral salience’ mentioned above. When situations lack 
complexity or ambiguity we may not always be aware that we are relying on moral 
principles or rules: we simply apply them without much thought because they have been so 
deeply inculcated and internalized (as in the example of the bicycle rider). These are 
commonplace situations requiring common sense action. When there is a situation of some 
complexity, however, moral reasoning can be taken up. This is crucial. If education is 
about helping individuals develop autonomy, then education is also about providing the 
moral foundations that can be draw upon and modified as the challenges of adulthood are 
encountered. 
 
Nancy, recall, is an abused and neglected child. She cares for her siblings. Her parents are 
incapable of doing so because of violence, drug and alcohol addiction. Her father abuses 
her mother. So far as we know, neither Nancy nor her siblings have been sexually abused. 
However, suppose she tells me, because she trusts me, that she and her sisters have been 
abused, and that the previous evening her uncle made his first move on her. She pleads 
with me to tell nobody because she knows that Social Services will place her and her 
sisters into care, possibly splitting them up. She does not want her mother to be exposed to 
further beatings and she fears what her father might do to all of them if the police and 
Social Services get involved. Nancy is also ashamed, embarrassed and angry, not wanting 
the further stigma of social derision or pity. She has had her fill of both.  
 
How do I react? Am I ‘better’, as Noddings (1984) suggests, to use my ‘intuitive or 
receptive modes’ because this is a situation that is new and ‘baffling’? Do I forego 
abstractions of moral complexity because I prefer, as a woman, to place myself in a 
concrete situation, employing modes of receptivity that are ‘mysterious, internal and 
nonsequential’ (1984:7). Recall that, for Noddings, caring is a form of displacement of 
interest from my own reality to the reality of Nancy. To feel or to see Nancy’s reality is to 
accept that reality as a possibility for me so that I can be moved to help Nancy in some 
way. Recall, too, that while an ethic of care involves judgements about fact and feeling, it 
nevertheless allows for ‘situations and conditions in which judgement (in the impersonal 
logical sense) may properly be put aside in favour of faith and commitment’ (Noddings, 
1984:25). This is because ‘caring is essentially non-rational’ and ‘one of the greatest 
dangers to caring may be premature switching to a rational-objective mode ... of limited 
and particular use’: natural caring requires ‘no moral effort’ (p.26). If I follow Noddings’ 
reasoning and ethic, it is possible that I will cause Nancy harm. Nancy does not need my 
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engrossment. She needs me to act wisely, judiciously and in a reasoned manner. Despite 
the suspicion that Kant would have us consult the rules each time we act, we must appeal 
to an act of judgement for which no rule can be given, ‘for otherwise we would be doomed 
to an infinite regress of rules, never reaching any concrete application of our principles’ 
(Guyer, 1993:8). I doubt Nancy would want me to ‘feel’ to the extent that I am unable to 
take in what I have been told and to assess it carefully (cognitive processes), think 
rationally about what to do with her revelation (next steps, who to contact, what to say to 
Nancy, what justifications can I offer her, how to advise her) or engage in mysterious and 
nonsequential receptive modes, because these could either lead to inaction, or aimless or 
thoughtless action. Consulting abstract moral principles will not add to the dangers that 
Nancy finds herself in but may, in fact, help get her out of, or deal with, a dangerous 
situation. The depth and urgency of Nancy’s needs in her particular situation mean that 
there are no rules to follow but, following Kant, what moral rules can do is to describe 
what our duties are, ‘directing that, in certain circumstances, actions of a certain sort are to 
be done’ (Herman, 1993:27). In Kantian parlance, engaging in acts such as causing harm 
or using someone to further one’s self-interest is impermissible. The motive of duty does 
not mean, as is usually assumed, that we cannot have personal commitments or that we 
cannot prefer those closest to us. We can and we must. Most of our moral obligations arise 
from the relationships we have with our family, friends and acquaintances. I care for 
Nancy, but my care is moral and the actions I eventually take will have moral 
consequences. I will be guided by abstract conceptions of values, right conduct, human 
worth, dignity and respect, the inviolability of the person as an end in her own right. And I 
will be guided by my particular experiences, and/or the experience of fellow professionals, 
to find solutions for a vulnerable young person whose emotional and physical integrity is 
being violated.  
 
In sum, sentiment is not, as Noddings would have it, prior to ethical principles. Neither 
should it be for it would be unstable, crude, and indiscriminate. Sentiment alone, as 
Sherman (1997:134) tells us, can lead to evil, the suppression of agency and to an 
abdication from judgement on what it is morally right to do. Our sentiments, our emotions, 
must be educated as we develop and, in turn, educate our moral character. Emotions are 
important for virtue, but are posterior to morality. Emotions require morality, and are 
secondary to morality. Morality cannot, however, function well without the cultivation of 
emotions (Kant, DV.484-5). Whilst I can empathise with Nancy, I will not be moved to 
action simply because I imagine her reality as a possibility for me. I will be moved to act 
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from moral indignation and respect, as well as from compassion and sympathy, though not 
necessarily empathy which can be morally neutral. Empathy can also find us sympathising 
with the wrong kind of people and the wrong kind of acts, or be overridden by self concern 
when the demands and needs of another person exhaust the motive to help (Batson, 
2011:191). Empathy can be erased, too, by an egoistic impulse (p.191) to avoid the 
feelings of pity or compassion when we see vulnerable people like Nancy, victims of war 
or famine, hear stories of calculated rape217 or read the statistics and effects of poverty.  
 
What can I do for a girl like Nancy? I can care but care, on Noddings’ account, is not 
enough and can take us only a short distance. Care without attention to moral principles 
and the regulative power of reason, without attention to moralised compassion, and a view 
of personhood endorsed by Rawls and Kant, and as outlined here, is not an ethic we should 
endorse. Care, as developed by Noddings, endorses gender stereotypes and supports 
arguments for innate sex differences and these become my central focus in the next 
chapter.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217See for example http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11819732 for one of the most serious cases of sexual 
abuse in recent times with nine men found guilty of raping or harassing a total of 27 girls. 
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Chapter Five: Gendered Emotions. 
 
I see that there’s a whole world of girls and their doings that has been unknown to 
me, and that I can be part of it without making any effort at all. I don’t have to 
keep up with anyone, run as fast, aim as well, make loud explosive noises, decode 
messages, die on cue. I don’t have think about whether I’ve done these things 
well, as well as a boy. All I have to do is sit on the floor and cut frying pans out of 
the Eaton’s catalogue with embroidery scissors, and say I’ve done it badly. It’s 
partly a relief.  (Margaret Atwood, Cat’s Eye, 1990:54) 
 
 
5.1 Introduction. 
Gender, as a social construct, endures. Surmount a long-held conviction about sex 
difference and gender capacity, and both the difference and the capacity gap regroup in 
another field or in another guise. Brain science, and genetics, the modern frontiers of 
science, provide new territories in which to explore and find ‘evidence’ for hardwired sex 
differences, including emotional differences. As yet little understood, the highly complex 
research emerging from these disciplines is being used, argue Kaplan and Rogers (2003), 
to make claims about sex difference. As I shall indicate, these claims are precipitate, and 
any differences that do emerge are minuscule. Such claims are, however, influencing ways 
in which people gender emotions.   
 
Unlike the human beings in whom they reside, genes, hormones, cellular activity are not 
conscious entities: they are not concerned with the business of morality or of what matters 
in human relations or to a good human life218. Nevertheless, genes and other biological 
processes and mechanisms are interpreted and hailed as if they do possess these capacities. 
Neither, surely, need they play a role in how we express our emotions, or in which sex 
should express which emotion, to what degree, in which situation. As I have argued thus 
far, we are rational, autonomous individuals, moving around in a rich, diverse and complex 
social world, and we act on that world as much as the environment acts on us. But just as 
we are constituted by our values, family, friends, education, work, life experience, the care 
we receive and the choices we do or do not make, so we are constituted by gender. 
Because of our brains’ remarkable plasticity, there are endless potentialities for 
behavioural flexibility: we are ‘open in all directions’ (Jordan-Young 2010:87). Such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218In Professions for Women (2003), Virginia Woolf kills her guardian angel who has urged her to employ 
the wiles of the female sex to achieve her desires and hide from society the fact that she is an intelligent 
woman with a mind of her own. Woolf’s guardian angel, her own mental creation, presses her to follow the 
conventions and expectations for women of her society. Kaplan and Rogers (2003) cite this work to make the 
point that it is not Woolf’s genes that are whispering to her to give up writing, but her society’s sanctions and 
norms.  
 
 
150 
openness is available if we have autonomy (self-determination) and agency (what is 
necessary to constitute oneself as the author of one’s actions) but culturally attuned brains 
and beliefs about gender may limit these capacities, investing men and women with those 
qualities that correspond to the ‘facts’ that science tells us about sex difference.  
 
Gender, as one part of our social existence, is a construct of our identity, deeply moulding 
how we see ourselves and others, shaping our goals and aspirations as women and men in 
distinct ways. Gender does not, however, grow directly from genetic or hormonal soil, but 
from the soils of human cultures. Gender is, nonetheless, pursued with zeal and so:  
 
[t]hose distressed by the conjunction of gender sexuality and power will not find 
it easy to reflect on rules encoded in the rules they rely on. (Herman, 2008:118) 
 
New reasons will be sought to continue the status quo and, as scientists such as Kaplan and 
Rogers (2003), Fine (2010a, b) and Eliot (2011) warn us, science itself is being used to 
continue the gendered status quo even in the face of suspect evidence (Kaplan and Rogers, 
2003:3-4). 
 
The social-psychological focus is on gender and gendered emotions, and their expression 
in the home and institutional, including educational, settings. The philosophical focus of 
this chapter is autonomy. This chapter is organised into three sections. In the first section, I 
outline the nature and importance of autonomy to women’s equality, arguing that 
autonomy is essential to resisting exploitation, to having a sense of one’s legitimate claims, 
and for thinking about our gendered roles. Linking autonomy to the complexity of 
emotions, I will suggest that autonomous agents are emotionally complex agents, 
necessarily so because they are enmeshed in diverse relationships. I will also outline the 
threats to autonomy, including those emanating from scientific claims that women are 
predetermined to be compassionate, which destines them to follow their ‘natural’ caring 
mothering roles. Exemplifying the discussion are Margaret Atwood’s Cat’s Eye and 
Nancy. Whilst friendship, I suggest, is important to a good moral life, an external good of 
the utmost importance to eudaimonia, in Cat’s Eye it is disabling and immiserating, for 
instead of encountering conventional narratives about female compassion and relatedness, 
the virtues of friendship and mercy, or loving parent-child relations, we find, in Cat’s Eye, 
oppressive and insidious relational practices. 
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In the second section, I turn to the field of science, specifically to research in neuroscience 
and genetics, in order to explore how gender is being afforded scientific certitude that 
lends potent support to dimorphic (gendered) schema. In the third section, I move to a 
consideration of the empirical research on gendered emotions and roles, demonstrating 
how interpretations of emotional sincerity are influenced by gendered expectations and 
beliefs. We are less likely to trust a person’s sincerity if they transgress gender norms or, 
more specifically, social and professional gendered norms. But emotional expression or 
repression can impact on self-esteem whilst emotional expression can be effective in 
maintaining masculine power. From gendered emotions I move to outline the impact of 
gendered roles on professional mobility and acceptance, considering, for example, ways in 
which gendered expression in the work place can disadvantage women in terms of their 
status, mental and physical health. Finally, I examine whether women are, in fact, more 
empathetic than are men.  
 
 
5.2 Autonomy and Agency. 
In my exploration of women’s experiences, including those of Nancy and Elaine and 
Cordelia from Cat’s Eye, I am driven by the concern that they might struggle with Berlin’s 
very neat summary of autonomy: 
 
to be a subject; not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, 
which are my own …  I wish to be somebody not nobody; a does-deciding, not 
being decided for … that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and 
realising them. (Berlin, 2002:178)   
 
In Cat’s Eye, by Margaret Atwood, 9 year old Elaine is tormented by her best friends 
Grace, Carol and Cordelia. Cordelia begins her insidious torment by trying to improve 
Elaine’s appearance and posture. Carol and Grace collude, always taking instruction from 
Cordelia: they do not act of their own accord219. The abuse is underhand, mute, and rarely 
committed in front of anyone outside the group, effectively isolating Elaine from help and 
insulating the group from censure220. Elaine becomes introverted, frightened and starts to 
self-harm, beginning with her feet, which no-one can see. While Elaine hates what is 
happening to her, she is powerless to refuse Cordelia’s commands or to stand up to her. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219In Kantian speak, Carol and Grace are heteronomous agents, acting at the behest of another, Cordelia, 
rather than at the behest of their own moral laws. See DV.4:433.  
220Relational aggression can take many forms including whispering, gossiping, ostracism, sending nasty texts 
or social network messages, manipulating friendships. It often goes undetected because it is covert: girls hide 
their aggression because it is not usually approved of or seen as fitting for girls (Eliot, 2011:270). Relational 
aggression may also be a bid for power. I return to this in a later section. 
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Cordelia’s power increases as it goes unchecked. ‘Undue humility makes tyranny; weak 
concession creates selfishness’ (Bronte, 2006:169)221. This is a mirror to real life abuse 
processes. 
 
The effects of childhood bullying haunt Elaine all her adult life, colouring her attitude to 
herself, her work, to her lovers and children, above all towards women. She distrusts 
women who:  
 
collect grievances, hold grudges and change shape…they have a certain way of 
wanting me to be and I am not that way. They want to improve me. At times I  
feel defiant: what right have they to tell me what to think? (pp.378-379)  
 
Her attitude towards women, here lesbian women and the feminist movement of the early 
70s, helps explain why Elaine feels only part relief when she joins the world of girls (see 
the epigraph). But there is more to the abuse that Elaine experiences and from which she 
suffers. Cordelia, too, is a victim, enacting her own experiences on Elaine who becomes 
the repository for her own confusion and pain. Cordelia’s personality disintegrates, and she 
becomes prey to truancy, exam failure, overeating and drugs. Does Elaine see this? She 
does, I think. Cordelia reminds Elaine of the holes she used to dig in her back garden: 
 
‘What did you want it for?’, I ask. 
‘… I wanted some place that was all mine, where nobody could bug me. When I 
was little, I used to sit on a chair in the front hall. I used to think that if I kept very 
still and out of the way and didn’t say anything, I would be safe’. 
‘Safe from what?’ I say 
‘Just safe’, she says. ‘When I was really, I guess I used to get into trouble a lot, 
with Daddy. When he would lose his temper. You never knew when he was going 
to do it. “Wipe that smirk of your face” he would say. I used to stand up to him. 
(Elaine, realising the import of what Cordelia has told her, reacts badly and 
refuses to accept the guilt and shame she feels222.) 
A wave of blood goes up to my head … There’s the same flush of shame, of guilt 
and terror, and of cold disgust with myself … I don’t want to know. (abbreviated 
from p.253) 
 
And part of Elaine’s own inability to let go of Cordelia is her shame at not helping her 
when she met her as a young woman, at least for not giving the adult Cordelia the chance 
to explain her behaviour as a nine-year old. The adult Elaine does not want to know what 
Cordelia experienced because, I think, had she known much sooner, her ability to move 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221See p.45, Chapter 1, here. 
222As we will see in Chapter 7, refusing to acknowledge emotions such as guilt, shame or remorse, is a tactic 
used by abusers to avoid moral responsibility and culpability for their acts.  
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around in the world would have been very different: Elaine would have been a freer 
woman. 
 
As a child, Elaine learns to faint to escape her torment and damages her feet to conceal her 
mental pain. Cordelia digs holes she wishes she could hide in and blisters her hands to 
mask her mental anguish. My pupil, Nancy, lashes out, as we know, and she chews her 
fingers. She invents stories to get attention and fantasises that she is not the Nancy 
everyone dislikes. What all three have in common is a longing to escape from their selves, 
their present and their torments and they (fictionally) exist in some deformed state, as 
coerced, manipulated and oppressed creatures, unable to practise what they value deeply 
(in so far as young children or adolescents can) or to choose to be and do. The conditions 
in which Elaine, Cordelia and Nancy are socialised will infect their capacity to form good 
relations, to value the right things in the right way. Their circumstances will deform their 
self-respect, and push them towards oppressive conditions because that is the norm of their 
existence. If they are dominated by the emotions of fear223, shame, anger and disgust, their 
capacity to act according to what they truly value will be undermined, and so might the 
capacities of those for whom they try to care. In experiencing these emotions, the three 
fictional characters may compare themselves to an ideal of their former selves, or what 
they could have been had their choices or circumstances been different. And if their 
emotions and judgements are dismissed as being of no consequence because of their age, 
gender or social standing, they are diminished even further since emotions are fundamental 
expressions of who they are and of what they value. Their autonomy and agency are, and 
may continue to be, compromised: they may, and do, struggle to shape their own life 
course or realise their own individual and unique potential. Additionally, the three girls do 
not care for each other in morally appropriate ways. Autonomy so circumscribed may 
scarcely meet the conditions required for equality, dignity, and self-respect.  
 
Autonomy is the basic condition of being able to determine one’s own goals, plans, values, 
commitments, experiences and so on. It should mean an entitlement to express one’s 
emotions without fear of discrimination, dismissal or disparagement. Autonomy is self-
determination (Friedman,2003:4), self-reflectively endorsed. Expressed in Kantian terms, a 
free will is a fully determining will that is governed by a law that it gives to itself. Free will 
is not occasioned by an alien cause (Korsgaard, 2008:12) and so must be an autonomous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223Too much or inappropriate fear lies at the heart of many common psychiatric problems: self-harm, 
obsessive-compulsive disorders, panic disorders and post-traumatic stress disorders. Fear, as LeDoux 
(1999:130) observes, is a ‘core emotion in psychopathology’. I return to this theme in Chapter 6. 
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will. An agent who chooses or acts in ways that reflect her goals, plans and values, is 
expressing a distinctive self, an autonomous will (GW:4:446-448). Self-reflection may be 
deep or shallow, extensive or narrow, conscious or unconscious, depending on how 
cultivated or habituated are the goals, plan or values of the agent but it is part of autonomy 
because it partly determines behaviour (Friedman, 2003:5). If self-reflection is impeded in 
any way, through fear, manipulation, control or abuse for example, it becomes less 
effective and so, in turn, does autonomy. Autonomy may also be impeded by gender norms 
and by beliefs about biologically determined behaviours. Why self-reflect on one’s role as 
mother, carer or as a person who ought to be compassionate, sympathetic or angry in a 
certain way? In Chapter 4, I outlined concerns with Noddings’ ethic of care, noting it does 
not adequately incorporate concepts such as autonomy. Being ‘suffused’ with joy, being 
‘receptive’ to the other, is all very well, but only if there is also some reasoning about the 
rightness of one’s caring role, about one’s plans and goals, and whether one is situated in 
circumstances that permit autonomy. 
 
Individuals who are unfavoured and lack power, such as Nancy, Elaine and Cordelia, can 
be subject to abuse and made fearful, so reducing their autonomy, at least in certain 
environments, in the school or the family. These are inhibiting conditions which distort, 
though need not totally preclude, the agent’s ability to reflect thoughtfully on her plans, 
goals and values, being forced or coerced to choose and act in ways that are not in accord 
with the unique person she is or would like to be. Nancy, Elaine and Cordelia, along with 
their mothers (see below) as carers, are, to varying degrees and for different reasons, not 
always able to be the unique individuals they would like to be, or even to be 
‘efficacious’224 in their private and public worlds. Conforming to gender roles, including 
caring roles, may also have this impact on their efficacy, as I shall indicate.  
 
As autonomy is an expression of what matters deeply to the agent (Friedman, 2003:7), it is 
also important to agency and to emotional wellbeing. What matters and to what degree 
may change over time, fluctuating as new situations or moral concerns confront the agent. 
How the agent reacts to external circumstances, what capacities she has to judge and act, 
reflect and issue from her stable of values, concerns and commitments, and the degree of 
autonomy she can exercise. Whatever these capacities and values, and they develop as a 
result of socialisation processes and her connections to her family, friends and community, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224Efficacious in the Kantian sense of using instrumental reason to bring about certain states of affairs that the 
agent desires, but which are also universalisable in the sense of being acts that other rational agents could 
endorse as permissible. See Korsgaard’s (2008) Introduction on the principles which constitute the agent. 
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they should, ideally, be self-reflectively chosen, valued, evaluated and re-evaluated225. 
Friedman (2003:12) argues, reasonably, that perspective, orientation, attitude and outlook 
ground the agent’s autonomy, and are constitutive of the practical, self-reflective agent. If 
the agent is defined by or welded to and categorised by beliefs, practices and norms not her 
own, or not freely or reflectively chosen, that agent’s autonomy is weakened. An obvious 
objection to such an account is to question how we can know what our values, wishes, 
commitments, goals and plans really are given that we are socialised beings. Indeed, how 
can we meaningfully speak of autonomy if our actions, preferences and tastes are 
biologically or neurologically determined? A woman who is brought up to conform to her 
biological destiny of being a mother, a carer, to be more compassionate than men, to be 
unsuited to competition and aggression, cannot really be autonomous: rather, she is 
heteronomous. She is a determined being acting at the behest of alien forces that are 
internal (her genes and hardwired feminine brain) and external (her family, community, 
society). But what happens to women’s perspectives, orientations and attitudes when they 
are exposed to new ideas, presented with alternative interpretations to what is seemingly 
irrefutable? The general point I wish to make is that neither biological destiny nor social 
norms are fixed. We all have the capacity to do and to be in more diverse ways than we 
have been socialised to expect. That is, as human beings we have access to, by means of 
our ability to reason, ‘possibilities for enlarged competences’ (Herman, 2008:80) enabling 
us to choose from an acceptable range of choices. However, these competences are often 
denied to women on account of their caring role and assumed emotional simplicity. In the 
brief account I provided on Nancy, Elaine and Cordelia’s circumstances, it is clear that the 
competences of the girls were reduced in varying ways. Nancy struggles on so many 
fronts. Elaine distrusts women and herself. Cordelia resorts to drugs and alcohol, never 
making use of her talents before she commits suicide.  
 
If we place Nancy and Atwood’s girls, carers, and oppressed women (the girls’ mothers) 
within Isaiah Berlin’s conception of autonomy, to what extent are they subjects, not 
objects, moved by reasons and conscious purposes which are their own? The girls, as they 
grow into maturity, will continue to act in ways that are contrary to what they really want 
to do and to be, feeling ambivalent about who they are as individuals and how to realise 
their individuality. This kind of ambivalence can be seen in the real world, with mothers, 
for example. In Asher’s (2011) study on motherhood and equality, the mothers she 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225I acknowledge, with thanks again to David Carr, that a communitarian might question the extent to which 
goals or values can really be self-chosen. 
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interviewed said they had freely chosen to become pregnant. They were supported by their 
husbands and by their health institutions, and, to varying degrees, by social welfare and 
employment laws. However, it became more difficult for mothers to remain subjects, self-
deciders and doers, realisers of their own plans and goals when their babies were so needy. 
Many did the bulk of the caring work and the majority gave up their jobs or took maternity 
leave. While they found being a mother a joyous experience, they also felt frustration and 
doubt when they realised the extent to which motherhood and domestic chores eroded their 
autonomy, their plans and goals and their sense of being a self. Women in these 
circumstances might be seen as ‘ambivalently’ autonomous (Friedman, 2006:14), 
particularly as women (and men) who wish to have families do not often have viable 
choices about whether to work or not. Institutional structures are organised in ways that 
can limit such choices: tax breaks, child care, health care structures, discrimination against 
mothers, flexible working time and partner support. When we factor in gender stereotypes 
and beliefs about gender, opportunities for autonomy become even more complex for both 
sexes, though in different ways, as I will show below.  
 
While there are objections to autonomy, as conceived, for example, by Butler (1990), 
Dennett (1991) and Sandel (1996), I will not discuss these here as they are not germane to 
my general argument226. One objection does, however, remain relevant, following from 
some of the criticisms of the ‘masculinity’ of justice claims and liberal moral theory I 
made in Chapter 4 with regard to Noddings’ (1984) theory of care. The view that 
autonomy is too individualistic, rational, abstract and self-maximising and that 
autonomous agents are in danger of being too self-sufficient and removed from meaningful 
relationships, needs further attention. What matters, as noted in the previous chapter, is 
what kind of ‘individualism’ one has in mind. If all that the self-maximising agent is 
concerned with is gain at the expense of others, then her actions are morally suspect. If the 
autonomous agent does not take care of the relationships for which she is responsible, she 
is, again, morally suspect. An agent who disconnects herself from others or destroys 
relationships in the pursuit of self-interest is likely to encounter loneliness and scenes of 
wrecked relationships, bodies or minds. Whether these outcomes matter or not to the agent 
will be a variable of the agent’s moral literacy. The danger, on the other side, of 
relinquishing autonomy for the sake of intimate relations, is that an agent may fail to be a 
‘tenacious advocate’ (Hampton, 2007:29) of herself, setting few ends of her own because 
she is so instrumental to achieving the ends of others. This is the position of very many 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226See Friedman (2003) for further discussion. 
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women, who, in conforming to the beliefs and demands of their gender role, are vulnerable 
to inequality, weak self-assertion and exploitation. 
 
Further, as I argued in Chapter 4, excessive individualism is not a prerequisite to achieving 
autonomy because autonomous beings, as I have described them here, are social beings, 
mothers and fathers, who develop their wants, wishes, plans, goals and values in social 
relations with others. Neither is autonomy about the separation of reason from emotion, as 
some theorists would claim. Let me reiterate: emotions can be rational and they can give us 
reasons to act, though these need not be good reasons. Autonomous agents are rational 
agents who experience emotions that will be influenced by their personality, up-bringing 
and social context. A mother (or father) who chooses or acts in ways that reflect her goals, 
plans and values, is expressing a distinctive self, an autonomous will, while she loves and 
nourishes her children, partner and friends. Autonomy is an expression of what matters 
deeply to the agent, and we can assume that what matters deeply to a mother is that her 
children, partner and friends are happy and well cared-for. However, it may also matter 
that she can pursue her own goals and plans, to the extent that domestic, social and 
institutional structures will allow. There will, however, be limitations to her autonomy 
resulting from gender and asymmetries of power.  
 
Criticisms of autonomy also suggest, as we saw in the previous chapter, that autonomy is a 
masculine, rather than a feminine, aspiration and ideal state. However, not to claim 
autonomy for women is, as noted, hazardous for gender equality: failing to claim 
autonomy serves to sustain a gendered division. This is because, as Kittay (1998:84) has 
argued, ‘gender identity formation and women’s subordination are intimately entwined, 
and women’s mothering is the linchpin in the complex’. Gendered selfhood begins in early 
childhood (Chodorow, 1978; Kittay, 1988). The primary caretakers for (almost) all 
children are women. Girls learn that they, in their turn, will become female caretakers. 
They will separate from the mother so as to be like her in the ‘reproduction of 
mothering’227 but they will be less differentiated or separated from their mothers than boys, 
remaining enmeshed and defined by their close and personal relationships. Boys tend to 
define their personalities by radically differentiating and separating themselves from their 
mothers, to forge distinct identities that are anchored to independence and autonomy. The 
emotionality of nurturing and rearing, these very messy domains in which empathy, 
compassion, love, and pain prevail and suffuse relations, is where women will remain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227Chodorow’s term and title of her (1978) acclaimed book. 
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entangled, apparently hard-wired to their predetermined role. Men, on the other hand, 
escape to the domains of cool objectivity, calm assessment, and rational self-pursuit. 
Middle class and wealthy women are more likely to achieve autonomy because they can 
transfer some of the responsibility and the burden of care to, usually, poor or ill-situated 
women228. But even these wealthy women will be responsible for looking for suitable care, 
and then ensuring that the care work is carried out to a good standard.  
 
Why do men and women pursue these different domains? According to Baron-Cohen 
(2003a:1), a widely cited and highly influential neuro-scientist: ‘The female brain is 
predominantly hard-wired for empathy. The male brain is predominantly hard-wired for 
understanding and building systems’, an essential difference he traces to foetal testosterone 
exposure (I will return to this in the next section). Gender capacity is linked to testosterone, 
the ‘male’ hormone, taking us a little further from when our gender was fixed at ‘gestation’ 
to uterine chemical forces now imbuing us with those male capacities. However, Jordan-
Young (2010) cites a variety of studies which contradict these findings, concluding that 
studies of prenatal hormones and sex-typed behaviour yield significantly different results 
across different study populations making it difficult to claim cohesive evidence for any 
aspect of sex-typed behaviour (2010:87). What deterministic conclusions seem to bypass is 
that, because human beings are ‘open in all directions’, emotionally, morally and 
intellectually, we have a rich capacity to develop in diverse ways, depending on our goals, 
values, commitments and beliefs, our freedom to be and to do. These capacities are 
important constituents of our autonomy (self-determined) and agency (what is necessary to 
constitute oneself as the author of one’s actions) as I have already argued. If either sex is 
limited in the range of emotions available to them, because of scientific ‘evidence’ of 
hardwired emotional capacity, or related assumptions of appropriate gendered expression, 
then neither sex can be said to be completely autonomous. To do emotion, Shields 
(2002:170) suggests, is to do gender. Men have emotions; women are emotional (p.171). 
Men get angry; women get mad. But when women do get mad, accusations of emotionality 
control what is significant, or not, about the legitimacy of their felt injustices (Campbell, 
1994:57). Dismissing the anger of disadvantaged groups such as women, young girls like 
Nancy or Elaine, impoverishes them further by bringing them below the threshold of 
equality, below the do-doing levels of autonomy. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228Kittay (1999) discusses the elusive nature of equality for women. Men, she notes, rarely share the 
responsibilities of dependency work, and rarely is the distribution of dependency work an issue of political 
discussion. That situation pertains in the UK. 
 
 
159 
Women’s traditional roles as providers of care, nurture, sympathy, compassion and love, 
and their willingness to give up their careers and interests for the sake of those they love, 
are very convenient for those left free to pursue their own goals and plans, preserving their 
agency and autonomy as a result. Compassion and empathy are good emotional capacities 
for women helping them in their caretaking role which, if we go along with Baron-Cohen, 
we are hard-wired to fulfil. There is an assumption that empathy is a ‘good’ capacity 
because we put ourselves in the shoes of another. But, as I have suggested, empathy can go 
wrong. Women’s sacrificial tendencies, especially towards their children, partners and 
close relations, and the cultural norms which deem these tendencies to be highly desirable 
characteristics of womanhood and femininity, are exemplary of a vicarious tendency in 
which one is so consumed by the other’s situation that one’s own needs are dismissed as 
unimportant. To return to the earlier point of reproducing mothering, children who observe 
their mothers’ ‘saintly’ and ‘devoted’ behaviours are learning about the ‘permissibility of 
their own exploitation by submitting to, and even supporting, their subservient role’ 
(Hampton, 2007:53). Abused women, tend to have heightened sensitivity to the needs of 
their partners, anticipating their wants and desires in order to minimize opportunities for 
violence and aggression (Friedman, 2003:142). While they are preoccupied with strategies 
of survival and security, particularly for their children, such women cannot attend to their 
own needs and wants. Their adaptive strategies against violence may include deference, 
passivity and appeasement. Abused women, as a consequence, may struggle to be ‘do-
deciders’; they are acted on by alien wills, who govern all aspects of their existence. As I 
argued in the last chapter, some accounts of care ethics may also mean that women who 
care may struggle to be ‘do-deciders’ because of their approbation of selflessness and the 
risk that poses in turning the ‘pathologies of women’s lives into virtues’ (Nussbaum, 
1999a:76). This is why I spent some time arguing for care to be supported and understood 
from an alternative, liberal, philosophical platform. I claimed, too, that an ethics of care 
ought to be theorized with respect to the emotions and concepts such as autonomy, agency, 
respect of the intrinsic worth of the individual, and it ought not to rest on assumptions of 
what it right and natural for person to be. Care ethics ought to vigorously challenge the 
division of gendered labour and emotions. 
 
To help provide some insight into how autonomy can be circumscribed and why both 
autonomy and a theory of emotions are essential to an ethic of care, let us return to the 
subtlety and complexity of emotions I referred to in Chapters 1-3. Complex emotions, I 
argued, such as envy and compassion, develop in social relations with others. They 
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express, further, concern about our own and others’ attitudes, and, if properly cultivated 
over time, emotions are morally appropriate evaluations of people and their acts. That is, 
our desires, beliefs, wishes and so on, are essential to social and moral development. 
Autonomous agents, therefore, contra claims of ultra rationality, atomism, and excessive 
individualism, will have complex emotions and desires, beliefs and wishes. Emotions such 
as compassion, I also argued, are crucial for the development of complex social 
relationships and for a moral standpoint (Ben-Ze’ev, 2001) and they are, in turn, essential 
for good care. If we cannot imagine other agents suffering joy or pain then we cannot 
imagine them having moral rights and responsibilities, and we will care less. This is why, 
for example, the fictional pupils of Nancy’s world and Elaine’s friends cannot see their 
pain or distress, trampling so easily on their right to live free from stress and worry. The 
girls are not seen as emotionally complex individuals: they are either angry or sullen. 
Cordelia, manipulative and calculating, is more outwardly emotional, but she is morally 
obtuse, perhaps in part because of her need to exercise the power she lacks at home, to 
subrogate Cordelia for her father whose abuse she is powerless to resist. Cordelia’s 
bullying is both a re-enactment of her own treatment and an attempt at self-assertion and 
some form of autonomy: she wants to be a somebody, even if a deformed somebody. As 
Elaine observes of paternal power: ‘Darkness brings home the fathers, with their real, 
unspeakable power’ while ‘daytime is ruled by mothers’ (p.164) but the daytime rulers fail 
to see and act on their daughters’ unhappiness or to check their husbands’ power.  
 
Their mothers fail, I suggest, because their role is to be subservient to their husbands. 
Atwood’s mothers police their children, controlling them with the threat of their fathers if 
they do not conform to domestic and social rules, and because they themselves are 
frightened of their husbands’ powers. Their other role is to be caring and loving. But caring 
work is not seen as emotionally complex work but routine and monotonous, rarely calling 
upon the capacity to choose, decide, judge or discriminate229. Empathy is ‘simply’ 
imagining what another is feeling, and if one knows one’s husband and children, then very 
little thought is required. This kind of work is, also, women’s work and not valued as much 
as that of non-caring work. If, further, emotions have no thought, and are merely 
suffusions of feeling, as Noddings’ asserts, reason has very little place in care work.  The 
capacities essential for autonomy, such as critical self-reflection, reasoning and moral 
literacy, being able to determine one’s own goals and plans, are not fully available to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229On the importance of reason, justice and moral literacy in the private sphere and intimate relations, see, for 
example, Kittay and Meyers (1989); Okin (1989); Sherman (1989); Friedman (1994); Herman (1996, 2008); 
Nussbaum (1999a); Houston (2002); Baier (2010).  
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mothers of Nancy, Elaine and Cordelia, or to Noddings’ carers. This is also why abusive 
men can erase their intimate partner’s identities, and justify their abuse to (I will return to 
this topic in Chapter 7). It is also, presumably, why Nancy and abused women can be so 
neglected at home: they are not emotionally or morally complex beings.  
 
If one aspect of autonomy is the capacity to judge and to be motivated by deliberative 
moral principles, then the ‘empirical realisation [of autonomy] is a function of well-formed 
values and evaluative skills’ (Herman, 2008:128). If Nancy spends a lot of her time 
resisting taunts and neglect, protecting herself against this malice, it is hard to see where 
she will find the space, in her hostile world, to acquire the skills for good deliberation, to 
become morally literate, or to express meaningful autonomy and agency. To be 
autonomous is to have and to develop cultivated emotions along with intellectual and 
moral capacities that are responsive to, and evaluative of, one’s own goals, plans, values, 
commitments, and so on. Being aware of one’s own separateness and the separateness of 
the other is also important to a sense of autonomy, and to emotional wellbeing. Otherwise, 
one’s emotional repertoire may be contingent and unstable, being only lightly tethered to 
one’s own genuinely authored constitution. We can begin to imagine, then, how care can 
go wrong, stunting the capacities of the cared-for if the carer cannot, or will not, see the 
other as a person of value, worth and dignity, or as someone who has the capacity for 
emotional complexity. We can also begin to imagine how care can go wrong, stunting the 
capacities of the carer if she cannot, or will not, see herself as a person of value, worth and 
dignity, or as someone who has the capacity for emotional complexity. And we can also 
see how care can go wrong if a parent simply cannot, will not, or is not allowed to care for 
her children because she is frightened, full of anxiety or traumatised by violence (the 
theme of Chapter 7). Cultivating the requisite habits of feeling toward any human being in 
need requires ‘a sensitivity to the needs of others that involves a whole pattern of 
emotional and psychological engagement’ (Cottingham, 2000:312). If emotions are rich 
intelligent complexes and if we hold that an ethical life derives from ‘deep structural traits 
of our character and personality,’ then to live a caring life will depend upon the cultivation 
of emotional sensibilities (Cottingham, 2000:312-313). For Noddings, caring is ‘the very 
bedrock of all successful education’ (1992:27) and ‘the primary aim of moral education is 
to produce people who will engage successfully in caring relations’ (2010:394). But if we 
do not understand how to care in emotionally appropriate ways, then it may be difficult to 
achieve good care in schools.  
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Noddings (1984) may or may not believe in the innate capacities of the sexes, but, as 
noted, she does tend to refer to the carer as ‘she’ and the cared-for as ‘he’. I will now turn 
to ways in which gendered emotional capacity is supported by science which tends to be 
trusted, taken to be authoritative and hard to challenge, not least because of the complex, 
esoteric nature of genetic science, cognitive neuroscience or cellular biology. These are the 
frontiers of science where there are hopes to reveal the human being and her nature gene 
by gene and nerve by nerve, or so it seems. 
 
 
5.3 The Context for Gender Differences: The Field of Science. 
I have argued that individual beliefs, norms and expectations can circumscribe, or promote, 
the capacity for autonomy, and the capacity to do and to be. Gender, as I have also argued, 
is a stubbornly persistent way in which the capacity for autonomy can be circumscribed. 
Sex is irrefutable biological difference, while gender is the ineluctable expression of that 
difference. Interestingly, sex, in some important ways, can be seen as an effect of gender: 
the desire, perhaps the need, to confirm the truth of gender by finding the proof of its 
naturalness in sex difference230.  
 
On Kaplan and Rogers’ (2003:20-21) analyses, one way to understand how such 
differences are constructed, maintained and then supported with ‘proof’, is to consider a 
hierarchy of orders of analyses that corresponds to physics, chemistry, biology, psychology 
and sociology, each level rising in complexity, from the first to the last. Notably 
philosophy does not make the list. It is possible to discuss behaviour at the level of the 
gene231 but that would yield only incomplete and oversimplified explanations. At higher 
levels of complexity, understanding behaviour involves the whole individual interacting 
with her social environment. At birth, the brain is incomplete. It does not have a sex232 
although some persist in arguing the contrary233. Many of the connections between the 
nerve cells and other parts of the body are tentative, as with sex, requiring some 
environmental stimulation to become permanent, as with gender. The brain is hardened in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230This is complex but, for example, babies born with indeterminate genitalia, that is without gender-specific 
physical sexual characteristics, tend to be, very quickly, ‘sexed’ so as to be able to conform to a gender type.  
See Fausto-Sterling (2000). 
231The term ‘gene’ is ambiguous. The definition will change depending on what aspect of heredity is being 
researched (Balaban, 2003:299). To add to this complexity, ‘development’ has many layers. This is, in turn, 
complicated by DNA which, contrary to popular belief, is ‘not easily translated into developmental or 
functional information’ (p.300). Arguing for the innateness of sex is, at best, highly dubious. 
232Fausto-Sterling (1992,2000); Fine (2008,2010a,b); Elliot (2010).  
233Pinker (2002); Baron-Cohen (2003a,b); Gurian (2004); Gurian and Stevens (2005); Lai et al. (2012).  
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the first three years of life (and so with gender) and whilst it continues to harden in the first 
decade (Fausto-Sterling, 2000:240), it is not completely fixed then but continues to 
develop and change throughout our lives, as do we, though notions of gender tend to be 
well and truly fixed by the time we are adults. The plasticity of the brain, argues Fausto-
Sterling (2000), makes it plausible that the body can incorporate gender-related 
experiences throughout life. The point of this is that gender is not fixed biologically: much 
of the work for that is done by society. In other words, gender is a ‘situated 
accomplishment’ (West and Fenstermaker 1995:21) based on social interaction at all levels 
of society in complex ways that reinforce beliefs about the naturalness and inevitability of 
gender and sex difference.  
The intricate multiplicities at work at the societal level can be captured by the complexity 
of trying to understand the operations of the central nervous system: 
 
The true nature of the central nervous system has eluded investigators because of 
its fully integrated, constantly changing structure and a symphony of chemical 
mediators. Each sensation, thought, feeling, movement and social interaction 
changes the structure and function of the brain. The mere presence of another 
living organism can have profound effects on the mind and body. (Arnstein, 
1997:179, cited in Fausto-Sterling, 2000:242) 
 
The pliancy of the central nervous system should be warning enough that we ought to be 
cautious about what we can claim as ‘truth’ or evidence of timeless nature. Although 
nothing should be taken as permanently fixed, our bodies are used to confirm and 
incorporate what science tells us is the case.  
 
There are complex forces at work in the construction of something so fine, so intricate and 
so formidably complex, as the central nervous system (CNS), without which our organism 
could not function, let alone exist. The CNS, comprising the brain and spinal chord, is a 
complex whole, highly complex in its particulars as research on the corpus callosum, an 
area of nerve fibres that straddle the left and right hemisphere of the brain, reveals. 
However, Fausto-Sterling (2000:117) notes that complexity does not inhibit researchers or 
media correspondents from making reductivist, deterministic and rather outlandish claims 
that the corpus callosum could explain all physiological and social differences between the 
sexes. The debate on the corpus callosum (hereafter CC) began in 1982, based on a 
preliminary study of just nine males and five females, and concluding that the CC could 
explain certain gender differences, such as visuospatial functions. Further claims were 
made that the CC could explain all of the following: women’s greater intuition (Time 
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magazine); inborn sex differences in mathematics (Brain and Cognition, 1994); why girls 
are less likely than boys to take physics and engineering (Elle); why women have stronger 
verbal skills (The Boston Globe), and that women think holistically because they are in 
touch with the rationality of the left hemisphere and the emotions of the right hemisphere 
simultaneously (Newsweek)234. The latter claim was rather unusual, because, as we have 
seen, the two are mutually exclusive on some accounts but, if we follow this line of 
reasoning, women are both rational and emotional.  
 
If we accept such claims as these it follows that there will be no point in, for example, 
encouraging girls to take up maths, sciences or engineering because they are not hard-
wired for these professions. Neither will there be any point in encouraging boys to be 
caring and compassionate or in persuading girls that their choices to do and to be are equal 
to the choices of boys. The issue is, of course, that these ‘differences’ are not hard wired, 
and neither are they to be found in the CC which is far from being a structure that can be 
so reduced as to offer simplistic causal explanations of sex difference. The data on which 
some of the claims I described above are based come from the size and shape of the CC. 
However, the size and shape of the CC are so irregular and complex that it is very difficult 
to get accurate measurements of this structure. Do these difficulties, along with differences 
in research methodologies, techniques and measurements, or attention to the different part 
of the CC, deter some scientists from making claims about sex difference, or at least 
encourage some concurrence that there are none? It seems not, according to Fausto-
Sterling (2000:126), who bases her research on the particular problem of the CC 
methodology, techniques and measurements in a study of thirty-four scientific papers 
published between 1982 and 1997. Drawn from studies of the CC, researchers in Fausto-
Sterling’s study drew conclusions about size, function, changes in age, sex, gender, 
depending on the statistical approach to difference, including within and between group 
variation. Can researchers ‘know’ for sure about sex differences, if there are any, 
emanating from the CC, or indeed any part of the human body? Our response will depend 
on what we understand ‘know’ to mean. The epistemological bases of CC research differ, 
as I have suggested, so there is no single, unified ‘know’ in this sense. Further, the 
questions the researchers want to ask, which ones they will abandon or set aside as the 
research progresses, which data will be selected for further investigation, how the research 
is linked to their research or funding communities, and, indeed, the communities of beliefs, 
norms, values and so on, to which all researchers belong, all add to the epistemological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234These examples are cited in Fausto-Sterling (2000:116-117). 
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complexity of ‘knowing’. Caution is, however, necessarily apposite with respect to these 
so-called ‘scientific’ claims about sex difference and gender. 
  
The CC, along with other mechanisms, functions and parts of the body, acts as ‘fly paper’ 
(Fausto-Sterling, 2000:119) for hopes, wishes, beliefs and certainties of sex and gender 
differences, trapping whatever happens to fly past it. Nelly Oudshoorn235 (1994:16-17) 
argues that early 20th century endocrinologists sought, created tests for, and classified sex 
hormones according to pre-existing beliefs about sex differences, and preconceived ideas 
about masculinity and femininity, for which the androgens, sex hormones, were the 
‘chemical messengers’. Scientists, determined to find causes for sex difference in 
specifically male (testosterone) and female (oestrogen) androgens, had some difficulty 
with research that showed that males and females produce and use these hormones, not 
only for sex reproduction and development, but for a wide variety of functions such as 
liver function, bone growth, blood cell formation and carbohydrate metabolism (Jordan-
Young, 2011:24). These hormones affect organs throughout the body, and are not specific 
to either sex236. To complicate matters further, male and female hormones come in several 
molecular varieties, as a family of chemically related compounds with similar biological 
properties (Fausto-Sterling, 2000:181-182): the hormones are but two amongst many. 
Although the term ‘sex-hormone’ is utterly inaccurate for what are multi-site chemical 
growth regulators, the label endures, and many of us have little idea that these chemicals 
have a function beyond sex, or that they have no sex at all. Gender is chemical even while 
there is no clear-cut source of hormonal sex difference. Sex hormone research has been 
profitable, however, for pharmaceutical companies who manufacture oestrogen and 
progesterone based medicines for contraceptives, post-menopausal women and agricultural 
livestock. It is also convenient to label hormones as packages of sex because that fits with 
our dualistic systems of gender. Such dualisms, on Plumwood’s (1993:43) analysis, consist 
of, for example: 
 
Reason-male-mind-master-freedom-human-civilised-production-self 
Nature-female-body-slave-necessity-nature-primitive-reproduction-other   
 
The dualisms map onto each other and are interdependent, Plumwood (1993) claims, 
shaping the identity of each side, while interdependency is denied or kept invisible. Care, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235For the history of how sex hormones became gendered see Fausto-Sterling (2000); Oudshoorn (1994); 
Jordan-Young (2011). These writers draw on extensive research for how and why hormones have become 
strongly associated with sex, and thence gender.  
236See also Fausto-Sterling (2000). 
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as we saw in the previous chapter, maps onto this picture very well. Cultures, be they 
scientific, political, media, or social, absorb such dualisms ‘as a store of weapons which 
can be mined, refined, and redeployed’ (Plumwood, 2003:43). Scientists often cannot see 
the belief systems weaving their way into their work, and so ‘they labour with partial 
sight… Gender and science form a system that operates as a single unit…’ (Fausto-
Sterling, 2000:194). 
 
Another popular flypaper for ‘proof’ of sex difference is neuroendocrinology, from which 
we learn that early exposure to different ‘sex’ hormones apparently results in sexed 
brains237. Lise Elliot, a biologist studying the plasticity of the brain, has made an 
exhaustive study of the research into differences between the sexes’ brains and concluded 
that there are only two facts that have been reliably proven so far. The first is that boys’ 
brains are bigger than girls by between 8 and 11 percent, a difference reflecting the height 
and weight differential of boys and girls. The second reliable finding is that girls’ brains 
finish growing about one to two years earlier than the brains of boys, reflecting the 
different maturation rates of the sexes, with girls entering into puberty a year or two before 
boys. So the brains of boys and girls are very similar and less sexually differentiated than 
those of adult men and women (Elliot, 2001:5). Nevertheless, the belief that the brain is 
sexed is still widespread and popularly accepted. Women’s brains, argues Brizendine 
(2006), have unique capacities, including verbal dexterity, the ability to form deep bonds 
of friendship and the capacity to read for emotions and states of minds, talents which men 
lack238. But the evidence for these differences comes from studies of adult men and women 
(Eliot, 2011:9). How can we be certain that such differences have not arisen from years of 
inculcation and nourishment from gendered stereotyping? Given the plasticity of the brain, 
the influence of epigenetic factors on the human brain, it is highly likely that these 
differences are not innate, solely biologically determined or fixed. For example, out of 124 
extensively studied psychological traits that show sex difference, such as moral reasoning, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237See Fausto-Sterling (1992, 2000); Fine (2010a,b); Jordan-Young (2010); Eliot (2011) for good critiques of 
this research and its doubtful claims for hormonal influences on sexing the brain.  
238Brizendine claims that female foetuses grow more neural connections in the brain male foetuses. However, 
there is little, if any, credible scientific evidence to support these claims. See Fine (2010a: 259, fn.3.) In a 
review of the book, Jordan-Young and Balaban (2006) wrote that the Female Brain failed to meet ‘even the 
most basic standards of scientific accuracy and balance’, and was ‘riddled with errors’ (p.634). The problem 
with explanations of sex differences ‘is not that they are overly biological, but that they are fundamentally 
non-biological and explain nothing’ (p.364). Mark Liberman, a linguist, has also criticized Brizendine for her 
lack of relevant scientific sources and her claims about female communication skills. See 
http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/004370.html. Liberman also debunks Leonard Sax’s 
(2006) claims (along with many others who misuse science) criticising him for over-interpretation and over-
generalisation of cognitive science research, see 
http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/003284.html.  
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aggression and a range of academic skills, psychologist Janet Hyde (2005, cited in Eliot, 
2011:13) could only find 96 different traits and these fell in the small-difference range, 
with d values239 of less than 0.35. Where there are extremes between the sexes, such as in 
ADHD and dyslexia (which affect males more than females), or performance in 
mathematics, in which men, generally, do better than women, (or so it seems240) these 
make the headlines: the values which show similarities do not (Eliot, 2011).  
 
Claims about male and female capacity, in whatever field, have consequences for men and 
women’s ability to pursue their innate talents and achieve autonomy. Neuroscience is 
being ‘insidiously misused’ (Eliot, 2011:9), influencing how we see ourselves as 
individuals with gendered identities and changing the way boys and girls are educated. 
Exemplifying this, Pinker (2002) confidently asserts that ‘women experience basic 
emotions more intensely, except anger’, they feel more empathy towards friends, smile and 
laugh more often (p.345) and he continues: ‘Learning and socialisation can affect the 
microstructure and functioning of the human brain of course, but probably not the size of 
its visible anatomical structures’ (p.345). How do these anatomical structures affect 
behaviour? Research suggests that the amygdala, to which Pinker is referring, is larger in 
men than in women, and that it is important for sexual arousal in men but not in women 
(Eliot, 2011:290-291). However, both sexes experience arousal, and brain growth is 
unaffected by puberty, as are core personalities and cognitive development. That men are 
taller than women generally is no indication of cognitive capacity, individual talent, skill or 
potential or emotional capacities.  
 
Science, allied with beliefs about gender, remains, nonetheless, a potent dimorphic schema 
that can influence, quite profoundly, how we perceive our status, attributes, and behaviour, 
both actual and imagined. There is a plethora of research, for example, to show that 
ascriptions of gender will have a significant impact on the way we perceive emotions and 
the behaviour of children (Jordan-Young, 2011:249)241. Baron-Cohen (2003a;b), however, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239Statistically, the d value is the difference value, calculated by subtracting a mean score on a given test for 
one group, say females, from the mean score of another, males. The result is divided by the standard 
deviation of both groups. The results are, usually, shown as a bell curve to indicate the overall spread of 
abilities. Differences are considered small when the d value is around 0.2, positive or negative, medium when 
the d value is 0.5 and large if the value is higher than 0.8. See Eliot (2011:11).   
240See research by Andreescu et al. (2008) that points to the influence of cultural and educational systems and 
attitudes, not sex, on mathematical aptitude and performance. 
241And see Condry and Condry’s (2006) study of 200 adults’ perceptions of a baby’s reaction to a toy in 
which they were ascribed emotions depending not on what the observers saw on their faces, but on how they 
thought a baby boy or baby girl should react: their descriptions were gendered. 
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is clear that boys are natural systematisers whilst girls are natural empathisers242. To test 
this assertion, in a study that has become a cornerstone for claims about innate 
differences243 according to Nash and Grossi (2007), Jennifer Conellan et al. (2000) with 
Baron-Cohen filmed 102 day old infants to measure how long boys and girls looked at a 
face and a mobile phone. Both boys and girls looked, on average, at the face for equal 
amounts of time. Boys, however, showed more interest than girls in the mobile phone, 
looking at it for 51 percent of the time, compared to 41 percent for girls. Girls on average 
spent 49 percent more of their total looking time looking at the face compared to boys who 
looked at it for 41 percent of the time. The researchers claimed that they had ‘demonstrated 
that at 1 day old, human neonates demonstrate sexual dimorphism in both social and 
mechanical perception’ (Conellan et al., 2000:116). The study excited much comment and 
confident conclusions because day-olds would not have not been ex-utero long enough to 
have been socialized. The study ‘proved’ that girls were hardwired for empathy and boys 
for interest in detail and systems building. The implications for careers were clear: girls 
should aim to be carers – teachers, nurses, and social workers. Boys should aim to be 
engineers and physicists244. However, there were problems with this study (Nash and 
Grossi, 2007). Firstly, newborns are difficult to study. Their attention spans are variable 
and they drift amongst various states of consciousness. There are methodologies which 
take account of these difficulties but Conellan and her team did not apply them. For 
example, the preference for faces represents a perceptual bias preference for patterns, 
rather than for faces per se but the face the babies looked at was the face that of a female 
researcher who knew the sex of the child and could have moved her face to increase 
salience (Nash and Grossi, 2007:8-9). The conclusions of the findings, that there are 
dimorphic sex differences, based on the statistical analyses, which were also problematic, 
were not ‘proved beyond a reasonable doubt’, and the comparisons between the length of 
time spent looking at the mobile phone or the face were not significant (Conellan et al, 
2000:114). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242See Eliot (2011) who agrees that women are more empathetic but notes that whilst, in self-report studies, 
women often report that they are empathetic, the size of the difference is not as great as many suppose and 
women’s views of their empathetic capacity is coloured by their desire to be empathetic, and so conform to 
the gender stereotype. Men report less empathy, but, similarly, this may be coloured by their desire to appear 
unaffected and masculine (p.260-261). Whilst tests to measure how well men and women interpret emotions 
from other people’s faces do show women are faster and more accurate, the size of the difference is small 
and reveals that a third of the men were better than women at recognising facial expression. 
243The authors cite Pinker, who warmly endorsed the test methods in a letter to the New York Times in 
August 2005, suggesting that Baron-Cohen and his colleagues had provided the ‘most sophisticated research 
on the nature and origin of sex difference in cognition’. 
244See, for example, Baron-Cohen (2003a,b; 2012); Sax (2006). Baron-Cohen traces the essential difference 
between the sexes to foetal-testosterone. For criticisms see Jordan-Young (2010) who cites a number of 
studies which contradict, or at least raise doubts about, Baron-Cohen’s research claims and methods on the 
effects of testosterone on sex-typed interests and components of empathy. 
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Further, the findings of the study have not been replicated. Instead, ‘When preferences for 
real faces over face-like patterns emerge in three-month olds, they are found for girls and 
boys alike’ (Turati et al., 2005, cited in Nash and Grossi, 2007:11). If the research had 
been conclusive, boys and girls should continue to diverge in their innate capacities for 
empathy and social intelligence and reasoning skills: but they do not. Individuals may well 
vary in their capacity for empathy or reasoning abilities (systematising) but, as a group, the 
sexes do not245. However, if women are not present in great numbers in the sciences or 
mathematics, that may have something to do with beliefs about boys’ and girls’ innate 
skills, how they are consequently socialized, and which subjects, courses and careers they 
are encouraged to take (Prosser, 2006; SEED 2006,2007). Moreover, women’s absences 
from the upper echelons of these fields, and other competitive and ‘masculine’ professions, 
may have much more to do with how we ‘see’ women than how women actually ‘are’.  
Narrow reproductive differences are, of course, not denied. They exist. But biological 
difference is surely no reason for inequality of opportunity. Ought women to stay at home, 
asks Socrates, ‘on the grounds that the bearing and rearing of their puppies incapacitates 
them from other duties…?’ (The Republic, 2007:451d). To Glaucon’s response that men 
and women should share all duties, but recognise women as weaker than men, Socrates 
responds: 
And can you use any animal for the same purpose as another…unless you bring it 
up and train it in the same way?’ (415e)  
… if the only difference between them is that female bears and male begets, we 
shall not admit that this is a difference relevance for our purpose (454e). 
Women’s ‘natures’, reproductive differences between men and women, and beliefs about 
hardwired differences, all entail a division of domestic and nurturing labour and that, in 
turn, ensures their unequal status with men as I shall now demonstrate in the final main 
section of this chapter.  
 
 
5.4 Gendering Emotions, Gendering Roles. 
Empirical research confirms the gendered nature of emotional expression. Hutson-
Comeaux and Kelly (2002:1) claim that stereotypes regarding individual emotions such as 
anger and sadness are gender-specific. They studied the reactions of 60 women and 117 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245See Nash and Grossi (2007) for further evidence that brings into question claims about widely believed sex 
differences in cognitive abilities and empathizing capacity.  
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men presented with 16 scenarios depicting male and female actors over-reacting to eight 
female (happiness) and eight male consistent (anger) emotional events, four in an 
interpersonal context and four in ‘an achievement context (i.e., work- and goal-related 
events’ (2002: 4). Whilst both sexes were negatively evaluated when over-reacting to 
gender-consistent emotional events, women’s over-reactions to happy events were judged 
less appropriate than the same over-reactions by men. Especially in interpersonal contexts, 
men’s over-reactions to angry events were judged less appropriate than women’s 
overreactions, providing some support for the ‘emotional double-bind effect’ in which both 
sexes:  
are expected to express particular emotions (and their behavior is judged as 
inappropriate when that emotion is not expressed) but are judged as inappropriate 
when those emotions are expressed in an extreme manner (Hutson-Comeaux and 
Kelly, 2002:7).  
 
Such an effect, Hutson-Comeaux and Kelly suggest, could lead to limiting the range of 
emotional expressions available to women, encouraging them to express positive emotions 
‘rather than being able to express a full range of emotional intensities’ whilst gender-
inconsistent emotional reactions could ‘provide more veridical information and thus 
legitimize the emotional expression’ (p.7). Men’s over-reactions to happy events were 
judged more sincere than women’s over-reactions but women’s over-reactions to angry 
events were judged more sincere than men’s. Both sexes were judged to be more sincere 
expressing gender-inconsistent emotions thereby providing some evidence that gender-
inconsistent emotional over-reactions will be judged more valid or sincere than gender-
consistent reactions. In turn, argue Hutson-Comeaux and Kelly (2002:8), ‘gender 
stereotypes appeared to create expectancies for behavior that influenced its 
informativeness’. Moreover, as these findings occurred mainly with respect to scenarios in 
the interpersonal context, that provides further support for the over-reactions of women to 
angry events in work-related situations being judged less appropriate than men’s reactions 
and lead Hutson-Comeaux and Kelly (2002:8) to question why it is more appropriate to 
overreact to a happy event in an interpersonal context and to call for more research to 
enable a better understanding of ‘the context specificity of emotion stereotypes’. Of 
particular relevance to my study, is that Hutson-Comeaux and Kelly’s research 
demonstrated that women were expected to be more expressive in other-orientated events, 
while men were expected to be more expressive in self-orientated contexts in which they 
were, of course, autonomous/agentic. Men or women who deviate too far from what is 
expected of them emotionally meet with negative social sanctions. Men who cry might be 
judged weak, while women who become ‘too’ angry may be regarded as bitter and their 
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emotional reactions dismissed as over-reactions not worthy of serious consideration 
(Campbell, 1994). Gender inconsistent reactions and gender stereotyping of emotions can 
become more complicated for women than men with women caught in a double bind as 
expressiveness and social control can both be negatively evaluated (Shields, 1997). 
Women who are not emotional may be regarded as cold or their expressiveness viewed as 
overblown.  
 
Such empirical research findings, and Campbell (1994), Shields (1997) and Hutson-
Comeaux and Kelly (2002) cite a wide range of supporting studies, lend empirical weight 
to my argument that, for both men and women, to stereotype emotions along gender lines 
and to evaluate their expressions differently is to limit the range of emotional expression 
available to them. Empirical findings suggest that gendered expectations and beliefs of 
emotional expressions can distort the interpretation of emotions’ epistemology. We assess 
a reaction not solely on the basis of the person who expresses the emotion, but on their 
gender, potentially undermining not only the sincerity of the person who is happy, sad, or 
angry, but also their integrity. If we suppress our emotions, in effect if we conform to 
gendered expectations in order to be positively evaluated by our peers and intimates, that 
suppression, as noted earlier, can have ill effects and lower self-esteem. Self-esteem is, as I 
have argued, an important constituent of autonomy and agency, as it is of one’s dignity, 
and that holds, of course, for both men and women. On these grounds, gendered 
expectations require consideration in an exploration of emotional expression.  
Boys are more likely to experience high levels of self-esteem than are girls246. This is 
important because girls’ feelings of vulnerability and tendency to feel negative emotions 
can impair not only their access to the full range of emotions but, also, their levels of 
academic and professional confidence (Eliot, 201:257). Girls’ suppression of anger and 
aggression can lead to interpersonal stress and depression. Relational aggression among 
girls is a significant cause of loneliness and isolation of victims, and can cause harm to the 
perpetrators who are jostling for power and status, as we saw with Elaine and Cordelia 
earlier in this chapter. We also encountered this with Nancy. Many boys experience 
relational aggression, but often not to the same degree as girls because they have approved 
outlets for ritualised aggression: sport, rough activities, playing aggressive video games. 
Girls also have access to these activities, but perhaps avail themselves of them less 
frequently than boys. In any case, girls are not encouraged to be angry whilst acts of  ‘soft 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246See Kling et al.’s (1999) survey of more than two hundred studies measuring self-esteem, from which they 
concluded that whilst differences were small, men’s self-esteem was shown to be higher than women’s at 
every stage of life. 
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tactility’, such as holding hands, gentle hugs or kissing, are not acceptable for boys and 
men. Those boys who do display such soft behaviour may be socially stigmatised and thus 
homosexualised (Anderson, 2011:732). Epstein et al. (2001) suggest that young boys are 
expected to prove they are ‘ ‘‘real boys” in ways that mark them as masculine, even 
macho, and therefore (by definition) heterosexual’ (p.135). The homophobia explicit in 
denigrating ‘feminine’ behaviour, limits their behaviour, simultaneously functioning to 
promote the maintenance of heterosexual power, while subjugating women (Anderson et 
al., 2011).  
 
Burke and Attridge (2011) undertook a study that examined gender differences in family, 
personality, work style and leadership among high earning professionals. These women 
and men were similar on most of the measures tested, including parental and early-life 
experiences, work styles and leadership styles but twice as many women as men reported 
experiencing prejudice or discrimination at work (p.207). A majority of mean and women 
acknowledged gender-specific obstacles, such as childbearing and shouldering the burden 
for greater family care responsibilities, to career success for women in general, and being a 
successful leader also was defined somewhat differently for women than for men 
(p.207)247. Explaining the paucity of women at the top of many professions, Asher (2011) 
suggests that becoming a mother can entail a profound break with career aspirations, 
affecting earning potential, opportunities for promotion, and equal parenting. She notes the 
wide disparity between men and women’s experience of parenthood, and the ‘glacial 
slowness’ of progress towards domestic equality (p.8). Three quarters of mothers claim 
primary responsibility for the care of their children, a source of marital stress, with only 
four percent reporting that this responsibility is shared by their partner (Lewis et al., 
2009:34)248. However, in the same report, only 29 percent of respondents believed that 
childcare was the primary responsibility of the mother, and men and women had differing 
perceptions on the extent to which childcare was shared. 31 percent of men stated that they 
shared childcare with their partner but only 14 percent of women agreed (p.35). In this 
study, perceptions of domestic involvement clearly differ between men and women and, 
arguably, between desired and real states of affairs. Segregated family roles leave many 
women feeling trapped and excluded, contributing to unhappy families according to Asher 
(2011:23). Fathers’ low involvement in childcare and domestic responsibilities increases 
the risk of divorce, particularly if the mother has had a previous job and  ‘In economic and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247See Jordan-Young (2011) for similar studies. 
248Also cited in Asher (2011:19).  
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sociological research, there has been too great an emphasis on women’s paid work and not 
enough attention given to the division of unpaid work’ (Sigle-Rushton, 2010: 22)249. Sigle-
Rushton (2010) also suggests that measures of subjective wellbeing should be incorporated 
in empirical studies of individual and household behaviours, a suggestion I endorse and a 
theme I will return to in the concluding chapter. Of course, I have pointed here to but a 
fragment of the data and analyses available on gender segregation but what emerges is that 
gender norms, begin and endure throughout a child’s life into adulthood and such norms 
will surely include the cultivation of gendered emotions. Once a pregnancy is confirmed 
by health officials, a woman moves inevitably into women-centred natal care (Asher, 
2011:35)250. Here we see in action Shield’s (1992) observation of gender being fixed at 
‘gestation’, arguably reinforcing the simple dichotomy between men and women’s 
reasoning and emotional natures, a dichotomy that is fixed, as Mill discerned, ‘beforehand 
on some general presumption, that certain persons are not fit to do certain things’ 
(2006:151). 
 
I have sought to indicate here that gendered stereotypes, including those related and 
pertaining to emotion, can be powerful, even damaging, to mental and physical health and 
wellbeing (Brody, 1997; Syed, 2008). The systematic suppression of human emotional 
capacity is a major source of gender and class division and discrimination (Syed, 
2008:186), especially if men or women transgress their expected stereotypical roles.  Such 
role expectations, of course, transcend gender. If they transgress Islamic norms in the 
workplace, Muslim women, for example, may express negative states based on emotions 
of guilt, shame (when they cannot control events that go wrong) or fear251. As we have 
seen already, beliefs about the scientific basis of innate difference play into gendered 
emotional stereotyping and will likely shape the way we socialize children, as well as 
guide our interpretations of and reactions to emotions expressed by others and ourselves. 
Girls will be nurtured to feel greater compassion and sympathy, and therefore to care more 
for others, than boys. The obvious problem with such reductionist arguments, and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249The UK coalition government, especially post the August 2011 riots, when the question of single parents 
was once again raised as a source of young rioters’ lawlessness, ought surely to be aware of the effects of 
segregated parenting roles. See for example http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/uk-world-
news/2011/08/15/english-riots-david-cameron-blames-the-parents-for-mayhem-86908-23346519/. The latest 
report from the Centre for Social Justice (October, 2011) does not talk of improving gender disparity in 
domestic involvement in its recommendations on how to prevent family breakdown.  
250One way in which governments or health services could lessen gender disparity is to include men in every 
aspect of neo- and post-natal care.  
251Syed also notes that Muslim girls’ experience of having lower status and preference than her brothers 
curtails the expression of certain emotions such as aggression (2008:191). This curtailment explains the 
women’s typical shyness, lack of confidence and self-assurance.  
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apparently logical conclusions they lead us to make, is that they reduce, in effect, 
autonomy or agency. These beliefs mean that we are what our genes or our hormones 
determine us to be. If men are not hardwired to empathise to the same degree as women, 
but are by nature system builders, then men ought to realise their potential by, as Levy 
ironically suggests ‘understanding the world and building and repairing the things we need 
in it’ while women should get on with ‘putting people at their ease’ (2004:319-320). 
 
Whilst gendered stereotyping can lead to a restricted repertoire of ‘acceptable’ emotional 
expression, in the workplace it can also lead to disadvantages for women and their career 
opportunities. In studies to test hypotheses on the relationship between gender, emotional 
expression (anger) and status conferral, Brescoll and Uhlman (2008)252 found that male 
and female evaluators conferred lower status on female professionals deemed to be angry 
than on angry male professionals, regardless of occupation or job status. Women’s 
emotional reactions were attributed to dispositional states such as ‘she is an angry person’ 
(p.268) with angry women regarded as less competent at dealing with workplace situations 
(p.273)253 and, as a result, less likely than men to be accorded status in the workplace. By 
contrast, men’s reactions were attributed to objective, external circumstances (p.273), 
supporting Shields’ (2002) argument that anger is a status emotion that can enhance the 
power of men but lower the status of women. Ben-Ze’ev (2001) (and see below) also 
argues that emotions interpreted from and accorded status depending on a person’s rank, 
colour, ethnic group or gender. Such ‘emotional display rules’ (Ekman and Friesen, 1969) 
are, according to Ekman (1984:320), ‘over-learned habits’ about who is or is not permitted 
to show what emotion. If we are content to follow these emotional display rules then 
women should not show anger, except in maternal roles with children. Men should not cry. 
But in early childhood there is no significant sex difference in emotional expression 
between the sexes.  Boys, however, are socialised out of crying so as to assume the male 
stereotype of ‘toughness’ and by the age of 11, boys are 20 percent less likely to cry than 
girls and, by the age of 16, 40 percent less likely to do so (Eliot, 2011:254). Boys still feel 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252See also Swan (2008) who writes of therapeutic practices in the workplace. She cites Furedi (2003) who is 
concerned about the feminization of the self and the workplace, believing the ‘emotionalism’ of women, 
black middle-class and working-class and white working class people is ‘marginalizing emotional self-
control, rationality, invulnerability and independence’ (p.90). For Swan such beliefs can be read as a fear of 
‘white middle class emasculation’ (p.93) with Furedi claiming that the preference for feminine emotions has 
led to a ‘gender hierarchy’ with ‘women at the top, feminine men at the bottom’ (p.93) in a hierarchy ‘hostile 
to self-reliance and self-control’ (p.93). See, too, Faludi (1993) for accounts of the backlash against 
feminism. 
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the emotions, but learn not display their feelings, adopting instead the ‘mask of 
masculinity’ (p.254). The impact on health, Eliot notes, of constantly suppressing emotions 
such as sadness, shame or sympathy, is to increase mental health problems and the 
inability of some men to connect to others (p.255). Girls, on the other hand, can display 
and confess vulnerable feelings because they are expected to be more vulnerable and to 
display that vulnerability. Again, this helps explain why women care for and about people, 
and are directed into the caring professions. Even if it were deemed desirable, Nancy, 
however, might not be permitted this outlet. Nancy is not a girl who has high status and she 
is not a member of any favoured in-group. If she tried to express feelings that indicated her 
vulnerability by crying, becoming distressed or angry, she would likely embarrass her 
peers or incite mockery and I shall return to this later. 
 
We see, in both the workplace and the home, further examples of emotional display rules 
that affect women. Women are more likely to express shame as an ‘internalization of the 
idea that they deserve less status’ than men (Brody, 1997:385; Syed, 2008)254. A woman 
may express guilt when promoted to a position of higher power than men (Brody, 1997) 
and she may over-compensate at home if she holds a higher status job than her husband 
(Fine, 2011a). The status hypthothesis, as Eliot (2011:152) notes, may also provide another 
explanation for why women may smile more than men. Women may need to smile more 
and be faster and more accurate in reading faces in order to avert aggression, the more so 
the more unequal the relationship. Eliot (2011:262) suggests, too, that both men and 
women are more sensitive to the emotion expressed on men’s faces than on women’s and 
men are especially attuned to reading men’s facial anger. Women also tend to score well 
on the Interpersonal Perception Task (IPT) as demonstrated in Koenig and Eagly’s (2005) 
enquiry that sought to examine if women’s greater empathy gave them an unfair advantage 
over men in social settings.  Research participants were all told they were undertaking a 
test of social sensitivity. One group was told that men do less well than women on such 
tests, while the second group was given test information in a gender neutral manner, that is 
with no information about men or women scoring higher or lower than each other. The 
men in the group given the gender loaded information did slightly worse than the women. 
In the gender-neutral group, men performed as well as women. What this study seems to 
show is that if we are primed by our gender, we will think in gender terms, assuming the 
behaviours, gestures and emotional expressions of that gender. If you tell me that, because 
I am a woman, it is natural for me to be more compassionate than a man, I may well 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254We will see this at work in the next chapter. 
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conform to the emotional expression of compassion and caring.  If I am told that I will be 
more attractive to men if I smile and display happiness than if I display pride255 then, 
again, I may well tend to conform to that emotional display.  Nancy, if she is told her angry 
outbursts and refusal to smile are ‘un-ladylike’, may well be less inclined to conform, 
especially if her refusal to comply with what is expected has become part of her emotional 
defence.  To that extent we might applaud her resistance of gender stereotyping but such 
resistance might well lead to further negative consequences from teachers and peers alike. 
 
In a further apposite enquiry for my study, Graham and Ickes (1997) devised an empathic 
accuracy test to infer the thoughts and feelings of others. In a three-part experiment, two 
people were partnered and asked to wait while the experimenter changed a light bulb. As 
they waited for the experiment to begin, their interactions were covertly filmed for six 
minutes. When the experimenter returned to explain the true purpose of the experiment, the 
participants were asked if they would like to view the film, stopping the tape to record a 
thought or feeling, and noting whether it was positive, negative or neutral. Finally, the film 
was replayed but this time it was stopped when the partner reported a thought or a feeling. 
The other participant now had to infer what her or his partner was thinking or feeling. 
Once finished, the inferences and reported thoughts and feelings were compared. In the 
first seven studies, no gender differences were found in married couples, heterosexual 
couples, strangers, all female or all male groups, or across state or country (Ickes, 2003). 
However, gender differences emerged in the next three studies in which the researchers 
had modified their instructions to the participants, asking them, now, to gauge how 
accurate they thought were their interpretations of the others’ thoughts and feelings. Ickes’ 
conclusion was that including a question on the accuracy of their perceptions of others’ 
thoughts and feelings primed women to be more empathetic. He suggests that this research 
provides further corroboration for what he describes as compelling evidence that women 
will show greater empathetic accuracy than men when they know that this is being 
measured and when, consequently, they may consciously conform to expected gender 
stereotyping (2003: 135)256.  
These studies reveal that context, socialisation processes and cultural beliefs are key 
determinants of emotional capacity and expression and that hormones or genes may be far 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255See Tracy and Beall (2011).  
256And see Ickes et al., (2000). Fine (2011a) also cites a study by Klein and Hodges (2001:21) in which the 
empathy difference between men and women disappears when financial incentives are introduced: both sexes 
do well and accuracy increased when they were offered $2 for every correct answer. 
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less important than some scientists and commentators would have us believe. As I stated in 
the introduction, and subsequently argued, I follow the view that human beings are ‘open 
in all directions’ and that we are not pre-determined, pre-destined creatures. The plasticity 
of our brains and our ability to reason ensures our potential for diversity and growth. But 
gender, especially gendered stereotypes played out with regard to expected and acceptable 
emotional expression, can clearly limit that potential and so limit our autonomy, especially 
if we uncritically accept the findings of so-called science. 
 
 
5.5 Concluding Chapter Five. 
We cannot claim to be autonomous beings, capable of making rational choices if we act at 
the behest of our genes and hormones, rather than on moral deliberations informed by 
emotions and intellect. Our actions constitute who we are, not our genes: genes do not act 
for reasons. What count as reasons are principles, and principles describe something 
essential about our deliberations, as well as the content of those deliberations. These 
deliberations, in turn, say something about the kind of person we are, who we wish to be, 
and how we might like to appear to others. If one goes to the extent of asserting that our 
thoughts and decision making powers are largely physically caused, that not only 
disempowers human agency, our acts cannot truly be our own, at least not in a reasoning 
way, but it also seems to suggest that if we are not choice making creatures, then we lose, 
with that capacity, our dignity.  
 
Autonomy is a capacity that is employed in the context of rational deliberation (Hill 
1992:92) in which we might ask ‘what is the situation at hand?’, ‘how am I to read it?’ and 
‘what should I do?’ Determinism, as Hill (92-93) advises, ‘offers no guidance on how to 
act’. It is not, therefore, relevant to rational deliberation, or to deciding what sort of reasons 
have weight. Autonomy, in sum, includes the idea that we are committed to:  
 
both a principle of self-respect…that includes respect for other rational agents. 
The former requires that – one’s choices be justified to oneself not merely at the 
moment, but over time, and not merely as one reflects on the products of one’s 
choices but also as one reflects on the sort of person one makes of oneself by these 
choices. (Hill, 1992:90) 
 
As we will see in the next chapter, respect for women and children as rational agents, who 
are encouraged to make choices that reflect their values, plans and goals, are curtailed in 
exploitative and abusive relationships, so threatening their emotional wellbeing.
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Chapter Six: Emotional Wellbeing – Threats and Capabilities. 
 
Imagine ... being afraid to go to sleep at night, being afraid to wake up in  
the morning. 
Imagine ... being denied food, warmth or sleep. 
Imagine ... being punched, slapped, hit, bitten, pinched and kicked.  
Imagine ... being pushed, shoved, burnt, strangled, raped, beaten. 
Imagine ... that you can't face the shame of admitting what's really going on to 
family or friends. 
Imagine a future without fear.257 
 
 
 
Alison: Can you see a future with no fear, Nancy? 
Nancy:  A future wi’ no fear? A cannae imagine that, naw. A cannae imagine no 
stressin’. 
 
6.1 Introduction. 
This chapter extends my focus on the emotional wellbeing of women and girls, focussing 
initially on ways in which that can be threatened by forms of abuse. It is in the private 
setting of the family that many abuses against women occur258. The private space of the 
home, Mackinnon argues, belongs to men: it is where ‘wives are raped in private’, women 
are exploited and made ‘objects of male subjectivity and male power’ and where ‘equality 
is not guaranteed’ (2005:38). A universal fact of womanhood is that nowhere are women 
equal to men, socially, politically or economically. While MacKinnon’s writings may be 
regarded by some as extreme, it is a disturbing universal fact that women are subject to 
gendered violence, often at the hands of their intimate partners or family members259. I 
suggest that the problem of violence is universal because it is found everywhere regardless 
of region, country, class, faith or race. Htun and Weldon (2012)260, presenting data from 
over 70 countries across four decades, also assert that violence against women is a ‘global’ 
problem. Research from North America, Europe, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, 
and Asia found ‘astonishingly high rates of sexual assault, stalking, trafficking, violence in 
intimate relationships, and other violations of women’s bodies and psyches’ (p.548). No 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257‘Imagine…’ is part of the Women’s Aid Federation campaign on domestic violence. See 
http://www.womensaid.org.uk/page.asp?section=0001000100140004&itemTitle=Posters 
258While my focus here, as elsewhere, is on the experience of women, I do not mean to suggest that men do 
not get trapped into abusive and oppressive relationships. They do. The statistics we have, however, such as 
those used here, demonstrate overwhelmingly that more violence is perpetrated against women by men, than 
by women against men. 
259See the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence at http://www.ncadv.org/learn/TheProblem.php  
260The report contains detailed statistics on the kind and levels of violence. The importance of feminist 
movements to raising awareness of violence against women is a key theme of this report.  
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region of the world, the authors report, is immune to violence against women, and in 
Europe, ‘violence against women is far more dangerous to the female population than 
terrorism or cancer’ (p. 549, citing Elman 2007:85 and see Nussbaum, 2005). The Human 
Development Report (2000:50) states that, with globalisation, trafficking of women and 
girls for prostitution has increased with 500,000 women a year trafficked out of countries 
in Eastern Europe and the CIS (the former Russian Federation). In Asia, about 250,000 
people, mostly women and children, are estimated to be trafficked every year. Between 85 
million and 115 million girls and women have undergone some form of female genital 
mutilation and suffer from its adverse physiological and psychological effects. Domestic 
violence is a serious human rights threat to women in every society. Around the world, on 
average, one in every three women has experienced violence in an intimate relationship 
(p.50). 
Nussbaum (2005)261 also notes that while some women are more vulnerable than others to 
violence few women are entirely free from the fear from violence. In 2010, the National 
Union of Students (UK) published a survey on women’s experience of harassment, 
stalking, violence and sexual assault on university and college campuses. Of more than 
2000 women surveyed, 14 per cent had experienced serious physical or sexual assault; 68 
per cent had been subject to verbal or physical sexual harassment, and nearly one in four 
had experienced unwanted sexual contact. Reporting such incidences to the police is low, 
ranging from 1 per cent (less serious physical violence) to 17 per cent (serious physical 
violence) (pp.3-5). The reporters noted that ‘[m]any women students struggle to get 
through their course without coming into contact with harassment or violence in one form 
or another’262. 
One of my aims in this chapter will be to consider the effects of abuse on emotional health 
and to ask why women and children are so abused. One route to abuse is the 
dehumanisation of the person to be abused. Following Zimbardo’s (2007) psychological 
studies of the processes of dehumanising low status groups and individuals, society, often 
censoriously, perceives victims as deserving of their punishment (battered wives, 
unpopular children, the assaulted women who should have been more ‘chaste’ in my 
introductory account of attitudes I encountered whilst growing up in Lewis, for example). 
We blame victims for the consequences of their actions, perceiving them to be beneath our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261Nussbaum (2005) cites her own position as an example. She has a secure job, a good income, came from a 
good family, has a security protected apartment, and lives in a country where rape and sexual assault is 
treated as a serious crime. Despite her privileged position, this did not prevent rape, attempted rape, sexual 
assault and sexual harassment (p.167). To her account, I could my many of my own anecdotal experiences. 
262From the foreword. 
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moral concern, and we dehumanise them in the process. In such dehumanising, we ‘out-
group’ people263 and divest them of emotions, for humanness belongs only to the in-group. 
The out-group lack human essence and complex emotions such as compassion, shame or 
guilt, emotions that contain strong moral evaluations. Out-groups’ emotions are primary: 
they feel anger, disgust or fear, emotions they share in common with animals. This process 
of dehumanisation complements the self-humanisation of the in-group which does have 
complex pro-social emotions such as compassion, pity and sympathy. Research amply 
demonstrates the power of dehumanisation and the fact that many of us frequently (though 
we might not admit it) infrahumanise those we regard as inferior264. As I shall demonstrate, 
men who abuse women dehumanise those women and that, of course, has a deleterious 
effect on those women’s emotional wellbeing.   
 
In the first section of this chapter, I present a brief narrative from Nancy that describes her 
life at home and her abuse at the hands of her father. From that narrative, I outline how 
abuse affects children and women before discussing the psychological processes by which 
women and children come to be abused. Following Nussbaum’s (1999) analysis, I draw on 
her seven routes to objectification, illustrating these with excerpts from abused women and 
abusing men, and introducing the Scottish legislation intended to protect women and 
children from such harm. I then move to the Capabilities Approach, an ethical framework 
focused on basic justice and entitlement, in order to discuss Capability 5, Emotions, asking 
how this central capability is compromised when women and children are treated as mere 
ends to others’ advantage. In the second section, I focus more specifically, but briefly, on 
the physical and emotional effects of intimate partner violence, citing research to 
demonstrate how abuse corrodes functioning, a key idea of the Capabilities Approach that 
I develop in the third section. Here I outline the key features of the Capabilities Approach 
(hereafter CA), internal and combined capabilities, and functioning. The ethical aspiration 
of the CA is that people should be enabled to be and to do, as dignified beings with goals 
and plans. Accordingly, governments and institutions should aim, minimally, for threshold 
levels of functioning in the ten key capabilities, including, essentially for this thesis, 
emotions. The value of the CA, I propose, is that it allows us to assess overall advantage 
and quality of life with regard to various freedoms, or what can be termed ‘opportunities’. I 
suggest, in line with Nussbaum’s CA, that if any of these opportunities are absent or not 
fully available, then we will have reduced functioning. I start, here, to link this claim to my 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263See Ben-Ze’ev (2000); Leyens et al. (2000). 
264Research cited by Bandura (1996); Leyens et al. (2000); Zimbardo (2007). 
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assertion that emotional ill-health or compromised emotions can severely limit functioning 
in all of the capabilities. As Nancy lives in an environment of abuse, and is unpopular in 
school, I apply the CA to Nancy to evaluate her level of functioning.  
 
In the fourth section, I propose that Emotions, Capability 5, might be regarded as an 
‘architectonic’ capability as it ‘organises and pervades’ the other capabilities (Nussbaum, 
2011:39). Nussbaum has, to date, claimed this role for only two of her ten capabilities: 
Affiliation and Practical Reason. However, I shall suggest that emotions are architectonic 
because they are critical for functioning across each capability: all can be compromised or 
strengthened by an individual’s emotional health. To support my claim, I return to 
empirical research, this time from psychology and sociology, on abused women’s 
emotional states and the justifications that abusing men offer for their abusive behaviour.  
Finally, I reiterate the arguments made thus far in this thesis, that cultivating our 
dispositions to feel compassion, anger or joy appropriately, for the right reason, and in the 
right way, is integral to moral education and ethical orientation, and to how we respect the 
integrity and agency of others. Attaining critical judgement, or practical intelligence, so as 
to discern what is worthy of our attention is likewise essential to developing appropriate 
affective dispositions265.  
 
6.2 Nancy’s Narrative: The Routes to Abuse. 
What follows is a narrative of Nancy’s experience of violence. Violence is extreme and 
can have extreme effects on a person and a limiting effect on that person’s ability to 
function and act in ways that reflect her experiences, values, concerns and goals. I focus on 
domestic violence in this chapter because it is a common experience universal to women 
and is due, in part I suggest, to corrosive beliefs about gender norms and entitlement. 
Specifically, continual violence, and the expectation of violence, has corrosive 
consequences for emotional and physical functioning. A further motive in focussing on 
domestic violence is to prepare the ground for the study of emotions to be included in 
education curricula and in order to enable compassionate work in schools with pupils such 
as Nancy. I am motivated to make this argument by working from my experiences as a 
teacher and as a woman. The previous chapter sought to demonstrate, using fictional 
accounts from the novel, the effects of malformed views about women and, in turn, the 
power of the state and its institutions on people’s ability to function well, emotionally, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265See Burnyeat (1980:69-92); Kosman (1980:103-116); Sherman (1989:157-199); Annas (1993:47-131). 
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creatively and physically. Many adolescents are embarrassed and ashamed to talk about 
what they have experienced and witnessed, fearing that they will be stigmatised or 
disbelieved (Mullender et al., 2002). They are also extremely reluctant to talk about what is 
happening in their personal lives because of a strong sense of loyalty to a parent or to their 
siblings whom they wish to protect, not just from social opprobrium, but from the 
involvement of Social Services, schools, and the police. This desire to protect also stems 
from a fear that outside interference, or ‘meddling’, will incite the abuser to further abuse. 
Often the children and abused parent are sworn to silence: ‘Or else!’. Here, Nancy is 
responding to questions about her life and domestic violence. There are long pauses before 
she answers.  
 
All a’ve known is them shouting and arguing, ma Dad hittin’ ma Mum, ma Mum 
screaming when he hits her bad, her going tae hospital or the polis turning up at 
the door. Disnae dae any guid when they dae turn up, like, cos he just gets 
madder and blames her for getting him into bother.  
O aye, she’s feart o’ him, rattlin’ roond wi’ nerves most the time. She’s a rash on 
her hawns and fis – no braw. We’re all feart. We go roond being quiet, trying to 
please him. Ma Mum will clean like mad, get on at us to dae our rooms and 
‘hings. Sometimes, though, she just sits and stares into space, no hearin’ or seeing 
anyhin’. She’ll no go out, disnae dare tae, no withoot his say so. He e’in gets mad 
if she phones her own Mum. 
After a big fight, ‘specially if she’s tae go to hospital, it’ll calm doon for a while, 
but no for long. All he says is he’s gone tae far, that he’d no meant to hit her so 
bad. Says it’s all her fault, been nipping his heid, no leaving him alone, she’d no 
had the tea on, or was wasting his money. Sometimes he’ll no e’in let her boil the 
kettle for tea,  no e’in let her eat her dinner – it’s his stuff, his food, his electricity, 
no fur scum like her. 
Aye, we’ve begged her tae leave him. But she’s too feart o’ what he’d dae to us. 
And we’ve nowhere to go anyhows. Aye, he’s kicked and skelpt me a few times, 
‘specially when a’ve tried tae help ma Mum. He just laughs or goes raj wi’ me, 
tellin’ me am a skinny wee slut, no use to anyone, another fucking waste o’ space, 
just like ma Mum. What comes out his mouth is pure filth like. 
His brether’s no better. Another raj. Tried it on wi me one night…trying to take 
ma jammies off. Said it was decent like, no tae worry, but no tae tell no-one. It’s 
no right to be touched like that, no by an Uncle. I said no and kicked him – he 
backed off quick like cos ma Dad was doon the stairs drunk, Mum tae – she just 
drinks all the time now. He disnae like that neether. Says she’s no a woman, just a 
slut and a whore, like the rest o’ ‘em. If ma Uncle comes roond now I put the 
chest o’ drawers across the door – cannae risk it if it’s only ma Mum in the hoose. 
She’d no hae a clue what tae dae like. 
A dae ken how I feel most the time, just deid like. Cannae ‘think neether. Feel as if 
ma stomach’s been eaten up by hungry rats. Sometimes they’re up for running up 
ma insides so’s to escape, ken? Cannae blame them – rubbish place tae be. 
Imagine? Could spit them oot at ma Dad (she giggles, then sobers up). He’d 
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prob’ly throw me oot, or worse. Got these blisters on ma fingers – Mum says its 
stress.  
School? School’s nae use. Cannae dae the work, too tired, and a just dinnae get it 
now. My heid burns, my eyes tae. Teachers nip ma heid all the time, they go on 
and on, so I just lose it. No really got friends neether. No there in school. 
A dinnae talk aboot it. Tae embarrassed, feel tae stupid, ken? A cannae imagine 
nothin’ but what’s coming next, and that’s no worth imagining. 
Naw, I cannae imagine a future wi’ no fear266.  
 
As Nancy says, she cannot imagine a future with no fear, abuse, neglect or shame. And she 
is not alone. According to Department of Health statistics, 750,000 children experience 
domestic violence, and almost every school will have children affected by it (2002:16). In 
three of five cases where children experience abuse, their mothers are also being abused 
although figures may be higher because many women do not report domestic violence, and 
it may take many years before they finally do (Department of Health, 2009:7). Mullender 
et al.’s (2002) research, which directly asked school children about domestic violence, 
revealed that approximately one third lived with some form of domestic abuse. In 30 to 60 
percent of domestic violence cases, the abusive partner is also abusing children (Edelson, 
1999). 54 percent of women victims of serious sexual assault were assaulted by their 
partner or ex-partner (Stern Review, 2010)267. Repeated abuse not only reduces a mother’s 
capacity to parent well, it increases her children’s vulnerability to further and ongoing 
abuse (Farmer and Owen, 1995). The effects of domestic violence on the wellbeing of 
children like Nancy is understood: it features as the strongest contributory factor to a 
child’s poor outcomes in school and in adult life. Many children and young people live 
with the fear of violence and abuse that the Women’s Federation asks us to consider in 
their ‘Imagine’ campaign. The effects of distress and trauma on children include constant 
worry and anxiety about family; difficulties eating and sleeping; absence from school and 
difficulty in concentrating; depression or distracted behaviour; aggression, behavioural 
difficulties; deliberate holding of breath; reduced resilience and self-protection. 31 percent 
of children living in abusive or violent homes report low self-esteem (Department of 
Health, 2009:9). The effect on children’s health includes physical injuries; premature birth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266Feart - scared; hawns and fis - hands and face; braw - pretty; skelpt - slapped; cannae - can’t; hae - have; 
ken - know; heid - head. 
267Report of the Taskforce on Health Aspects of Violence against Women and Children (Albierti, 2010:10) 
that includes statistics on forced marriage, female genital mutilation (an estimated 66,000 women in the UK), 
abuse of disabled children, people with a limiting illness, and the elderly. See Crown Prosecution Service for 
links to a variety of reports on domestic violence, http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/articles/domestic_violence_-
_the_facts_the_issues_the_future/. 
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and/or low birth weight; stress related illness; speech and language delays268; self-harm; 
and substance abuse (pp.11-13). In cases of neglect, it is the mother who is most often 
blamed for failing to provide good care, doubly punishing her when she is also 
experiencing domestic abuse (p.13). Children may be neglected because their mother is not 
allowed to care for them properly, has had her resources to care for them removed, or is 
simply physically and emotionally unable to look after the children as she might wish. 
Recall Nancy saying that ‘sometimes he’ll no e’in let her boil the kettle for tea, no e’in let 
her eat her dinner – it’s his stuff, his food, his electricity, no fur scum like her’. This is a 
further example of an unfair, arguably unjust, effect of the gendered view of parenting in 
which women are expected to be the primary carers. While the primary focus here is on the 
effect of abuse on emotional function, the effect of emotional dysfunction on physical 
health is all too apparent: the two are mutually reinforcing and, as I will shortly 
demonstrate, poor emotional functioning, along with physical and mental ill-health, will 
continue into adulthood if children are not removed from harm.  
 
Domestic abuse is increasingly seen as an important child protection issue. In Scotland, 
there is a framework for early intervention in families at risk. Getting it Right for Every 
Child (GIRFEC, 2007), which builds on the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC), is a multi-agency policy approach that sets out the values and principles of helping 
all children achieve their potential. GIRFEC has been incorporated into The Scottish 
Government National Domestic Abuse Delivery Plan for Children and Young People 
(2008)269 and in England and Wales, the Department of Health (2009) 270 has undertaken to 
raise awareness and understanding of domestic violence, and to offer guidance in schools 
on how to help children who live with domestic violence. Yet, despite these measures, and 
despite increased understanding of the dreadful and comprehensive effects of domestic 
violence on its victims, violence against women remains a pervasive, universal 
phenomenon. So, too, does women’s subordination (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2000:4). 
The violence persists because of the prevalence of attitudes that normalise and excuse it, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268In a study by Veltman and Browne (2001), 75% of abused or neglected children situations had delayed 
cognitive development and 86% had delayed language development.  
269See the Scottish Child Care and Protection Network (SCCPN) briefing Children Living with Domestic 
Abuse (2011) for further resources on children and domestic violence, including strategies, policies and 
children’s experiences. The National Society for the Protection of Children Against Cruelty (NSPCC) is also 
a rich resource on research on domestic abuse, 
http://www.nspcc.org.uk/Inform/resourcesforprofessionals/domesticabuse/research_wda87793.html 
270This is a practical toolkit aimed at practitioners working with children. Improving Safety, Reducing Harm 
is a practical toolkit which cross references with Every Child Matters (2003), The Children Act (2004), 
Safety and Justice: the Government’s proposals on Domestic Violence (2003), Domestic Violence, Crime 
and Victims Act (2004) and the Vision for Services for Children and Young People Affected by Domestic 
Violence (2006). 
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and because beliefs about gender are rarely challenged, as I have argued throughout this 
thesis. As a 2011 NSPCC271 report on teenage intimate violence amply demonstrated, 
many young children see violent relationships as the norm. It is so prevalent in their lives 
that many teenagers tolerate or accept intimate violence (p.105), as well as coercion, 
harassment and controlling behaviours. The violence is also gendered. The NSPCC study, 
along with many others, continues to show that sexism, misogyny, and beliefs about 
gender, all serve to perpetuate power asymmetries between men and women, including 
beliefs that women deserve their maltreatment272. Whilst policy makers have sought to 
address the issues, the statistics indicate that abuse is alive and thriving around the family 
hearth.  
 
As noted, the most pervasive form of violence suffered by women is abuse by an intimate 
partner. The setting for the abuse is the private space of the home, where, traditionally, 
government has sought not to interfere, and where men can exercise power, in the form of 
repressive and oppressive acts, over their partners and their children. The UN Convention 
Against Torture (1987), for example, omits to discuss the violence and torture of women in 
the home, ‘even though this is a problem so pervasive it occurs on a global scale’ 
(Charlesworth et al., 1999:628). A 1989 UN Report noted that ‘violence is part of the 
dynamics of many family situations’ but, despite the murder, abuse, humiliation and 
degrading treatment of women, this ‘does not seem to be considered unusual, or 
uncommon behaviour’ (cited in MacKinnon, 2007:30-31). A further pervasive feature of 
abuse is that women suffer because of their ‘sex and gender’ (p.12): men get what they 
want and what they believe they are entitled to with the aid of, in MacKinnon’s (2007) 
analysis, a state that is itself gendered as male because the public sphere is dominated and 
shaped by men. Women are controlled by ‘all tiers of society’ and their violence is directly 
connected to the gendered imbalance of power found across the globe, argue Charlesworth 
and Chinkin (2000:12). Women are more likely to suffer poverty due to unequal access to 
paid employment, and a lack of status and influence within their communities (p.8). 
Women face disadvantage and inequality, not because their individual capacities are 
inferior to those of men, but because of their primary roles as mothers and carers. Equality, 
as MacKinnon points out, ‘is valued nearly everywhere but practised almost nowhere’ and 
this ‘is nowhere more true than between men and women’ (2007:44). In no country do 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271Wood et al.’s (2011) NSPCC report, ‘Standing on my own two feet’ was the first UK report specifically 
concerned with the effects of intimate violence on disadvantaged teenagers.  
272See for example, Burton and Kitzinger (1998); Mullender et al. (2002); Barter, et al. (2009); McCarry 
(2010); Somali (2011). These authors also cite additional studies. 
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women have equal political power with men, claim Charlesworth and Chinkin (2000:10), 
who also suggest that gender-based violence ‘poses a health burden to women similar in 
magnitude to that caused by tuberculosis or HIV infection’ (p.13). In England, ‘violence 
against women is more prevalent than stroke, diabetes or heart disease’273. 
 
Women, too often, are treated as objects. Nussbaum (1999a:218) suggests there are seven 
routes to objectification, the first being the ‘instrumentality’ that occurs when the woman 
is treated as a tool and which is, interestingly, a route used to preserve and enhance male 
pride and masculinity, as exemplified in the excerpt below, cited in Dobash and Dobash 
(2000:32-34). 
 
When do you think it’s okay for a man to hit a woman?  
I don’t like it. A slap, yes, now and again if it’s needed.  
What do you mean a “needed?”  
If you’re sitting in the pub with all your pals and she comes in and gives you a load 
of cheek. To put her in her place verbally, and if verbally doesn’t work, physically.  
What do your friends think of women then? 
That they’re here for one thing and that’s it.  
Do you not think men’s attitudes towards women are changing?  
Not in the pub I go to.  
  
The second route to the objectification of women is ‘Denial of autonomy’.  
 
She’ll no go out, disnae dare tae, no withoot his say so. He e’in gets mad if she 
phones her own Mum. (Nancy) 
 
Used to just stop me from going out and I used to like sit in my house. …Well 
sometimes he did used to hit me. It was a relationship like that … And then if I go 
out he’ll just go mad and then just basically I’ll just end up crying and go back 
home. So I’d just rather stay in … Which was a mistake really because then he 
used to do that all the time then, and then obviously he had something over me. 
(Caitlin, aged 16, extract from NSPCC,2011:27) 
 
‘Inertness’, in which the woman is regarded as having no agency, is the third route to 
objectification, as in: ‘I am fed up with everyone running my life for me, and doing my 
thinking for me, giving me their opinions on who I am’ (Department of Health, 2010:23). 
The fourth route is ‘Fungibility’, in which the woman is regarded as interchangeable with 
other objects: 
 
At first I felt really bad, dirty and ashamed. But after a while it had been going on 
for so long and with so many different men, I didn't feel anything towards it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273Taskforce on the Health Aspects of Violence Against Women and Children (2010). 
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anymore. What they did to me was evil, they ripped away my dignity, my self-
esteem…It's not a normal relationship when your boyfriend is getting you to sleep 
with all his friends for money. (Anonymous young woman, aged 15, victim of a 
child exploitation ring274.) 
 
‘Violability’, when the woman or girl is permitted no personal boundaries, is the fifth route 
to objectification, exemplified by the anonymous victim of a child exploitation ring above 
and by Nancy’s experience of her Uncle’s attempted rape: ‘His brether’s no better. 
Another raj. Tried it on wi’ me one night… trying to take ma jammies off…  It’s no right to 
be touched like that, no by an Uncle’. The sixth route is ‘Ownership’, which occurs when 
the woman is regarded as the personal property of her partner. ‘Denial of subjectivity’ is 
the final route, in which the woman is treated as if her emotions, feelings and experiences 
are of no account, as when Nancy’s Dad mocks her for trying to protect her Mum from his 
blows: ‘tellin’ me am a skinny wee slut, no use to anyone, another fucking waste o’ space, 
just like ma Mum’ or when he calls his wife a ‘slut, whore, just like all women’.  
Nancy’s world is a dark place. And as I have argued, emotions are powerful. They 
enshrine our experiences, values, concerns and goals. Emotions, too, provide us with an 
orientation, an attitude to the world, colouring that world in a variety of tints, shades, and 
colours, which enliven or darken our world, depending on what is happening to us (see 
Chapter 1:1). The tints, shades and colours in Nancy’s world will be dull, indistinct. The 
girl caught up in the child exploitation ring has had to live in dark places. The emotional 
currents that Nancy and this girl experience will, for the most part, lie still and cold as the 
girls shift out of the emotional and physical present, to places where they cannot be 
reached and harmed. Emotions, because they contain beliefs, the capacity for appraisal of 
the self and others, and the context in which these selves occur, can be manipulated for 
good or ill. In this present discussion, women’s emotions are being manipulated for malign 
purposes: women become the objects of some men’s use and satisfaction. When women 
and children are abused, the abusers have embarked upon one or more of these routes to 
objectification, and consequent dehumanisation, of their victims. And when women are 
treated as objects, they will likely experience multiple and corrosive capability failure, that 
is a diminished capacity to do and be that undermines their dignity and self-respect, along 
with their sense of worth and value. Women’s bodily integrity is compromised and 
longevity is likely shortened. In Nancy’s words, her mother is: ‘a rash on her hawns and 
fis – no braw’. This level of capability failure will also stunt women’s emotional 
development (if the abuse begins in childhood) or capacity (if the abuse occurs in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274The girl was coerced into having sex with up to five men a day, at least 4 times a week. See BBC, 8 May 
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-17914138.  
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adulthood), reducing her ability to function well in the world to a corrosive degree. ‘She’s 
rattlin’ roond wi nerves most o the time’, says Nancy of her mother. Such failure has 
consequences for physical and mental health, undermining her capacity for senses, 
imagination and thought, as well as her practical reason because she ‘cannae think…she 
just stares into space’. Because Nancy’s mother is abused, treated as a mere object for 
Nancy’s father’s use, her freedom to affiliate with others in friendship, to join groups, to 
pursue interests outside her home, even to love her closest intimates without fear of 
reprisal or ridicule, is compromised because ‘she cannae e’in phone her own Mum’. Along 
with these multiple failures comes the failure to control her environment and to feel safe 
and secure, ‘aye, we’re feart o’ the time… he’ll no e’in let her eat her dinner’. The need to 
always think and act in the present means that future planning is almost impossible 
because ‘a cannae imagine nothin’ but what’s coming next, and that’s no worth 
imagining’. 
 
In the light of what I have presented here, I propose that schools should incorporate studies 
on emotions so that young students understand not just the importance of emotional health, 
but also what emotions are and how they enable us to move around in the world. I argue 
that good emotional health can entail good physical and mental health, a positive 
orientation towards the world that allows us to flourish in ways that express our moral 
values, goals and aspirations. When emotional health is hampered or distorted through 
cultural norms, gender stereotypes or experiences of abuse and neglect, wellbeing is 
degraded in multiple ways. I will argue too that close attention should be paid to the 
Capability Approach (CA), as developed by Martha Nussbaum, because the key question 
that drives the approach is: what am I able to do and to be to live a dignified life of my 
choosing in good relations with others? This is a rich and significant question because, 
following Aristotle, and indeed Kant275, in treating each person as an end, the CA asks us 
to think about the potential quality of a person’s whole276 life and the opportunities 
available to her to realise her own conception of eudaimonia. If individuals’ emotions are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275Aristotle understood that choice was central to a good human life, the practical life but that wealth alone 
could not achieve happiness. Wealth ‘serves only as a means’, to realise something else (NE.1096a5-10). 
Kant, influenced by the Stoics, believed in the equal dignity of persons. Both philosophers believed in each 
person as an end who should not be exploited in ways that increased vulnerability or undermined dignity. 
The CA is concerned with wealth to the extent that it enables a person to develop, promote and safeguard 
capabilities and realise functioning. For the philosophical influences of the CA, see Sen (2009), Nussbaum 
(2011) and later discussion here.  
276Aristotle, in his discussion of eudaimonia in the NE. was interested in the practical life of the person over 
the whole of that person’s life. A single event, or series of events, or taking a short span of a person’s life, 
would not tell us whether such a person was habituating virtuous character in order to realise her ultimate 
end: eudaimonia.     
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stunted or deformed, we can posit that the quality of their life will be limited unless 
institutions such as schools, medical services, social work departments, can intervene to 
help, with sensitivity and humanity. I shall also propose that the CA should be 
incorporated into education as a way of thinking about how well those we teach are able to 
do and to be, and how we are to understand and promote their emotional wellbeing. In 
Scottish school education, such an approach, along with the suggestions I make here on 
what could be included in curricula, would link very well with the aims of a Curriculum 
for Excellence. 
 
I have already referred to two key terms of the CA: functioning and capability. Briefly, a 
‘capability’ is the opportunity to achieve the plans and goals a person has reason to value, 
whereas a functioning ‘is an active realization of one or more capabilities’ (Nussbaum, 
2011:24-5). I have also alluded to what Nussbaum refers to as the ten ‘central capabilities’. 
This is a list of ten central capabilities, which, Nussbaum argues, governments or, indeed, 
institutions such as schools or universities, concerned to promote and sustain social justice 
should take as integral to realising that goal. The CA was originally developed by Amartya 
Sen (1999, 2009) to provide and informational focus’ (2009:232) for judging and 
comparing overall [dis]advantage and life quality including, for instance, levels of poverty, 
disability and the opportunities for various kinds of freedoms. Unlike Nussbaum, Sen does 
not specify a formula, such as the central capabilities, for how governments or institutions 
should use that information, or provide an account of basic justice. The CA insists that 
each person be taken as an end, not as an object of another’s exploitative use, and that each 
person be given opportunities (sometimes translated as freedoms) to pursue goals that she 
or he has reason to value277. Nussbaum has incorporated into the CA notions of dignity, 
threshold levels of functioning (the minimum capability needed for a person to flourish in 
each of the central areas) and the idea of political liberalism, the latter in order to 
‘prescind’ advocates of the CA from ‘offering any account of comprehensive value’ 
(2011:19)278. That is, the theory is partial so as to achieve overlapping consensus on what 
is of value to people of different political and religious persuasions in a liberal democracy. 
If we apply the CA to Nancy, and to the women described here, it becomes immediately 
clear that they are not flourishing and certainly not free, or able, to enjoy a fulfilling life. 
Rather, their lives exemplify instrumentality, inertness, reduced autonomy and subjectivity, 
fungibility, violability, and ownership by partners. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277But not trivial, selfish or exploitative goals, for example. 
278See Chapter 4 for the importance of a liberal approach for the view of personhood adopted here. 
 
 
190 
 
While, on Nussbaum’s version, the capabilities are to be regarded as non-fungible (not to 
be traded up or down or exchanged for more or less of another capability), some 
capabilities can be seen as particularly fertile and so particularly beneficial for functioning 
(2011a:45) and for the promotion of other capabilities. Emotions, (Capability Five) as I 
have intimated above, and will shortly demonstrate in some detail, is a fertile capability 
that promotes fertile functionings. Women anywhere, who experience injustice because of 
their sex, embody capability failure on so many levels. It is, tragically, the case that many 
women are in prison because of abuse and exploitation, suffering from emotion 
dysfunction. Unless fertile capability is restored to them, not only will they be unable to do 
and to be, many of these women will go on to become repeat victims, with increasingly 
degraded functionings, a theme I shall return to later.  
 
 
6.3 The Emotional and Physical Effects of Intimate Partner Violence. 
 
Fear 
Intentional components:  
a] cognitive evaluation:  negative  
b] belief:   harm, danger; vulnerability, current or future events 
outwith one’s control  
c] threat to eudaimonia:  many, concerning oneself and/or others: e.g., threats to 
personal safety, artistic freedom, physical, moral and 
emotional integrity, affiliation, one’s own life  
d] object many and heterogeneous: intimates, oppression, 
violence, imprisonment, the state, etc.  
 
Link to other emotions:  guilt, regret, shame, anger. 
 
Intimate partner violence is one of the most common causes of injury amongst women 
(Campbell, 2002:1331). The dominant emotion is fear, allied with anxiety (see the 
intentional components above). The injuries and fear associated with battering can result in 
chronic ill-health such as recurring pain (headaches) or recurring nervous system 
symptoms such as seizures. Battered women also report gastrointestinal symptoms, such as 
irritable bowel syndrome related to chronic stress and cardiac problems such as 
hypertension. According to Campbell, gynaecological problems are the ‘most consistent, 
longest lasting and largest physical health difference between battered women and non-
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battered women’ (2002:1332). These problems include sexually transmitted diseases279, 
vaginal bleeding, chronic pelvic pain, and urinary tract infections, and such problems were 
three times higher for victims of physical and sexual abuse than amongst who experienced 
just physical abuse (p.1332).  
 
Turning to emotional health more specifically, Lang and Sharma-Patel (2011), in a review 
of the literature on the relation between childhood maltreatment and self-injury, note that 
children will develop healthy emotions if those emotions are safely and sensitively 
reflected and accepted by their carers. Healthy emotional development also requires that 
adults tolerate and model children’s emotions so ‘that children learn to identify, accept, 
express, and then manage intense affect in an organized, cohesive manner’ (p.29). By 
contrast, emotionally maltreated children do not have their own affective states ‘reflected, 
accepted, or clarified’, rather they are often ‘discouraged, punished, ignored or otherwise 
rendered helpless in making emotional expressions’ (p.28). Children can become 
‘silenced’, scared to their own emotions, and without an outlet for emotional expression. 
The result of poor modeling, or ‘silencing’, the authors report, is often affect dysregulation 
and mood lability280 (mood instability) with poor outcomes. Children will either express 
affective sates that are not moderated by cognitive input, potentially leading to self-harm to 
alleviate powerful emotions or they will process cognitive information without the role of 
affect, thereby inducing a sense of ‘psychic numbness’, a form of ‘dissociation’ in order to 
escape from trauma (Lang and Sharma-Patel, 2011:30). A study by Tull et al. (2007) on 
the impact of heightened negative affect (NA) on victims of childhood violence found that 
the intensity of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) was influenced by negatively 
evaluated emotional responses. Victims had poor emotional regulation as a result of a 
limited awareness of emotional responses, non-acceptance, and/or negative evaluation of 
and reaction to one’s responses (p.581). NA intensity and psychological problems can 
result from unhealthy emotional responses, such as avoiding emotional experiences, which 
reduce functional emotional processing (p.584) and the capacity to read the environment 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279‘Battering’ encompasses patterns of behaviour that are used to establish and maintain control over an 
intimate partner, including sexual control. The behaviours are many, and include: isolation from family and 
friends, criticism, forced sexual contact, manipulation, sexist comments, harassment, rape, destruction of 
personal property, unwanted touching, stalking, sabotaging attendance at job or school, brainwashing, threats 
of being killed.  For a full list, see the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence at 
http://www.ncadv.org/learn/TheProblem.php 
280Emotional lability is usually a neurological disorder that manifests as uncontrollable laughter or crying, 
states which bear little relationship to the underlying mood, or are greatly in excess of the mood or eliciting 
stimulus. Emotional lability can have a significant impact on individuals' social functioning and their 
relationships with others. Sudden, frequent, extreme and uncontrollable emotional outbursts may lead to 
social withdrawal, interfering with daily living, and social and professional pursuits, and have a negative 
impact on overall healthcare. See Green (1998), Olney et al. (2011).  
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for emotional clues. The result for victims is increased vulnerability to PTSD. Nooner et al. 
include the following consequences of PTSD brought on by trauma. 
 
Trauma that is associated with more shame and deviance is associated with higher 
rates of PTSD (e.g., for sexual abuse 57 percent have PTSD versus 10 percent for 
natural disasters). 
Serious physical health problems increase the risk of PTSD in adolescence. 
Over 80 percent of individuals with PTSD have a comorbid substance-use 
disorder, typically beginning in adolescence. 
PTSD in adolescence is also associated with suicide, substance abuse, poor social 
support, academic problems, and poor physical health. PTSD may disrupt 
biological maturational processes and contribute to the long-term emotion and 
behavior regulation problems that are often evident in adolescents with the 
disorder. 
Adolescent females with PTSD were three times more likely to have asthma, five 
times more likely to have irritable bowel syndrome, and twice as likely to have a 
sexually transmitted disease (Nooner et al., 2012:7). 
 
 
Shields and Cicchetti (2001), examining the relationship between parental maltreatment 
and the likelihood of bullying and repeat victimisation, investigated 169 maltreated boys 
and 98 maltreated girls at a summer camp for inner city children in the USA. They 
concluded that adults maltreated as children are more likely to batter their partners, abuse 
their children and become repeat victims of partner abuse or sexual assault. Children of 
abusive or neglectful parents may come to believe that ‘coercion, violence and 
exploitation’ are a normal part of all relationships281, influencing their behaviour towards 
aggression and intimidation, or appeasement (p.349). The authors noted that maltreated 
children demonstrated more anti-social and fewer proscocial behaviours, so showing low 
respect for the feelings and rights of others (p.348). Research also shows that some 
maltreated children show submissive and ingratiating behaviour in order to appease their 
parents and avoid violence (p.348)282. Such children may become vulnerable to later 
exploitation and abuse because, once targeted for bullying, maltreated children are less 
likely to be assertive or to defend themselves since such behaviour is what they have come 
to expect, as noted earlier. In new social situations, ill treated children may be socially 
compromised, reacting with hyper-arousal and fear, which may further contribute to their 
risk of victimisation (p.348). As Shields and Cicchetti point out, ‘whereas arousal and 
vigilance may be adaptive in dangerous homes, they would undermine social functioning 
with peers’ (p.348). Other maladaptive emotional responses include showing limited 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281For supporting, and disturbing, evidence on the experience of domestic violence on young teenage 
behaviour, see the report by the NSPCC 2009 and 2011.  
282Cichetti and Toth (1995). 
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capacities for guilt or remorse; little empathy for peers; impoverished emotional 
connections; difficulties in processing social information to respond in emotionally 
appropriate ways; difficulties in adjusting socially because of limited emotional 
competence.  
 
Shields and Cicchetti’s analyses also revealed that gender did not moderate bullying 
behaviour (p.358). Maltreated girls are as likely to bully and to harass as maltreated boys. 
Consistent with other studies, victims are more anxious and distressed, bullies are angry, 
and both passive victims and bullies have emotional regulation problems (see also 
Shipman et al., 2007). Effective regulation of emotions helps us to make decisions about 
when and how to express emotions. Parents who respond harshly to emotional expression, 
or who respond inconsistently or rarely, are likely to teach their children to suppress 
‘wrong’ emotions, or express them inappropriately283. Shipman et al.’s (2007) findings 
also reveal that maltreated children are at risk of emotional and behavioural difficulties 
which could interfere with the attainment of academic and social goals, placing them on an 
‘altered development trajectory, increasing the risk for the development of psychosocial 
difficulties’ (p.278). In the case of child sexual abuse (CSA), the victims, unsurprisingly, 
encounter the same emotional regulation difficulties. CSA victims have less understanding 
of emotion, inhibit negative emotions to a greater degree, use fewer emotion words, and 
display greater affective suppression than do non abused children (Walsh et al., 
2011:1104)284. As with the studies of maltreated adults and children above, emotion 
regulation defects will be manifest in victims who learn to cope with their chronic stress 
and anxiety by repressing their emotions and avoiding heightened NA. While avoidance is 
an important adaptive strategy in abusive homes, in the long run, the victims are more 
likely to be vulnerable to psychopathology285 such as PTSD and dissociation (Walsh et al., 
2011:1104)286. Victims also report more difficulty identifying emotional states, a disorder 
referred to as alexithymia287, and may engage in emotionally avoidant behaviour such as 
drug and alcohol abuse, sexual promiscuity and self-injury (Corston, 2006; Plugge et al., 
2006; Walsh et al., 2011). As with victims of domestic violence, victims of early child 
sexual abuse are at greater risk of repeat victimisation.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283See Chapter 1. For the fictional account of such effects, see Chapter 5 and Cat’s Eye. 
284See Shipman et al. (2007). 
285Recall that fear is the core emotion in psychopathology (fn.183, p.126). 
286See Litz and Gray (2002). 
287A state of deficiency in understanding, processing, or describing emotions. Alexithymia places individuals 
at risk of other medical and psychiatric disorders while reducing the likelihood that these individuals will 
respond to conventional treatments for the other conditions. See Haviland et al. (2000).  
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In Walsh et al.’s (2011:1109) study of 160 female inmates in a US correctional facility, 84 
had experienced sexual abuse, 90 of the participants reported at least one rape since age 14, 
and 60 reported at least one instance of physically forced vaginal penetration. Other 
women, however, self harm288 to relieve intolerable feelings of anxiety, stress and 
depression. 
 
For me it is easier just to pick up a knife or a razor blade … and feel all the 
tension come out of my body. It was a very blissful and calming experience. 
…[if] you’ve seen me after I’ve cut my wrists, I’ve got this smile on my face. 
It’s like all of a sudden all this energy and all this negativity have come out 
and I’m feeling, yeah, I’m on top of the world. (Plugge et al,2006:58) 
 
The relief comes from having power over her own body, the power to inflict self-harm, 
since, until she receives help, she has no other way of relieving her distress and anxiety.  
This is an understandable and rational exercise of power in the sense that it is she, the 
prisoner, who is reasoning about the best way to relieve her tensions in the absence of 
meaningful palliative help. Indeed, given that self-harm can be seen as a ‘form of self-
preservation’, a ‘prelude’ to suicide and so survival because someone else may be alerted 
to the distress or suicidal feelings of the harmer (Royal College of Psychiatrists Report, 
2010:23), self-harm is a rational act. Studies interviewing people who have harmed 
themselves show remarkable consistency in expressing the desire to manage ‘unbearable 
pain or unbearable situations’ (p.23). In a study of people who self-injure and have a 
diagnosis of borderline personality disorder, about 90% indicated that they felt less angry 
and anxious and more peaceful after self-injury (Klonsky, 2007). Participants in another 
study also reported that self-harm helped them to ‘function better, helping them to stay 
connected with reality’ (Csipke and Horne, 2008, cited in Klonsky, 2007:23). Self-harm is 
very different from the power of external subjection which impairs the capacity to reason, 
to make authentically informed decisions (in the sense that decisions are the subjected 
person’s own), and creates distortions of what is natural (subjection rather than 
opportunities for freedom)289. CSA victims were significantly more likely to experience 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288See the literature review by Lang and Sharma-Patel (2012) mentioned earlier. The correlation is high. 
Common effects include alexithymia, PTSD, feelings of suicide and depression. Guilt, shame and disgust 
increase after self-injury (p.28), contributing to further self-injury in order to vanquish negative emotions. 
Affective disorders also underlie borderline personality disorders (BPD). Self-harm moderates overwhelming 
emotional states. Cf. the girls in Cats Eye. 
289Lukes (2005) discusses the concept of power as capacity in a highly illuminating way. Power could be 
transformative and a force for moral good, being able to live authentically and autonomously. The powers I 
discuss here do not realise transformative change in a positive way, but in ways that malform and corrupt the 
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adolescent and adult rape and were significantly more likely to experience emotional 
regulation problems. Re-victimised women had significantly higher impulse-control scores 
compared to women reporting only rape (pp.1109-10), that is revictimised women 
experienced greater difficulty in controlling their behaviour. In addition to trauma 
symptoms, emotion dysregulation, non-acceptance of emotional responses, lack of 
emotional awareness and clarity, maladaptive coping mechanisms such as drug abuse, 
victims may be vulnerable to further assault because of alexithymia (Cloitre et al., 1997). 
Because the victims cannot differentiate between different emotional states, compounded 
by their difficulties in accepting emotional arousal and denying emotional states, they 
cannot regulate their emotions. This may lead to frustration and anger, feelings of 
inadequacy and shame, and an inability to regulate chronically negative states such as 
intense fear (Walsh et al., 2011:1112). Research290 also shows that victims are more likely 
to endorse negative emotional appraisals such as shame, anger and disgust, so that their 
self-appraisals of worthlessness, stupidity, and the effects of powerlessness might take root 
even more deeply in their psyches. The combined effects of these complex negative states, 
allied with coping strategies such as intoxication and/or emotion control, mean that women 
are less likely to discern risks in their social environments due to poor ‘attentional 
capacity’ (Walsh et al., 2011:1112).  
 
What these analyses clearly indicate is corrosive capability and function failure of 
Emotions, that is, Capability 5, one of the ten central capabilities on Nussbaum’s list. 
Capabilities, recall, describe what a person is able to do and to be or, in Sen’s terms, 
opportunities and choices to live different lives and to achieve actual functionings. As 
demonstrated here, emotions are a powerful and fertile means by which we can do and be, 
choose and act, but when they become corrupted, distorted, disabled or maladapted, we 
may act less well, and find it difficult to do and be. We may also find that emotional 
malfunctioning arises when the opportunities to develop healthy emotions are closed 
down. To understand how this occurs, and to offer an antidote, at least a step towards one, 
I now consider key elements of the Capability Approach.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
person. I cannot digress into such a discussion for reasons of space, save to use the concept in its commonly 
accepted sense of ‘power over’. 
290Including that conducted, for example, by Gratz et al. (2007).  
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6.4 Capability Failure: The Capability Approach. 
To become a fully realised person is to be able to make and have plans for one’s present 
and future, and to have a stake in realising those plans; and it is about being in a positive 
mental and emotional state from which we can imagine the forms our life might take. 
Capabilities are not simply about a person’s natural abilities and talents, for no matter how 
much talent or innate ability we have, if we are given few opportunities to develop these, 
they will remain in a nascent state, and we will not be fully realised individuals. As I 
argued in Chapter 5, imagination is vital to seeing what life might be like for others, to 
imagining what is possible, and to extending the borders of our own experience to 
encompass the realities of others and ourselves. Such imaginative construals are also 
important for compassion, sympathy and positive empathy. The novel, as I have started to 
suggest can help us in these respects, though it may be less effective for the person who 
has experienced high levels of abuse. If an abused individual lacks insight or 
understanding of her own emotional state, because of alexithymia or emotion 
dysregulation, she is unlikely to respond with insight and understanding to a novel. But 
that is not to say the novel could not be used as a therapeutic and educational tool. 
 
Being free to become a fully realised person is also, importantly, about having a life of 
breadth and diversity in terms of being free to pursue interests, hobbies, physical, 
intellectual and emotional activities, friendships and family, professional life. It is also 
about being free to examine, explore and take up or reject opportunities for new life 
experiences. How well we can achieve richly realised selves is dependent, however, on a 
‘combination of personal abilities and the political, social and economic environment’ 
(Nussbaum, 2011a:20). Nussbaum refers to these ‘freedoms’ as ‘combined capabilities’ 
(p.21) which are the ‘totality of the opportunities [one] has for …for choice and action in 
[a] specific political, social, and economic situation’ (p.21). In developing our capabilities, 
we develop our range of human powers, enabling us to become distinctively individual and 
unique, but in relations with others since we are by nature, as Aristotle observed, social 
animals. 
  
Further, the power of the capability approach lies in its facility and potential as a tool by 
which to judge and compare overall advantage and life quality, such as opportunities for 
various kinds of freedoms. We can already begin to see the difficulties that Nancy, and 
other women discussed here, face in realising capabilities. At the most basic level, Nancy 
is not in a position to ‘imagine’ a future without fear. Incarcerated in the present by abuse, 
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her imaginative powers are paralysed by fear and anxiety. Nancy is alienated from herself, 
from her body and from her mind; she is neither free nor purposive because she is subject 
to the cruel and arbitrary power of her father. She may also, if her Uncle becomes 
determined to pursue her, become alienated from her own sexuality if the right to her own 
bodily integrity becomes her Uncle’s, an entitlement to use whenever he so desires. 
Nancy’s social environment is directly impacting on her opportunities to do and be, and 
very specifically on her emotional expressiveness. As we have seen, in order to cope with 
adverse circumstances, Nancy’s ability to cope with emotional regulation becomes stunted, 
limiting awareness of her emotional responses, compounded by non-acceptance of her 
affective states. When she does have emotional episodes, these will most likely contain 
negative evaluations. Her shame, for this is likely to be one of the emotions she regularly 
experiences, at her inability to control what is happening to her and those she cares for, 
will penetrate very deeply into her being, working closely alongside fear to paralyse her, 
and to conceal Nancy and her plight from the world. Nancy will turn inwards towards 
negative self-appraisals, undermining her self-confidence, and her feelings of self worth 
and dignity, as she denigrates her own personality. This is a girl with combined capability 
failure, and Nancy is only 14 years old. 
 
Shame, of course, has an important moral function, which is to signal to us when our 
conduct falls below our own and others’ standards, and when we have not exercised 
enough compassion or sympathy for those affected by our actions. However, here, in the 
case of Nancy, the function of shame is being distorted. It is very closely allied with 
humiliation, a public exposure of Nancy’s ‘weakness’, her vulnerability; in other words, it 
is allied to malign forces in her environment, which puts her at a great disadvantage291. By 
way of contrast, consider masculine shame at being dishonoured by a woman, the effects 
of shame differing by gender, and the consequences for a woman judged to have brought 
shame to the family honour292. Okin (2005:234) reminded us how men are ‘radically 
dependent on the work and efforts of women’. Men are also, however, radically dependent 
on women for their states of being. As I intimated earlier, and will return to shortly, 
women must not only ballast and support men’s pride and masculinity, they are 
instrumental in supporting male autonomy and subjectivity, and their states of not being 
inert, owned, fungible, violated and used as instruments; the very states that many women 
are denied in the process. However, entrenched beliefs about gender serve neither sex well, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
291For a developed account of shame, see Nussbaum (2004a). 
292See, for example, Honour, by Elif Shafak (2012). 
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disabling men and women from realizing their full potential, from realizing complex ends 
and from realizing their capabilities. Because of unjust self-preference, men and women 
may suffer combined capability failure. In the case of honour killings, capability failure 
reaches the extreme: fathers, brothers and uncles resort to murder or serious injury; women 
must forfeit their lives, or live abjectly constricted lives. In these cases, I suggest, the 
capacity for compassion will also be suppressed, overridden by tradition and custom.  
 
‘Internal capabilities’ refer to intellectual and emotional capacities, states of mental and 
physical health, levels of learning and understanding, and personality traits, dispositions to 
belief, and so on. These capabilities are ‘fluid and dynamic’ (Nussbaum, 2011a:21) 
because they are developed, for example, in the family, school, social and professional 
environments. While the two kinds of capability overlap, Nussbaum draws a distinction 
between internal and combined capabilities to allow us to judge whether each is being 
developed well. In the case of Nancy, we might judge that her combined capabilities are 
not being well developed. A just society, Nussbaum argues (2011:21), will see to it that 
opportunities exist to permit the healthy development of both sets of capabilities. For 
example, education to secondary level (age 18) is free in the UK, while provisions exist to 
allow young adults to attend further and higher education. To that extent, many young 
adults have the opportunity to develop their internal capabilities for learning and 
understanding, in the process developing their emotional, intellectual and social capacities. 
Health care is also free, so that the internal capability for good health should be realised 
without reference to class, race, gender or age. In this country too, the internal capability 
for developing critical thought may be realised externally in freedom of expression, and for 
that capability to be realised, education is necessary. As should be clear from these brief 
examples, internal capabilities cannot be fully realised unless social, political and 
economic conditions conduce to their flourishing. Combined capabilities, then, consist of 
internal capabilities and the social, political and economic conditions (2010:22) in which 
they can be realised. 
 
What then of capability five, Emotions? Like all our capabilities and capacities, emotions 
need nurturing and developing, especially if they are to be morally appropriate, as I have 
argued in this thesis. Emotions are expressions of our values, commitments and goals, of 
who we are in the present, the past, and possibly, the future (see Chapters 1 and 2). They 
are the rational expressions of our beliefs or evaluations of what is happening in our 
internal and external landscapes. Emotions can also be rational responses to external 
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events, important coping mechanisms that allow us to adapt to changes in our environment. 
Emotions also indicate the familial and cultural influences on our socialisation. The extent 
to which we are able to express our emotions is a function of all of these complex, 
interacting factors. Women, as I argued in Chapters 2-4, are generally nurtured to be 
compassionate, to be less aggressive than men and to control anger. Men, on the other 
hand, are generally nurtured in the opposite direction: many feelings and emotions are 
‘feminine’ and so ‘unmasculine’. In some respects, men’s and women’s capacity to access 
the full range of human emotions is not fully realised. It is restricted, limited, or, in 
extreme cases, stunted and deformed. In any of these situations, emotional ‘functioning’ is 
affected, where ‘functioning’ is understood as an ‘active realisation of one or more 
capabilities’, the ‘end-point’ of capability articulation (Nussbaum, 2011:25).  
How does this analysis fit in with Nancy’s ability to function? Nancy does not know how 
she feels most of the time; she feels ‘dead’. Her emotions are paralysed, save for those 
which keep her vigilant and on the look out for harm. On some occasions, she is unable to 
think, she is too emotionally drained to work well in school, and she struggles to make 
friends. 
A dae ken how I feel most the time, just deid like. Cannae ‘hink neether. Feel 
as if ma stomach’s been eaten up by hungry rats. Sometimes they’re up for 
running up ma insides so’s to escape, ken? Cannae blame them – rubbish 
place tae be. Imagine? Could spit them oot at ma Dad (she giggles, then sobers 
up). He’d prob’ly throw me oot, or worse. Got these blisters on ma fingers – 
Mum says its stress.  
School? School’s nae use. Cannae dae the work, too tired, and a just dinnae 
get it now. My heid burns, my eyes tae. Teachers nip ma heid all the time, they 
go and on, so I just lose it. No really got friends neether. No there in school. 
 
The tragedy of Nancy’s state is that she can barely function and her capabilities will barely 
be realised. It is probably fair to suggest that Nancy is not even close to a minimum 
threshold level of functioning, and what levels of functioning she has are not ‘secure’293 by 
dint of the organisation of her familial and social life. Emotional health is so fundamental 
to general wellbeing that I would argue that it plays, alongside affiliation and practical 
reason, an ‘architectonic’ role in a good human life. Nussbaum (2011a:39) singled out 
affiliation and practical reason for their particular potency to organise and pervade all other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
293The notion of capability security comes from Wolff and de-Shalit (2007). Capabilities not only need the 
conditions to be realised, they need to be secured for the future. Public policy should be developed to secure 
future capabilities and functionings. They too give a central place to affiliation as an organising capability. In 
education, one way to secure capabilities is to make provision to support children with any additional need. 
In Scotland, for example, the ASN Act (Scotland) (2004) specifies that all pupils should receive additional 
support for learning whenever that support is needed and for whatever reason, including, for example, 
bereavement, illness, or a temporary disability. GIRFEC policy documents also make this provision. 
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capabilities, hence their architectonic power. I agree. Part of what makes emotions 
powerful mechanisms for acting in the world is that they often, if not always, result from 
reason. In love, we can reason about the person we love. In anger, we can reason about the 
sources of our anger. In compassion, we can reason about why the person merits our 
compassion. These types of emotions are dispositional (see Chapters 1-2). It is more 
difficult to reason with oneself in occurrent states such as fear, but recall that fear has an 
evolutionary role in protecting the organism from danger. Sudden anger may also seem to 
displace reason, but there is an appraisal mechanism involved, and usually a healthy person 
can give reasons for their anger. As we have seen here, abusive men will often not confront 
their emotions for fear of what those emotions would reveal about the kind of person they 
are, and for what the emotions would disclose about the effects of their acts. Guilt, 
remorse, shame, disgust and compassion are banished. Abused women often cannot 
distinguish between their emotions because of the mental anguish that such discernment 
brings to them about their current state of being. On my account, whilst we might not 
approve of them or find them morally acceptable, maladaptive responses can be rational, 
and understandable, given the circumstances. 
The lack of discernment is also a rational, [mal]adaptive coping mechanism. Unremitting 
fear and anxiety is incapacitating: such a state results in mental and physical ill health. At 
best, such women might reason ‘I can’t cope’ with my thoughts, daily living, social 
pursuits or professional career. Her functioning in the central capabilities of health, 
affiliation, reason, and so on will, consequently, be negatively affected. This is why I 
suggest emotions are architectonic: they control and direct, pervade and organise, the other 
capabilities. Let us now see if the argument for emotions as an architectonic capability can 
be sustained by applying it to Nancy’s case before I expand the discussion to include an 
analysis of why men might assault their partners.  
 
 
6.5 The Architectonic Potency of Emotions. 
Nancy is humiliated by the power she lacks over her life. Her physical and emotional 
integrity are far from guaranteed, and certainly not secure from further violent 
encroachments. She is powerless to protect her mother and siblings from abuse and 
encroachments on their bodily integrity. She feels, when she does acknowledge feelings, 
shame, anger, humiliation and fear. These are strong and disabling emotions, though she 
may not be able to distinguish between them. Nancy, hyper-vigilant at home to the tiniest 
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inflections of tone, to the merest physical movement of the hands, arms, eyes or alteration 
in posture, as well as hyper-sensitive to her father’s choice of words and the quality of his 
demands, is emotionally unattuned, even obtuse, outside the home. This emotional 
‘deadness’ may disable Nancy even further, as we shall see, if no-one intervenes to palliate 
her circumstances. Nancy is severely disadvantaged. Her life is miserable. She lacks 
opportunities to flourish, her capabilities and functionings are repressed or stunted, and 
what little she has is only insecurely her own. It is doubtful she feels any self-respect or a 
sense of self-worth. She is emotionally stunted and very vulnerable, a likely candidate for 
repeat victimisation, not just by her father or Uncle now but also outside her home, and 
possibly in later life, because she is unable to regulate her emotions. In any case, if Nancy 
has normalised violence, she is likely to tolerate high levels of violence, coercion and 
oppression in her own intimate relationships.  
 
Emotional dysregulation affects Nancy. Access to friends, education and health are all 
compromised. She is vulnerable to repeat victimisation, drug and alcohol addiction and 
promiscuous behaviour, all of which compound her disadvantages. Nancy’s maladaptive 
emotional responses mean that her power to reason and to affiliate will be limited. She is 
likely to show limited capacities for guilt or remorse if she becomes violent with her peers. 
If she is passive, she is unlikely to be aroused to action if she sees that someone deserves 
her attention and her help. She may have little empathy or compassion for her peers 
because her ability to make emotional connections is impoverished. Nancy is so anxious or 
traumatised by her experiences that she simply does not have the resources to be pro-social 
towards others. Nancy may develop difficulties in processing social information in order to 
respond in emotionally appropriate ways, lacking the psychological and emotional acuity 
to interpret potential harm from predators. Because of her limited emotional competence, 
Nancy may develop difficulties in adjusting socially, whether in school, in college, or in 
work in later life. This is how capability failure in Nancy’s emotions affects her 
opportunities for doing and being: virtually every capability is pervaded and disorganised 
by emotional corrosion. This is why I describe emotions as an architectonic capability. But 
how does this capability failure manifest itself in men?  
 
Borochowitz (2008), in a study of 18 batterers in Israel, explored the narratives that the 
men used to justify their violence. The data was collected during two open in-depth 
interviews that focused on the emotional life stories of the participants, 
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as presented and interpreted by them. Each participant told his life story from his earliest 
recollection to the present, with an emphasis on his emotions.  Borochowitz noted the 
common patterns that characterise violent men294, many of them came from emotionally 
alienated, hostile and abusive families. Their dominating emotions were anger and 
jealousy, fuelled by possessiveness resulting from stereotypical attitudes about women 
(p.1168). The men, further, not only struggled to recognise the emotions of their partners, 
they found it difficult to recognise and express their own emotions (p.1168). They lacked 
empathy for their partners (Dobash and Dobash, 2011). In their narratives, the men 
‘erased’ their wives as independent beings, along with their emotions, perceptions and own 
life narratives (p.1170), in the same way that Nancy’s father has erased his children and 
partner. The justification the men gave for their physical and emotional violence was that 
they saw themselves and their inner world as ‘hurt and shattered by the other. 
Consequently, the other must be devalued or changed’ (p.1170). This was a particular 
consequence of these men’s idealisations of what a woman should be and do. If she fails to 
live up to his expectations, fails to fit into his narrative conception of their life together, a 
narrative defined purely on his terms, she has to be corrected. The men permit no deviation 
in emotional and behavioural expression; to do so would be an assertion of their partners’ 
individuality and separate existence. In erasing all the features of her existence as an 
independent person, the violent man erases his partner’s autonomy and, with it, her 
capacity to think, reason, feel, to do and be. He renders her functionless, a ‘mere branch of 
the batterer’s inauthentic self’ (p.1170). One of Borochowitz’s respondents articulates the 
objectification of his wife indicating his anger that she did not fit into his ideal of 
womanhood: 
…as someone who grew up a prince…all of a sudden finds himself with a woman 
that doesn’t take care of him, doesn’t spoil him… Well, I felt betrayed … she 
betrayed my principles. She betrayed the relationship I thought we had. (p.1176) 
What is also striking in this narrative, as I read it, is the self-centredness of the respondent. 
Proust (2003/2) wrote eloquently that self-centredness makes each man a ‘king, enabling 
him to see the ordered ranks of the universe beneath him’ and to ‘enjoy the luxury of 
absolute monarchy’ (p.351). It is still the case, as we saw in Chapter 4, that many women 
remain subservient to men, being nurtured to believe that they are subservient, or coerced 
into behaving subserviently if they form a relationship with men who do not respect them 
as equals with a right to a separate existence. The preference for males over girls in some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294For example, Bowlby (1988) and Dutton (1996). 
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cultures295, their better treatment, and their acculturation to believe that they are superior to 
women, cannot but help fuel the propensity towards violence when women do not conform 
to their standards of ideal womanhood. J.S. Mill (2006) powerfully remarked that if men 
were not taught to worship their own will as a ‘grand thing’ (p.178), they might be more 
unselfish.  
 
The nurseries of violence, selfishness, self-centredness, abuse are families, or at least, they 
‘overflow from that source’ wherever else they might exist296. While the incidence of 
violence in middle income families may be diminished (Campbell, 2002), that could be 
because women of independent means, who are educated and have a job, can escape their 
violent partners whilst many poor women cannot. One reason for the level of violence that 
continues even in more egalitarian societies such as the UK may be because, still, ‘the 
generality of the male sex cannot yet tolerate the idea of living with an equal’ (J.S. Mill, 
2006:186). Selfishness and unjust self-preference derive their nourishment from the 
unequal relations between men and women. This has no rational basis save that, to follow 
Figaro297, the man ‘went to the trouble of being born, and nothing else’. Dobash and 
Dobash’s (2011:114) drew on qualitative data drawn from a subset of 104 casefiles of men 
convicted of murdering an intimate partner in the UK in order to examine their post-event 
beliefs, rationales, and justifications prior to and after murdering their partners. Dobash 
and Dobash (2011) found that the men, as often happens, either flatly denied murder or 
responsibility for the murder. For some, they noted, denial is ‘absolute, whereas for others 
it is conditional and based on various rationales and notions that absolve the perpetrator of 
responsibility’ (p.120). The reason for denial of responsibility is that abusers and other 
violent offenders are ‘generally non reflective, reluctant to acknowledge and/or address 
their problematic behaviors, and rarely genuinely self-critical’ (p.120). The men saw 
themselves as ‘norm-enforcers’, upholding ‘high values’ such as marriage and 
motherhood. Many displayed no remorse or sorrow for what they had done, seeking 
instead to blame the victim for failing to obey or show them respect, or being flawed as a 
partner, housewife or mother. 46 percent felt no empathy for the murder victim even after a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295See The Economist article on ‘Gendercide’, in which it was claimed that 100,000 million girls have 
disappeared through abortion, murder or neglect. The ‘destruction’ of baby girls, the article claims, is a 
product of three forces: ‘the ancient preference for sons; a modern desire for smaller families; and ultrasound 
scanning and other technologies that identify the sex of a fetus’ (March 4th, 2010), 
(http://www.economist.com/node/15606229). 
296For compelling and critical discussions on the family see, for example, Okin (1989) and J.S. Mill (2006). 
297Mill cites the character Figaro, the valet-hero of Pierre Beaumarchais’ play The Marriage of Figaro 
(1778).   
 
 
204 
lengthy time in prison (p.127)298. Self-pity was used to deny agency and responsibility299 
and, by refusing to be empathetic or feel remorse, they were able to justify violence and 
even murder. Bandura (1991) suggests that men’s violence, rigid denial of responsibility, 
moral culpability and weak empathy, is made ‘righteous through cognitive restructuring’ 
(p.73). That is, their acts are seen as being committed for high moral purpose, while they 
also employ mechanisms to distance themselves from those acts, dehumanising their 
victims so that they become objects of contempt. The men remain wilfully uninformed 
about their behaviour and, as a result, will continue to be violent to their partners. 
 
 
6.6 Concluding Chapter Six. 
Mill, writing in 1869, thought it presumptuous that men could know the real nature of 
women, because women’s natures had been so distorted and disguised by suppression, a 
lack of education and a denial of equality. Contemporarily, we can still see the effects of 
defective attitudes to women in stark terms, particularly in their capability to access the 
rich resources and forces that are their emotions. Persistent sexual inequality, assumptions 
of male entitlement, the denigration of women on account of their ‘weak’ nature and 
emotions (Chapters 1-2), and beliefs about what women are and should be (Chapters 3-4), 
including their commodification continue. We need not presume how such attitudes impact 
on women, however, because we know their effects in reality. Perhaps the most 
unfortunate victims of negative and dehumanising attitudes can be seen in female prison 
inmates. Women with histories of violence and sexual abuse are over represented in the 
prison system, and relationship problems are one of the main pathways for women’s entry 
into prison (Corston, 2006)300.  What can we do to stop Nancy becoming one of these 
women and to help her and others like her?  
 
Schools are amongst the most important places where children should find support, 
positive influences and role models301. Warm and respectful relationships with teachers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298Blake and Gannon (2008). Rapists are more likely to have perspective-taking deficits, believe the violence 
to be less harmful than non offenders, enjoy the victim’s distress, especially if the relationships were 
adversarial. 70% of rapists in a study of 17, regarded women as sex objects and 68% believed they were 
entitled to sex (p.41).  
299See also Adams (2007). 
300See Corston’s (2007) study for a vivid example of the effects for women prisoners of being poor, not in 
control of their lives and with few choices. Almost half of the women had experienced violence at home, one 
in three women had suffered sexual abuse, compared to just under one in ten men; and one in twenty women 
had been raped since the age of 16. 
301Veltman and Browne (2001) also make this point in the case of abused children. 
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who model kind and compassionate behaviour, might help to develop higher levels of self-
esteem and worth, so reducing aggressive behaviour. Sensitive and creative teaching can 
help foster a sense of academic accomplishment which might, again, reduce poor 
behaviour and negative psychopathologies. Another way is to encourage children like 
Nancy to stay interested in order to achieve later educational and professional success and 
to encourage children to take part in activities to boost their confidence. These are obvious 
ways to help them feel safe, secure and worth something to somebody. Reading novels to 
engage the imagination and transport the mind to another safer world in the comfort of the 
school library or with a sensitive teacher might be another strategy and I pursue this in the 
next chapter. Unfortunately, however, maltreated children consistently struggle at school 
and are more likely than others to be excluded (Veltman and Browne, 2001:230). As noted, 
there are very promising policies and legislative proposals in Scotland to help all children 
with needs, including maltreated children, but there is a gap between policy aspirations and 
what schools are able to do in practice. That gap exists not just because of the complexity 
of these children’s backgrounds, behaviours, personalities, attitudes and affective states, 
but because of resource shortages, inappropriate training, and teachers who might feel 
overwhelmed with the number and complexity of their responsibilities. An oft repeated 
refrain from teachers is ‘I’m not a social worker’. So, what can schools do to support 
Nancy and, indeed, all pupils in their emotional development?  
 
I shall now turn, in the concluding chapter of this thesis, to ways in which we might help 
teachers provide sensitive, caring and compassionate support for all of the pupils they 
teach, including young people such as Nancy and others who suffer the sort of abuse I have 
outlined here. I concur with Auerbach (2003: 549) that ‘…there is always going on within 
us a process formulation and interpretation whose subject matter is our own self’. This is 
true for Nancy, young learners, and their educators alike (indeed every citizen) and 
interpreting literature is part of this process, and a support to developing our capabilities. 
By working together, Nancy and I, we may bring our overlapping, complementary, 
perspectives, experiences, beliefs and insights to bear on the novels we read so that we can 
come to, perhaps, a view of the human condition, a view of who we are and what we might 
become. Novels give us pause for thought, a space in which to contemplate ourselves and 
others, in thought-provoking, compassionate and imaginative ways. I propose that reading 
novels may help develop our emotions, senses imagination and thought, and practical 
reasoning, helping us to become autonomous individuals concerned for justice and 
wellbeing.  
 
 
206 
Chapter Seven: Moving Forward. 
 
7.1 Introduction. 
In this final chapter I will, initially, reiterate the principle arguments of this thesis and then 
propose a number of recommendations, derived from these central arguments, on ways in 
which we might move forward on emotional wellbeing and gender equality in education. A 
number of the proposals I make here pertain to teacher education and activity in schools 
and these recommendations are both tentative and brief. What I propose here could, as 
noted earlier, equally well be advocated in other public institutions such as prisons, 
hospitals and care homes, but as my professional expertise lies in secondary education, this 
is what I concentrate on here.  
 
In greater depth, I focus, in this final chapter, on the use of the novel to illustrate 
philosophical points but also as a vehicle for the education of emotions and, especially, for 
the cultivation of compassionate minds. Here, I bring together the novels I have drawn on 
in this thesis, arguing that fine novels can help us to explore and to understand what it 
means to have enduring traits and emotional sensibilities. Novels can help us to inculcate 
moralised emotions as an integral part of good character in ways that might support the 
emotional health of pupils such as Nancy. This is a fairly lengthy discussion, focused on 
ways in which the exploration of the emotions in this thesis might play itself out in 
pedagogy and the curriculum. I then outline some limitations of this thesis and note, in so 
doing, some areas for further research. In the fourth section, I articulate the impact that 
researching and writing this thesis has had on my own professional practice and attitudes 
whilst noting, here, how I believe that this enquiry represents an original contribution to 
the field. Finally, I close by giving Nancy the final word as she speaks of her favourite 
book and her emotional reactions to it.  
 
 
7.2 Summing Up. 
In the introductory chapter to this thesis, I stressed the importance of emotions as essential 
elements of human intelligence and wellbeing. Accordingly, I noted that the central issue 
the thesis would address was that the emotions deserve and demand more scrutiny and 
theoretical attention than populist accounts provide if we are to educate young people who 
can enjoy emotional wellbeing. I went on to argue that emotions are complex, sometimes 
subtle, sometimes overt, evaluations of what is important to us. They can be rational and 
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intelligent because they are responses to information streaming in to us from the external 
world. They are intelligent because to judge, appraise, or reason, is to exercise the 
intellectual faculty (Deigh, 2000:298)302. Emotions are responses to what we value, to our 
perceptions and beliefs about who we are, what matters to us, how we see ourselves in 
relation to others and how we think our goals and aspirations are being realised or 
hindered. These were the principle arguments of Chapters 1 and 2. Emotions connect us to 
our past, keeping alive thoughts, images, feelings, events, long after they occur. Emotions 
also keep us rooted in the present while bringing us information about the possible world 
of the near future, information on which we might act, if we can. Emotions matter to our 
reason, wellbeing and functioning, as I have demonstrated throughout, because emotions 
can themselves be rational, arising as they do in reasoning creatures.  
 
I argued, particularly in Chapter 4, and following Aristotle and Kant, that human beings as 
rational creatures are of absolute value, ‘beyond price’ but also vulnerable. The ends we 
pursue are varied and plural, reflecting our dispositions, intellect, virtuous character, plans 
and goals. The goals we pursue are important to us because we are ourselves ends and we 
are end-setters303. If I accord myself status as a human being with a rational nature, then 
surely every other person has the same claim to make. Being rational, end-setters of 
intrinsic worth (we are persons, not things), we ought not, therefore, to be made subject to 
others’ wills if, in the process, our autonomy, dignity and intrinsic worth is degraded or 
denied for the sake of some other’s ends. To so subject or sacrifice ourselves would be to 
deny our basic humanity, and we saw the fictional consequences of such acts in HD, The 
Road and Cat’s Eye. Ethically, I argued, we should respect ourselves by pursuing what is 
good for us to enjoy a good life, or eudaimonia, while promoting the good ends of others. 
We ought also to respect the right of others to make and follow decisions that accord with 
their personhood, that is with who they are and what they want to do and be. If we give 
reasons for actions that justify the instrumental use of another person, we are, in effect, 
subjecting the reason of that person to the will of our own reason, erasing or denying that 
she is a valuable, thinking, goal setting person in her own right with legitimate intelligent 
feelings and emotions.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302And so on this account, screaming one’s head off at one’s shadow, punching a wall, or throwing darts at a 
picture, could be construed as rational and intelligent, if, in responding thus, an inanimate object is 
substituted for the real person. As outlets for these intense emotions, the responses, we may suppose, rest on 
reasons, such as to alleviate the discomfort of anger, frustration or thwarted loved. Alternatives may have 
been assessed and an (symbolic) action chosen – screaming, punching and throwing darts – bringing, 
thereby, some kind of satisfaction and consequent discharge of the emotion without causing harm to a 
sentient being.  
303GW:4:428-9. 
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Rearing a child304 to nurture ethical regard and respect for the absolute worth of all others 
can be facilitated by cultivating a healthy emotional repertoire to which that child has free 
access. Individuals should, I have argued here, be able to call on that emotional repertoire 
to help them choose responses at the appropriate time, in the right circumstances, and to 
the right degree. Those responses should be available to persons, not on the basis of their 
sex, but on the basis of their evaluations of human need or action. While all emotions can 
be regarded as guardians of the moral realm305 if appropriately cultivated to respect the 
absolute worth of persons, or to disdain immoral acts, in Chapter 3 I selected compassion, 
following the work of Nussbaum (2001) as the emotion to be guardian of this moral realm. 
Compassion rivets our attention to a person in need or distress, propelling us, sometimes 
with urgency, to palliate her discomfort. Compassion need not require a tragedy to make 
itself present; noticing an unhappy pupil should be enough to motivate me to ask what is 
wrong and if I can do so, to act to help alleviate her discomfort. Compassion, too, might be 
present when we just look at people, moving our thoughts towards the hope that their lives 
are going well but when, for example, our gaze falls on people we know to be routinely 
stigmatised or negatively stereotyped, compassion should be present in greater force. 
Compassion can call on a rich combination of anger, disgust, love, pity, shame, wonder or 
awe to help us judge whether an act or an individual merits our ethical opprobrium or 
concern. I felt compassion for the father and the son in The Road, for the pitiful victims of 
European colonisation in HD and for those bullied in Cat’s Eye. Given its role in our 
ethical life, compassion, as I see it, might be regarded as an ‘arch-guardian’ of the moral 
domain, a kind of ‘architectonic’306 emotion that pervades and organises all other 
emotions, organising and directing what we do, once we have taken in and evaluated what 
the world is doing to a vulnerable, sometimes powerless, person such as Nancy. 
 
Central to my argument in support of attending to the emotions in education, is that, 
suitably cultivated, emotions are not only ethically good guides to action and interpreters 
and judges of moral salience, they are also intelligent because the creature they animate is 
intelligent. However, emotions are still often regarded as irrational, as ‘emotive’ 
unthinking forces of nature that propel us without will or reason. On such accounts, the 
intelligent person is an emotionless person: cool, rational and objective, one who is not 
easily moved by love or compassion, or at least, one who can set these feelings aside for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304Following Aristotle, it is easier to cultivate the requisite habits in a child than in an adult. 
305Following Haidt (2009). 
306Following Nussbaum (2011:39). 
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some greater good. I have sought to show that such a view of emotions and their 
bifurcation from rationality is mistaken and, whilst calling for care in education, I have 
1highlighted a tension occasioned by some accounts of care. Some care ethicists wish to 
disavow rationality because of its remoteness from ‘feeling’ and caring; but, as I argued in 
Chapter 4, such a view misapplies or misunderstands the liberal, ethical conception of the 
person whilst promoting a view of emotions as unthinking. Allied with the still 
commonplace view of emotions as distinct from reason, we can begin to see how the 
absolute value of women as ‘Woman’ has been denied. Her ‘emotional nature’ entails a 
propensity to irrational attitudes and conduct. These beliefs have been embodied in, and 
they sustain, gendered asymmetries in which men are viewed as the legitimate possessors 
of power, being rational and impartial. Women are deemed the natural recipients of male 
power and organisation, being irrational and partial, as I demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5. 
I argued that such a view, whilst convenient to those who enjoy the privileges of gendered 
power, is disabling of women’s and men’s potential to do and to be. In education, boys and 
girls are steered into subjects, careers and behaviours that are motivated by beliefs about 
natural roles and innate capacities, including natural emotional capacities: compassion for 
girls, aggression, or at least, assertiveness and rationality, for boys. In such circumstances, 
school pupils are, arguably, circumscribed end-setters, particularly if their lives are 
contoured around gendered emotions. 
 
I examined how emotions can be used to dehumanise, denigrate and deny dignity to 
women, firstly, because the intelligence of emotions is not generally understood and so 
emotions are frequently regarded as neither intelligent nor rational, but unintelligent.  
Secondly, emotions can be used to deny dignity to women because women and children 
are frequently taken to have fewer complex emotions. Despite the fact that compassion, 
sympathy and empathy may be deeply complex, because they develop in relations to 
others, as I demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 4, these emotions are often dismissed as weak 
and sentimental, fit primarily for caring, for women’s work. Women are caught in a double 
bind, as they are with their emotional expressions (see chapter 5). When they are 
outgrouped, seen as inferior to men, then their emotions are deemed mainly primary: they 
feel anger, disgust or fear, emotions they share in common with animals. If they are 
regarded as natural primary carers, their emotions are conveniently taken to be basic, 
because emotional care is not complex (see chapter 4). However, properly cultivated, as I 
argued, such emotions contain complex evaluations of what is salient and worthy of our 
attention, motivating us to good action. But to do good acts requires practical, reflective 
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activity that is conducive to achieving good ends, promoting our own and others’ 
flourishing in the pursuit of those valued ends. Moralised compassion, as arch-guardian of 
the moral realm, is necessary for ethical conduct and should, I have sought to demonstrate, 
be available to and cultivated in both sexes. 
 
However, the effects on women and children of having their emotions, perceptions and 
experiences denied, can be deeply traumatising, erasing to a large extent who they are and 
what they can and could be as persons. I indicated this in Chapter 6 where I also outlined 
the routes to women’s objectification. These routes included the denial of autonomy, 
experiences, perceptions and opinions, and the fungibility and instrumental use of 
women’s bodies and services in the private sphere. Here, compassion is absent. Women 
are denied their status as rational end-setters and their best and natural role is as carers 
undertaking an undervalued act, as I argued in Chapters 4 and 5, because such acts require 
love, compassion and sympathy, emotions that are less important in the public sphere 
where aggression and objectivity seem to be more purposeful. Where there is a lack of 
respect for children, and especially young girls, this can extend to women, and vice versa, 
as the NSPCC reports of the previous chapter clearly demonstrate. They are treated as 
fungible objects, things without intrinsic value, things for which compassion is 
unnecessary. And so, if compassion, the arch-guardian of our moral conduct, is absent and 
supplanted by contempt and disdain, some women and girls are ready to be, and do 
become, dehumanised. A character such as Nancy, who exemplifies all too many of the 
young women in today’s schools, will require sensitive support if she is to realise her 
capacities to do and to be, to live a life worth living, to express a full range of healthy 
emotions. I will make the case here, and with respect to practical pedagogy, that the novels 
could be used to explore themes that might be sufficiently removed from real life 
experience to allow a sense of confidence in talking about one’s own emotions and life’s 
experiences; at least to help us with our need to understand ourselves and our lives. I will 
suggest that novels can provide exemplars of how we come to treat people well or badly. 
How we come to see people, how we value them as persons, will, to a large extent, 
determine how we treat them.  
 
When we treat people as possessions, as persons we need in order to define our own, 
selfish, states of being, or as persons whose duty it is to subsume their personhood into that 
of her partner, so that he may continue to pursue his own ends, we fail to respect such 
people as ends. Women, or children, who fail to conform to what is expected of them by 
 
 
211 
their partners, or carers, may be ill-treated or have their choices limited. Maltreatment of 
any kind is rarely conducive to wellbeing, and sustained maltreatment, of the kind I 
discussed here, and as exemplified in the bullying in Cat’s Eye, can have catastrophic 
effects on the lives of the maltreated: emotional dysfunction, emotional dysregulation, 
PTSD, mood lability, alexithymia. All such consequences can have serious, deleterious 
consequences for health, affiliation, senses and imagination, and the capacity to reason and 
deliberate with the result that repeat victimisation may be the result. Consequently, and on 
the claims I have made throughout the thesis, because they are powerful forces that 
pervade, organise, control and influence what do, how we are, what we might be and how 
we might act, I propose that emotions should be seen as an architectonic capability. 
 
Proposing that emotions are an architectonic capability indicates an emergent, now to be 
developed and tested, original contribution to the field. Aware of the need for any PhD to 
make a distinct contribution to knowledge, and for its author to demonstrate independent 
critical ability, it is, at this stage, useful to sum-up ways in which this thesis has sought to 
fulfil such criteria. Focussed on the emotions in education, I have co-located philosophy, 
feminism and gender, relevant insights from psychology, sociology and the novel, arguing 
that all of these are important to an understanding of the person if we are to educate that 
person to their fullest potential and to enable them to live a life of emotional wellbeing. 
The philosophy of the person I have constructed derives from Aristotelian and Kantian 
conceptions. My insistence on attention to personhood represents a relatively unusual 
approach in Scottish education which does not often, if ever, begin with a philosophically 
explicit idea of a person, either in its curricula or pedagogy. I am not here thinking of the 
work developed in academic journals or books, many of which deal with these issues 
extensively (see, for example, Carr and Steutel, 1999) but of explicit conceptions of the 
person, as articulated in this thesis, in curricula design or pedagogy. Some of these strands, 
gender for example, or emotional wellbeing and treating pupils with respect, are, of course, 
to be found in education policy and documents, and so are not, perhaps, new. However, the 
strands are, arguably, not well connected in curricular documents and policy, and often 
lack theoretical and philosophical depth and clarity. Further, teacher education curricula, 
practice and policy in education rarely attend to any deep consideration of, for example, 
what an emotion is, that emotions can be educated as well as managed, the roots of gender 
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and sex disparities307, or that institutions can override inappropriate or harmful personal 
values and beliefs, along with natural empathic and compassionate concerns. Scant 
attention is paid to philosophy, to the ethics of educational practice as practice in Initial 
Teacher Education, postgraduate or Continuing Professional Development programmes for 
primary or secondary teachers.  Philosophy and ethics are often regarded as too theoretical, 
too difficult, and of little use in practice. I have sought to suggest otherwise. On my 
account, education should begin by asking what is a person and what does that person need 
to do in order to become a being and doing end-setter who can enjoy emotional, 
intellectual and physical wellbeing. 
 
What I have sought to articulate is the importance of justice to realising capability 
development and functioning that enable emotional wellbeing. Justice rests on the ethical 
principle that human beings, as reasoning, vulnerable creatures, ought to be treated with 
dignity, and to have their personhood, including their autonomy, valued and respected. Just 
institutions have a key role to play, but we should, in education, promote greater awareness 
of what constitutes human emotion. The Capability Approach, with its ethically evaluative 
principles and stress on the non-fungibility of ten central capabilities, one of which is 
Emotions, can be a powerful tool of analysis to see how those we teach are faring.  
Additionally, it can serve as a powerful tool for the evaluation of our professional practice 
and pedagogy, helping us to interrogate our attitudes towards those we teach and towards 
what it is we think we should be teaching and our pupils should be learning.  
 
In order to respect and protect Nancy’s personhood, aided by the development of her 
capabilities and the provision of opportunities to realise her potentialities and plans, she 
will need a number of important goods and services. There needs to be recognition that 
Nancy needs help and that her problems require acknowledgement. She will need, for 
example, therapy and counselling, strong support in school, assistance from Social 
Services and health care services. Nancy needs to feel secure, to live in an environment in 
which, for at least some of the time, she is free from anxiety about her personal safety and 
those for whom she cares. She needs, too, to believe she has a future for which she can 
effectively plan. To secure that future, Nancy needs to be able to access, accept and 
employ her emotions in order to develop practical wisdom (Chapters 1-3). The account, 
recall, is of Nancy as an abused child. She often misses cues about the emotional states and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
307Only recently have notions of gendered teaching practice been introduced into year four of the B.Ed. 
degree at the University of Glasgow and few courses in that four year programme are explicitly concerned 
with philosophy, for example.  
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well-being of others and herself. She represses her emotions and so is not employing them 
in ways that might allow her to deploy her practical reason to its fullest extent (Chapter 6). 
To do so, as I argue in this conclusion, she needs help. Nancy needs to be able to interpret 
and act with a degree of moral literacy (Chapter 4), and to protect herself from destructive 
impulsive behaviour and predatory interests (Chapter 6). If we could get it ‘right’ so that 
she can flourish, then school could offer a haven, a safe place for Nancy, physically, 
intellectually and emotionally.  
 
There are, as I noted in Chapter 6, statutory provisions for children of domestic violence 
and children with additional support needs, emotional and educational, are ensured support 
throughout the public sector via legislation and policies. Some of these legislative and 
policy initiatives have been discussed, as have some of very many reports that focus on the 
needs of young people such as Nancy, including, for example, Shaping a Fairer Future 
bulletins and research papers, legislation such as the Equality Act (2010)308, and campaign 
group publications such as those from the Women’s Aid Federation and EVAW (End 
Violence Against Women Coalition), the NSPCC and the SCCPN. Such publications 
outline what ought to be done to end inequalities, discrimination, violence arising from 
gender stereotypes and beliefs, and all are very valuable and important. The Shaping a 
Fairer Future Report (Prosser, 2006), for example, acknowledges the dramatic changes that 
have taken place in the traditional assumptions about what men and women can do. 
However, that report also notes that the gender gap persists, and along with it, gender 
stereotyping. Subject and career choices are still determined by deep-rooted assumptions 
of gender, and children, as we saw in Chapter 4, still have fixed views about men and 
women’s roles from a very early age. Prosser (2006:20) recommends that teacher training 
should emphasise the need to challenge gender stereotypes and that there should be a 
‘systemic’ change in the way education is delivered in order to reduce gender stereotyping 
(p.16). Used in conjunction with the Capability Approach, these resources could be more 
valuable still, if we ask, from a well informed perspective, how well, or not, women’s 
equality, status and emotional wellbeing are being developed and protected. Many of the 
goals to which policy makers, researchers and campaigners aspire for women are richly 
embedded in the CA: respect, human dignity, women as ends not means who strive for a 
life of flourishing and wellbeing in relationships with those they value and care for and the 
opportunity to enjoy relationships not defined by control and subjection.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308Equality Act, 2010 [c.15] at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/introduction. 
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The CA, in more general terms, may also be useful for examining the extent to which we 
are expected to conform to prevailing norms. It provides an evaluative framework against 
which we might ask, for example, how women should look when the dominant image is a 
variation on Barbie. We might question, too, norms on sexuality in denominational 
schools, perhaps in all schools; the identification of young people with dominant groups, 
local and national, such as gangs in impoverished areas or the ‘in-group’ in schools, and, 
of course, gendered expressions and interpretations of emotions. The CA can also offer 
essential insights into how the ten central capabilities are intrinsically connected and 
woven into each other, such that a deficiency in one capability area can lead to a deficiency 
in another, as I have sought to demonstrate here with Capability 5, Emotions. Each of the 
capabilities potentially fertilises the others, promoting their active realisation (Wolff and 
de-Shalit, 2007), and emotions, I have argued, are especially important in either fertilising 
or inhibiting other capabilities. But how can we move forward with the CA and with the 
emotions capability in particular? There is an increasing awareness of the importance of 
the CA in education, as the upcoming special edition of the Cambridge Journal of 
Education testifies309. We may expect to hear more of the CA in the future if we can 
include the approach in education curricula but there is very significant work to be done on 
emotions before we might expect our teachers to feel equipped to help their pupils attain 
emotional wellbeing.  
 
Based on the key points raised in each of the chapters here, and drawing on their main 
conclusions, I shall now offer some recommendations, premised on the view that a more 
compassionate society is possible if, in education, we can cultivate compassionate minds. 
To do this, teachers will need to understand how human emotions work and the extent to 
which they are crucial to understanding our own and others’ wellbeing. The capability of 
Emotions, a capability I have proposed as architectonic, pervades and organises all of the 
capabilities and merits much deeper attention than it has received hitherto. Thus, I 
emphasise, in the recommendations that follow, ways in which schools and teacher 
education might respond. Unless our teachers of today and tomorrow are better equipped, 
then little change is likely to occur.  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309And in which I have a co-authored paper on the CA and Inclusion (Hedge and MacKenzie, 2012b). 
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7.3 Teacher Education and Emotions in Schools. 
Please note that teacher education, here, includes initial and ongoing teacher education, 
from undergraduate to postgraduate study and Continuing Professional Development 
(CPD). The focus on emotions in teacher education that I propose below would include 
research from psychology that demonstrates that institutions and situations have great 
power over the behaviour and attitudes of the individual. Seminal research by Darley and 
Batson (1973), Zimbardo et al. (1973), Milgram (1974) and Doris (2002), for example, 
shows, quite conclusively, that moral and emotional character can be overwhelmed by the 
norms and practices of the institution, or by the novelty of a new situation in which the 
individual has no previous experience and, consequently, lacks first hand moral literacy. 
We know teachers come to teaching with strong moral and empathic concern for the 
emotional wellbeing of their pupils. Once in schools, unfortunately, despite the fact that 
emotions are inextricably linked with teaching (Zembylas, 2004), newly qualified teachers 
learn to suppress their emotional concerns and to ‘sublimate their feelings to a cognitive 
and management process which disables their ability to express and enact their feelings of 
care for individuals’ (Cooper, 2004:12). Knowing that institutions can have this effect on 
emotional capacity and moral values may help teachers adhere more confidently to their 
own beliefs and values, and to retain their compassionate and sympathetic concerns for 
their pupils (Zimbardo, 2007), hence the following recommendations. 
1. Embed attention to emotions in teacher education curricula. This should take into 
account the philosophical basis of emotions, including their ethical components, and 
the cognitive structure of emotions. There should be an exploration of gendered 
expressions of emotions, and how the gendered cultivation of emotions may limit 
good human functioning, and sustain stereotypes and prejudice. The complexity of 
emotions, both basic and complex310, should be examined. Studies from psychology 
could be used to show how emotions are implicated in the dehumanising of 
‘outgroups’ whilst humanising ‘ingroups’, denying complex emotions such as 
compassion to the ‘outgroups’ who may comprise women, children and ethnic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
310Six emotions, as I argued earlier, are regarded as ‘basic’: joy, fear, anger, etc, so-called because they are 
evolutionary adaptations. They may lack intentional content, depending on the context, but can still be 
‘complex’ in the sense of the evaluations they contain, as expressions of our personal values and dispositions, 
their relationship to objects of value, and consequent responses. Our capacity for complex emotions means 
we can integrate first person intentionality with third person intentionality, making comparisons or drawing 
inferences from what we perceive, believe or imagine is happening. This kind of intelligence is important for 
social understanding and development (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000: 108). 
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minorities, while attributing emotional complexity to ‘ingroups’, enabling them to 
assume superiority over people seen as less powerful or important than themselves.  
2. With particular attention to pupils’ emotional wellbeing, and to foster compassion, the 
CA (in combination with other resources such as legislation, policy initiatives, 
government commissioned reports on equality, women’s health, domestic violence; 
reports from women’s groups such as Women’s Aid Federation, and children’s 
advocacy groups such as the NSPCC) should be used as a framework to determine 
whether gendered practices pertain, and to assess the extent and appropriacy of 
support for all pupils, including the vulnerable.   
3. In order to premise a better understanding of the emotions in a much more clearly 
articulated view of personhood, embed the CA in teacher education in ways that take 
account of the philosophical bases of the approach, specifically its concepts of 
personhood, dignity, self-respect, and persons as ends not means. The construction of 
the CA itself, the central capabilities and their application to the real life situations and 
emotional health of children and teachers should be applied to considerations of 
educational policy, teacher education practices, school classroom practices and 
pedagogy, and school management and leadership.    
4. Critical lessons on gender construction, discrimination and violence should be 
embedded into the curriculum accompanied by courses that challenge gender 
stereotypes, including discussions on ‘masculinity’ (see McCarry, 2010). Gender 
curricula should also tackle issues of sexualisation of women and young girls in the 
media and popular culture including courses on gender equality to educate about the 
following discriminatory practices311. 
• The ways in which women are devalued: dismissed or criticised for being 
‘emotional’ and irrational; inequality, unequal power, the subordination of women; 
the seven routes to the objectification of women; women and girl’s discrimination 
in education and the workplace; challenge honour codes, whether in individuals, 
gangs or in traditional cultures. 
• How emotions are used to dehumanise or denigrate women: the lack of 
compassion, sympathy and moralised empathy for women and children; effects on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
311EVAW (Cerise, 2011) has a very useful section on the multiple factors that contribute to violence against 
women and girls, and their work sits well with what I argue here.  
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women and children when their emotions, perceptions and experiences are denied 
or erased; the effects of trauma on emotional development. 
• How a lack of respect for children, and especially young girls, can carry forward to 
a lack of respect for women.  
• How we might challenge notions of masculinity: challenge male entitlement to 
sexual services, women’s work and efforts; men’s entitlement to be cared for at the 
expense of women and girls’ own entitlement to flourish; men’s entitlement to 
punish women for not conforming to gender norms of femininity; men’s beliefs 
about what it means to be a man. 
• Innate sexual differences: challenging beliefs about innate differences between men 
and women and assumptions about how and what boys and girls should learn and, 
in particular, which emotions are ‘natural’. 
Embedded in such courses should be an examination of the effects of poverty and 
exclusion, and the importance of justice to realising capability development and 
functioning. Vulnerable people are especially prone to capability failure. A ‘whole school 
approach’ to prevent VAWG (violence against women and girls) might support awareness 
raising on how a lack of public focus on gender stereotypes, in government and the media, 
perpetuates discriminatory practices and relates to emotional health. In these ways, we can 
expand perceptions of women and children as unique and separate entities, who are 
dignified beings, worthy of respect, by dint of their humanity, emphasising that, alongside 
men, they are equally valuable members of our species with a right to a full emotional 
repertoire.  
 
 
7.3a The Novel as a Tool for Educating the Emotions. 
My fifth recommendation, and one that I shall pursue in greater depth than those above, 
pertains to the use of the novel to help inculcate moralised emotions, particularly 
compassion, in order to enrich children’s emotional evaluations and to help them explore a 
range of emotions as they read accounts of other, fictional, worlds. The novel, and all art 
forms, could be used in the courses suggested above to creatively and imaginatively 
explore themes that are rarely present in the curriculum. Working with judicious excerpts, 
whole passages, or, if time permitted, whole books, would be an invaluable and 
illuminating way to explore themes such as anger, fear, compassion and justice, whilst 
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expanding the literary competence of learners. Reading might help Nancy to develop 
enough resilience to come through her awful experiences, to withstand the bullies in school 
and somehow resist her father. She might use her anger to fight injustice and avoid her 
own injustices, but only if she is strongly supported. If those who teach her can feel 
compassion for her plight, and seek to understand, rather than punish her, for poor 
behaviour and emotional excesses, then Nancy might pull through. She might begin to 
imagine an alternative future that she can plan and organise and in which she can, at last, 
express her own personhood. My claim is that novels can be helpful in developing 
emotions if used sensitively by educators to see the particulars and to develop practical 
intelligence. Novels can help us ask: ‘What would I do if I were in this situation?’ and then 
evaluate responses, both our own and those of the fictional characters in the books.  
 
Reading, as an ethical endeavour, may help in examining and exploring the themes of 
compassion, justice, autonomy and gender. And so I ask how Nancy might experience the 
novel, what emotions she might feel and what insights novel reading might furnish to 
support her emotional wellbeing. Creatively used, novels can illuminate abstract ideas or 
shed light on complex human lives since, at their imaginative and sensitive best, they are 
explorations of human psychology and experience. They may help the reader ask: ‘What 
if?’, ‘How does this apply to me?’ or ‘Why have I reacted in this way?’. Developing 
pupils’ capacities to read beyond the surface of the story’s structure and intentions may 
help them read the psychology and experience of the fictional characters with insight and 
wisdom. Importantly, too, novels can provide exemplars of how we come to treat people 
well or badly. How we come to ‘see’ people, how we value them as persons, will, to a 
large extent, determine how we treat them. 
 
Engaging us emotionally is one of the hallmarks of a good novel. We make judgements, 
guess the next move, rationalise what is happening. We respond emotionally to the world 
of the novel in ways that express our values. Importantly too, we can hypothesise on and 
clarify our own values in the safety of the novel’s situations and characters. Perspective-
taking (empathy), a capacity that can encompass compassion, pity, sympathy, envy, 
jealousy, anger, guilt or revulsion, is aroused when the reader responds imaginatively 
enough to enter the novel’s universe. Novels, in this way, promote our capacity to connect 
and identify with people and situations outwith our everyday world of experience312. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
312Woessner (2010:235) has argued that sensitizing us to the pain of others has been one of the central aims 
of the novel since the Enlightenment.   
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Novels can captivate us morally as we read, and viscerally participate, in their profound 
moments. So, too, novels may have ‘surpassing value’ (Nussbaum, 1994:54) for Nancy, 
who, if we could imagine her reading some of the novels used here, might embark on a 
journey to explore her own moral sensitivity and allegiances to characters and events. We 
might muse with her on the ways in which the individual’s moral sense is socially 
conditioned, on the relationship between individual responsibility and her social context. 
We might discuss with her the limiting and enabling conditions that allow the imagination 
to pulsate, the emotions to be nourished, the mind to be freed from servitude, ranging 
across questions that concern virtue and vice, emotional wellbeing and human flourishing. 
I have argued here that literature can play a philosophical and epistemic role in the 
cultivation of moral emotions. Reading literature, in this sense, may be instrumental, since 
it is aimed at desiring a good end. As Williams (2002:170) observes there may be, 
inevitably in literature education, a means-end relationship but ‘it is as inappropriate to 
speak in means-ends terms of benefits of literary study as it would be to speak of the 
activity of sailing as a means to the pleasurable end of enjoyment’ (p.172). The end of 
sailing is not just simply enjoying the elements or testing one’s skills in navigation, any 
more than the end of reading a novel is to extract all the juices of its moral life. However, 
one of the purposes in reading novels may be to inculcate an appreciation of our responses 
to the life depicted in the novel, and thereby promote, perhaps, greater self-understanding. 
Of course, and as Williams (2002:172) notes, ‘pedagogic tact’ will be necessary to avoid 
narrow instrumentalism, so ensuring that young pupils like Nancy remain sensitive to the 
novelty and complexity of the books she reads.  
If the novel is a journey of all human experience, the ‘highest form of human expression so 
far attained’ (D.H. Lawrence, cited in Leavis, 1967), then Nancy should be encouraged to 
read, including so called ‘difficult’ novels. Leavis understood Lawrence to mean that this 
form of human expression was the ‘highest form of thought’ about the ‘nature, the 
meaning and the essential problems of human life’ (1967:11). If we accept novels as 
visions of humanity in all its diverse complexity, a reader such as Nancy should surely be 
granted access to these visions to ponder on how far they reflect her own life 
circumstances, on what she might learn about her own complex and difficult universe, and 
on what the worlds of others might reveal to her. I contend that literature, of the kind 
discussed here, can arouse in us emotions we did not think we were capable of 
experiencing, or normally wish to experience, as well as emotions that we do normally 
feel. By this, I mean that the novel invites us to empathise with the characters, to be 
aroused by anger, fear, compassion, sadness, or to feel satisfaction with varying intensity, 
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and to do so privately. Reading is usually solitary but in our solitary sealed world, we are 
free to imagine vividly, to feel, encounter and confront vicarious emotions in the privacy 
of our own mental worlds. Fictional worlds are safe places in which to experience 
emotions and to let the imagination wander free; there are no real world obligations, 
demands or expectations. These private experiences can also furnish more public 
discussions of the novel, assuming that Nancy is willing to reveal her true feelings to her 
classmates and to me313.  
 
Might Nancy feel the compassion and pity I feel for the father and his son in The Road? I 
might ask her to dwell on the intense love the father feels for his son, for whom he 
sacrifices his own death in the vain hope of finding a better life on the coast. I say 
‘sacrifice’ because death would probably be better than trying to survive although death is 
a luxury in this novel. I might ask her to examine why she feels compassion or pity: what 
do these emotions contain? I would like to know her reaction to the mother’s suicide, 
whether she could sympathise with her frightened despair at the thought of living in a 
world in which women are used to give birth to babies for food, knowing this might be the 
fate of her own child. Would Nancy feel respect for the boy’s moral integrity, his resolute 
determination to stay alive (morally at least) by keeping ‘the fire’314 alight within the soul 
without becoming like the predators hunting what is left of living human flesh? And would 
Nancy recoil in horror at the depredations that have brought about the hunters’ depravity, 
whilst feeing profound sadness that, at some unspecified date in the past, an event occurred 
that would end all life? I would enjoy discussing with Nancy the beautiful profundity of 
the novel’s ending. 
 
Once there were brook trout in the streams in the mountains. You could see them 
standing in the amber current where the white edges of their fins wimpled softly 
in the flow… On their backs were vermiculate patterns that were maps of the 
world in its becoming. Maps and mazes. Of a thing which could not be put back. 
Not be made right again. (p.137) 
 
In The Road, we are confronted with a ghastly, eternal, changeless present: the past is 
receding, words are dying. For the boy, there is no future, no history, no memory, no hope. 
Even to remember in the present is a struggle. The end of existence in The Road is the 
‘onset of some cold glaucoma dimming away the world’ with ‘nights dark beyond 
darkness and the days more grey each than what had gone before’ (p.1). What would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313Trilling (2008:381-401) discusses just such concerns in On Teaching Modern Literature.  
314The boy’s metaphor for moral goodness. 
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Nancy make of this? Might the book allow her the opportunity to reflect on and deliberate 
about her own life, and to consider ways in which she might have a future that is denied to 
those in The Road? In his reading of Macbeth, Cavell (2003:229) fastened to the idea that 
we humans crave the 'inhuman, of limitlessness, of monstrousness', but that we are also 
horrified by thoughts of what breaking the bonds of humanness would wreak. The craving 
and the horror is an anxiety about human identity whose bonds we wish to escape. In The 
Road we have escaped all bonds but that of predator to predated, morality to humanness. 
The fascination of the book is in the inhuman, in the limitlessness of destruction and in the 
monstrosity of our heedless regard of the future.  
I have claimed that novels such as The Road can help train and develop the literary 
competence of Nancy, and others of a similar age, as part of their intellectual and 
emotional growth (Nikolajeva, 2010). Such a training may contribute to the development 
of Nancy’s ‘practical intelligence’, the disposition to make good judgements in all aspects 
of her life as she matures as a learner and young woman to become a virtuous person, or 
person of good character in the Aristotelian sense. For Aristotle, a virtue, is ‘some kind of 
state in a “person’s soul” ’ (Annas, 1993:4), one in which she is kind, honest, courageous 
or just. Virtues are dispositions, how we have ‘made ourselves and chosen to be’, 
according to Annas (1993:49), who notes that virtues involve deliberation and decisions 
over time which, in turn, can improve the effectiveness of our rationality (p.51). This is 
one part of the structure of virtue. The second, and most pertinent here, is the affective 
aspect of virtue in which we can habituate our emotions over time to respond to what is of 
value in the right way: a form of ethical perception. The third aspect is the intellectual 
structure of virtue, that is the reasoning about and grasping of the right thing to do315. A 
virtuous person engages in good practical or intelligent reasoning and she will be sensitive 
to the complexities of a particular situation. Nancy’s education, along with her up-
bringing, is vital to this process of good habituation316. Nancy, as she develops her 
practical intelligence, will have to put effort into ‘considering, thinking about and working 
out the various factors relevant to her choices’ (Annas, 1993:90). As a young learner, she 
is still ‘internalising about the right ideas to follow; is still tempted by temptations contrary 
to virtue, since her feelings are still not in harmony with her judgement’ (Annas, 1993:90). 
Literature, I suggest, could guide Nancy towards developing her emotions to see the 
particulars ethically and to develop her practical intelligence to ask, ‘What would I do if I 
were in this situation?’.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315Representing in NE.II ‘Moral Goodness’; VI ‘Intellectual Virtues’; VII ‘Continence and Incontinence.’  
316NE.1095b3-13; 1104b3-12; Sherman (1989). 
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What might also happen to Nancy as she reads is that she may develop skills of perception 
and responsiveness to fictional events, an ability to ‘read’ the fictional situation and to 
discern the emotional and ethical particulars, so as to generalize these to more universal 
conclusions317. This relates to Aristotle’s concept of practical learning discussed earlier: 
practical intelligence allied with emotional intelligence318. This is not a technique in the 
way of recognising metaphor (‘like’) or simile (‘as’): it requires different guidance. 
Practically, in real life, discerning the particulars by emotional discernment is a process of 
maturation and guidance and Nancy, indeed all pupils, will need to learn this. And novels 
might help. To enable Nancy to read for the narrative in The Road, she will need to 
develop the skill to understand, indeed the desire to accept319, that time, cause and effect, 
do not always happen in simple linear ways, but contract, expand, bend and overlap in 
complex, fascinating ways320. Narratives that play around with time can be disconcerting 
and unsettling; or they may be exhilarating. Nancy’s literary and emotional competence 
will improve if she accepts that plots, as life, need not be linear or predicable. Plots can 
move between temporal planes or from the natural to the supernatural; they can take place 
in parallel but different times or have no specific sense of time as in The Road, where time 
is meaningless because it will shortly cease. Nancy, when she comes to that realization, 
may be deeply unsettled, filled with wonder and sorrow at such a state of pitiful affairs. 
How does one imagine that life can never exist again because human beings sought to 
eclipse nature, and to control the ambitions of nations by amassing destructive weapons, 
assuming nuclear disaster to be the cause of the dying world? For those who remain for the 
moment, they are living in the ashes of an adventure gone disastrously wrong321. And 
Nancy may understand the implication of the message: ‘That all our knowledge will be 
completely dead at that time when the door to future things is closed forever’322. 
 
Nancy’s competence will be tested to the extent that she can read the connections between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317See Chapter 4 for the development of this argument. 
318And these issues, of course, connect with those raised in Chapters 1-4. 
319I say ‘accept’ because unsophisticated readers (and I do not mean to suggest that in a pejorative way) may 
become irritated and switch off from the novel unless its complexity and intention is not explained to them. 
See Nikolajeva (2010) from whom I derive these points. 
320Mikhail Bulgakov is exemplary at playing with time. See the Master and Margarita. 
321There is a resonance here with Steiner’s (1971) analogy of Bluebeard’s Castle. Successive women open 
the doors to his castle because the doors are there to be opened. The women pay for their curiosity by being 
imprisoned forever or murdered, depending on the version by Bluebeard (and the metaphor suggests his 
misogyny and what happens to inquisitive women). Our curiosity and endless pursuit of facts are hardwired 
into human intelligence, so that learning moves endlessly onwards. We are, says Steiner ‘hunters after 
reality, wherever it may lead’ (p.103). 
322Dante describing the condition of hell. There is no present in hell, only the past and future. Canto X. 
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the plots to derive meaning or author intention and to be moved, emotionally, by the 
narrative strategy. However, Nancy’s ability to follow the plot will not necessarily mean 
that she is reading for meaning. For this she will need to understand the novel’s 
hermeneutic or interpretive code (Nikolajeva, 2010:150), developing her ability to make 
meaning of the text on many layers, drawing out a variety of themes such as the nature of 
memory and identity, or the relationship between bullying, abuse and self-harm that 
intimately frames the world of friendship in Cat’s Eye323. Cordelia commits suicide; Elaine 
attempts it and is left to die by her friends. Elaine’s brother is killed by terrorists and, 
throughout her life, she navigates her persona, psyche and art uncertainly amongst and 
across feminist and male dominated communities.  
 
Another layer of complexity which could be opened up to Nancy is the ambiguous and 
open-ended nature of the novel: the reader has sometimes to imagine the fate of the 
characters beyond the last page of the book. A novel, too, may be resistant to a single 
interpretation, it can be cognitively and emotionally demanding. Nevertheless, such novels 
need not impede Nancy’s (or other readers’) understanding and she may, indeed, feel 
compelled to go on reading because she relishes precisely that complexity and character 
identification. It is easy to dismiss ‘difficult’ books as unsuitable for young readers, but it 
is worth bearing in mind that while: 
 
Readers may not be able to articulate their understanding… they are certainly 
capable of some meaning-making even in extremely complex narratives, 
especially with training and assistance. (Nikolajeva, 2010:157)  
 
Teachers, of course, may focus much of their effort on teaching the basic skills of reading, 
the how of reading: the plot, character, narrative voice, metaphor, allusion, analogy, reader 
response, and so on, not least because they are inevitably driven by curricula and 
assessment regimes. Of greater interest to me is how Nancy will reason about the novel she 
is reading. There is little research evidence about the ‘process’ involved in understanding 
works of literature, according to Nikolajeva (2010:147)324. Pupils such as Nancy may 
competently discuss the plot and metaphors of a poem, for example, but do so without 
having connected to that poem in a deep and personal way, without necessarily 
understanding the interdependence between its literary facets, or without discerning the 
various themes and levels of complexity. We might posit, in common terminology, that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
323Atwood’s portrayal of friendship broke new ground when the novel was first published. 
324Researchers in the field of psycholinguistics might dispute Nikolajeva’s claim. As I have no expertise in 
this field, and as it would take me away from the focus of this discussion, I will not pursue the point further.  
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such a reader is ‘competent’ (Culler, 1975) at an adequate if basic cognitive and aesthetic 
level (Nikolajeva, 2010:146). But how does Nancy learn to process what she reads in a 
competent, or as I shall call it, a sophisticated way? Undoubtedly, she would need to be 
guided. Nikolajeva suggests, and I agree, that the role of the educator is crucial, and I am 
acutely aware that the educator can kill the desire to read novels for their own sake if 
teaching is routine, utilitarian or mediocre. If the novel is treated as a mere means to 
extract understanding for examination purposes, without sensitivity or passion, the novel’s 
potential life, all its possibilities, will sink into inanity. Poor teaching, Steiner argued 
(2005:18), ‘diminishes the student, it reduces to gray inanity the subject being presented’ 
and he described poor teachers as ‘amiable grave diggers ... they do not “open Delphi” but 
close it’. By contrast, Steiner suggests, good teaching ‘is to lay hands on what is most vital 
in a human being. It is to seek access to the quick and the innermost of a child’s or an 
adult’s integrity’ (p.18). Insensitive or instrumental teachers may threaten the pupil’s 
willingness or desire to be uncertain, to doubt, to dissent, to freely engage in hard thought, 
to want to know more and to begin to feel the freedom that comes from exercising the 
mind and questioning what is. There can be emotional discomfort with uncertainty and 
complexity; but there can also be feelings of exhilaration and excitement at the possibility 
of what knowledge and understanding can reveal to a pupil such as Nancy. True teaching 
‘can be a terribly dangerous enterprise’, the teacher ‘takes into his hands that inmost of his 
students, the fragile and incendiary matter of their possibilities’ (Steiner, 2005:103). It is 
the ‘incendiary possibilities’ of emotional and intellectual engagement that I wish to open 
up in Nancy to support her emotional development and wellbeing. 
 
The novels I have used in this thesis exemplify writerly and dialogical texts325.  Such texts 
are challenging and stimulating. As noted, they leave open ‘gaps’ (Nikolajeva, 2101:157) 
that allow the reader to explore and to fill according to her imaginative powers or 
imaginative courage, to interpret according to her experience, or to imbue with meaning 
depending on her cultural or social context. There is a tendency to think that children and 
young adults prefer the closed and monological text, where the cracks and gaps are filled, 
the plot is easy to follow and the levels of meaning are few. There is a tendency, too, to 
offer young readers, as Nikolajeva (2010:157) regretfully notes, adaptations of literature 
classics such as Shakespeare or Austen, that have stripped the lives of their creations to 
bare plot so that readers have nothing but ‘proairetic’ (or anticipatory) codes to explore. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325I follow Nikolajeva (2010:157) here. Texts can be writerly or readerly, following Raymond Barthes 
(1977), monological or dialogical, following Mikhail Bakhtin (1981), or closed and open, following Umberto 
Eco (1979).  
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This may have the effect of disconnecting readers from cognitive, emotional and moral 
development, as well as disconnecting them from the joy of reading. Offering stripped 
down adaptations or merely anticipatory, predictable novels may also indicate that we 
mistrust and under-estimate young people’s ability to engage with complex novels, 
discouraging them from wishing to read and to explore, in their own ways, the gaps that 
good novels provide. Nancy’s real world is complicated. Is it the educator’s role to ignore 
that and to pretend it is not or is it our role to provide Nancy with opportunities to consider 
other, equally but differently complicated worlds and to work with her on possible 
responses to those worlds?  
 
Novels, of course, contain ‘contextual codes’ and understanding those codes could also 
contribute to Nancy’s emotional and intellectual development. Nancy could gain a sense of 
satisfaction, a certain pride and pleasure that she understands more than just the surface of 
plot and character. Nancy may come to understand what inspired writers to write as they 
did, and to understand writers’ own emotional and intellectual responses to their contexts. 
The Road may be prophetic; it may be a 21st modernist version of Dante’s Inferno326. The 
context for Unless and Cat’s Eye is feminism in the 1990s and 1970s. Atwood, as noted 
earlier, is ambivalent about feminism, Shields less so. Feminism, for Shields, has not fully 
achieved its own dreams and hopes, and is still uncertain, as women are, about how to 
assert its own vision in the face of powerful masculine visions327. These contexts offer 
wonderful opportunities for the teacher to teach, as I have said, much more than just 
theme, structure and plot, and so, for example, how does Nancy feel about feminism?     
 
There are, further, ethical codes that may help to orientate Nancy, depending on which 
social or cultural group is writing, at which particular historical period. Attitudes about, for 
instance, gender, race, patriarchy, children, parent-child relationships and sexuality will 
vary across time, as exemplified in the novels discussed here. Consider Chinua Achebe’s 
(1977) condemnation of a Heart of Darkness for its racism and the astute feminism of 
Cat’s Eye and Unless. Classics, of course can be ‘treacherous’ (Nikolajeva, 2010:156) 
because of their sincerely held, but now objectionable, attitudes and beliefs328. However, 
these very relationships are there to be examined: why and how have such beliefs changed, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326I am speculating but cannibals are in punished in the lower reaches of Cocytus or hell where they are 
frozen in ice. Sinners here lose their souls (Canto XXXIII). 
327Shields examines this feminist ambiguity by means of Reta’s relationship to writing. Reta is a successful 
novelist but her new editor is eager to change the feminine focus of her novel to one that is more masculine. 
328See Chinua Achebe (1977) on HD and Wayne Booth (1988a) writing about Paul Moses’ take on 
Huckleberry Finn which he damned as ‘bad education’ on race and slavery.  
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and are the changes for the better? A young reader like Nancy could critically assess the 
codes in all of the novels described here. Would she identify with Cordelia or Elaine, or 
both?  
 
Aristotle conceived friendship to be one of the finest things of a good life. Valued ends, he 
believed, became finer if shared with friends. Friendship embodies good will, generosity 
and affection, acts of mutual reciprocity. Friendship is not only instrumental to happiness, 
it is the ‘greatest’ and ‘most necessary’ of external goods, important in developing and 
expressing virtuous character329. Elaine and Nancy lack this fine thing. Hazardous 
friendship, of the kind depicted in Cat’s Eye, is disabling and immiserating, marring 
Elaine’s possibilities for happiness and a rich and rewarding relational life, as noted in the 
previous chapter. The ‘Lady of Perpetual Help’, about whom Elaine hallucinates when she 
is close to death, embodies the kind of mothering she needs. Elaine needs compassion, 
kindness, rescue, salvation, and protection from danger, all of which are absent in her real 
world. Sometimes we know too that children (and wives) can turn out to be ‘the wrong 
person’ (p.249), unable to please their fathers whatever they do, as Nancy well knows. 
Like Cordelia, Nancy, I imagine, is unlikely to want to please her father, or to be abject 
before him. Like Elaine, Nancy would probably be angry if she saw either her sibling or 
her mother acting abjectly so as to avoid violence or humiliation. There are strong feminist 
issues for Nancy to explore: the role of women, their social construction, their unequal 
relationship to men, and how girls are brought up to conform to a stereotype of femininity 
and to express the ‘right’ emotions in accordance with those stereotypes.  
 
However, as Nancy might learn, Atwood defies feminist expectations330: the feminist code 
is more complex and ambiguous. Despite what Elaine knows about the female universe, 
the aetiology of women’s oppression and deformed ethics, she is an anti-feminist (or is 
she?). She does not turn towards the female community for safety and reassurance; she 
seeks out safety amongst men, despite their misogyny. Women frighten her more because 
they ‘collect grievance, hold grudges, and change shape’ and, unlike men, ‘know too 
much, they can neither be deceived nor trusted’ (p.379). Nancy knows these women, but as 
girls. Elaine, as adult and child, is defined by the speech and thought acts of others: her 
childhood friends, her parents, male and female intimates and acquaintances. Nancy, like 
Elaine, is an outsider, a peripheral figure who is accorded a central place only when she 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329NE.VIII, IX. See also Sherman (1989:118-128); Nussbaum (1986). 
330Elaine’s young adulthood is set in Toronto when feminism was making its strident mark on the political, 
social and artistic scene. Elaine is a successful painter.  
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becomes the butt of others’ jokes, derision or foul play. As outsiders, Nancy and Elaine 
provide a commentary, a critical perspective on the structures, social mores, conventions 
and social hierarchy of their real life and fictional contexts. Atwood’s ambiguous anti-
feminism is reflected in her art and psyche which is about denying gender categories, while 
documenting the life of women. Childhood, in liberal society, is often depicted as a time of 
anxiety, as a time in which femininity is constructed to subtly marginalize middle-class 
white girls through blame, failure to live-up to the expectation of the ideal woman. Hite 
(1995:138) observes that Cat’s Eye is in some respects little different from The 
Handmaid’s Tale; it is just that liberal societies are far more subtle in constructing gender 
on the basis of biology (see Chapter 5). The construction is more extreme in The 
Handmaid’s Tale331 where fertile women are enslaved to produce children. In Cat’s Eye 
Elaine is an independent, detached, and observant ‘I’; the cold, unblinking persona she 
develops to shield her from her friends’ abuse and humiliation332.  
 
Teaching the novel is also an excellent way to explore beyond the confines of literary 
construction, bringing to the reading a variety of interdisciplinary and intertextual contexts 
that can help open up the imagination. Indeed, Nikolajeva argues against the claim that 
intertextuality deprives the reader of pleasure: 
 
Extensive exposure to various texts, verbal, visual and multimodal, historical and 
contemporary, highbrow and mass-market-related, stimulates readers to make 
connections between texts, recognize allusions, acknowledge recurrent features in 
books by the same author, and not least appreciate parodic play. The déjà-lu 
experience, the joy of recognition is the basis of all mature reading. (Nikolajeva, 
2010:156) 
 
The novels I have used in this thesis exemplify these points well. HD opens the mind to the 
brutality of racism and rapacious exploitation (see Chapter 4), telling us that depraved acts 
will deprave the soul and immiserate profoundly the recipients of contempt and loathing333. 
Proust is rich in commentary on the shallow social mores and habits of upper class French 
society, making innumerable references to the arts in the process. His meditations on the 
meaning of time, habit, the power of the imagination and selfish love, themes highly 
philosophical in nature, open up the reader’s mind with wonder and awe at creative genius. 
A great history book, such as Michael Burleigh’s (2001) on Nazi Germany, Eric 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331Another of Atwood’s novels, arguably her most celebrated.  
332And emotional adaptation to fear and anxiety. 
333As is Kurt, in HD, who is corrupted by the terrible exercise of power over those he has conquered, he who 
is the ‘progressive’ and ‘liberal’ face of a ‘civilized’ empire that is in fact vicious and barbarous. 
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Hobsbawm’s (1962) on the revolutions of the Enlightenment, or Conquest’s (2000) 
Stalin’s Terror, will fill our minds with images of what they depict, and may occasionally 
evince indignation or horror at what they tell us of these brutalities. The novel is, in my 
view, even more powerful, and may complement these fine works, saturating our minds 
with powerful images and emotions that endure to such an extent that these novels become 
lifelong companions.  
 
HD set alongside a history of Enlightenment ideals of human progress334, makes each 
genre more accessible to imagination and intellect. The linear and factual nature of one 
may inform the creative, imaginative and emotionally evocative nature of the other. The 
contextual codes and intertextual meaning that this kind of reading can bring to the reader 
is enriching. The intertextuality of novels permits me, with Nancy, an examination of all of 
the key themes in this thesis: compassion, justice, autonomy, and gender disparities in 
different settings. And so, reading the novel can be an ethical endeavour that can have 
ethical consequences for the way we think about, reason about and construe the world. We 
see the world differently when we put the novel before us and read what it has to say about 
a particular world, in a particular place and in a particular time. We also see that world in 
deeper hues and colours if that reading is complemented by other kinds of reading or if we 
can connect the threads of the novel to other works of art, history, geography or to politics, 
for example. The novel also stretches the imagination, helping us, if we are so-minded, to 
perceive the world more generously, and to regard others, and perhaps ourselves, with 
greater sympathy and compassion.  
 
I follow, amongst others, Nussbaum, Booth and Trilling’s335 arguments on the power of 
the novel to transform our moral imaginations and to extend our imaginative capacities. 
Following Steiner, ‘literacy of feeling is a pre-condition to sane judgement in human 
affairs’ (1972:623): a culture without a significant contemporary literature and a critical 
challenge is not fully alive336. The world is there for Nancy to explore, at least inside the 
pages of the books we have here. Importantly, too, novels, as invitations to imaginative 
enlargement, as contemplative activity on human emotions, choices, prejudices, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334Kurt, as embodiment of the Civilised Europe, is the dark space of human potential.   
335See, for example Trilling (1950, 2008); Murdoch (1970); Frye (1972; Booth (1988a,b); Nussbaum (1990, 
1994a,b, 1998, 2001); Calvino (1997); Dadlez (1997); Adamson et al. (1998); Hogan (2003); Carr (2005, 
2006, 2009); George (2005); Oatley (2011). The journal of Philosophy and Literature is a valuable resource 
which examines the relationships between philosophy and literature and what the disciplines can learn from 
each other. 
336And see Leavis (1952:194-203). 
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perceptions, judgements, desires, preferences, in short to the human condition, can liberate 
us from present contingencies. In being so liberated, Nancy may learn over time to counter 
‘the prefabricated, generalized and uniform’ (Oakeshott, 1989:33337) responses that come 
too readily into minds that are prepared to be ‘vacant’ (p.31) rather than learned and 
disposed to critical examination. However, we might now ask whether, if a just society 
needs just citizens as Rawls (1971) suggested, reading good literature can really help in the 
task of creating just citizens with emotionally appropriate concerns? Some, like Posner 
(1997,1998) would argue that such a transformation is unlikely. So why argue that we 
should read to be better human beings? 
 
I have suggested that perspective-taking is aroused when the reader responds imaginatively 
enough to enter the novel’s world and that the emotions have the power to help us to 
reason well and to incite us to good action, provided they have been properly cultivated. 
Novels, I have now suggested, can help in that cultivation. They can support education that 
seeks to moralise the imagination and cultivate ethical regard for others. Ignorance can not 
be advanced as the reason for atrocity or cruelty or as reason to abdicate from 
responsibility. The novel, then, because it helps to awaken conscience, expanding and 
bending the imagination beyond its own frontiers and the borders of the self, can be a 
prophylactic for ignorance, deformed or stunted views. Of course, the novel alone, despite 
the ‘possibilities of life’ (Trilling, 2000:424) it contains, its powerful ability to convey the 
shape and condition of human existence, and the emotions consonant with those human 
events, will not make us good. However, the novel can give us moral help, because it asks 
us to focus on events which are valuable. The novel enables us to ‘see’ in the sense of 
having good vision so as to occasion good conduct as moral complexity is brought before 
our reason and our imagination. Fictional events describe the conditions under which 
people often make their choices. How well they act will depend on the quality of their 
emotional capacities, their virtues, the ethical climate in which they live, and the ‘quality 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337Oakeshott wrote the essays collected in The Voice of Liberal Learning in response to his concerns about 
the state of liberal education generally which he saw as being usurped for instrumental, purely practical, 
considerations. Pupils had to be given a period of time in which to escape from the quotidian, to immerse 
themselves in liberal learning so as to become more fully human. To be fully human meant an education in 
imagination, discovering what there is to be learned and who one is. Education also allows us to become free, 
that is better able to understand or misunderstand ourselves. The epithet ‘vacant’ may seem harsh, but 
Oakeshott was describing what he saw as the danger to liberal education if pupils could not pursue learning 
for learning’s sake: minds incapable of critical contemplative reflection would be unable to discern the 
fatuous, false or jingoistic, becoming instead, receptive to the ready-made and uniform. These concerns have 
hardly gone away. We become human by learning and learning is a task of individual responsibility. See A 
Place of Learning (1-34) in the same collection that was inspired by the debates on education in the 1980s 
which were dominated by, for example, Allan Bloom’s (1988) The Closing of the American Mind (and see 
Chapter 4 here).  
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of our habitual objects of attention’ (Murdoch, 1970:54). In the novels considered here, 
Nancy and I can examine the ethical climate to ask if the protagonists made good choices 
and whether they habitually contemplated good things.  
 
The ravaged environment that the boy and his father seek to escape in The Road never 
corrupts the child’s goodness. Despite their slow death from starvation and the certain 
knowledge that it is death that awaits them, the boy cannot contemplate cruelty and will 
not succumb to cannibalism: such bad acts cause him anguish. He resists selfishness and 
his ravaging hunger to offer compassion and kindness whenever he can, and those 
occasions are rare. There is nothing in that world to re-orientate the boy and the father 
towards goodness: what they see about them is hell, a glaucomic and dying world choked 
with noxious pollution, peopled with survivors without whose torment has left them 
without souls. There is no light but that which is in the boy and it is by that inner light, his 
goodness, that the world is seen, and by which father and child are orientated. These are 
powerful images. Goodness exists in hell and hell is still a place where ethical choices can 
be made. The boy ascends338 to the idea of good even while there seems to be no point to 
that virtue. But perhaps that is the point: we value virtue and we have ‘intrinsic value or 
worth’ with virtues goods in themselves with ‘non-teleological character’ (Carr and 
Steutel, 1998:14). Where virtue fails to exist, human beings can realise only their dark 
potential. They cannot flourish; their dignity cannot be preserved. The novel, as an 
‘excellent analogy of morals’ (Murdoch, 1970:58), can enlarge our sensibilities, mine, 
Nancy’s and other pupils’, to perceive and contemplate the contours of our moral and 
emotional existence. We can take these analogies and hold them up to our own lives to ask, 
for example, questions about our own present ‘hells’, how we should act, and what 
emotions might be morally appropriate. 
  
However, it might well be charged that novels such as The Road and HD are too dark. Are 
the novels too dark? Might Nancy not benefit from reading ‘lighter’, less serious novels 
than those I present her with here? She may. If she becomes a hungry reader she might also 
become an omnivorous one. In any case, the fear that dark novels might be too gruesome is 
confounded, perhaps, by Suzanne Collins’ ‘The Hunger Games’ which is amongst the 
most popular teenage fiction in recent times339. Set in post-apocalyptic society, the novels 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338Plato’s idea of ascent in The Republic. 
339An NPR book poll lists The Hunger Games as the second most popular selection in their Teen Fiction Poll, 
see http://www.npr.org/2012/08/07/157795366/your-favorites-100-best-ever-teen-novels and see an article in 
The Daily Telegraph that suggests the ‘market in teen fiction is dominated now by societies in breakdown. 
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(a trilogy) deal with severe hunger, poverty, war, oppression, ruthless exploitation and 
helplessness in a post-apocalyptic society. The Hunger Games are an annual event in 
which one boy and one girl aged between 12 and 18, from each of the twelve districts 
surrounding the capital city Panern, are selected by lottery to compete in a televised battle 
to the death. The heroine must not only kill the children in order to survive and to stop her 
family from starving, she must also appeal to the viewers to win gifts to survive. The 
morality of the novels is complex and compelling. The Wall Street Journal, in 2011, 
carried an article340 which asserted that young adolescent literature is ‘rife with depravity’ 
and ‘so dark that kidnapping and pederasty and incest and brutal beatings are now just part 
of the run of things’ (Meghan Cox Gurdon, 2011). The responses to the claim were swift. 
Rather than encourage depravity, self-harm or suicide, such novels, ‘prevent rather than 
promote dangerous behaviour’ (Publishers Weekly, 2011), helping young readers to 
confront and understand difficult subjects. These novels also, according to one of the 
contributors to the debate (Maureen Johnson, 2011), tell vulnerable young people that that 
they are ‘not alone’ and that what they’re experiencing is ‘survivable …There’s someone 
like me. There’s someone this happened to’. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
And it’s girls who are lapping them up’, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/9143409/The-Hunger-
Games-and-the-teenage-craze-for-dystopian-fiction.html. 
340 ‘Are Teen Novels Dark and Depraved - or Saving Lives?’ by Karen Springen (June 9th, 2011). See the 
full discussion at http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/childrens/childrens-industry-
news/article/47570-are-teen-novels-dark-and-depraved-or-saving-lives.html. Meghan Cox Gurdon started the 
debate with ‘Darkness Too Visible:  Contemporary fiction for teens is rife with explicit abuse, violence and 
depravity. Why is this considered a good idea?’ in The Wall Street Journal, June 4th, 2011 at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303657404576357622592697038.html. See too David 
Boudinot on Violence and Fear in Folktales (2005, NB online journal with no page numbers ). Fear and 
violence in many forms have always and everywhere permeated societies, Boudinot (2005) points out, and it 
is to be expected that these themes will turn up in folk and fairy tales: ‘Tales of monsters eating children, 
parents beating their young, and witches putting spells and curses on beautiful maidens are only a few of the 
many fantastical examples of violence, cruelty, and fear evident in folk tales’. Fairy tales have been used to 
teach fear to exercise and caution, improve judgement and ‘sharpen critical thinking skills’. Fairy tales can 
allow children to ‘encounter existential challenges that we also battle with in adult life: betrayal, intrigues, 
overcoming fear, feuds, quarrels and jealousy. They are faced with the ugly sides of mankind but also learn 
to mobilize capabilities in order to deal with these dark forces’ (Guggenbuhl, 1996:7-8, cited in Boudinot, 
2005). See, too, Carr and Davis (2007) who argue that there are ‘no valid educational arguments - at least in 
open democratic societies for denying young people access to works considered politically or religiously 
problematic’ (p.100). Indeed, Carr and Davis suggest that moralizing about art for its potential to corrupt the 
young is ‘wrongheaded and unsustainable’ (p.95) and they support authors such as Anne Fine and Melvyn 
Burgess who push the moral boundaries of what is acceptable in literature by discussing themes such as gang 
warfare and drug addiction (p. 97). See Anne Fine’s The Tulip (1997, about gangs) and The Devil Walks 
(2012, about family oppression and abuse). Fine is also Children’s Laureate for Literature. See, too, Melvyn 
Burgess’ Junk (1996, about heroin addiction) and Kill All Enemies (2011, about neglect, addiction and 
abuse). 
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The morality of the novels is complex and compelling. Pass by such popular but dark 
novels and, I suggest, we may reduce opportunities to discuss seriously the potential for 
emotional corruption or its converse, emotional flourishing. The novels may not confront 
us with the true meaning of horror and cruelty because reading novels emotionally is a 
vicarious experience, a simulacra of true emotional engagement. However, novels can 
reach into very ‘dark places’ (Steiner, 1971:32) of human barbarity and ordinary 
obtuseness and these are places where, morally, Steiner advised, we must encounter and 
confront ourselves. As Nancy will come to understand, there are numerous varieties of 
dark place to be found in any century, in any place or relationship, and with these, the 
imagination to bring misery and pain to victims. Pass by these dark places, Sterner warns, 
and we will be unable to discuss seriously the darkness of human potential and the limits 
of human behaviour. Pass by and, I suggest, we will not be able to discuss seriously the 
potential for emotional corruption or its converse, emotional flourishing. However, Steiner 
(1971) also suggested the need to refine the proposition that minds could be cultivated, 
nurtured and nourished, for the ‘precise fabric of the relations between them’ (p.61) was a 
complex one. Working to improve ourselves, cultivating our emotions to the right degree, 
is a lifelong endeavour, as Aristotle averred. Novels alone will, of course, never be enough 
for Nancy to develop and habituate a sustained belief in human potential to avert injustice 
and develop her own good character and emotional wellbeing. In order to continue the 
enlightenment goals of progress and human rights, the importance of the individual and her 
wellbeing, along with informed political action, is required, as is a broad liberal education 
that values learning for learning’s own sake. Mariella Frostrup, the presenter of a BBC 
radio 4 programme, ‘What the Scandinavians know about Children’s Literature’341,  
asserted that Scandinavia’s liberal tradition, the region’s excellence in health, good 
governance and female emancipation, is due to the fundamental role of reading in these 
societies. The programme’s contributors were unanimous in their view that children’s 
books are emblematic of these humanistic, liberal ideals suggesting that the literature 
reflects the respect for the child that is so deeply rooted in Scandinavian culture. The 
Moomin books (Tove Jansson), Pippi Longstocking (Astrid Lindgren) or the novels of 
Hans Christian Anderson, for example, are subversive. Children’s literature in Scandinavia 
does not shun difficulties. Instead, children’s fiction embraces same sex families, 
bohemianism, independent adventure, dysfunctional families, and domestic violence, 
crossing the demographics of class, race, gender, age. Girls such as Pippi Longstocking are 
depicted as strong and independent, which may help explain why women have high status 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341Broadcast 26 March, 2012. 
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in Scandinavia and are well represented in political life. ‘The Angry Man’, a picture book 
by Norwegian author Gro Dahle, is a heartbreaking and harrowing story of a young boy, 
Boj, listening to his father beating his mother, praying for him to stop, while he apologises 
for causing the violence. What is revolutionary about this particular picture book, 
according to Agnes-Margrethe Bjorvand (2010), is the depiction of domestic abuse and 
violence in a book intended for very young children (it took ten years for it to be finally 
published in Sweden in 2009). One may posit that portraying domestic violence and its 
effects so graphically may be powerful in educating young minds about the harm of 
asymmetries of power leading to gender based violence and contempt for bodily 
integrity342. 
 
7.4 Future Research. 
As a result of the research I have undertaken for this thesis, I am now drawn to further 
research in the following areas. 
• Following the research of Wolff and de-Shalit (2007), on the fertility of the CA and 
further additions to the central capabilities, further research might usefully be 
conducted amongst both under- and post-graduate students studying, for example, in 
Social Sciences. Unlike Wolff and de-Shalit, however, I would work with the ten 
central capabilities, acknowledging that a key aspect of the research would be to make 
the capabilities accessible to, and understood by, the students. How would this cohort 
of largely young and generally aspirant students react to the list of ten central 
capabilities? Which capabilities would emerge as being absent from the list, be seen as 
redundant, surprising or fertile? Would emotions be architectonic? The second phase 
of this survey research might then be extended internationally with a focus on the 
teachers of tomorrow.   
• Assuming that a well-developed course on emotions could be added to the teacher 
education curriculum, I could then follow a group of teachers, to see if a focus on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342This is not to suggest that literature of this nature will eradicate violence against women. The power of the 
novels lies in their stark illumination of violence and its effects. The Millennium Series, by Stieg Larsson 
(2005-07), is partly disturbing because it challenges the stereotype that Swedish women are the most gender 
equal in the world. Lisbeth Salander, its heroine, is subjected to appalling violence but she triumphs over her 
adversaries. Larsson, who witnessed the gang rape of a girl when he was 15 years old, denounces rapists and 
sadists in these phenomenally popular novels. His failure to help the girl led to his life-long loathing of 
sexual abuse. See Laurie Penny (2010) ‘Girls, Tattoos and Men who Hate Women’, New Statesman, 5th 
September at http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/laurie-penny/2010/09/women-girl-real-violence.  
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emotions significantly changed their attitudes and approaches. It would, additionally, 
be desirable to devise a longitudinal study on the impact of educators on the emotional 
wellbeing of those they teach. Of course, the assessment of such wellbeing is 
ubiquitously complicated but the work of those such as Ramos and Silber (2005), 
Anand et al. (2009) and Wolff and de-Shalit (2010) provides a sound starting point. 
Would the arguments I make in this thesis for the emotions, including compassion, 
stand up to empirical scrutiny?  
• What impact does reading the novel in the way I suggested earlier have on moral 
character and the cultivation of emotions? There is very little research343 on this, 
understandably, since it would be a difficult project to construct given the many 
variables at play in character formation. However, might a course in which teachers 
engaged with novels as an integral part of work on the emotions provide initial data on 
their attitudes and understandings? It would be feasible to work with such teachers to 
assess, initially, any changes they experienced and, then, to work alongside them 
investigating ways in which they used novels in their own classrooms.  
• In this thesis, I looked at the implications of abuse for a girl like Nancy. Future 
research might also look at the story of Norman, her class mate344 How do we educate 
Norman so that he is not complicit in the kinds of pervasive gender inequality I have 
presented here, not complacent about, but sensitive to, the ways in which knowledge 
about sex and gender is inherited and adapted to meet present cultural norms? How, 
alternatively, might Norman’s story tell a narrative of sexual abuse on boys? Sex 
education might focus on, for example, how inequality is eroticised, and how 
eroticism maintains inequality. Both Nancy and Norman, and indeed all of their class 
mates, surely ought to be made aware of how the unquestioning acceptance of, and 
collaboration in, asymmetries of power may corrupt and harm very many of us.  
 
 
7.5 Limitations of the Thesis. 
My thesis sought to explore the emotions and the cultivation of morally appropriate 
emotions, particularly compassion, in education. Undertaking the PhD gave me, as I stated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343See Keene (2007). 
344I thank Gayle Letherby for this excellent suggestion. In the light of the recent abuse scandals in the UK, I 
am at present engaged in research with two colleagues on the role of sex education in schools. There is an 
urgent need, I suggest, to address such issues in schools, universities, prisons, and in institutions where the 
opportunity to educate on these issues is available. 
  
 
 
235 
in Chapter 1, ‘a way to explore my interests: gender, feminism, equality, justice and 
fairness considered through emotions’. It would be ‘fascinating stuff’, I decided, as I 
sought to unravel the questions I asked prior to embarking on the study. What do we know 
about emotions? How are we to understand them? What lies in an emotion? Those 
questions have, to a limited extent, been answered here in a thesis that does span studies 
from gender, feminism, equality, justice and fairness. Accordingly, this work is 
predominantly a thesis in the philosophy of education, but it draws extensively from other 
disciplines and is broad in scope. Whilst that will be a strength for some, and whilst it is 
consonant with my own interests and concerns to better understand the emotions, the 
breadth of the thesis may also be one of its limitations. A further, related limitation lies in a 
restricted word length and time. A great deal of useful literature and arguments had to be 
lost. There were lines of argument that could not be followed, such as sociological 
analyses of masculinity theories, and postmodernist analyses of emotions, sex, gender and 
justice, though what I had read in that field failed to convince of their merits. There is a 
large body of work from empirical psychology, noted earlier, that suggests, persuasively, 
that good character is no protection against the power of situations and institutions. These 
are important claims and should be set against the position I take here. Although I briefly 
introduced situational psychology in Chapter 6, further treatment of this rich theme was 
outwith the parameters of this study but is an important area for further research. Some 
might regard my own lack of empirical research as a limitation. I am of the view that this 
conceptual exploration of the emotions represents an essential prior stage without which 
empirical enquiry would be inadequately anchored. 
 
Conceptually, a limitation of this thesis is that those who not interested in, or persuaded by, 
liberal feminist philosophy, will not take the arguments I make here seriously. The thesis is 
premised on an explicitly feminist and liberal approach, not one that will suit everyone’s 
intellectual stance, way of thinking or convictions, especially if they position themselves as 
Marxist, postmodernist or communitarian. For psychologists who claim that situations and 
institutions have the power to overwhelm the person of character, my claims may seem 
dubious, at best. Additionally, in a climate of economic austerity, the resources for the 
recommendations I make here may not be available. Schools of education in universities in 
the UK may not see the value of adding yet another course to their curricula with the 
staffing and resource implications that these recommendations imply. There are already 
policy statements, laws and proposed laws that can bring about, over time, what I 
recommend. However, without recourse to curricular study of the emotions, equality and 
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justice, we might be waiting too long. Cultures and attitudes do change, but slowly, and in 
the meantime women and children continue to be neglected and treated unjustly. 
 
 
7.6 Impact of the Thesis.  
I am a still a girl from the Isle of Lewis. I still question how women are supposed to 
behave, and why, and the thesis has started to provide answers to the questions I raised in 
Chapter 1. How is it possible to help pupils come to terms with what may have happened 
to them if those who could help them do not seek to understand the nature of emotions? 
How do emotions motivate us to action? What does it mean if emotions are evaluations of 
self, others and self to others and, further, that emotions express our values, experiences 
and self-worth? How do we react to a girl who is sullen, uncommunicative and unpopular? 
Why can we not treat pupils with a little more compassion? Why do we expect and even 
encourage different emotions from boys and girls? 
 
Murdoch suggests (1970:86) that intellectual disciplines are moral disciplines and I agree: 
they reveal the reality of our world, in seemingly random, complex detail, but detail upon 
which we must try to impose an honest unity, to see how concepts connect with each other, 
and with them, why morality is important to a life of excellence. In my case, these 
concepts included emotions, gender, justice, capability, equality, the extent to which these 
concepts interconnect, and why we should be concerned to defend such concepts as being 
essential to a just society. These are also important ideas in Scottish education or, at least, I 
have argued that they should be thus. Murdoch also wrote that the student requires honesty 
and humility not to pretend to know what she does not know and undertaking a PhD has 
demonstrated the power and veracity of these two virtues. The inspiration, as I suggested 
in the introduction to this thesis, for my interest in philosophy was the work of Martha 
Nussbaum and, importantly for me, her application of philosophy to real life. This is what I 
have sought to do in this thesis, learning a tremendous amount from the work of Ben-
Ze’ev, Herman, Hampton, Korsgaard, Moller-Okin and Sherman, as well, of course, from 
Aristotle and Kant, on the journey. The empirical research has been illuminating and 
invaluable. I have, as a result, a keener perception of the problems that interest me and a 
stronger awareness of what I do not, yet, know. I have, too, a greater confidence to read 
difficult texts on my own, unassisted by secondary helpers, though it was a pleasure to 
return to secondary resources to see how the authors have interpreted and used the primary 
work I had just read.  
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Eighteen months ago, I had not read any work by Kant or Aristotle except via secondary 
sources. Two years ago, I read Rawls for the first time. Three years ago I had no idea how 
I would, today, be enthused and inspired by philosophy. The academic engagement the 
PhD demands, indeed that philosophy demands, has been stimulating and, often, 
revelatory. At its most basic level, philosophy asks why, how and what ought to be. From 
these three, seemingly simple, questions, the philosopher, the philosopher of education in 
my case, begins to strip away at each and every layer of what is familiar and taken for 
granted, picking away at the encrustations of habit and somnolent thinking, to begin 
constructing arguments, making and defending claims that employ critical scrutiny. From 
the stem of a single question, there may emerge the branches of an elaborate and 
sophisticated theory that has refined distinctions, examined concepts and detected fallacies. 
Whilst I have learned a great deal, I am a fledgling. A careful, but all too brief foray, into 
Kant’s Groundwork or Rawls’ Theory of Justice, is far too cursory with respect to what a 
scholar of these kinds of work needs to undertake. But philosophy has come to matter to 
me as a result of this enquiry. Practical philosophy can be a tool for the disempowered, 
excluded and harmed as I have sought to show. Because philosophy brings reality and 
theory together, when it infuses each with reason, insight and clarity, it makes the world, 
MacKinnon says (2006:34), accessible to understanding and change. For women the world 
over, for example, this means a better understanding of their status and plight, and the 
actions available to them to change imposed realities and rigidities. Philosophy, when it is 
not merely abstract and remote, the private domain of an elite cognoscenti, is on all fours, 
hunting amongst the flora and fauna of human existence, with magnifying glass in one 
hand, microscope in the other, examining the inscrutable and exposing the concealed. In 
other words, the kind of philosophy that I have engaged in is responsive to people’s lives. 
It is a guide to good human conduct and a relentless critic of obtuse and harmful practices. 
But how is the researcher-educator to achieve a state of mind that is open and questioning, 
lively and imaginative, alert to new possibilities and ideas, whilst, predating on 
assumptions and stereotypes? Condensing complex philosophical arguments so that they 
remain clear and explanatory, true to the author’s own argument, is a scholarly endeavour 
demanding honest application and intellectual rigour. Undertaking a PhD is a critical 
facilitator in this process, but it is just the start. 
 
My research has also been about stepping behind the Veil, piercing it sometimes, to try and 
see the problem clearly and to expose my own ignorance and prejudices. The fascinating 
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and revealing aspect of the inter-disciplinary approach of this thesis is that there are clear 
lines of convergence on what it means to be a sex, to be a woman, to have supposed innate 
capacity and a defined moral character, to have and react to emotions, one’s own and those 
of others. Subverting these lines so that they converge in some original way is challenging. 
One has to be willing to expose one’s mind to difficult and unsettling ideas, to stretch the 
imagination to see problems with discernment and good judgement, to be able to dream 
what one cannot yet see. I also realise that controversial arguments of the kind I have made 
in my thesis will be difficult for many to accept, but it is not the job of a researcher to shy 
away from what might be mocked as ridiculous. It is easier to gaze upon false suns. I agree 
with Proust that sound ideas do transmit their force, even surprising, unsettling ones, if the 
idea has merit and contains the grains of truth. 
 
With its share of the universal value of all mind, it [the idea] takes root among 
other adjacent ideas, growing like a graft even in the mind of someone whose own 
idea it rebuts; and this latter person, drawing some advantage from the new 
juxtaposition, may round the idea out or adapt it… But the ideas which leave no 
possibility of a rejoinder are those which are not properly speaking ideas, those 
which, by being supported by nothing, find nothing to attach to in the other’s 
mind: on one side, no brotherly branch is held out, and on the other, there is 
nothing but a vacuum. (2003/2:137). 
 
I have learned too, paraphrasing Mill (2006), that originality can only be attained by minds 
which have undergone elaborate discipline and are deeply versed in the results of previous 
thinking. What I have learned most of all, is that subjecting the intellect to imagination and 
examination, exposing it to seminal works is ‘… so nourishing, so beneficent, that I have 
all the immobility, gravity and placid gluttony of an infant on the breast’ (Proust, 2003/2: 
247).  
 
One of the roles of moral philosophy, and an important role of the researcher, is to be 
‘critical, attentive and responsive to particularity while committed to explanation’ 
(Nussbaum, 1990:239) in order to arrive at an ethical form of criticism. As we move 
through one work to another, moving through the concepts, through the ideas, following 
one thread to link it with another, we entwine these to create discernibly new concepts, and 
to view old problems in a new light. It has become even clearer to me that cultivating a 
healthy emotional landscape is crucial to social justice, to wellbeing and functioning. And 
from this I claim that education must play a role in the cultivation of social justice by 
enabling every individual to flourish and to live a life worth living, a life of dignity. As I 
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close this thesis, I am more than ever convinced that emotions have a significant role to 
play in education and that they deserve and demand greater scrutiny and attention. 
 
 
7.7 The Last Word … For the Moment.  
My favourite book, like, is The Lion, the witch and the wardrobe. I got it from the 
library and read it in class. Why? Cos I wanted a wardrobe that took me to 
another world, ken? It was just so magical. When the teachers were nippin’ me, 
or ma dad and mum were at it, sometimes I’d disappear into Narnia.  
Edmund was an idiot, really got up himsel’. He disnae believe Lucy that there is 
this other world and just take the mince o’ her. Typical, eh? Thinks she stupid and 
a daft lassie but she proves him wrong, like. But he gets nasty, thinkin’ he can do 
what he likes cos he’s got the Queen supportin’ him so he betrays his bre’hers 
and sister for lumps o’ Turkish Delight. He e’in lands the faun in it! Cos the faun 
takes pity on Lucy and disnae hand her over tae the Queen, he’s turned tae stane. 
Power’s gone to his heid! I’d like to turn ma dad to stane, that’d shut him up. 
Could gie him a smashin’ for a change! 
Aye she’s wicked like, has a lot o’ power. Wants to hold ontae it. Frozen she is, no 
feelin’ just what she wants, so it’s winter o’ the time. Imagine? A could gie ma 
dad some Turkish Delight and get him tae dae my mum’s bidding. I dinnae like 
the wolf, naw, he just does what he’s told and hunts people for the Queen so she 
can freeze them. Aye, it’s usually the other way aboot…no women wi’ power, its 
men, but ma teacher told me it was tae dae wi men being feart o’ women.  
I cried when they trapped Aslan. I loved him. He was so big, kind, so dead nice, 
how could they kill him? But they knew he was guid345 like, and he wanted to end 
her evil power. But he’s resurrected. Ma teacher told me he’s like Christ, died fur 
Edmund cos he was sorry for what he did. A wouldnae hae. I liked him cos he 
liked kids, wouldnae dae them no harm. He was wise, so guid, I wanted to ride on 
his back, bury ma fis in his mane…aye I wanted tae be protected by him. Funny, a 
imagine ma mum being sweet and protectin’, like Aslan, an’ ma dad. But they’re 
no. 
I’d like to be Aslan. No likely though. He’s got power, a’ve nane. He’s so 
compassionate. 
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